The Dissertation Committee for Alexander Havemeyer Catlin Certifies that this is the approved version of the following dissertation:

The Elucidation of Poetry:

A Translation of Chapters One through Six of

Mammaṭa's *Kāvyaprakāśa*

With Comments and Notes

Committee:

____

Stephen Phillips, Supervisor

____

Nicholas Asher

____

Joel Brereton

____

Robert Hankinson

____

Kathleen Higgins

____

Robert Solomon

The Elucidation of Poetry:

A Translation of Chapters One through Six of

Mammaṭa's *Kāvyaprakāśa*

With Comments and Notes

by

Alexander Havemeyer Catlin, D.E.U.G.; B.A.; M.A.

Dissertation

Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of

the University of Texas as Austin

in Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements

for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

The University of Texas at Austin

December 2005

Acknowledgements

Dr. Stephen Phillips has been a constant source of support and inspiration for this work. He helped with literally every stage of the project, from the research that led to the selection of the topic through the final day. During these long years he as always been ready to inspire, direct, suggest improvements, and provide moral support. It is a rare student who finds a mentor so generous with his time and energy. Thank you, Stephen, you were all a supervisor should be, and much more.

I have also been fortunate to receive the support of my family, through good times and bad. Thanks especially to my nieces, whose innocent love has been a great source of hope and strength for me.

Conor Roddy offered support, camaraderie, and inspiration. I am lucky to have such a friend. All the members of my committee offered assistance at key times. Many other friends have helped throughout the years: Ed Allaire, Jill Glenn, Tami Wright, John Garcia, George Dickey, and Ellen Briggs merit special thanks.

Thanks finally to Connie Rochelle, whose love gave me motivation and whose support gave me the strength to finish. I know we will accomplish great things together. I am looking forward to helping you with your dissertation!

The Elucidation of Poetry:

A Translation of Chapters One through Six of

Mammaṭa's *Kāvyaprakāśa*

With Comments and Notes

Publication No._________

Alexander Havemeyer Catlin, Ph.D.
The University of Texas ay Austin, 2005

Supervisor: Stephen Phillips

Mammaṭa's *Kāvyaprakāśa* is an eleventh-century Sanskrit work on poetics that synthesizes two earlier schools of poetics: the Alaṅkāra School (the School of Poetic Ornamentation) and the Dhvani School (the School of Suggestion). The first six chapters establish the method of synthesis and explain the position of the Dhvani School. Jyatsna Mohan's edition of the *Kāvyaprakāśa* (Nag Publishers, 1995) is transliterated, edited, and translated from Sanskrit into English.

The dissertation's introduction places the work in conceptual, artistic, and historical context. Here a new theory about the nature and importance of Mammaṭa's theoretic synthesis is advanced. It is argued that Mammaṭa was aware of the tensions between the two schools and sought to create a system of poetics that could incorporate the theoretical and critical tools of both.

Explanatory comments are added to make the work more accessible and to clarify philosophic difficulties. Additional comments seek to show how the poetic examples serve to illustrate theses of the larger philosophic discussion.

Contents

Introduction

1. Mammaṭa and the Elucidation of Poetry (*Kāvyaprakāśa*)

1.1 Mammaṭa. We know little of Mammaṭa's life. Three facts establish that he wrote after 1000 CE. First, Mammaṭa quotes a poem that eulogizes King Bhoja of Dhara, whose reign extended from approximately 1005 to 1054. Second, he quotes Abhinavagupta, whose dated works are from 990, 992, and 1012.[1] Third, Mammaṭa draws four stanzas from Padmagupta's *Navasāhasankacarita*, which is commonly dated circa 1020.[2] Two further facts establish that he wrote before 1150. First, Mammaṭa is quoted in Ruyyaka's *Alaṅkārasarvasva*, which is thought to have been written between 1135 and 1155.[3] Second, there is a dated commentary on the *Kāvyaprakāśa* that dates from 1159-1160.[4] Arguing from these facts, the scholarly consensus dates the *Kāvyaprakāśa* to the middle or end of the eleventh century.[5] The form of his name, his reference to King Bhoja, and his familiarity with Abhinavagupta's work suggest that he

[1] Ingalls, et al. (1990:32).
[2] Gajendragadkar (1939:11).
[3] Gajendragadkar claims this is the same Ruyyaka who wrote the *Samketa* commentary on the *Kāvyaprakāśa* (1939:11).
[4] Mohan (1995:xxviii).
[5] De (1960:145-148) and Kane (1961:273-275). Interested reader should refer to these works for the arguments supporting these dates.

hailed from Kashmir.[6] Apart from the *Kāvyaprakāśa,* there is the only one extant work attributed to Mammaṭa, the *Śabdavyaparavicara*. However, there are references to a lost work, the *Samgitaratnamāli.*[7]

Rājānakānanda, a 16th century commentator, claims that Mammaṭa was a *Śaiva*.[8] Nothing in Mammaṭa's extant work corroborates this claim. In his introductory verse, Mammaṭa praises Sarasvatī, the goddess of speech and poetry. This has been used to suggest that Mammaṭa was a *Sārsvata Brāhmana*.[9]

There is evidence, beginning with a manuscript dated 1159-1160, that part of the *Kāvyaprakāśa* was written by a certain Alaka or Allaṭa, about whom nothing else is known.[10] As there is no certainty about whether and in which parts Mammaṭa was "helped" (only the 10th chapter? also the 7th? the *vṛtti*? the whole work?), no philological or interpretative thesis can be reasonably based on double authorship. Like the scholarly mainstream, I speak of Mammaṭa as the sole author of the *Kāvyaprakāśa*.

1.2 The Text of the *Kāvyaprakāśa*. Like many late influential Sanskrit works, there is little variation among the manuscripts. The earliest manuscript known dates from 1159-1160.[11] Unfortunately, a true critical edition of the text has not been made. However, the Mohan edition, though lacking scholarly apparatus, includes seventeen commentaries and

---

[6] Gajendragadkar (1939:9-10).
[7] Gajendragadkar (1939:10).
[8] Gajendragadkar (1939:9).
[9] Gajendragadkar (1939:9).
[10] Gajendragadkar gives the most extensive treatment of this issue (1939:18-24). He concludes that the theory of double authorship is based on a mistake.
[11] De (1960:145) and Kane (1961:274).

is free from major errors. I have romanized this edition and made a list of corrections. The errors in Mohan's edition are mostly typos. All the corrections were confirmed in other editions and few of them seriously affect the meaning.

2. Conceptual Introduction

Before turning to Mammaṭa's role in the history of Sanskrit criticism, I would like to introduce some of his principle conceptual tools. I hope to provide primarily non-specialists with an overview of the topics they will encounter in Sanskrit poetics, and, more specifically, in Mammaṭa. Many of the topics I introduce here are examined in greater detail either in the following sections of the introduction or in my comments on the individual theoretical verses (*kārikās*).

2.1 Definition of Poetry and Poetic Ornaments. I will often refer to two traditions of poetics that Mammaṭa attempts to synthesize. In the first chapter, he lays the conceptual foundation for his synthesis while discussing his definition of poetry. Early Sanskrit poetics conceives poetry in formal terms. Broadly speaking, the early critics strive to define poetry in terms of syntactic or linguistic features. They agree that all poetry contains some striking element that sets it off from non-poetic writing. Later, the Dhvani School shifts the emphasis of poetics from form to content. Its proponents believe poetic discourse to be characterized by a dominance of suggested meaning. They claim that

suggested meaning is the soul of poetry and strive to make the semantics of suggestion an objective science.

Mammaṭa's conception of poetry attempts to synthesize the two approaches. He insists that poetry must be defined formally. He defines poetry is meaningful speech that has poetic excellences, avoids poetic faults, and can be decorated by poetic ornaments. To this definition he adds that the quality of a poem is determined by the intensity of its suggested content; the more intense, the better the poem. By means of this integration, he avoids the formalism of the early poetics on the one hand and the overly inclusive emotive theory of the *Dhvani* School on the other. This conceptual synthesis is Mammaṭa's most original contribution to Sanskrit poetics. Indeed, I will attempt to show that it structures his entire investigation and through his influence gives shape to late Sanskrit poetics. Let us examine the terms of his definition.

Despite their differences, the early critics all realize that there is something stylistically distinct about poetry. To emphasize its difference from normal discourse (*svabhāvokti*), they speak of poetry as "deviant speech" (*vakrokti*), "excellent speech" (*atiśayokti*), and "super-mundane speech" (*lokottarokti*). All these expressions point to the idea that poetry is distinguished by its mode of expression, not its content. The most important of these expressions, "deviant speech," suggests that the early critics believe that the difficulty of poetry contributes to its aesthetic value.

Many of the poetic features the early poetics investigate are grouped together under the heading "poetic ornaments" (*alaṅkāra*). These are of such importance to the

early critics that the study of poetics (*alaṅkāraśāstra*) came to be named after them. Critics divide ornaments into verbal ornaments and semantic ornaments. Verbal ornaments include difficult meters, rhyme, alliteration, onomatopoeia, etc. Mammaṭa also classifies punning (*śleṣa*) as an ornament verbal ornament because the effect depends on a particularity of the word (the fact that it has two meanings). Generally, any ornament that loses its force when the word is replaced by a synonym is a considered a verbal ornament. Sanskrit poetics also categorizes over one hundred semantic ornaments, including many types of metaphor and simile, as well as hyperbole, synecdoche, zeugma, and others. For the early theorist, these ornaments do not decorate poetry, they decorate speech and thereby turn it into poetry.

The primacy of the structural elements is especially clear in the eighth century critic Vāmana, the first critic to speak not only of the body of poetry (word and sense), but also of its soul. He claims that style (*rīti*) is the soul of poetry and that the styles are grounded in particular arrangements of words (*viśiṣṭapadaracanā*).[12] Styles are differentiated by the presence or absence of poetic virtues or excellences (*guṇa*), such as compactness of word structure (*ojas*), smooth word coalescence (*śleṣa*), and absence of long compounds (*mādhurya*).[13] We have seen that Mammaṭa integrates the concept of poetic excellences in his definition.

The early critics also identified several poetic faults (*doṣa*) that can mar or destroy a poem. Mammaṭa agrees that poetry should be free from faults. Faults include technical

---

[12] De (1960:2:90).
[13] De (1960:2:94-95).

errors in grammar, logic, and meter, as well as stylistic errors such as inappropriateness, harshness in sound, and errors that unexpectedly arise when certain words are combined (unintentional puns, etc.).

The early critics could not turn to meter as a distinguishing feature of poetry because not all Indian poetry is metrical and metrical verse is not confined to poetry in Sanskrit literature. Prominent religious, philosophical, and scientific works share this form. Metrics is viewed as a separate science closely allied with grammar. However, poetics does treat the artistic value of certain meters. Rhyme is rarely used in Sanskrit poetry. It is discussed by the late critics, perhaps because of the increasing popularity of rhymed verse in the vernacular languages after the tenth century. But it is never considered a candidate for poetry’s defining feature.

The *Dhvani* School claims that suggestion of *rasa* is the soul of poetry. We will return to the very important concept of *rasa* presently. Here it is enough to notice that the *Dhvani* School defines poetry as emotionally evocative speech. The theorists observe that there are poems that contain no ornaments, while all good poetry moves its audience. The *Dhvani* philosophers are particularly troubled by the many examples of pure technical virtuosity in Sanskrit poetry that seem to involve no suggestion. They conclude that despite appearances, even these poems must be suggestive to be considered poetry.

Mammaṭa is the first critic to separate clearly the issue of poetic quality from that of its essence. As we saw, he defines poetry as meaningful speech that contains formal excellences and is free from faults. The *Dhvani* School raises strong objections to the

claim that the ornaments define poetry, and Mammaṭa agrees that ornaments are optional. With the formal definition in place, Mammaṭa asserts that the prominence or strikingness of the suggested content determines a poem's worth. We will return to this issue in our discussion of *rasa*. But let us note here that Mammaṭa attempts to resolve the problem posed by poems of technical virtuosity. Formally, such poems are indeed poems. However, their lack of emotive content makes them bad poems. In this regard, Mammaṭa's system captures the taste of his period perfectly.

The Indian critics, however, are not content with definitions and descriptive classifications of the formal elements found in poetry; they also want to understand how poems convey information. Let us turn to this issue.

2.2 Semantic Powers. All classical Indian theorists hold that words, whether singly or in sentences, are capable of conveying meaning in a number of ways. While Indian philosophy of language addresses a broad range of topics, poetic theorists focus primarily on two: In how many ways can words convey meaning? And how does each way function? The various ways a word conveys meaning are called "semantic powers," and Mammaṭa, like most late critics, believes there are three such powers.

A first semantic power is denotation (*abhidhā*). Although almost all Indian theorists accept denotation, how it functions is hotly debated.[14] Perhaps because the

[14] I say "almost all" to except the Buddhist "exclusion" (*apoha*) theory, which is important in classical Indian philosophy as a whole, but not in poetics.

emphasis in poetry is on suggestion, Mammaṭa takes a fairly non-committal view of denotation. In chapter two, he claims that by means of social conventions certain words come to refer to certain types of objects. He leaves open the question whether words have this power singly or only when combined into sentences. Furthermore, he makes no explicit claims concerning the ontological status of the various types of referent, although he seems to believe that denotative words primarily refer to physical objects and facts. Finally, he seems to believe that truth lies in correspondence, but gives no account of the relation between the truth-bearer and truth-maker.

Mammaṭa deals with two Mīmāṃsaka theories that purport to explain how individual words combine to make a sentence, the Bhāṭṭa's "relation-of-the-designated" theory and Prabhākara's "designation-of-the-already-related" theory. We will examine the details of these views in chapters two (*kārikā* 6) and five (in the defense of suggestion). There is an important rival theory of sentence meaning, Bhartṛhari's *sphoṭa* theory. Mammaṭa, however, does not discuss it. Sentence meaning is important in Mammaṭa's theory of suggestion. However, Mammaṭa feels that he theory works equally well on either Mīmāṃsaka theory.

There are three main factors govern the combining of words into sentences: syntactic expectancy (*ākāṅkṣā*), semantic fittingness (*yogyatā*), and contiguous pronunciation (*saṃnidhi*). We will examine these in the next section: metaphoric indication.

A second semantic power is commonly called metaphoric indication (*lakṣaṇā*). Like denotation, metaphoric indication is almost universally accepted in Indian philosophy of language. This power comes into play only when the denoted meaning does not mesh with the broader semantic context. This "blocking" of the literal meaning allows the speaker to communicate secondary meaning related to the denoted meaning. For example, if we say of a man that he spends all his time chasing skirt, the literal meaning of the word "skirt" is blocked for two reasons. First, skirts, being inanimate, are not the sort of thing that can literally be chased. Second, even if one could imagine a context were skirts could be chased, such a context does not fit into our broader knowledge of the man in question. Rather, the literal meaning is blocked and the word comes to refer to those who commonly wear skirts, i.e., women (whether they are actually wearing skirts or not). Again, when we say of a boxer that he is a real tiger, the literal meaning is blocked by the fact that a human cannot literally be a tiger. In this case we mean that the man shares qualities with the animal, e.g., speed, strength, and ferocity. The most common Sanskrit example is the sentence, "The village is on the Ganges." The use of the locative case in Sanskrit, more so than the preposition "on" in English, makes it appears that the village is actually located on top of the river. As villages were not built on top of rivers in ancient India, the literal meaning is blocked and a secondary meaning is understood, namely that the village is on the bank of the Ganges. The relation between the primary and secondary meaning in this case is said to be proximity.

Indian philosophy of language attempt to catalogue the different ways this semantic power operates, focusing on how the literal meaning is blocked, how other possible meanings are generated, and how one of the possible meanings is selected. Let us take these up in turn.

There is blocking of the normal process of denotation when the individual words that make up a sentence cannot be combined into a meaningful unit. Three main factors govern the combining of words into sentences. First, the individual words of a sentence are expected to combine into a syntactic whole (*ākāṅkṣā*). Minimally, a sentence must contain a subject and a verb. Depending on verb and the context, other words may be required. Second, the meanings of the words are expected to combine into a meaningful whole according to the principle of semantic fittingness (*yogyatā*). The classic example of a sentence that fails this condition is "He wets with fire" (*siñcati agninā*), although "The village is on the Ganges" is another. Third, the words have to be perceived contiguously in a reasonable span of time (*saṃnidhi*). Only failure of the first two conditions can be overcome by metaphoric indication. Words create both syntactic and semantic expectations, which, when frustrated forcing the hearer to search for an alternate meaning for one or more of them. The ways in which there can be such frustration are numerous.

Two types of metaphor occur even when the denotations of the words do combine into a meaningful whole. The first occurs when the resultant sentence does not fit the larger semantic context. Here the concept of semantic fittingness (*yogyatā*) is expanded

to operate on semantic units above the sentence level. The second occurs when the resultant sentence is ambiguous. In this case theorists resort to the speaker's intended meaning (*tātparya*) to disambiguate. This is especially important when part of a group is metaphorically used to indicate the entire group. For example, "The king is leaving," used to mean that the entire royal entourage is leaving.

When investigating how one generates possible alternative meanings, special attention is paid to the types of relations that can exist between primary and secondary meanings. Metaphors are divided into those based on similarity (*gauṇī lakṣaṇā*) and those based on other relations (*śuddhā lakṣaṇā*). The similarity relation is seen to be particularly important and is analyzed into similarity of location, similarity of purpose, similarity of appearance, and so on. The *Nyāyasūtra* lists ten other types of relations that can ground metaphoric indication, including such relations as part-whole, cause-effect, and means-end.[15]

If more than one alternative meaning is possible, the hearer must determine which is intended by the speaker. This is done be attempting to determine what purpose the metaphor serves. By examining details of the context, the speaker's goals, and, in poetry, the constraints and expectations of the genre, the hearer eliminates unlikely options. If there are still several options, especially in poetry, the reader should consider possible relations between these and attempt to determine if the ambiguity is intentional.

[15] *Nyāyasūtra* 2.2.62.

Mammaṭa shows particular sensitivity to poems that use intentionally ambiguous suggestive metaphors in chapter five.

Metaphoric indication is of special interest to critics of poetry for two reasons. On the one hand, critics focus on the aesthetic value of this method of communicating. As we saw, they classify many types of metaphor, synecdoche, hyperbole, etc. Even when the same meaning can be communicated by denotation, they believe that these poetic ornaments either comprise or augment the beauty of a poem. Mammaṭa is also aware that figurative speech slows the reader down and potentially making her more sensitive to the texture of the words and the resonances of meaning.

On the other hand, critics notice that metaphoric indication not only serves to decorate a verse, but almost always to suggest a further meaning.[16] For example, the synecdoche we just examined (chasing skirt) could be used to suggest that the man is only interested in women sexually. Likewise, the metaphoric use of the locative in the sentnece, “The village is on the Ganges,” is said to suggest that the village shares the coolness and purity of the holy river. This leads us to the third semantic power, suggestion.

Suggestion (*dhvani*) is the most controversial semantic power. Although the term has its roots in descriptions of ritual practice, critics of poetry, including Mammaṭa, use it to describe the semantic function that conveys a meaning, especially an emotive meaning, which cannot be explained by means of the other two semantic powers. This negative

[16] Indian philosophers are aware of dead metaphors. Mammaṭa discusses them in chapter two.

definition leads many schools of Indian philosophy to deny the existence of suggestion as a semantic power. To explain poetic suggestion, the critics attempt to adapt the explanation of how a dramatic spectacle suggests its *rasa* or mood. The adapted theory, however, does not prove adequate to the new medium and the critics do not provide an alternative (more on this in the section on *rasa*). In line with Ānandavardhana, Mammaṭa and the other defenders of suggestion admit that they cannot fully explain how it works.

Instead, the defenders of suggestion call attention to semantic phenomena that cannot be explained by the other semantic powers. These range from the connotation of a single word, thru the allusions of a sentence, to the evocation of an emotion or mood by an artwork as a whole. We have already seen an example of the connotation of a single word ("skirt" and "Ganges") in connection with metaphoric indication. Mammaṭa, while setting out his system, provides us with many more. Let us first examine Mammaṭa's presentation of suggestion and then turn to his defense of it against objections raised by other schools.

In chapter three, Mammaṭa lists various factors that can bring about suggestion of additional meaning. He then clarifies the nature of suggestion by means of the classificatory system and almost one hundred poetic examples that comprise chapter four. For each poem he points out why denotation and metaphorical indication cannot account for the total meaning. Although indirect in nature, Mammaṭa's demonstration is imposing. He makes the reader aware of vast quantities of semantic content any rival eliminative theory would have to explain.

Mammaṭa follows the tradition, which divides suggestion according to what is suggested. The first level of division is comprised of three groups: suggestion of facts (*vastu*), suggestion of poetic ornaments, and suggestion of emotive content (*rasa* and emotions). It is striking how disparate these three types are. We will look at each in turn. We have already encountered a metaphoric expression that suggests a fact: "The village is on the Ganges." This sentence suggests that the village is cool and pure. In this case, the additional semantic content communicated by this type of suggestion could be communicated literally. In cases such as this, suggestion adds to the beauty of the expression. However, sometimes a poem suggests several mutually incompatible facts. In this case the resultant ambiguity can be an integral and non-reducible part of the poem's aesthetic value (see poem 8, for example).

When the literal meaning suggests an ornament this also enriches the non-emotive semantic content. Consider poem 57, for example:

> Honor the trident god's artistic prowess!
> Even without color or canvas,
> He paints the wondrous world.

The poet uses a comparison to suggest the poetic ornament of "distinction" *(vyatireka)*. Śiva, the trident god, is compared to an artist, but the comparison does not hold: no artist can paint without medium (colors) or support (canvas). The literal meaning makes a comparison, but the suggestion is that Śiva's mode of creation is incomparably superior. Although in this case one can paraphrase the additional meaning, this is not always the case. Several incompatible ornaments can be suggested, as in poem 65.

Mammaṭa believes that literary works can be described objectively as erotic, heroic, etc. He asserts that neither the denoted nor metaphorically indicated meaning can convey the information necessary to ground such statements. Mammaṭa gives three reasons in support of the claim that a piece of literature does not communicate its *rasa* by denotation. First, many pieces of literature do not state their *rasa*. Second, merely denoting the *rasa* does not insure that the audience experiences it aesthetically. Finally, a single *rasa* is often communicated by the piece as a whole, and denotation does not normally work this way. Mammaṭa assumes that if a piece of information is denoted, we ought to be able to indicate where and explain how. Neither of these expectations holds for suggestion of *rasa*. As we will see in the section on *rasa*, the suggested emotive content of a poem is not limited to the *rasas*. This type of suggestion can also evoke the full gamut of human emotions.

In the second half of chapter five, Mammaṭa attempts to defend suggestion against objections raised by various philosophic schools. The largely negative nature of Mammaṭa's justification of suggestion leaves it vulnerable to alternative theories. The most powerful alternative comes from the Naiyāyikas, who urge that the first two semantic powers, along with world-knowledge and inference, are sufficient to explain verbal knowledge. Although established before Ānandavardhana, this theory is most forcefully set out by Mammaṭa's contemporary, Mahimabhaṭṭa.[17]

---

[17] Despite the fact that they both probably hailed from Kashmir, there is no evidence that Mammaṭa and Mahimabhaṭṭa knew each other.

Mahimabhaṭṭa argues that any additional meaning "suggested" by a poem can be deduced from the literal meaning by means of the ordinary process of inference. Inference is based on the inference grounding-pervasion (*vyāpti*) by the property to be proved (*sādhya*) of the prover property (*sādhana*) and the presence of the prover in the inferential subject (*pakṣa*).[18] The inferential subject in the case of poetry is a certain verse, the prover property is "having a certain literal meaning," the property to be proved is, "having the desired additional meaning." Mahimabhaṭṭa argues that the pervasion can be established by non-cognition (*anupalabdhi*) of the suggested meaning in the absence of the literal meaning, identity (*tādātmya*) of the words that communicate the two meanings, and causation (*tadutpatti*) of the additional meaning by the literal meaning.[19]

Mammaṭa, in his reply, shows that the inferential process, as spelled out by the Nyāya philosophy, cannot account for the suggested meaning. He does this by pointing out that in many poems the "prover property" is not invariably concomitant with the "property to be proved."[20] He claims if you move a phrase from a poem into another linguistic context, the same "prover property" (the literal meaning) might exist without "the property to be proved" (the suggested meaning), or might be linked with a different property (an alternative suggested meaning). Mammaṭa does not avail himself of the fact that many suggestions depend on the exact wording of the poem, not on its literal meaning. These poems could be rewritten without changing their literal meaning in a

[18] Phillips (2002:8-12).
[19] De (1960:2:197).
[20] Mammaṭa is summarizing the arguments found in the *Dhanyāloka* 1.4b and Abhinava's comments thereon.

manner that would strip them of their suggestiveness. These poems clearly show that the literal meaning does not always imply the suggested.

Mammaṭa adds a second critique. Not only are the "prover quality" and "quality to be proved" not invariably linked in poetry, they sometimes contradict each other. Consider poem 2, for example;

> O false messenger!
> You know not the pain you bring.
> The sandal paste is washed clean off your rounded breasts,
> And the rouge from your lips is completely rubbed off.
> Gone is the makeup from the corners of your eyes,
> And your slender body still shakes.
> So you went for a bath in the tank,
> And not to be with that wretch?

The poem affirms that the young woman has gone to bathe, but its suggested meaning is that she has gone to make love and not to bathe. Here the supposed prover proves its own negation; clearly not a desirable outcome. The same might be said for poem 57, which we just examined, where the literal comparison suggests that the objects are incomparable.

Mammaṭa also discusses poems that suggest several mutually incompatible meanings and leave the reader in an intentional state of doubt as to which is intended (see poem 111, for example). Mammaṭa claims that part of the aesthetic pleasure of these poems is the unresolved ambiguity. The Naiyāyikas would be hard pressed to explain how this is possible within their system of inference.

Although the defenders of suggestion do not convince all Naiyāyikas to adopt it, at least one famous late Naiyāyika, Jagannātha, did. Furthermore, they are generally credited with causing other late Naiyāyikas to expand their conception of "the speakers

intended meaning" (*tātparyajñāna*), which, as we saw above, was introduced primarily to resolve instances of ambiguity.[21] Kunjunni Raja writes, "According to some of the later Naiyāyikas a general knowledge of the meaning intended by the speaker is an essential factor in all cases of verbal comprehension."[22] Indeed, the theory of suggestion and this broad theory of the speaker's intended meaning cover much of the same theoretical territory.

2.3 ***Rasa***. Mammaṭa shows in chapters three and four that there are many types of suggested meaning. Historically, however, suggestion of *rasa* is held to be the most important. Broadly speaking, *rasa* is the mood, tone, or feeling evoked by a piece of literature. *Rasas* are the aesthetic counterparts to certain basic human emotions, called "abiding emotions" in the literature on aesthetics. The nine *rasas* generally accepted are the erotic, the comic, the pathetic, the wrathful, the heroic, the frightful, the disgusting, the wondrous, and the tranquil. The corresponding abiding emotions are sexual desire, mirth, sorrow or grief, anger, heroic energy, fear, disgust, wonder, and world-weariness. As we will see, the relation between the basic emotions and the *rasas* is explained differently at different points in the history of the literature on aesthetics.

Bharata's *Nāṭyaśāstra* contains the oldest extant discussion of *rasa* as an aesthetic concept. "*Rasa*" also means "flavor," and Bharata likens the *rasa* of a dramatic spectacle

[21] Kunjunni Raja (1963:176-178 and 290-292).
[22] Kunjunni Raja (1963:176).

to the flavor of a dish.[23] Just as various foods and spices combine to create the flavor of a certain dish, so the various elements of a drama come together to produce the mood. These elements include the emotions, actions and reactions of the characters, the setting, the plot development, etc. Neither Bharata nor his early commentators discuss the aesthetic response that an artwork provokes. Although present in a theatrical performance, *rasa*, for the early thinkers, is a quality either of the characters in the play or of the actors. Let us look at these two theories.

In the *Abhinavabhāratī,* Lollaṭa, the earliest commentator on Bharata whose work survives, is reported as claiming that a *rasa* is an intensified abiding emotion.[24] The erotic, for example, is an intensified form of sexual desire. The abiding emotion is intensified primarily by the artistic representation of the determinants, symptoms, and auxiliaries (we will return to these below). The *rasa* is chiefly experienced by the character represented, but is also tasted by the representing actor.

I believe that Lollaṭa, like Bharata himself, writes primarily to instruct playwrights and actors. Like Aristotle, his theory explains which elements need to be included in a successful plot. Lollaṭa discusses the story of Rāma's love for Sītā and claims that more than mere sexual desire must be presented. Rāma's fervor needs to be intensified by being developed through out the play. In a good romance, the lovers go through trials, doubts, and frustrations that augment their ardor. The climax leaves the

---

[23] *Nāṭyaśāstra* 6.31. I suspect that this passage is later than the sūtra it is attached to. Part of it is quoted by Lollaṭa (early 9th century), so it must predate him.
[24] Gnoli (1968:26).

viewers with the impression that the couple is deeply in love and that their love will last. Rāma's love, lived over a period of several years, is focused and intensified by being condensed into an artwork.

Rāma's love, however, not only changes in degree, it changes its nature. Lollaṭa is aware that an artistic presentation of a love story is a different type of thing that a real love story. Here we see that from the beginning, *rasa* is understood as the aesthetic counterpart to a real emotion. The actor who presents Rāma's love is filled with the erotic *rasa*, but is not himself in love with either Sītā or the actress playing that role. Some later theorists misunderstand this and claim that the actor would forget his lines if Lollaṭa's theory was correct!

Bharata explains various factors that allow a spectacle to evoke *rasa,* including costumes, sets, music, dance, plot developments and many others. The elements of plot that most interest the poetry critics are the determinants, the symptoms, and the auxiliaries of the emotion. These are best explained by example. Juliet is a "determinant" of Romeo's sexual desire (other determinants include the proper setting and time, i.e., the Capulet garden at night). The symptoms of Romeo's desire include the actions taken for the sake of the beloved, such as climbing garden walls, writing letters, exchanging smiles, etc. Also included are certain behavioral changes like his willingness to risk danger and his desire to befriend Tybalt. Finally, the auxiliaries of Romeo's desire include both secondary emotions, such as the jealously Romeo feels toward Paris, and "involuntary states" that arise from being in love, such as perspiration and trembling.

Bharata sets out guidelines regulating the use of these factors. He explains which symptoms and auxiliaries pertain to each *rasa* and which are antithetical, he advises which factors can be mixed and the result of their mixing, he shows which *rasas* can be introduced in digressions without diminishing the dominant *rasa*, and other such things. Although Bharata's system can seem both mechanical and limiting, it does explain how a dramatic spectacle successfully conveys meaning beyond the literal and metaphoric.

Bharata's is the only aesthetic system that survives from the early period of Indian Aesthetics (pre-sixth century) and it has been adapted to many different art forms. This is not surprising when one remembers how complex both Indian dramatic spectacle and Bharata's text are. In so far as they are important to the production of a dramatic spectacle, Bharata discusses poetry, music, painting, and dance. The more specific Indian theories of both music and painting, as we understand them presently, are both rooted in Bharata's system.[25] When the *Dhvani* School critics looked for inspiration, it seems this was the only place to find it. *Rasa* theory offered two distinct theoretical tools: the theory explained the nature of dramatic emotional expression and how such expression is achieved. The *Dhvani* School attempted to use both.

When *rasa* theory was adapted from dramaturgy to poetics by Ānandavardhana, several changes were necessary. As we will see in the following section, Sanskrit poetics deals primarily with short, self-contained poems. The limited length of the poems forced the critics to reconsider the list of elements that were said by Bharata to produce *rasa*.

---

[25] Almost all modern *rasa* based theories show the strong influence of Abhinava's reworking of Bharata.

Although they retain Bharata's requirement that the determinants, symptoms, and auxiliaries of the emotion must be present, the critics allow that some of the elements may be inferred by the spectator rather than explicitly presented in the artwork. They also realize that a short poem can present only a fraction of the elements that a play can.

More importantly, Bharata's explanation of the mechanics of evoking *rasa* proves too cumbersome for the short verses. Almost without exception, the verses describe a single moment or scene or observation. In this way they are more closely related to painting than drama. There simply is no room in a couplet for the digressions and details that serve to develop and reinforce the *rasa* in drama. When determinant, symptoms, and auxiliaries are presented, they are used to fill in the details of the poetic image, not to advance the plot.

The impossibility of applying the mechanics of theatrical spectacle to short verse leaves the critics without a theoretical explanation for the functioning of suggestion. As we saw in the section on suggestion, this pushes them to attempt a classification of the types of suggestion and to show that the "suggested" meaning cannot be arrived at by means of the traditional semantic powers. They fare better with the other half of *rasa* theory: the explanation of the nature of aesthetically presented emotions.

The critics adopt the idea that the emotions, when evoked by an artwork, undergo a transformation. They model their theory of the poetically evoked emotions on *rasa* theory, but the difference of medium forces them to make important changes. While only a limited number of themes were treated in classical Indian drama, Indian short poems

address almost every aspect of classical Indian life. Bharata's list of eight *rasas* was most probably a list of the *rasas* actually embodied in the plays he knew. Later drama theorists add "tranquility" (*śanta*) to the list, perhaps to account for the dominant mood of the *Mahābhārata* and perhaps because of religious works such as Aśvaghoṣa's long poem (*mahākāvya*), the *Buddhacarita* (first century). In either case, the art seems to have driven the theory. And when confronting a different art form, even this expanded list proves inadequate.

Rudraṭa, a ninth century poetician, argues that any emotion, if developed by determinants, etc., can become a *rasa*.[26] Coupled with the view that the emotions are infinite in number, this leads to the view, attributed to Lollaṭa, that the *rasas* are infinite.[27] Pratīhārendurāja claims that the original list should be maintained for tradition's sake and the other emotions dealt with under different titles.[28] The final great critic, Jagannātha, takes this view to the extreme by claiming that the original system should be retained merely for the sake of convenience.[29]

Mammaṭa seems to follow Pratīhārendurāja. He retains the nine *rasa* limit, but blurs the distinction between the nine abiding emotions (those that can become *rasas*) and other important emotions by grouping them together in one type of suggestion. Several other emotions can be (and actually have been) developed into a full drama, and as such could ground an additional *rasa*. Devotion, family love, and friendship are among

---

[26] Rudraṭa, *Kāvyālaṅkāra* 12:3-4, discussed in Raghavan (1967:127).
[27] In the *Abhinavabhāratī,* vol. 1, 346.
[28] Raghavan (1967:129).
[29] Raghavan (1967:142).

the additional emotions that are considered as possible candidates for a corresponding *rasa*. While they are ultimately denied *rasa* status, Mammaṭa seems to consider them on a par with the abiding emotions of sexual desire, etc. He lists them in the chapter on the best type of poetry, giving excellent poems as examples.

Mammaṭa also recognizes that many less robust emotions that may not be able to ground a classical Indian drama can certainly be suggested in a poem. Indeed, the *Subhāṣitaratnakoṣa*, an anthology of short verse compiled in Mammaṭa's time, shows a great interest in verses that suggest emotions other than the nine that can become *rasa.*[30] Mammaṭa is well aware that the evocative powers of poetic suggestion extend far beyond the nine *rasas*.

Although he includes poems that treat the traditional "pseudo-*rasas*" in the chapter that treats the best type of poetry, it is difficult to determine Mammaṭa's attitude toward them. Indian philosophy resorts to the concept "pseudo" to describe a close imitator of what is being investigated. Items so described ultimately fail to meet the standard, giving the term a strong negative connotation. Thus in logic there are "provers" (*hetus*) which are sufficient to establish the desired inference and "pseudo-provers" (*hetu-ābhāsas*) which appear to be provers but fall short under close scrutiny. Abhinava uses the common example of seeing pseudo-silver that turns out to be mother-of-pearl.[31] This

[30] Ingalls puts its date at "shortly before the year 1100." Mammaṭa is believed to have written in the second half of the eleventh century (see Introduction). Vidyākara includes a whole section on adulterous women and myriad other poems that fail the standards of *rasa*.
[31] Ingalls, et al. (1990:217).

would be an example of pseudo-perception. Likewise in Bharata's drama theory, there are emotions that seem transformable into *rasas*, but fail to do so on closer inspection.

Every example of pseudo-*rasa* I have encountered fails to be a true *rasa* for moral reasons. Raghavan suggests that the category of pseudo-*rasa* was invented to handle Rāvaṇa's illicit passion for Rāma's wife Sītā.[32] Indeed, Abhinava cites an earlier critic who claimed that Rāvaṇa's lust (*laulya*) should be counted as a new *rasa*, with the abiding emotion covetousness (*gardha*).[33] Abhinava rejects this view, claiming instead that until we realize the inappropriateness of a pseudo-*rasa*, we experience it as *rasa*. After the realization, however, our experience changes according to which emotion is portrayed.[34] Mammaṭa's example concerns the pseudo-erotic *rasa* evoked by a woman with several lovers.

Given the differences between a public spectacle and a court poem, it is hard to understand how and why the moral constraints of drama theory should be adopted by poetics. Mammaṭa position on the issue is not clear. The main evidence that Mammaṭa feels that poetry should obey the same moral constraints as drama is his retention of the term "pseudo-*rasa*," which we saw has strong negative connotations. However, he could be using the name merely to identify certain poems. The main evidence for this view is that he includes suggestion of pseudo-*rasa* in the group of poems described as the best

---

[32] Raghavan (1969:125).
[33] *Abhinavabhāratī* (1956:1:342).
[34] Ingalls, et al., (1990:107).

poems. I would like to think that Mammaṭa is aware that the immoral, like the horrible and the frightful, can be aesthetically appreciated.

The difference between the abiding emotions and the other emotions is a key element in Bharata's system. Only the abiding emotions are robust enough to be developed throughout an entire dramatic spectacle. They alone can be elaborated through the presentation of the determinants, symptoms, and auxiliaries. As Abhinava makes clear when attempting to find the abiding emotion for the *rasa* of tranquility, the abiding emotions are primary: the *rasas* are merely their aesthetic counterparts. When the brevity of the Sanskrit poems made it impossible to use Bharata's mechanics of *rasa* in poetics, the main justification for distinguishing the abiding emotions is lost.[35] While drama theorists need to be certain an emotion is stable enough to ground a play, poetics has no such concern. No emotion is too fleeting to ground a poem. If it is admitted that the distinction between the abiding emotions and the other emotions is not relevant to poetic beauty, the elevated status of the nine *rasas* is seriously threatened.

The logical conclusion for poetics was drawn by Lollaṭa: the number of *rasas* should be considered infinite. In other words, each emotion should have an aesthetic correlate. This move would have greatly facilitated criticism. However, the fact that the distinction between the stable emotions and the other emotions is still important to drama theory militates again this move. Unfortunately, no other way to express the fact that all

[35] Abhinava puts forth two additional arguments for the distinction in the *Abhinavabhāratī* (1956:665-667). First, only the abiding emotions do not depend on the object that produces them, being innate, and second, all the other emotions presuppose at least one abiding emotion. Neither argument seem convincing to me.

emotions can be appreciated aesthetically is found. With the exception of the nine abiding emotions, Indian theorists, Mammaṭa included, simply call emotions suggested in poetry and emotions lived in the world by the same name. While Mammaṭa's broad appreciation of poetry is shown throughout chapter four, he never discusses the relative poetic merit of the stable emotions and the other emotions. If I am correct in thinking that the abiding emotions lose their primacy, this is never explicitly stated.

The ninth and tenth century critics not only reworks and expands Bharata's theory of the nine *rasas* to better analyze poetry, they also add a whole new orientation to aesthetic theory. When the early dramaturges discuss *rasa*, they focus primarily on how to create a play that evokes *rasa*. The poetic critics too are interested in showing how to create *rasa* rich artwork. However, they increasing consider the psychology of the aesthetic experience as well.

The *Dhvani* School, striving to understand the psychology of audience response, develops a sophisticated theory that centers on the aesthetic universalisation of the emotions. R*asa* is no longer considered an object to be enjoyed, but as the ongoing process of aesthetic enjoyment itself. This view, which can be usefully compared to T.S. Eliot's theory of the universal correlate, became the orthodox for later writers. Let us examine it in greater detail.

Several key elements of the *Dhvani* School theory were worked out by the ninth century critic Śaṅkuka. He claims that *rasa* is not a heightened form of an emotion, but rather an artistic reproduction of the emotion. For Śaṅkuka, sexual desire exists in the

world, while the erotic *rasa* arises from its reproduction in art. The aesthetic experience arises in one who is trained to appreciate art by means of the perception of an artistic imitation. The *rasa* is located in the play, and not, contra Lollaṭa, in the actors. The actor makes manifest the play's *rasa* through his skill in imitating the emotions of the characters.

Śaṅkuka notices that the audience perception of the *rasa* comes about by means of a cognitive process that is unique to art. He says that in aesthetic experience, "there is neither doubt, nor truth, nor error. The notion that appears is, 'This is that,' not, 'This is really that.'"[36] In aesthetic perception, in other words, there is "willing suspension of disbelief" that allows the audience to fully engage in the production in a manner distinct from normal experience.

Another important pre-Abhinava critic, Bhaṭṭanāyaka, builds on Śaṅkuka's theory. He believes that the abiding emotions, determinants, symptoms, and auxiliary states were universalized by a special power of words.[37] The universalization process of artistic production transforms a particular emotion and the events surrounding it into a general emotion free of context. The audience can appreciate these general elements without personal attachment. We can see that this view is much more radical than Śaṅkuka's. The audience is not "disinterested" simply because they understand that art, as imitation, is different from reality and engage with it accordingly. Bhaṭṭanāyaka's view

---

[36] Gnoli (1968:32).
[37] Gnoli (1968:45).

undermines the very idea of art as imitation. He sees art as universalizing, not imitating, reality. His view of what is enjoyed in an artist production is correspondingly novel.

Ingalls writes that Bhaṭṭanāyaka "sees *rasa* not as an object to be enjoyed, but as the ongoing process of (aesthetic) enjoyment itself."[38] *Rasa* is no longer thought of as in a play, much less in the actors or characters, but in the experience of an artistic production. *Rasa*, in other words, is a process, not an entity or quality.

The process of enjoyment is causally dependant on the artwork enjoyed and yet experientially free of it. Abhinava represents him as saying, "is due to the emergent state of goodness (*sattva*), is pervaded by beatitude (*ānanda*) and light (*prakāśa*), and is similar to the tasting (*āsvāda*) of the supreme *brahman*."[39] We can see that once the artwork gives rise to the *rasa* experience, it is left behind. The experience itself is of bliss and light alone unqualified by the details of the artwork. It is the transcendent nature of the experience that invites comparison to mystical experience.

Abhinava refines Bhaṭṭanāyaka's theory and his version that becomes the touchstone for the Indian tradition, a place it continues to hold today. He accepts the theory of universalization, both of the determinants, etc., and of the abiding emotion. He maintains that the universalized emotion must be perceived, not inferred, by the individual spectator. He provides three conditions that the spectator must meet to be fit for the *rasa* experience: he must be trained in the arts, he must be in a state of willing suspense of disbelief, and he must be disinterested to the point of self-forgetting. These

[38] Ingalls, et al. (1990:37).
[39] Gnoli (1968:47-48).

conditions are necessary to enter the state of sympathetic union that Abhinava describes. He further agrees that *rasa* is an experience, not an object, affirming that *rasa* exists only in the spectator.

Abhinava also agrees that the *rasa* experience is akin to the mystic union with Brahman. However, he differentiates the aesthetic from the yogic by insisting that the aesthetic experience has an object, namely the artwork. This is very important, for it provides Abhinava a way of avoiding Bhaṭṭanāyaka's homogenizing of aesthetic experience.

Abhinava's condition that the spectator be cultured underpins his claim that the *rasa* experience produced by a certain work is always of the same type. While some connoisseurs are more receptive than others, they are all receptive in the same way to the same thing. As is clear from the disinterested requirement, if any personal eccentricities enter into the aesthetic experience, they act to limit or destroy it. The *rasa* can only be evoked in a learned connoisseur that is capable of aesthetic distance.

3. Sanskrit Poetry

The following brief introduction to Sanskrit poetry is specifically intended to help the non-specialist understand Mammaṭa's examples. The earliest identified poems encountered in the *Kāvyaprakāśa* are excerpted from the two great epics, the *Mahābhārata* and the *Rāmāyaṇa*. The *Mahābhārata* is, "gigantic, comprising a length of about seven times that of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* combined… [It] narrates the story of

two rival groups of cousins both laying claim to the succession in a region somewhere near present-day Delhi, and the war that ensues."[40] The core story dates from approximately the fourth century BCE. Over the next eight centuries, many shorter tales were added, giving the text is current volume. The *Rāmāyaṇa*, the core of which dates from approximately the second century BCE, recounts the story of the abduction of Rāma's wife Sītā by the demon king Rāvaṇa and the war that follows. Apart from the verses Mammaṭa excerpts directly from the epics, many of his other examples are based on episodes found in the two epics.

Classical poetic literature (*kāvya*) is commonly held to have blossomed in the first few centuries of the Common Era in the context of royal courts. Although many hold that the tradition climaxed in the fourth to nonth centuries with such figures as Kālidāsa, Bhavabhūti, and Śriharṣa, there are major writers at least until the Mogul invasions of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (e.g., Rājasekhara, Jayadeva, and Jagannātha). Classical Sanskrit literature is highly ornate and displays great technical virtuosity. This is partly due to the fact that Sanskrit was a second language for the artists, and partly to its courtly nature. It is literature written by connoisseurs for connoisseurs and strives for both emotional power and intellectual charm.

Sanskrit *kāvya* aims at beauty through the presentation of ideal types in tightly crafted verse. Rarely does it touch on political matters, and never with the aim of effecting regime change. Neither does it generally strive to be expressive of the poet's

---

[40] Van Buitenen (1974:17).

personal emotions. Although the poetry is emotionally charged, and many writers probably write from their own experience, neither the personality nor the experience of the poet is normally the focus. Rather, idealized types – the lover, the beloved, the hero, etc – are used to evoke universal human emotions. The great individuals, e.g. Rāma, Sītā, and Chandragupta, are normally either mythical or historically distant from the writer. Even the most common exceptions to this rule, panegyrics written for specific royal patrons, portray the kings and princes in general terms, with very few personal details. Furthermore, when the protagonists of *kāvya* are individuated, it is normally more by their actions than by their character.

Three main forms of *kāvya* are considered important by aesthetic theorists. These are great poetry (*mahākāvya*), drama (*nāṭya*), and short poetry (*subhāṣita*). The great poetry presents mythic, royal, and religious themes in works that often run to several cantos. Also popular in this genre are ideal descriptions of nature and the seasons. As the plot is usually fairly simple, this form offers the poet great scope to show his control over the technical aspects of poetry. Generally, each canto is written in a single meter and the audience expects to find a great number of the poetic ornaments (*alaṇkāra*) skillfully woven into the story. While the "formalism" of Sanskrit poetry was often criticized in early Western evaluations of Sanskrit literature, it is now beginning to be appreciated on its own terms.[41]

---

[41] Macdonell (1899:328) offers a good example of the first approach.

Rather than striving to portray character development or the internal logic of a story, Sanskrit drama focuses primarily on the evocation of *rasa*. A simplified treatment of character and the various elements of plot (see introduction 2.3) are used to build up the spectators' appreciation of the *rasa* bit by bit. Ultimately, the evocation climaxes with an appropriate ending that reinforces all that has come before. In a romance, for example, the lover will be strong and noble, the beloved beautiful and pure. The lovers will meet in an ideal setting, such as a forest glade, and fall instantly in love. Their love will be tried and tested in various episodes that show the depth of their devotion. In the end they are united in loving union that reinforces or completes the romantic theme of the entire piece. The three most common themes in Sanskrit drama are the romantic, the heroic, and the comic.

The dramatist can excel in two areas: plot structure and language. The detours and obstacles the protagonists face must be carefully crafted to capture the audience's attention and augment the dominant *rasa*. The poet must avoid the opposing faults of monotony and incoherence. Although extensively discussed by the dramaturges, plot holds little interest for the poetic critics.

Generally, Sanskrit plays are written partly in prose and partly in verse. At climatic moments the main characters speak in polished verses that allow the dramatist to display his poetic capacity. These poetic sections vary in length from a single couplet to a hundred lines or more. These verses are often passionate, but also include descriptions of

natural beauty or general truths. Individual verses from these poetic passages are isolated for study by the poetic critics.

The third form of literature, short verse (*subhāṣita*), is of the greatest interest to the poetic theorists. Indeed, almost all of Mammaṭa's examples belong to this class. Many of the short poems exalted in the Sanskrit tradition are extracted from the first two types of literature (larger poems and plays). The idealized heroes and the simplified plots we discussed above made it relatively easy to extract verses and treat them as independent poems. Sanskrit poets also composed detached poems (*muktaka*) that are free of context are often collected into anthologies according to their subject. [42] As Ingalls has pointed out, wherever these verses come from, they ideally should be able to stand on their own, both in terms of meaning and mood.[43] The critics single out verses either because of their stylistic excellence or their emotional power. The early poetics addresses the former in terms of poetic ornaments, while the *Dhvani* school addresses the later by means of suggestion. Mammaṭa attempts to explain both.

The short poems are broken into quarters, the length of which is determined by meter. The common meters result in poems between forty and eighty syllables, although meters that yield more than one hundred syllables exist.[44] This places the *subhāṣita* midway between the Japanese *haiku* and the English sonnet in length.

---

[42] Vasudeva (2005:15-16).
[43] Ingalls (1965:33). We will see that several of Mammaṭa's examples do not meet this ideal.
[44] The eight syllable *śloka* of the *Rāmāyaṇa* was not common in classical poetry.

These poems can be compared to Indian miniature paintings because of their vivid visual imagery. With a remarkable economy of words, the poets evoke physical settings through carefully chosen details. In these settings, the parting or reunion of lovers, momentous decisions, victory in battle, and the like, are given emotional depth by focusing on minutiae of behavior and appearance. The poets can make much of a trembling lip, a sidelong glance, or fiery eyes. They are also very effective at letting their characters speak, choosing short phrases that reveal much more than they say. Again and again, the reader is surprised by the quantity of information the poets convey by the accumulation of such details.

It is too early to determine the exact extent of Mammaṭa's poetic culture. As of now, less than half of the poems he quotes have been traced.[45] From the approximately two hundred poems that are identified, we know that Mammaṭa was familiar with the two great epics (the *Mahābhārata* and the *Rāmāyaṇa*) and the major classical poems (both *mahākāvyas* like the *Meghadūta* and the *Raghuvaṃśa*, and anthologies like the *Amaruśataka*).[46] However, from what we know, he quotes most frequently from the classical dramas. Indeed, his quotes span almost all the extant plays, including works by Kālidāsa, Bhavanhūti, Śrīharṣa, Śūdraka, and others. I will discuss the great poems and plays individually in the comments.

---

[45] Dwivedi lists sources for almost three hundred of the six hundred poems (1970: appendix C). However, approximately one third of these references are other works of poetics that quote the poems as examples. This leaves only about two hundred poems fully identified.
[46] Interestingly, no Bhartṛhari poems have been identified.

The latest poet that Mammaṭa quotes is Padmagupta, who either lived shortly before him or was his contemporary. Further research into the sources of Mammaṭa's examples and into tenth and eleventh century literature, especially the short verse, may reveal more connections between Mammaṭa and his immediate intellectual context.

4. Mammaṭa and the Early History of Sanskrit Poetics

The *Kāvyaprakāśa* occupies a unique position in the history of Sanskrit poetics. Written in a period when several writers were trying to weave together the main threads of the previous poetics, Mammaṭa's text became the standard compendium of poetics.[47] As Mammaṭa is more a genius of integration than creation, a brief look at the history of Sanskrit poetics is necessary to understand his importance.[48]

Mammaṭa shows extensive knowledge of earlier Sanskrit poetics.[49] His work draws from two very different traditions of poetics. The first chapter and chapters seven to ten are drawn from the older *Alaṅkāra* School writers (Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin, Udbhaṭa, and Rudraṭa). Chapters two to six, on the other hand, are indebted to the *Dhvani* School writers (mainly Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta). This has led some to say that

---

[47] For information on Mammaṭa's competitors, like Bhoja, see Gerow (1977:271). Even Mammaṭa biggest rival, Viśvanātha (14th c.), wrote a commentary on the *Kāvyaprākaśa* and uses its structure in his own work, enlarging it only to include a section (5) on plot in drama. On the standardization of Mammaṭa see De (1960:2:216).

[48] The two standard histories are that of Kane (1961) and De (1960). While these works remain invaluable, the Gerow's history (1977) improves on them in many areas. It is, in my opinion the best introduction currently available.

[49] Mammaṭa quotes several writers by name (Bharata, Rudraṭa Ānandavardhana, Abhinava, *inter alia*). Almost half of the identified poems that Mammaṭa quotes had already been quoted in earlier works. In many cases Mammaṭa uses poems in the same theoretical context as the earlier writers. His familiarity with the earlier writes is further shown by the inclusive nature of his list of *alaṅkāra*.

Mammaṭa is better termed a "synthetic" writer than a "systematic" one.[50] While I agree with this assessment, I believe the synthesis that Mammaṭa achieves is both stronger and of more importance than is generally acknowledged.

The earliest writers on poetics are inspired most directly by the Grammarians and the Mīmāṃsakas, not by the *Nāṭyaśāstra*.[51] This is only logical, considering their desire to understand the "grammar" of poetic ornaments (*alaṅkāra*), poetic blemishes (*dosa*), and several syntactic stylistic excellences (*guṇa*). In pursuing these issues, they seek to differentiate poetic language from religious, moral, and scientific language. Poetry is held to be decorated or ornamented speech, thus the name "science of ornamentation" (*alaṅkāraśastra*) for poetics.[52] The main concerns of the early poetics are the definition of, justification for, and teaching of the art of poetry, as well as a classification of its various types. Its goal is to educate future poets. Drama theory *(nāṭyaśāstra)* is treated as a separate science by these writers. This is not surprising when one considers the enormous difference between the writing of an epic poem and the production of a dramatic spectacle.[53]

Ānandavardhana recreates poetics on an entirely new ground adapted from dramaturgy and philosophy. None of the important aspects of earlier poetics (poetic

---

[50] Gerow (1977:272).
[51] Kane (1961:335ff), Gerow (1977:221) and De (1960:2:18).
[52] Originally the poetic ornaments were thought to decorate speech, thereby transforming speech into poetry. Later the Dhvani school claimed that the ornaments decorated poetry, making them unessential. They introduced the famous analogy that the poetic ornaments are to poetry as jewelry is to a woman.
[53] Gerow (1977:227). Gerow has argued throughout many works against the standard vision that Sanskrit poetics develops toward Abhinava and then, having climaxed, goes into decadence. De is the most highly regarded proponent of this view (1960 v2:213 to 217 gives a wonderful summary) and Coomaraswamy the most popular. Among contemporaries, M. Chari's *Sanskrit Criticism* as well as most "popular" works on Indian art carry forward this highly suspicious theory.

ornaments, blemishes, and excellences) are taken up seriously in his work. Instead, he focuses on the concept of mood or flavor (*rasa*) as developed by Bharata in the *Nāṭyaśāstra* (see introduction 2.3). Ānandavardhana claims that producing *rasa* is the essential function of poetry. Furthermore, he modifies a key term from Mīmāsaka philosophy of language, "suggestion" (*dhvani*), to explain how a poem communicates *rasa*. This brilliant maneuver allows him to supplant the earlier writer-based poetics that focuses on techniques for producing good poetry with a spectator-based poetics that focuses on the reader/audience response. Gerow argues that the massive cultural changes that followed the fall of the Gupta Empire brought drama and poetry together. Plays became more read than preformed and devotional (*bhakti*) poetry was often sung, rather than read, blurring the difference between the two arts.[54] These changes may have acted as an impetus for Ānandavardhana's fusion of poetics and dramaturgy.

The devotional potential of poetry is not lost on Ānandavardhana's commentator Abhinavagupta. Ānandavardhana begins analyzing the effect poetry has on its audience and includes a ninth *rasa* "tranquility" (*śanta*) to extend his theory to the great religious epics.[55] Abhinava greatly refines the notion of *rasa*, increasing both the importance and the scope of aesthetic experience.[56] By closely examining the earlier commentators on the *Nāṭyaśāstra*, Abhinava is able to develop a theory of aesthetic psychology that has often

[54] Gerow (1977:252).
[55] Ingalls, et al. (1990:814).
[56] Ingalls, et al., (1990:35).

been compared to T.S. Eliot's theory of the universal correlate.[57] From this he argues for the religious value of artistic appreciation, claiming that pure *rasa* experience is analogous to blissful union with Brahman.

Mammaṭa bases his synthesis in the structure of the older poetics. The *Kāvyaprakāśa*, like the early works on poetics, strives to explain what Gerow calls, "the formal expressive repertoire of the poet, as a practitioner of a different and uniquely intelligible kind of language."[58] *Kārikās* 1 through 4b are entirely within the early tradition. In 4ab, Mammaṭa defines poetry using the three technical terms of that tradition (excellences, blemishes, and poetic ornaments). The entire second half of the *Kāvyaprakāśa* is devoted to an encyclopedic presentation of these three concepts. However, in *kārikā* 4cd, he introduces Ānandavardhana's grammatical tool, suggestion. Having already defined the essence of poetry along traditional lines, he cannot follow Ānandavardhana in making suggestion its essence. Instead, he ingeniously uses suggestion to establish a hierarchy of excellence among poems. By this move he manages both to accept the post-Ānandavardhana preference for suggestive poetry and resolve Ānandavardhana's problem of how to account for non-suggestive poetry and suggestive literature that is not poetry.

Mammaṭa reviews the grammar of suggestion, along with denotation and indication, in the second and third chapters. In these sections, suggestion is treated as one

[57] Perhaps the most striking example is Sahal, K.L., "Objective Correlative and the Theory of Rasa", Calcutta Review, N.S. 2, no. 2 p.237, but the comparison is common.
[58] Gerow (1977:258).

of the three factors (or semantic powers) that comprise the meaning of a sentence (see introduction 2.2). Included in suggestion are such linguistic phenomena as irony, pun, and the intention of a metaphor, as will be explained in various comments on particular poems.

Mammaṭa gives little detailed attention to Abhinava's psychological theory of *rasa* and less to his theologico-aesthetic theory. In *kārikā* 2, he repeats the claim that *rasa* experience is analogous to experience of Brahman, but offers no defense or development of the idea. In his commentary to *kārikās* 27 and 28, Mammaṭa quotes the *Nāṭyaśāstra* 6.31 and summarizes Abhinava's history of *rasa* theory. After summarizing and approving of Abhinava's theory, Mammaṭa simply moves on, adding neither criticism nor elaboration.

However, the central claim of Abhinava's *Locana* is presupposed in all of Mammaṭa's chapters four, five, and six. Abhinava establishes that the semantic power of suggestion, prevalent in poetry, makes possible a particular aesthetic effect for a receptive audience. The fact that Mammaṭa has nothing theoretical to add to Abhinava's claim does not reduce the importance of this theory in Mammaṭa work. The three chapters in question focus on illustrating the workings of poetry as an evoker of *rasa*.[59] It should be noted that suggestion has a much expanded role in these chapters. It is no longer only a necessary tool used to understand the grammar of a sentence. Suggestion is also viewed

[59] Chapter four treats poems in which suggestion is primary, chapter five poems in which it is secondary, and chapter six poems in which it is absent. Even chapter six uses *rasa* (or more exactly, absence of *rasa*) as the defining character for a class of poetry. Strictly speaking, these chapters also deal with the suggestion of emotions not eligible to become *rasa*.

as conveying both the intended meaning of an entire piece and its mood. If it is true that Mammaṭa is responsible for popularizing Abhinava, he did so through a streamlined presentation of Abhinava's theories and more than a hundred examples that show the theory in application.

The *Kāvyaprakāśa* can be divided into four parts. The first chapter presents the creative synthesis that will be worked out in the other three parts. It begins along traditional lines, but manages to integrate suggestion with the older aesthetics of ornament in a new and ingenious manner. Chapters two and three provide a philosophy of language inspired by some of Ānandavardhana's innovations, most notably the concept of suggestion as a third semantic power. Chapters four through six illustrate Abhinava's refinement of *rasa* theory. Chapters seven through ten return to an encyclopedic presentation of the traditional concepts of *alaṅkāraśāstra*, namely excellences, blemishes, and ornaments.

5. Mammaṭa's Legacy

Mammaṭa's integration of the Dhvani School writers into the older tradition proved definitive for the Sanskrit tradition in that all later theorists that discuss poetics as a whole do so within Mammaṭa's framework.[60] Mammaṭa's solution has the additional advantage of being inclusive. Every poem in the Sanskrit tradition can find a place in his

[60] That Viśvanātha added a chapter on drama to Mammaṭa's structure does nothing to undermine this claim. A house with an extra room is still the same house. Similarly, although there are differences of emphasis, Jaganātha's *Rasagaṅgādhara* can be mapped onto the *Kāvyaprakāśa* with little difficulty.

synthesis in contrast with many of the earlier theories.[61] His system has the opposite advantage of not being too inclusive, in contrast with Ānandavardhana's.[62] We saw that Mammaṭa's synthesis was presented in his definition of poetry and his creation of a hierarchy of quality among poems. Both of these were scrutinized by later theorists, who tend to reject his definition and accept his hierarchy.[63]

Given the synthetic and encyclopedic nature of the *Kāvyaprakāśa*, one would expect it to be very dense, and it is. What is surprising, however, is its appearance of simplicity. In presenting his compilation of earlier theories, Mammaṭa rarely presents the arguments found in those theories (the largest exception being the verse on *rasa*). Mammaṭa also rarely develops the arguments for his own view. And when he does so, they are given in skeletal form. Opposing positions are often only briefly sketched. With the exception of the second half of chapter five, Mammaṭa presents sparse counter argument. Mammaṭa's method of presentation makes the *Kāvyaprakāśa* seems more a textbook than polemic or creative addition to an ongoing debate.

I would argue that the *Kāvyaprakāśa* was intended more to teach the "correct view" than to defend this view against objections. This theory might explain its extreme popularity among commentators, most of whom fill in the missing arguments to a greater

---

[61] There exist poems with no ornaments, on the one hand, and poems with no *rasa*, on the other. Jagannātha claims that there are poems that are excluded by Mammaṭa's definition, but his examples are too short to be convincing. See the *Rasagaṅgādhara* 1.6.
[62] There are types of writing that evoke *rasa* yet are not poetry.
[63] Viśvanātha attacks it in his commentary on the *Kāvyaprakāśa* and in his *Sāhityadarpaṇa*, Jagannātha in the *Rasagaṅgādhara* 1.6, and, more recently, Gajendragadkar in his notes to the *Kāvyaprakāśa* (1939:151-155).

or lesser extent.[64] Indeed, I have found it necessary to do so in my commentary as well. Mammaṭa's text practically cries out for commentary, and if it was truly written to present the views, Mammaṭa himself probably expected it to be commented upon either orally to students or by teachers writing out the fine points of the analysis.

Mammaṭa's streamlining of the argument is counterbalanced by his extensive use of examples to illustrate philosophic claims. Indeed, Mammaṭa reverses the priorities of his hero Abhinava in this regard. Instead of lengthy arguments enlightened by an occasional example, Mammaṭa gives hundreds of examples structured by the theoretical framework. When the theoretical issues are largely resolved (and thus not in need of further argument), it is reasonable to turn one's attention to the poems themselves. Mammaṭa's popularity may also be due to his preference for example over minutia of argumentation.

Mammaṭa manages to pull together most of the earlier poetic theory into one theoretic whole. His text is both superficially attractive and rewarding of deeper study. His framework is inclusive enough to capture all that had been admired in Sanskrit poetry, yet also capable of distinguishing poetry from other forms of writing. The theory itself is grounded in a deep philosophic tradition, but Mammaṭa does not let the philosophy overshadow the poetry it is supposed to explain. The *Kāvyaprakāśa* reveals and tries to explain poetry's unique power and value. To those who are so inclined, it is an invitation to investigate theoretical issues at greater depth, and an indication of how to

[64] It is often claimed that only the *Bhagavadgītā* has more commentaries.

do so. To others it is an invitation to use the existing theory to enrich their appreciation of the poems so nicely collected, pushing them again and again to see details that they might otherwise miss. For all these reasons, Mammaṭa well deserves his position as the most popular Sanskrit poetic theorist.

6. Translation Method

The *Kāvyaprakāśa* is a theoretical work. It seeks to define poetry, classify its various types, explain how they convey their meaning, and examine why some poems are better than others. It consists of three distinct types of writing, each of which must be handled differently in translation. The core text consists of theoretical verses in fixed meter. These are explained in a prose commentary, also by Mammaṭa. Finally there are illustrative examples, which are drawn from the massive realm of Indian poetry. The purpose and form of all three must be considered. One can ask, for example, why Mammaṭa writes the core text in meter. What is gained by using the verse and commentary form? Precisely what role do the examples serve? Answers to these questions help shape the form of the translation.

Before I can turn to these questions, I should make clear the desired audience and the goal of the translation. This translation is targeted at three distinct audiences. The first is philosophers and critics. Mammaṭa's text is primarily theoretic and is philosophically rich. It treats extensively questions of semantics, emotion, and aesthetics. It also touches

on questions of ontology, epistemology, religion, and ethics. Those interested in comparative literature or comparative aesthetics might find the text especially interesting.

My second audience is readers of Indian poetry. One of Mammaṭa's goals is to teach his reader how to read Sanskrit poetry. Anyone interested in Sanskrit poetry, either in the original or in translation, might profit from this work. Furthermore, because of Sanskrit's historical influence, I imagine that readers and writers of poetry in the modern languages of the sub-continent will also find this text rewarding.

My final audience is readers and writers of English poetry. Some of Mammaṭa's ideas can certainly travel outside the Sanskrit context. I also hope that readers of poetry in translation will find some of these poems excellent. If not, the fault lies with me, not with the original Sanskrit, for Mammaṭa has chosen some great poems.

My goal has been to produce a text readable without any knowledge of Sanskrit. To this end I have attempted to make the translation complete, which means that no Sanskrit words that are not already current in English have been left untranslated. For those acquainted with Sanskrit, I have tried to include the Sanskrit technical terms in parentheses the first time I translate them.

I turn now to the structure of the *Kāvyaprakāśa* and how the various types of writing there should be translated. First, why did Mammaṭa write theoretic verses and a self-commentary to explain them? The verse - commentary form is about as old as Sanskrit philosophy, beginning with the grammarian Pāṇini, c.500 BCE, and the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra*, c.200 BCE. The form is used in hundreds of later philosophical and

scientific works. The verses were to be memorized by students. Like cue cards in drama, they can be used to evoke the rest of the argument. The headings of Descartes' *Principles* serve a similar function and were (and still are, in France) used in a similar way. To fulfil their function, the verses must to be short and easy to remember. Again, they are cues, not summaries. The commentary fleshes out the argument, providing much that is both essential and absent from the verses. Neither was intended to be what we would call an independent text.

Although the initial justification for composing theoretical verses was to aid memorization, later in the tradition, verses became also a means of showing one's technical virtuosity. How should these Sanskrit verses be translated? First, I think it is safe to assume that nobody will memorize an English translation of the *Kāvyaprakāśa,* thus the first possible motivation for a verse translation of these verses is removed. Second, it is not part of Western traditions to philosophize in verse, and even less to show off by doing so. Thus those reasons too are removed. Remembering that Mammaṭa's main goals were theoretical, and that in modern English theoretical goals are pursued in prose, I argue that the theoretical verses are most fully translated when rendered in prose.

The next question is how to deal with Mammaṭa's division of the theoretical text into two layers, verse and commentary. Along the lines just set out, it is tempting to assert that these two layers should be combined to conform with normal modern English theoretical style. What would be lost if it were suppressed? First, we would lose the implication that the verse material is primary, while the commentary is secondary. If this

were all, I would argue that this difference of importance would be better represented in an established English form. But Mammaṭa's commentators – and there were many – would be difficult to understand if the structure of the original were altered. As of now, none of these have been translated, but hopefully this situation will change in the future.

Finally, the poems. I assume that Mammaṭa chooses the poems he does for two reasons: they illustrate his point and he thinks them good poetry. Given that they are examples, clearly the translations must function as examples to English readers. As obvious as this seems, the existing translations fail on this score. Secondly, I feel that any translator of this text should, to the best of his ability, render the poetic examples as poetry. A failure to do so deeply falsifies the impression a reader will receive of the original.

What is a poetic translation of poetry? I suggest that it is a translation that takes seriously the aesthetic aspects of the original. These include qualities such as the tone, the level of diction, the rhythm, the rhyme, the line length, the use of vowels and consonants, the weight of the words, the images, the metaphors, etc. Another aspect is the resonant semantic capacities of the words used. Most of all, for these poems one has to consider the aesthetic emotion suggested or produced by the whole. Not all the aspects of Sanskrit poetry can be rendered in modern English. Some metaphors and images are culturally specific and the connotations of words shift from language to language. Not even all the aspects that can be rendered can be rendered in a single translation: different translations will capture different aspects. My method has been to first understand how poem is

functioning as an example. Then I have tried to isolate the most important aesthetic aspects of each poem and capture as many of those as I can while retaining the poem's function as an example. All translation is a compromise, the richness of poetry makes this doubly true of poetic translation. Where other translations exist, I have occasionally quoted them.

A word about puns, which form an important part of the Sanskrit poetic tradition. Sanskrit punning poems are often highly complicated and contain many words with double meaning. The poets often strive to present a pair of parallel meanings throughout the entire poem. Here I have found no option but to give a pair of juxtaposed literal translations for each poem, one reflecting each of the punning word's meanings. Where many words have a single meaning shared by both "sides" of the pun, I have inserted a center column. For example, poem 78:

Primary Meaning	Common Meaning	Secondary Meaning
	Who is not flooded with delight	
By the good scripture!		By a lover's visit!
	Always intent on	
Moral advice		Enjoyment
And leading to final salvation		And release from frustration
In a heavenly place		In a secluded place.

The way these poems are used in the text (along with the relative difficulty of punning in English) has forced me to sacrifice any attempt to achieve poetic merit in English. As I said above, my primary obligation is to make sure the English translations really do serve as illustrations of what they are supposed to illustrate. I hope the parallel presentation is more useful and enjoyable than a prose explanation of the puns.

As I hope I have made clear, my primary concern at all three levels of the text (theoretical verses, commentary, and poetic examples) has been to make the translation 'work' as an English book on poetics. I hope I have chosen the correct method to make Mammaṭa's text as useful, accessible, and accurate as possible.

7. Purpose and Content of Comments

The main purpose of my comments is to provide easier access into intricacies of Mammaṭa's text. I do this in four ways. First, I explain particular cultural references, such as the names of people and places. When a poem requires it, I sketch the plot of the larger work from it is drawn. I also explain metaphors and images that might not be clear in English and indicate when the connotations of a Sanskrit word are importantly different than those of its English translation.

Second, I expand and clarify Mammaṭa's terse presentation of philosophical arguments. This often requires providing the context of the debate and the implications of Mammaṭa's views. Readers familiar with Indian philosophy will notice that Mammaṭa does not give the traditional exposition of his opponents' views (*pūrvapakṣa*). I try to supply this by making clear which positions Mammaṭa is fighting against and the main arguments in their favor.

Third, I explain how the poems function as examples. When necessary, I clarify the suggestions and poetic ornaments. Then I tie the poem back into the philosophic context by trying to show exactly what aspect of the poem serves to illustrate each

theoretical point. This is particularly challenging when the example turns on a detail of the Sanskrit language, but I have tried to avoid being tedious.

Fourth, I give historical information pertaining to Mammaṭa's views, filling in the details of the historical outline of the introduction (sections 4 and 5). As Mammaṭa rarely mentions his sources, I try to identify them. I also try to note when Mammaṭa either introduces something new into the tradition or actually contradicts one of his respected sources. Finally, I try to indicate which of Mammaṭa's points are especially influential for later criticism and poetry.

Appendix to the Introduction 1 – Transliteration Details.

Concerning the Sanskrit text presented:

1. The *devanāgarī* text has been transliterated into the Roman alphabet using the standard modern method.
2. I have followed the sectioning of the text that the early commentators imposed (which was also followed by the later commentators). The only exception to this is an occasional transition word that has been moved to make the English more clear.
3. I have followed the Mohan text (1995) as my base text. I have checked it against the Jha (1925) and the Dwivedi (1977) texts. Where there is a conflict, I have further checked it against the text of the *Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series No.66* (1929).
4. I have listed corrections to the Mohan text in an appendix. If the correction is clearly a typo, not appearing in the other texts, the correction is not further justified. If the correction is more substantial (a very rare occurrence), the alternatives and a justification are given.
5. I have included the Mohan page number in parenthesis after each *kārikā* or section thereof that appears independently in the text.
6. I have not transliterated Mohan's numbering of the *kārikās* or the poems as these numbers do not exist in the earliest manuscripts. They are, however, represented in the translation.

7. Mohan is not consistent with his use of bold text. I have used it only for the chapter headings and the *kārikās*. Mohan decided to use commas in his text. I have either transliterated these as *daṇḍas* or dropped them, as seemed appropriate.
8. I have inserted an additional *daṇḍa* when one seemed desirable on grounds of sentence unity if it exists in other versions of the text.
9. Mohan has added paragraph brakes in his text. Most of these have been suppressed.
10. Mohan has no consistent use of the double *daṇḍa* in prose. This is partially, although not wholly, due to his addition of paragraph breaks. I have tried to use them whenever there is a paragraph break in the English, which makes it slightly easier to move back and forth between the texts.
11. I have not restored *sandhi*. However, I have tried to insert a space between words where this is possible without restoring the *sandhi*. I hope this make the text more useful to readers who want to identify a single word.

Appendix to the Introduction 2 – Translation Details

The following list gives some of the details of my translational strategy with reference to specific Sanskrit constructions:

1. Parentheses are used to indicate meanings not on the surface of the Sanskrit text but very closely implied. I supply them in the interest of readability.
2. Long Sanskrit sentences broken in translation often require repetition of the subject.
3. The antecedents of Sanskrit pronouns are often supplied.
4. Sometimes Sanskrit singulars are translated by English plurals in theoretical contexts.
5. The sense of *ādi* (etc.) is often spelled out. Other times X-*ādi* is translated as "X and the like." For example, *gotvādi* is sometimes translated, "universals such as cowhood."
6. When a Sanskrit adjective is used to modify two or more nouns, two different English adjectives are sometimes employed.
7. Following the normal Sanskrit convention, Mammaṭa (or a later copyist) places chapter names at the end of each chapter. These have been moved to the head of the chapter in the translation. Similarly, the last sentence of a section sometimes identifies its speaker. These sentences have been moved to the head of the section. I have, however, indicated these relocations in the notes.
8. In Mammaṭa's Sanskrit, the immediate future is usually expressed by the present and the future tense used to refer to a more distant future. Thus I have sometimes inserted 'now' in the first case and 'later' in the latter.

9. The optative of √*as* (to be) is often translated by the present indicative. Mammaṭa's use of the optative, in this case, is prescriptive and not potential.
10. When making a comparison, Mammaṭa often only supplies what is different, leaving the reader to fill in the rest. This is possible in Sanskrit because nouns are declined, making the parallel obvious. In English, the whole comparison is often given without parentheses.
11. Mammaṭa uses the locative to indicate the group or class (C) to which an item (x) belongs. Often there is no way to retain the locative in English and so I often render this x is a case of C or x is a C.

kāvyaprakāśaḥ

atha pratham ullāsaḥ

ity kāvyaprakāśe kāvyasya prayojanakāraṇasvarūpaviśeṣanirṇayo

nāma pratham ullāsaḥ ||

The Elucidation of Poetry

Chapter One

Specification of the Purpose,

Cause, and Types of Poetry

granthārambhe vighnavighātāya samuciteṣṭadevatāṃ granthakṛt parāmṛśati

niyatikṛtaniyamarahitāṃ hlādaikamayīm ananyaparatantrām **|**

navarasarucirāṃ nirmitam ādadhatī bhāratī kaver jayati **||** ***(1)***

niyataśaktyā niyatarūpā sukhadukhamohasvabhāvā

paramāṇvādyupādānakarmādisahakārikāraṇaparatantrā ṣaṭrasā na ca hṛdyaiva taiḥ

tādṛśī brahmaṇo nirmitir nirmāṇam | *etad vilakṣaṇā tu kavivāṅnirmitiḥ* | *ata eva jayati* | *jayaty arthena ca namaskāra ākṣipyate iti tāṃ praty asmi praṇata ity labhyate* ||

(1.1 Opening Auspicious Verse)

At the beginning of the book, the author focuses on the goddess properly preferred (by poets), hoping that she will remove all obstacles.

1. The poet's goddess, Bhāratī, excels by establishing a world composed of pure delight, dependant on nothing beyond herself, resplendent with the nine *rasas*[65], and free from the laws set forth by Fate.[66]

The creation of Brahman is necessarily ruled by the power of Fate. It consists of pleasure, pain, and spiritual ignorance, it is dependant on material causes, i.e. atoms, etc., and auxiliary causes, i.e. karma, etc, and finally it consists of (only) six *rasa*[67], which are not even always delightful. But the creation of the poet's speech is different from this, and for precisely this reason it **excels**. And by using **excels** reverence is implied. Thus the verse means, “I bow to her.”

Comments

It is traditional to begin any classical Sanskrit work with a prayer or invocation of the god that the author feel most relevant to his work. This practice is called *maṅgala,* "doing

[65] The nine *rasas* are: erotic, comic, heroic, horrific, enraged, terrific, pitiful, wonderful, and the peaceful.
[66] Niyati is the goddess Fate (the daughter of Meru). *Niyati* also means “necessity,” “natural laws,” etc.
[67] Here *rasa* refers to the six gustatory flavors: sweet, salty, bitter, sour, pungent, and astringent.

something auspicious." Bhāratī is another name for Sarasvatī, the goddess of speech and poetry. Mammaṭa playfully compares her to Brahman, the Supreme Being, to vaunt the advantages of poetry over reality. These include its independence from physical matter, its freedom from the laws of providence, its diversity of subjects, and its pleasant nature.

ihābhidheyaṃ saprayojanam ity āha

***kāvyaṃ yaśāse 'rthakṛte vyavahāravide śivetarakṣataye* |**

sadyaḥ paranirvṛtaye kāntāsaṃmitayopadeśayuje* || *(41)

kālidāsānādīnām iva yaśaḥ śrīharṣāder dhāvakādīnām iva dhanam rājādigatocitācāraparijñānam ādityāder mayūrādīnām ivānarthanivāraṇam | *sakalaprayojanamaulibhūtaṃ samanantaram eva rasāsvādanasamudbhūtaṃ vigalitavedyāntaram ānandam prabhusaṃmitaśabdapradhānavedādiśāstrebhyaḥ suhṛtsaṃmitārthatātparyavatpurāṇādītihāsebhyaś ca śabdārthayor guṇabhāvena rasāṅgabhūtavyāpārapravaṇatayā vilakṣaṇaṃ yat kāvyaṃ lokottaravarṇanānipuṇakavikarma tat kānteva sarasatāpādanenābhimukhīkṛtya rāmādivad vartitavyaṃ na rāvaṇādivad ity upadeśaṃ ca yathā yogaṃ kaveḥ sahṛdayasya ca karotīti sarvatha tatra yatanīyam* ||

(1.2) The author now states the purpose of poetry;

2. Poetry brings fame, wealth, knowledge of the world, destruction of the inauspicious, and instant, complete liberation. Poetry also serves to give advice in the manner of a beloved woman.

Poetry brings fame, like that of Kālidāsa[68] and others, **wealth** like that of (kings) like Srī Harṣa and (poets) like Bāṇa[69], **knowledge** of the proper conduct displayed by kings and others, protection from adversity, like (in the case of) the poet Mayūra by (his poems for) the sun[70], etc., and bliss, the highest of all goals, which, arising immediately from the taste of a *rasa*, consumes all other knowledge. Poetry is the work of poets skilled in descriptions of this world and others. Religious texts like the *Vedas* are composed essentially of authoritative statements (*śabda*) and thus are like teachers. In the *Puraṇas* and histories, what really matters is the point or moral (of the story), and they are thus like friends. But poetry is different. In it, one strives to produce *rasa* through graceful expression and a worthy subject. By turning the heads of the poet and the reader and filling them with passion *(sarasatā)* like a **beloved woman**, poetry entices them to act like Rāma and other heroes and not like Rāvana and other villains.[71] For all these reasons, poetry is to be pursued.

Comments

Following tradition, Mammaṭa first explains why the subject of his work, poetry in this case, should be studied. This passage is close to Bhāmaha verses two to eight. After giving examples of famous and rich poets, and claiming that poetry can be used to

---

[68] Kālidāsa was a Sanskrit poet and playwright of the early 5th century.

[69] I follow Gajendragadkar in reading Bāṇa for Dhāvaka. Bāṇa was a poet active in the court of Srī Hārśa (7th century).

[70] Mayūra was another 7th century poet. Having contracted leprosy, he composed poems to the god of the sun and was cured of his disease as a reward.

[71] Rāma is the hero of the epic poem the *Rāmāyaṇa*. Rāvana is the antagonist.

petition the gods, he states that poetry can instruct. Poetry instructs not like a religious text, nor like a history that aims to convey a moral, but rather like a lover that pleases and thus improves.[72] The goal of instruction made easy by pleasure is familiar from western poetics (one thinks of Dryden, for example), but that is not quite the point here. The idea is not to sugarcoat morality, but rather to spur one to greater actions through love of exemplary people illustrated in poetry. Think of the Greek desire to emulate Achilles, or the chivalrous emulation of Arthur. What is striking here, however, is that the portrayal of human ideals is compared to a woman. Like a woman, a good poem can capture one's heart and entice one to do its bidding. Would it be too much to see Freud's theory of the sublimation of sexual desire prefigured? Probably. But in any case, sexual desire and culture ideals are here seen to move people in analogous ways.[73]

The analogy seems to fall apart when one considers that a beloved woman only evokes a single *rasa* (the erotic), while poetry can evoke any of the nine. Mammaṭa picks an example, however, in which a woman Sīta, inspires not only the erotic passion, but many others as well in the course of the *Rāmāyaṇa* (indeed, a clever critic could easily show that she inspires all nine).

The real downside of this analogy is that there is no reason to believe that the beloved woman will always influence their lovers for the better. Sīta, for example, evoked not only the morally sanctioned passions of Rāma, but also the morally

---

[72] These metaphors date to Abhinava, at least, who uses them three times (Ingalls, et al., 1990:71, 437, 533).

[73] This analogy has a long history in Sanskrit. The *Ṛg Veda* (10.71.4) claims that only to one who understands the hidden or inner significance of words does speech reveal herself completely. Note also that the goddesses of speech and learning are both female.

reproachable passions of Rāvaṇa. Why, analogously, is there any reason to believe that poetry will evoke only commendable passions? If there is something distinct in poetry that makes its moral influence less ambiguous than that of a beloved, Mammaṭa needs to tell us what it is. If there is not, there is no basis for the claim that a poem will fill one with the desire to act like a hero and not like a villain.

evam asya prayojanam uktvā kāraṇam āha |

śaktir nipuṇatā lokaśāstrakāvyādyavekṣaṇāt **|**

kāvyajñaśikṣayābhyāsa iti hetus tadudbhave **||** ***(63)***

śaktiḥ kavitvabījarūpaḥ saṃkāraviśeṣaḥ | *yāṃ vinā kāvyaṃ na prasaret prasṛtaṃ vā upahasanīyaṃ syāt* | *lokasya sthāvarajaṅgamātmakalokavṛttasya* | *śāstrāṇāṃ changovyākaraṇābhidhānakośakalācaturvargagajaturagakhaḍgādilokṣaṇagranthānām* | *kāvyānām ca mahakavisaṃbandhinām* | *ādigrahaṇād itihāsānāṃ ca vimarśanād vyutpattiḥ* | *kāvyaṃ kartuṃ vicārayituṃ ca ye jānanti tadupadeśena karaṇe yojane ca paunaḥ punyena pravṛttir iti trayaḥ samuditāḥ na tu vyastās tasya kāvyasyodbhave nirmāṇe samullāse ca hetur na tu hetuvaḥ* ||

(1.3) Having explained the purpose of poetry, the author states its cause:

3. The cause of poetry consists of: capability, skill resulting from familiarity with the world, the sciences, poetry, etc., and practice of the instruction given by experts of poetry.

Capability is an individual propensity and is the seed of poetry. Without capability, either poetry does not appear, or, if it does, it is laughable. **Familiarity with the world** means study of the behavior of all things physical, animal and spiritual. **Familiarity with the sciences** means study of technical works on meter, grammar, and semantics, as well as works on the arts and the four goals of life[74], and those on elephants, horses, weapons, etc. **Familiarity with poetry** means study of the works of the great poets. Finally, the **etc.** implies the study of history. **Practice** proceeds by repeated creation, i.e., composition guided by those who know how to create and critique poetry. **Capability**, **skill**, and **practice** are not three separate causes, but rather the single collective cause of the composition and brilliance of poetry.

Comments

This section is admirable in its acknowledgment of the complexity of human nature and culture.[75] It bares comparison with Horace's *Ars Poetica*, lines 268-69 and 408ff. The topics Mammaṭa raises received much greater attention in a slightly earlier work, *The Kāvyamīmāṃsā.* For example, it divides capacity into seven types. By claiming that a poet needs to have studied the arts he mentions, Mammaṭa touches on issues raised by Plato in the *Republic*, et al., but these issues receive no extended attention in the Sanskrit tradition to my knowledge.

---

[74] The four goals of life: pleasure, wealth, fulfillment of duty, and liberation.
[75] This section is very similar to Bhāmaha verses nine and ten.

When a single entity gives rise to another single entity, one speaks only of a single cause. If the first entity is complex, as in this example, one can speak of different parts of the entity combining to make a complex cause. The point here is that although all the parts are necessary, none is sufficient for the creation of good poetry.

Despite the use of this technical vocabulary, Mammaṭa does not rise to the challenge of giving a precise description the causal process implicit in the creation of a poem. But I doubt he is to be condemned for this; such "descriptions" tend to falsify by oversimplification of the creative process. Jagannātha criticizes Mammaṭa's definition in the *Rasagaṅgādhara* 8, where he defends intuition as the only cause of poetry.

evam asya kāraṇam uktva svarūpam āha |

tad adoṣau sabdārthau saguṇāv analaṃkṛtī punaḥ kvāpi* | *(81)

doṣaguṇālaṃkārāḥ vakṣyante | *kvāpīty anenaitad āha yat sarvatra sālaṃkārau kvacit tu sphuṭālaṃkāravirahe 'pi na kāvyatvahāniḥ* | *yathā*

yaḥ kaumāraharaḥ sa eva hi varas tā eva caitrakṣapās
te conmīlitamālatīsurabhayaḥ prauḍhāḥ kaḍambānilāḥ |
sā caivāsmi tathāpi tatra suratavyāpāralīlāvidhau
revārodhasi vetasītarutale cetaḥ samutkaṇṭhate ||

atra sphuṭo na kaścit alaṃkāraḥ | *rasasya ca prādhānyān nālaṃkāratā* ||

(1.4) Having stated the cause of poetry to be such, the author states its nature:

4ab. Poetry consists of words and meanings that possess excellences and are free from blemishes. In some cases, it lacks poetic ornament.

Faults, **excellences**, and **poetic ornament** (all technical terms) will be described later. By saying, **in some cases**, the author states that generally there is a poetic ornament. But even when there is no striking poetic ornament, poetry is possible. For example:

> He who made love to me first loves me still.
> Ever the same are the nights of spring,
> As are the breezes from the flowering grove
> Heavy with the scent of jasmine blooms.
> I too remain the same. And yet –
> On the bank of the Reva river,
> In a secluded glade among the reeds,
> I long for those games
> That bring deep sexual rapture. (1)[76]

Here there is no striking poetic ornament. (Why not call the *rasa* an ornament?) The *rasa* is the primary purpose of the poem, not a poetic ornament.

Comments

[76] Attributed to Śīlābhaṭṭārikā in several later anthologies. Dwivedi says it is found in the *Sūktimuktāvalī*, a collection of poems the post-dates Mammaṭa by at least a century. Gajendragadkar adds that it is found in the *Sārṅgadharapaddhati* as verse 3768. It is also found in the *Subhāṣitaratnakoṣa* as verse 815, although with several important differences. See Kasambi and Gokhale (1957:150).
1a. yaḥ - who, kaumāraharāḥ - deprive of virginity, sa – he, eva – still, hi – indeed, varas – husband, tāḥ – the, eva – same, caitrakṣapās – nights of Caitra month.
1b. te – the, ca – and, unmīlita – opened, mālatī - jasmine, surabhayaḥ - perfumed, prauḍha – heavy/luxuriant, kaḍambānilāḥ - the breeze of/from/in the kaḍamba trees, which bloom in the spring.
2a. sā – it, ca – and, eva – same, asmi – I am, tathāpi – even so, tatra – there, surata – being deeply satisfied sexually, vyāpāra – coming together with/bringing about, līlā – play, vidhau- type
2b. revārodhasi – on the bank of the Revā , vetasī - cane/citrus, tarutale – clear ground under a tree, cetaḥ - heart, samutkaṇṭhate – longs after.

Attempts to give a precise definition of poetry fill the Sanskrit tradition. Gajendragadkar gives a detailed critique of Mammaṭa's definition, comparing to the definitions given by the other major writers of poetics.[77] The debate over which definition is best, like so many others in poetics, seems to me to turn on whether one takes the view of the poet or the reader/audience. The early definitions, which Mammaṭa echoes, are writer-based. For example, Bhāmaha, after defining the faults and ornaments, claims, "Poetry is a combination of verbal and semantic ornaments."[78] They tend to focus on what linguistic elements need to be incorporated and avoided in composition. Later definitions, like that of Ānandavardhana, are audience-based and focus on the experience to be triggered by a piece of writing. Thus he begins the *Dhvanyāloka* with the claim, "Suggestion is the soul of poetry."[79] One is not surprised when a twentieth century commentator like Gajendragadkar, heavily influenced by Ānandavardhana and Western romantic theories, criticizes Mammaṭa's definition for leaving out evocation of *rasa*. Such criticism, however, tend to show little appreciation for the way Mammaṭa integrates *rasa* into his system.

In his attempt to write a comprehensive summary of poetic theory, Mammaṭa is faced with the task of trying to integrate Ānandavardhana 's reader-based perspective within the older writer-based tradition. I have shown that Mammaṭa's definition of poetry is traditional by relating his text to Bhāmaha's. In the next *kārikā*, he will try to use the

---

[77] Gajendragadkar (1939:151-155).
[78] *Kāvyālaṅkāra* 1.16. I feel this verse, when read in context, has the meaning I have given. The common translation is non-sense: "poetry is a combination of words and meanings." For more on this issue, see the introduction.
[79] *Dhvanyāloka* 1.1.

types of poetry (from Ānandavardhana) to introduce the reader-based perspective. This will lead him to a "digression" extending to the end of chapter six. In chapter seven, he takes up the definitions of faults, excellences, and poetic ornaments, which, according to tradition, should have been explained right after their introduction in this definition.[80] I think Mammaṭa's awareness of the novelty of his method shows through in the accompanying assurance that he will eventually explain these terms.

The poem treats a familiar theme in Sanskrit poetry. Compare: Near death/ by the sacred Tāpi River/ I will tell the truth/ even now my eyes/ return to the stand of reeds/ by the water.[81]

tadbhedān krameṇāha

idam uttamam atiśayani vyaṅgye vācyād dhvanir budhaiḥ kathitaḥ* || *(112)

idam iti kāvyam | *budhair vaiyākaraṇaiḥ*

pradhānabhūtasphoṭarūpavyaṅgyavyañjakasya śabdasya dhvanir iti vyavahāraḥ

kṛtaḥ | *tatas tanmatānusāribhir anyair api*

nyagbhāvitavācyavyaṅgyavyañjanakṣamasya śabdārthayugalasya | *yathā*

> *niḥśeṣacyutacandanam stanataṭam nirmṛṣṭarāgo 'dharo*
> *netre dūramanañjane pulakitā tanvī taveyam tanuḥ* |
> *mithyāvādini dūti bāndhavajanasyājñātapīḍāgame*
> *vāpīm snātum ito gatāsi na punas tasyādhamasyāntikam* ||

atra tadantikam eva rantuṃ gatāsīti prādhānyenādhamapadena vyajyate ||

---

[80] Indeed, if you modified chapter one and cut chapters two through six, Mammaṭa's text could easily pass as pre-Abhinava.
[81] Merwin and Masson (1977:43).

(1.5) The author now states the division of poetry in order (of merit):

4cd. That (poetry) is best in which the suggested meaning dominates the literal meaning. It is called suggestive poetry by the learned.

That means poetry. **The learned** means the grammarians, who define suggestion as: a word that suggests the suggested meaning by means of the eternal concept (*sphoṭa*) that is the primary meaning. Following this view, others also define suggestion as: a connection of expression and meaning capable of suggesting a suggested sense that subordinates the literal sense. For example, a woman says the following to her go-between:[82]

O false messenger!
You know not the pain you bring.
The sandal paste is washed clean off your rounded breasts,
And the rouge from your lips is completely rubbed off.
Gone is the makeup from the corners of your eyes,
And your slender body still shakes.
So you went for a bath in the tank,
And not to be with that wretch? (2)[83]

---

[82] The information in this sentence is implicit in the use of the word *dūti*.
[83] This verse is in many recensions of the *Amaruśataka*, but falls outside the first hundred. I have found it as 103 and 105. Dwivedi and Gajendragadkar refer to it as 105. Frustratingly, it is excluded with no explanation from all existent English translations.
1a. niḥśeṣacyuta - completely, candanam – sandal ointment, stanataṭam – rounded female breast, nirmṛṣṭa – wiped off, rāgaḥ - color/redness , adharaḥ - lower lip/lips.
1b. netre – in the eye, dūram – far edge, anañjane – free from collyrium, pulakitā - horripilated (a symptom of stimulation), tanvī - possessed of a body, tava – of yours, iyam – this, tanuḥ - slender.
2a. mithyāvādini – o speaker of lies, dūti – o messenger, bāndhavajanasya –, ajñāta – not knowing, pīḍa – the suffering, āgame – that comes to me,
2b. vāpīm - tank, snātum – to bath, itah – from here, gatāsi – are gone, na – not, punar – on the contrary, tasyādhamasya – of that wretch, antikam – presence.

Here, "You have gone near him only to fool around (*rantum*)" is suggested by the prominence of the word "wretch".

Comments

Mammaṭa here leaves the early tradition and draws heavily from Ānandavardhana. Notice that he has been forced to use a whole new technical vocabulary concerning suggested meaning. The explanation of this vocabulary will occupy the next two chapters. Using *rasa* to impose a qualitative hierarchy on poems is Mammaṭa biggest innovation. Chapters four, five, and six are devoted to explaining the three levels of quality.

It is well known that Mammaṭa, while identifying the same three types of poetry as Ānandavardhana, introduces a hierarchy of quality, but nobody, to my knowledge, has offered an explanation of Mammaṭa's motivation. If my thesis is correct, Mammaṭa's reason for doing so is not hard to find. In so much as Ānandavardhana considered suggestion (of *rasa*) the essence of poetry, he had no need to explicitly develop such a hierarchy. It is implicit in his definition.[84] Mammaṭa, by insisting on a formalist definition of poetry, has to assert what Ānandavardhana could assume, namely, that suggestive poetry is better. His reward, however, is great. He successfully creates a theoretic structure that can

[84] See his commentary on 3.36b (Ingalls, et al. 1990:611). Ānandavardhana's problem was how to explain that last, non-suggestive, type could be considered poetry. See Ānandavardhana 3.40 to 3.42 and Abhinava's comments (Ingalls, et al. 1990:632 to 648).

house both of the earlier traditions. But what is more, his definition of poetry also better reflects the actual linguistic usage.

atādṛśi guṇībhūtavyaṅgyaṃ vyaṅgye tu madhyamam* | *(136)

atādṛśi vācyād anatiśāyini | *yathā*

> *grāmataruṇaṃ taruṇyā navavañjulamañjarīsanāthakaram*
> *paśyantyā bhavati muhurnitarāṃ malinā mukhacchāyā* ||

atra vyañjulalatāgṛhe dattasaṃketā nāgateti vyaṅgyaṃ gunībhūtaṃ tadapekṣayā vācyasyaiva camatkāritvāt ||

5ab. A different type of poetry occurs when suggested meaning is not dominant. It is called poetry of subordinate suggestion, and is of middle rank.

A different type of poetry occurs means cases where the suggested meaning does not dominate the literal meaning. For example:

> On seeing the young man
> Holding a fresh ashoka bouquet,
> The young woman's face
> Suddenly flushes a deep red. (3)[85]

Here the suggested meaning, namely, (that the girl) did not go to the rendezvous in the ashoka grove, is subordinate because the literal meaning is more striking.

---

[85]Ruhraṭa's *Kāvyālaṅkāra* 7.39. Also discussed by Ingalls, et al. (1990:168).
1a. grāmataruṇaṃ - village youth, taruṇyā – young woman, nava – fresh, vañjula - aśoka, mañjarī - bunch of flowers, sanātha – having a protector in, karam - hand,
1b. paśyantyā – having seen, bhavati – is/becomes, muhur – momentarily/repeatedly, nitarāṃ - very much, malinā - dark color, mukhacchāyā – facial complexion.

Comments

The boy reminds the woman of their rendezvous in the ashoka grove and shows he was there by bring a bouquet of ashoka flowers back to town. Upon seeing the flowers, the girl blushes deeply, ashamed that she did not keep the appointment. Mammaṭa claims that one is tempted to dwell on the description of the flowers in the hand of the youth and the girl's reaction, rather than on the suggested sense. Because of the post-Ānandavardhana focus on suggestion, this type of poem is excluded from the highest category.

śabdacitraṃ vācyacitram avyaṅgyaṃ tv avaraṃ smṛtam | (145)

citram iti guṇālaṃkārayuktum | avyaṅgyam iti sphuṭapratīyamānārtharahitam | avaram adhamam | yathā

> *svacchandocchaladacchakacchakuharacchātetarāmbhucchaṭā*
> *mūrcchanmohamaharṣiharṣavihitasnānāhnikāhnāya vaḥ |*
> *bhidyād udyad udāradarduradarī dīrghādaridradruma*
> *drohodrekamahormimeduramadā mandākinī mandatām ||*
>
> *vinirgataṃ mānadamātmamandirādbhavatyupaśrutya yadṛcchayāpi yam |*
> *sasaṃbhramendradrutapātitārgalā nimīlitākṣīva bhiyāmarāvatī ||*

5cd. Poetry based on semantic or verbal display is non-suggestive and is known as the lowest type poetry.

Brilliant means possessing excellences and poetic ornaments. **Non-suggestive** means having no striking suggested meaning. **Lowest** means inferior. For example:

May your doubts dissolve into the gentle Ganges,
Whose infinite waters absolve the great seers
and daily wash away their ignorance,
Whose sparkling clarity cuts through the fields,
offering a home to boisterous bull-frogs,
Whose pride flows out in mighty waves
Pushed up by the falling of towering trees.
May your doubts dissolve into these slow-flowing waters! (4)[86]

(Mammaṭa's second example:)

Having heard that Destroyer of Pride is about,
Even if just for a stroll,
Indra, flustered, quickly bolts the gates,
And the city of the gods seems to shut its eyes
From fear. (5)[87]

---

[86] This poem is in *śārdūlavikrīḍitam* metre (m s j s t t g 12+7). Much more than Mammaṭa's other examples, this seems to be an exercise in virtuosity. Many of the words are chosen largely for their sounds. This leaves the translator with the choice of trying to capture either the meaning or the play of sounds. I have chosen the meaning, and tried to give some indication of the auditiory effect in the comments. That said, this poem is more loosely translated than most.
1a. svacchanda – acting at pleasure (echo of svaccha – beautiful/transparent), ucchalad – shining/sparkling, accha - clear, kaccha – bank, kuhara – crevasse, chātetara – the other having been cut (chāta + itara), ambhu – water, chaṭā – lump/mass
1b. mūrcchan – dissolved, moha – spiritual ignorance, maharṣi – great sage, harṣa – joy, vihita – accomplish, snāna – bathing/ablution, āhnika – daily rite, āhnāya – at once, vaḥ - your.
2a. bhidyād – may it destroy/brake/cleave or dissolve/untangle, udyad – rising/jumping (ud+√i), udāra – excellent/loud, dardura – frog (I am aware that the bull-frog is native to North America), darī - cave, dīrghā - long, daridra – roving/mendicant, druma – tree.
2b. droha - injury, udreka - to grow high, mahormi – great waves, medura – thick/dense/great, madā – rapture/pride/intoxication, mandākinī - the slow streaming one, i.e., the Ganges, mandatām – indolence/ignorance/doubts.
[87] Found in Meṇtha's *Hayagrīvavadha* according to Dwivedi.
1a. vinirgataṃ - gone out, mānadam – destroyer of pride – the demon king Hayagrīva, ātma – his, mandirād - palace.
1b. bhavati - is, upaśrutya – to be heard, yadṛccha – spontaneous, accidental, yā – going, api - even, yam - him.

Comments

Mammaṭa's first example has a difficult meter and a pronounced technical brilliance. Part of its beauty comes from the remarkable alliterations. The first half-line uses "cch" (a fairly rare group) six times. Likewise with "d-r" and "m-d" later on. There are also myriad larger repetitions (moha/maha, harṣi/harṣa, darī/dari, mandā/manda, etc.). The compounds are both long and complex. Finally, there is a striking parallelism between the two lines, which both start with descriptions, move to the holy water, and finish with the removal of doubts.

The second poem is built around the city walls – face simile. This personification is decorated by a sustained juxtaposition of nasals and dentals.

It is striking that from my perspective, these poems are among the most beautiful in the chapter. While these poems were greatly admired before the theory of Ānandavardhana, the fact that neither of these poems has a striking suggestion mares them.[88] One of the great merits of Mammaṭa's synthesis is that he can acknowledge the importance of suggestion and also save poems like these. I would like to imagine that Mammaṭa was reacting to a larger awareness among

2a. sasaṃbhrama – quickly/angered, Indra – king of the gods, druta – without delay, pātita – made to fall, argalā – wooden bolt.
2b. nimīlita – having closed eyes, ākṣi – eyes, iva - like, bhiyā - fear, āmarāvatī - the city of the gods.

[88] See *The Kāvyamīmāṃsā* for an example of the importance of *citra kāvya* before Ānandavardhana (Parashar translation pg. 155).

pundits of the danger of prescriptive definitions. "In every man sleeps a zealot, and when he awakes there is a bit more evil in the world."[89]

[89] Cioran (1949:8), my translation.

atha dvitīya ullāsaḥ

iti kāvyaprakāśe śabdārthasvarūpanirṇayo nāma dvitīyaullāsaḥ |

Chapter Two

Investigation of the Nature of Words and Meanings

krameṇa śabdārthayoḥ svarūpam āha |

syād vācako lākṣanikaḥ śabdo 'tra vyañjakas tridhā | (160)

atreti kāvye | *esāṃ svarūpaṃ vakṣyate* |

(2.1. Types of Words and Meanings Introduced.)

The nature of words and meanings is now explained in order.

6ab. Here words can be considered to be of three types: literal designators, metaphoric designators, and suggestive designators.

Here means "in poetry." These types will be explained (in 7cd ff).

Comments

Mammaṭa is not implying that the language of poetry requires a unique philosophy. He is merely acknowledging that there are certain types of literature where suggestion is not often employed (law texts, for example).

vācyādayas tadarthāḥ syuḥ* | *(166)

vācyalakṣyavyaṅgyāḥ |

tātparyārtho 'pi keṣucit* | *(166)

ākāṅkṣāyogyatāsaṃnidhivaśād vakṣyamānasvarupāṇāṃ padārthānāṃ samanvaye tātparyārtho viśeṣavapur apadārtho 'pi vākyārthaḥ samullasatīty abhihitānvayavādināṃ matam | *vācya eva vākyārtha ity anvitābhidhānavādinaḥ* ||

6c. Literal meaning, etc., are their (respective types of) meanings.

(Here is meant) literal meaning, metaphoric meaning, and suggested meaning.

6d. According to some, there is also the speaker's intended meaning.

Those who hold the "relation-of-the-designated" theory *(abhihitānvaya-vādin)* claim that the speaker's intended meaning, which is the meaning of the sentence and not of the individual words, appears when there is a coming together of the word meanings (which are going to be explained) according to syntactic expectation, semantic fittingness, and pronunciation rules.

Those who hold the "designation-of-the-already-related" theory *(anvitābhidhāna-vādin)* (on the other hand) claim that the literal meaning is just the sentence meaning.

Comments

All of mainstream Sanskrit philosophy of language assumes that words and meanings are distinct. There is debate over what type of entity a meaning is, how each word is connected to its respective meaning, both within a sentence and without, and how many types of connection are possible. Mammaṭa explains the three semantic capacities in this and the next chapter. With regard to sentence meaning, he merely indicates that among the philosophers that use this concept there are two opposing camps.

Both camps accept the premise that whole sentences convey more than their individual words. Mammaṭa calls this the intended meaning, others call it the sentence meaning. Both schools are also committed to an ontology containing both particulars and relations (among other types of entities). The first school claims that the words denote only their corresponding ontologically independent entities. That is to say, each word is saturated (in the Fregean sense). In a sentence, they claim, a new element is introduced among the words. This element is a complex relation, the elements of which are listed in the text. The sentence meaning is a complex fact, which is grasped from both the words and the relation between the words.

The second school claims that the sentence is the basic linguistic unit — the utterance of a single word cannot be meaningful (unless other, elided, words can be filled

in by the hearer). The individual words of a sentence do denote entities, but only as existing in some possible relation. A dictionary entry must give not only the entity, but also the types of relation the entity can enter into (i.e., words are divided into parts of speech). Sentence meaning thus arises directly from the denotations of the words, as combined in a fact. This view is committed to the claim that all words are unsaturated, i.e., the meaning of the each word can change from sentence to sentence.[90]

Mammaṭa does not attempt to resolve the debate, which continues throughout Sanskrit philosophy.[91] Indeed, for the rest of the text he makes no use of this philosophic tool (sentence meaning). We will see the ramifications of this in connection with his explanation of meaning in chapter four.

sarveṣāṃ prāyaśo 'rthānāṃ vyañjakatvam apīṣyate | (176)

tatra vācyasya yathā

> *māe gharovaaraṇaṃ ajja hu ṇatthitti sāhiaṃ tumae* |
> *tā bhaṇa karanijjaṃ eme a ṇa vāsaro ṭhāi* ||[92]

[90] Because Sanskrit nouns are declined, word order is relatively unimportant in Sanskrit. Thus many of the obvious English-based objections to this theory were not considered (i.e., in Sanskrit you do not need word order to know if John kissed Mary or vice versa).

[91] I wanted to use Siderits's translation of the two theory names (1991:35 note 21). He calls the Bhāṭṭa position (*abhihitānvayavāda)* the "word-plus-relation theory" and the Prābhākara *(anvitābhidhānavāda)* the "related designation theory". In the context of his explanation this condensed translation is useful, but in isolation I feel it is quite confusing. Kunjunni Raja (1969) chapter 5 is a good place to start for anyone interested in the issue. Gopinath Bhattacharya's explanation in his commentary on the *Tarkasaṃgraha-Dīpikā* (p. 300ff) is also good.

[92] All of the following translations from Prakrit into Sanskrit, unless stated otherwise, are from the *Bālacittānurañjanī* of Sarasvatītītha, which is included in Mohan.

1a. **māe =** mātar – o mother, **gharovaaraṇaṃ =** gṛhopakaraṇaṃ - household provisions, **ajja hu** = atha khalu – now indeed, **ṇatthitti =** nāsti + iti – is not, **sāhiaṃ =** kathitam - discourse, **tumae =** tvayā – with/by you.

atra svair avihārārthinīti vyajyate |

lakṣyasya yathā

> *sāhentī sahi suhaaṃ kaṇe kaṇe dūmmiāsi majña kae* |
> *sabbhāvanehakaraṇijjasarisaaṃ dāva viraiaṃ tumae* ||[93]

atra matpriyaṃ ramayantyā tvayā śatrutvam ācaritam iti lakṣyam | *tena ca*

kāmukaviṣayaṃ sāparādhatvaprakāśanaṃ vyaṅgyam |

vyaṅgyasya yathā

> *ua ṇiccalaṇiṇpaṃdā bhisiṇīpattammi rehai balāā* |
> *ṇimmalamaragaaṇapariṭhṭhiā saṃkhasutti vva* ||[94]

atra niṣpandatvena āśvastatvam | *tena ca janarahitatvam* | *ataḥ saṃketasthānam etad iti*

kayācit kiṃcit pratyucyate | *athavā mithyā vadasi na tvam atrāgato 'bhūr iti vyajyate* ||

7ab. We accept that all the types of meaning are sometimes also suggestive.

There can be suggestiveness in literal meaning, as in:

> Mother, you said that we are out of supplies.

1b. **tā =** tasmāt - thus, **bhaṇa =** bhaṇa - say, **kim =** kim – what, **karanijjaṃ** = karaṇīyam – is to be done, **eme a =** evameva – in this way**, ṇa =** na – not, **vāsaro =** vāsaraḥ - day, **ṭhāi =** tiṣṭhati- stay. (Mohan:179)

[93] 1a. **sāhentī =** sādhayantī - win over/seduce, **sahi =** sakhi – confidante, **suhaaṃ =** subhagam – a beloved, **kaṇe kaṇe =** kṣaṇe kṣaṇe – every instant, **dūmmiāsi =** dūnā asi are suffering pain, **majña =** mama – of me/mine, **kae =** kṛte – when doing,
1b. ***sabbhāvanehakaraṇijjasarisaaṃ =*** *sadbhāva – true/good/faithful + sneha – affection + karaṇīya – to be done/made/effected + sadṛśam – resembling/having the appearance,* ***dāva =*** *tāvat - certainly,* ***viraiaṃ =*** *viracitam – is performed,* ***tumae =*** *tvayā – with/by you.*

[94] *Gāthāsaptaśatī* Weber 4 (1881:4), Patwardhan 3 (1980:2). 1a. **ua =** paśya – see!/look!, **ṇiccalaṇiṇpaṃdā =** niścalaniṣpandām – undisturbed and motionless, **bhisiṇīpattammi =** bisinīpatre – on the lotus leaf, **rehai =** rajate – whitish silver color, **balāā =** balākā - crane.
1b. **ṇimmalamaragaaṇapariṭhṭhiā** = nirmala – flawless + marakata – emerald + bhājana – dish + pratiṣṭhitā - resting**, saṃkhasutti vva =** śaṅkhaśuktir iva – like a conch-shell pearl, which is, of course, mother of pearl. However, as there are traditionally eight sources of pearls, the conch shell being one, I feel it was chosen in this case for stylistic, and not semantic, reasons.

Tell me what to do.
The day will not stay light for long. (6)

Here it is suggested that the girl desires to go out for reasons of her own.

There can be suggestiveness in metaphoric meaning, as in the following verse spoken by a woman to her female friend who is supposed to be acting as her go-between:

My dear friend!
For my sake
You've gone
Time after time
To seduce my beloved.
Your efforts do seem to spring
From honest affection. (7)[95]

The metaphoric meaning here is, "By giving pleasure to my beloved, you have acted like an enemy." And by means of this (metaphoric meaning) the suggested meaning is that the guiltiness of the lovers is known.

There can be suggestiveness in suggested meaning, as in:

Look! A silvery white crane
Motionless and calm upon a lotus petal
Like a pearl
Poised on a flawless emerald platter. (8)

By the word **motionless** is suggested a state of confidence (in the crane), and by this is suggested an absence of people. Therefore, the speaker of the poem is pointing out to her lover, "This is a place for a rendezvous." Alternatively, she is suggesting, "You lie! You did not come here (for our rendezvous)."

[95] The second half of the introductory sentence communicates what a Sanskrit reader would understand from the gender of the words in the poem and from the word "*sakhi,*" which means "friend" but also "confidante" and "romantic go-between."

Comments

The first poem presents a girl old enough to go out alone but young enough to be still living with her mother (and thus unmarried). She reminds her mother that they are short of some household supply (notice the past tense "said"). That she does so as evening approaches suggests that she wants to go out for her own (i.e., romantic) purposes.

In the second poem the word "friend" and the words "seduce my beloved" create a blocking of literal meaning, triggering the reader to search for an alternate meaning.[96] One realizes that the word "friend" is being used ambiguously, if not outright ironically. But the reader is pushed to ask why the speaker would use such irony. We conclude (from the use of **seduce** in place of something like "help me seduce") that the speaker must be aware of illicit relations between her erstwhile friend and her lover.

The third poem has no blocking of literal sense, it can be read as a simple description of a nature scene. The crane's calm suggests, to an attentive reader, that there are no people around.[97] Given the context (that the speaker is a young girl speaking to paramour in the presence of others), one can see that the speaker is suggesting the absence of people would be meaningful to them (for one of the reason given above). The ambiguity of the second level suggestion adds to the poem's charm, for both possible suggestions evoke the erotic *rasa*.

[96] Mammaṭa explains how metaphoric indication works later in this chapter.

[97] How it effects this suggestion is left unanswered. Some argue that all suggestion can be explained as an inference, others claim either that this cannot be done or that it is, in fact, not done in actual cases.

The poems reveal a problem that follows us though the next four chapters, namely, how much context and imagination are needed to understand the verses that are given as examples? All these verses originally were part of larger units (sometimes epics, sometimes plays, etc.), and many of them, like the poem at hand, cannot be fully understood out of context. The question I would like to pose is: how did Mammaṭa intend his readers to understand to his examples? There are several possible answers. First, he believed that the larger context, despite what I have just claimed, is not necessary to understand the poems. Second, he expected his readers to know the larger poems well enough to provide the necessary context for themselves. Third, he expected his readers to read a commentary that explained the context.

Clearly the first solution would be ideal, and Mammaṭa's text seems to imply that he held this view. Unfortunately, in the poem above and in countless others, I firmly believe it is impossible to get the full meaning from the verse alone. For example, how would you know that two lovers are involved? Or that they need to communicate secretly? Worst of all, even Mammaṭa himself is not sure of what the second suggestion is! He claims it could be a reproach or an invitation. But could it not equally well be a sweet reminder of a past rendezvous? Or an accusation that the lover has been there with another girl? The possibilities seem endless.

When considering the second and third solutions, we should note that they are not mutually exclusive. The second solution would apply to the ideal reader (and the pundits are know for their elephantine memories), while the third solution would apply to the less

ideal reader (like myself). If a similar text in English were illustrated entirely with Shakespeare quotes, an educated reader would not need the context explained. A fact that mitigates against this view is that the original locations of most of the poems are not identified in the commentaries, although usually a minimal context is given.[98]

With regard to the suggestions in the present poem, the situation is further complicated by the fact that a character is speaking to another character, and not (only) the poet to the audience (reader or listener). The poet has presented a scene in which a woman suggests certain things to a man that we readers, as eavesdroppers, as it were, are supposed to understand. Our case is thus quite different from that of the man being spoken to, who is obviously familiar with the context (himself, the woman, and their history together). The audience has to be brought into this fantasy by some means, for the understanding of a whole scene is often integral to understanding the verbal power of suggestion.

We shall return to these issues in the third chapter, and also in the fourth and fifth chapters.

vācakādīnāṃ krameṇa svarūpam āha |

sākṣāt saṃketitaṃ yo 'rtham abhidhatte sa vācakaḥ* | *(198)

ihāgṛhītasaṃketasya śabdasyārthapratīter abhāvāt saṃketasahāya eva śabdo 'rthaviṣeśaṃ pratipādayatīti yasya yatrāvyavadhānena saṃketo gṛhyate sa tasya vācakaḥ ||

[98] One wonders if the context is always given correctly, or if it is invented in the case of some poems.

(2.2.) The author explains the nature of literal designators, etc., taking them up in order:

7cd. A literal designator is a word that directly denotes a conventional meaning.

Since there is no knowledge of the meaning of a word whose convention is not grasped, a word causes one to understand a particular meaning only in so far as it is joined with a convention of use. When the convention of a word is grasped in relation to a meaning without an intermediary, the word is the **literal designator** of the meaning.

Comments

Mammaṭa uses a biconditional to show that the conventional meaning of a word is its basic meaning: you understand a word if and only if you understand the convention(s) governing its use. This view is traditionally associated with the Naiyāyikas, who argued for it early on.[99] The Grammarians and the Mīmāṃsakas, on the other hand, both argue for a natural or eternal connection between words and their senses.[100] The Mīmāṃsakas, however, do recognize the role of convention in limiting the nature ability of a signifier to a certain meaning. It is striking that Mammaṭa, who normally sides with the Grammarians and the Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas, takes the Nyāya position here.

[99] *Nyāyasūtra* 2.1.5.
[100] See *The Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.1.5. Also see Bhartṛhari 1.23.

saṃketitaś caturbhedo jātyādir jātir eva vā | (208)

yady apy arthakriyākāritayā pravṛttinivṛttiyogyā vyaktir eva tathāpy ānantyād vyabhicārāc ca tatra saṃketaḥ kartuṃ na yujyate iti gauḥ śuklaś calo ḍittha ityādīnāṃ viṣayavibhāgo na prāpnotīti ca | tadupādhāv eva saṃketaḥ ||

upādhiś ca dvividhaḥ | vastudharmo vaktṛyadṛcchāsaṃniveśitaś ca | vastudharmo 'pi dvividhaḥ | siddhaḥ sādhyas ca | siddho 'pi dvividhaḥ | padārthasya prāṇaprado viśeṣādhānahetuś ca | tatrādyo jātiḥ uktaṃ hi vākyapadīye na hi gauḥ svarūpeṇa gaur nāpy agauḥ gotvābhisaṃbandhāt tu gauḥ iti | dvitīyo guṇaḥ | śuklādinā hi labdhasattākaṃ vastu viśiṣyate | sādhyaḥ purvāparībhūtāvayavaḥ kriyārūpaḥ | ḍitthādiśabdānām antyabuddhinirgrāhyaṃ saṃhṛtakramaṃ svarūpaṃ vaktrā yadṛcchayā ḍitthādiṣv artheṣūpādhitvena saṃniveśyata iti so 'yaṃ saṃjñārūpo yadṛcchātmaka iti | gauḥ śuklaś calo ḍittha ityādau catuṣṭayī śabdānāṃ pravṛttiḥ iti mahābhāṣyakāraḥ | paramāṇvādīnāṃ tu guṇamadhyapāṭhāt pāribhāṣikaṃ guṇatvam ||

8ab. The conventionally designated is either fourfold consisting of natural kinds, etc., or it consists of universals only.[101]

(Arguments for the first view:) Even though it is fitting to act or avoid action with regard to particulars (and not universals) because particulars have causal efficiency, still, the meaning convention cannot relate a word directly to individuals because of (the faults of) infinite application (if the word is related to the entire class of individuals) or

---

[101] I translate *jāti* first by “natural kind” then by “universal” because I believe Mammaṭa is drawing from two different traditions, each of which use the word differently. Failure to recognize this makes this section impossible to understand. See the comments below.

misapplication (if it is based on a subclass). Furthermore, the individual entity does not serve to differentiate (various aspects of) the cognitive object in a (complex) cognition like, "This is a cow, white, walking, Ḍittha." Therefore, a linguistic convention connects only to a characteristic of the individual (and not the individual itself).

Characteristics are twofold: (1, 2, 3) properties of the object and (4) those imposed (on the object) by the will of the speaker. The properties of the object are also twofold: (1, 2) the established properties and (3) the properties that are to be established. The established properties are also twofold: (1) those which determine a kind (as different from other kinds) and (2) those which impose differentiation (on members of a single kind).

(1) The first of these are natural kinds. In support of this, there is a saying from the *Vākyapadīya*: "A cow is a cow by its connection to cowhood. It is neither a cow nor a non-cow by virtue of its own nature."[102]

(2) A second type of property is the quality (*guṇa*), because an object whose natural kind is already ascertained is differentiated by qualities like white, etc., (from others of the same kind).

(3) Properties that are to be established each take the form of an action or process, whose parts are the proceeding and the subsequent moments.[103]

[102] I have not been able to find this reference.
[103] Processes are not often thought of as properties in Western ontology. When we say a man is walking, we mean that he has been walking and that we expect he will continue to do so for at least another moment. He is thus in the process of establishing the property "walked a certain distance or time."

(4) A word like "Ḍittha," etc., that by nature is assembled letter by letter and grasped mentally at the end, is attached to an object, Ḍittha, in this case, by the will of the language user (*vaktṛ)* as a characteristic (i.e., "being named Ḍittha"). Such a word is called a proper name and has its essence in the voluntariness (of conventions made by language users).

(To conclude the presentation of this view I quote) the author of the *Mahābhāṣya,* "The basis for the application of words is fourfold, as in a complex cognition like, "This is a cow, white, walking, Ḍittha."[104]

Atoms, etc., are technically defined as qualities because they are listed among the qualities (by the early realist philosophers).[105]

Comments

As I have shown in the introduction, Mammaṭa is heavily indebted to both the Grammarian and the Mīmāṃsā traditions. As the quotes show, the view presented here is from the Grammarians. The Mīmāṃsā view is presented in the next section. Mammaṭa makes no attempt to determine which is correct, although he does present a couple strands of argument.

---

[104] I have not been able to find this reference. I follow Renou in translating *pravṛttiḥ* as "basis for the application" (1957:2:36).

[105] According to Gajendragadkar (1939:175) **Atoms** means atomic dimension and **etc.** means qualities like all-pervadingness. Apparently these were controversially listed among the qualities in the oldest Vaiśeṣika ontology. See his discussion for the details of this debate. Mammaṭa's point is that we do not need a fifth type of characteristic to account for them.

The first claim in the Grammarian argument is that only individuals enter into the causal web of the world. A stock illustration claims that it is individual cows and not cowness that one milks. The second claim is that the individuals cannot ground linguistic usage. For one must either take the entire class of individuals or some subclass thereof as the meaning of a particular word. If the first option is chosen, the meaning will never be certain because such a class is, in principle, infinite (or at least without any known limit). If the second option is chosen, further instances of the type not included in the defining group will be, by the definition, not examples of the type. This would result is a misapplication of the word as restricted to only the original group, whereas clearly new tokens should be designated.[106] The conclusion is that the linguistic conventions connect words to universals as instantiated in particulars. Notice that an understanding of the general concept of universal is implicit in this argument. Without such a concept, each of the four cases would have to be argued separately.

The Sanskrit of the *kārikā* at hand is confusing because Mammaṭa uses the same word, *jāti,* to name one of the subclasses of universals as he uses to name the entire class. This confusion evaporates when one understand the evolution of this word. In its earliest uses in grammatical texts, *jāti* meant "natural kind" or "species."[107] This use is preserved in the Grammarian school of philosophy much later than in other schools. Most notably for our purposes, Bhartṛhari uses the word this way. There seems to be no word in the

[106] Kumārila makes this argument in the *Ślokavārtika* 5:13:1.
[107] See Renou (1957:1:148).

early grammarians that refers to universals in general.[108] The word used here for an instantiated universal is a general word for properties, which I translate as "characteristic" (and which the *Saṅketaḥ* commentary glosses: ***tadupādhau*** *iti vyaktiviśeṣeṇe).*[109] In this section, the term "characteristic" is used to explain the ontological status of word meanings. Each type of word (common noun, adjective, verb, proper noun) is explained with reference to a subclass of characteristics.

The second view Mammaṭa refers to is the Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka view, and *jāti* here refers to the general ontological category "universal." Mammaṭa now proceeds to explain this view.

guṇākriyāyadṛcchānāṃ vastuta ekarūpāṇām apy āśrayabhedād bheda iva lakṣyate | *yathaikasya mukhasya khaṅgamukuratailādyālambanabhedāt* | *himapayaḥ śaṅkādyāśrayeṣu paramārthato bhinneṣu śuklādiṣu yadvaśena śuklaḥ śukla ityādyābhinnābhidhānapratyayotpattis tat śuklatvādisāmānyam* | *guḍataṇḍulādipākādiṣv evam eva pākatvādi* | *bālavṛddhśukādyudīriteṣu ḍitthādiśabdeṣu ca pratikṣaṇaṃ bhidyamāneṣu ḍitthādyartheṣu vā ḍitthatvādy astīti sarveṣāṃ śabdānāṃ jātir eva pravṛttinimittam ity anye* | *tadvān apoho va śabdārthaḥ kaiścid ukta iti granthagauravabhayāt prakṛtānupayogāc ca na darśitam* || *(234)*

---

[108] This should not be surprising. The grammarians worked to explain and distinguish nouns in general, verbs in general, adjectives in general, etc. They did not go beyond these to the more general concept of universals, which belongs more to ontology than grammar. See Renou (1957:1:78, 109, and 148).
[109] See Renou (1957:1:109).

(Arguments for the second view:) Others hold that universals alone form the bases of all words.[110] Just as a single face appears to be several when reflected in a sword, a mirror, and a pool of oil, so each quality, action, and proper name has a single essence in reality, even though they appear various due to the different substances (in which they are instantiated). A universal, whiteness, for example, is that on account of which there are identical expressions and thoughts, "(This) is white (and that) is white", for example, in really distinct white substances: snow, milk, shells, etc. Likewise, there is a universal, cookinghood, for example, in all the various distinct instances of cooking: cooking jaggery, cooking rice, etc. Finally, there is a (word) universal, "Ḍittha"hood, for example, (exemplified) in all the distinct utterances of the word "Ḍittha" by a child, by an old man, by a parrot, etc., and in Ḍittha himself, who is changing from moment to moment. Thus universals alone form the bases of all words.

Some (the Realists) hold that the substances which instantiate universals act as the bases of all words, while others (the Buddhists) hold that (instances of) exclusion do so. These views are not examined because they are not relevant and would, I fear, swell the work (out of proportion).

[110] This sentence is found at the end of the section in the Sanskrit (see translational note #6).

Comments

The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka claims that universal are the literal meanings of words. As all of Bhartṛhari's "characteristics" can be considered universals, the difference between the Grammarian and Mīmāṃsaka views is smaller than it first seems. The Grammarian view places more emphasis on the four types of universals, the Bhāṭṭa view on the ontological claim that all four types are subclasses of a single ontological category.

As we saw in the proceeding section, the personal identity of Ḍittha seems to depend on the property "being called Ḍittha," which remains identical throughout Ḍittha's life. Whether this claim concerning person identity is only supposed to explain verbal usage, or whether it is an ontological claim, is not specified. In view of the religious convictions that Mammaṭa appears to hold, I would incline to the former interpretation.

Mammaṭa points out that there are other views concerning the ontological status of the meaning element. I think he is right to claim that establishing which view is correct is not important for his project. As long as all the schools active at this time agree that there is such a thing (even the Buddhist exclusion class is an entity of sorts), Mammaṭa can move on to the semantic powers characteristic of poetry.

sa mukhyo 'rthas tatra mukhyo vyāpāro 'syābhidhocyate* || *(243)

sa iti sākṣāt saṃketitaḥ | *asyeti śabdasya* ||

8cd. That is the primary meaning, and with respect to it, the primary function of this (a word) is called denotation.

That refers to directly denoted conventional meaning. **Of this** refers to a word.

Comments

All the philosophical schools admit there is such a thing as conventional meaning (with the possible exception of Cārvāka).[111] Mammaṭa's definition is thus vague enough to avoid the dispute about the ontological status of meanings. What distinguishes poetry from other uses of language lies in other semantic powers than denotation. To these he now proceeds.

mukhyārthabādhe tadyoge rūḍhito 'tha prayojanāt |

anyo 'rtho lakṣyate yat sā lakṣaṇāropitā kriyā || (246)

karmaṇi kuśalaḥ ityādau darbhagrahaṇādyayogāt gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaṃ ityādau ca gaṅgādīnāṃ ghosādyādhāratvāsaṃbhāvāt mukhyārthāsya bādhe vivecakatvādau sāmīpye ca sambandhe rūḍhitaḥ prasiddheḥ tathā gaṅgātaṭe ghoṣaḥ ityādeḥ prayogāt yeṣāṃ na tathā pratipattiḥ teṣāṃ pāvanatvādīnāṃ dharmāṇāṃ tathā pratipādanātmanaḥ prayojanāt ca mukhyena amūkhyo 'rtho lakṣyate yat sa āropitaḥ śabdavyāpāraḥ sāntarārthaniṣṭho lakṣanā ||

[111] Kunjunni Raja (1969:24).

(2.3. Definition of Metaphoric Indication.)

9. Metaphoric Indication is a superimposed semantic capacity of words (that occurs) when the primary meaning is blocked and another meaning is metaphorically indicated which is connected to the primary meaning either by a (second-order linguistic) convention or by a special purpose.[112]

A non-literal meaning is metaphorically indicated by the literal meaning (when two conditions are satisfied, the first of which is:) when the literal meaning is blocked. (This can happen) either (1a) because of a (semantic) non-connection, as in expressions like "*karmaṇi kuśalaḥ*" ("a discerning workman," originally, "a *kuśa*-grass worker") where there is non-connection with gathering *kuśa* grass, or (1b) because of (semantic) impossibility, as in expressions like, "The village is on the Ganges," where there is the impossibility of a river like the Ganges being the site of a village. And (2) when a (semantic) connection is established (between the two meanings), either (2a) by a second-order linguistic convention, such as (the second order conventional meaning) "discernment" (where the literal sense "sacred grass cutter" came to mean anyone who works with the carefullness that is required of the *kuśa* cutter) or (2b) because of a special purpose, such as (the indicated meaning) "proximity," which aims to bestow (upon the village) such properties as purity, etc., (which are suggested properties and which) would not be conveyed by such literal expressions as, "The village is on the bank of the

[112] *Kriyā* is glossed as *śakti* in the *Dīpikā.* I follow this and translate it "semantic capacity" or "semantic power." Having semantic capacity means having the ability to convey meaning. Indicative words are said to be capable of conveying additional meaning (beyond the denoted meaning). Semantic capacities are that by which a word conveys meaning. Words can do this in three ways according to Mammaṭa. Thus there are three semantic capacities or powers.

Ganges." A metaphor is a superimposed function of a word that is grounded an another meaning (i.e., the literal).

Comments

The two examples point to two different linguistic phenomena that are covered by the term "metaphoric indication." The first concerns the secondary or parasitic meanings of a word that arise due to a semantic connection and/or addition. These become fixed by convention and are available to all language users. Often they come in the form of faded metaphors (*nirūḍhalakṣaṇā)*. Thus in English the word "maverick" first meant the cow of a certain rancher named Maverick who did not brand his cows. It took on the meaning of any cow that could not be identified and eventually any member of a group that does not fit. Mammaṭa would say that there are three conventions for the use of this word, and that the later two are parasitic on the primary one. There is much discussion in the Sanskrit tradition of whether metaphoric meaning can eventually become literal meanings (as with "maverick" and also, apparently, in the case that Mammaṭa discusses here).[113] This would not be a large step for Mammaṭa in that he holds that they are all equally conventional. The winning argument appears to be that the "becoming literal" view can explain the correct use of such words by people who are not aware that they are metaphors.

The second linguistic phenomenon we see here is closer to true metaphor. Here the secondary use of a word is specific to the occasion of use and is created for a specific

[113] One of the leading critics after Mammaṭa, Viśvanātha, claims that they can become literal (see Kunjunni Raja 1969:264).

purpose. Thus when Shakespeare has Macbeth say, “Life is but a walking shadow…” he does so for a specific purpose (to suggest the fleeting nature of life, etc.). In this case, there is no secondary linguistic convention that comes to include life as a meaning of “shadow.”

It is interesting to note that the specific purpose is said to be always a suggestion (see *kārikā* 13, below). This had led some to claim that metaphor is always in the service of suggestion. However, the first type Mammaṭa cites seems to contradict this, as do part-whole metaphors, which are often used simply for convenience (it is easier to say the class is bored than to say that most of the students in the class are bored).

It is regrettable that Mammaṭa does not tell us more about how we arrive at the correct secondary meaning. It is clear from the tradition that the ability to do so is both a result and a sign of good training. The training would thus have to teach both vast lexical knowledge and subtle appreciation of literary devices and intentions. This linguistic training would certainly compose part of the training described in chapter 1, *kārikā* 3.

***svasiddhaye parākṣepaḥ parārthaṃ svasamarpaṇam* |**

upādānaṃ lakṣaṇaṃ cety uktā śuddhaiva sā dvidhā* || *(264)

kuntāḥ praviśanti yaṣṭayaḥ praviśanti ityādau kuntādibhir ātmanaḥ praveśasiddhyarthaṃ svasaṃyoginaḥ puruṣā ākṣipyante | *tata upādāneneyaṃ lakṣaṇā* ||

gaur anubandhyaḥ ityādau śruticóditam anubandhanaṃ kathaṃ me syād iti jātyā vyaktir ākṣipyate na tu śabdenocyate viśeṣyaṃ nābhidhā gacchet kṣīṇaśaktir viśeṣaṇe iti nyāyād

ity upādānalakṣanā tu nodāhartavyā | na hy ātra prayojanam asti na vā rūḍhir iyam | vyaktyavinābhāvitvāt tu jātyā vyaktir ākṣipyate | yathā kriyatām ity atra kartā | kurv ity atra karma | praviśa piṇḍīm ityādau gṛhaṃ bhakṣayetyādi ca | pīno devadatto divā na bhuṅkte ity atra ca rātribhojanaṃ na lakṣyate śrutārthāpatter arthāpatter vā tasya viṣayatvāt ||

gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ ity atra taṭasya ghoṣādhikaraṇatvasiddhiye gaṅgāśabdaḥ svārtham apayati ity evamādau lakṣaṇenaiṣā lakṣaṇā ||

ubhayrūpā ceyaṃ śuddhā upacāreṇāmiśritatvāt | anayor lakṣyasya lakṣakasya ca na bhedarūpaṃ tāṭasthyam | taṭādīnāṃ gaṅgādisabdaiḥ pratipādane tattvapratipattau hi pratipipādayiṣitaprayojanasaṃpratyayaḥ | gaṅgāsaṃbandhamātrapratītau tu gaṅgātaṭe ghoṣa iti mukhyaśabdābhidhānāl lakṣaṇāyāḥ ko bhedaḥ ||

(2.4. Two Types of Pure Metaphors: Additive and Commutative.)

10. Pure metaphors are said to be twofold: the additive, which implies another meaning along with the literal meaning, and the commutative (*lakṣaṇaṃ*), which surrenders the literal meaning for the other (the metaphoric meaning).

In an expressions like, “The lances enter,” or, “The staves enter,” in order to make the entering of the lances possible, the men connected to them must be **implied** by the word “lances,” and likewise for “staves,” etc. Therefore, this is a metaphor by means of addition (of another sense, i.e., both the spears and the men bearing them are meant).[114]

[114] Strictly speaking, of course, these are examples of metonymy, not metaphor.

In an expression like, “The ox should be sacrificed,” the individual ox is not mentioned by the word (“ox”) according to the dictum: “The denotation (of a word) will not go to the qualified (the individual) when it has already gone to the qualifier (the universal).” (Some might claim that) the individual is implied by the universal, (because otherwise it might be asked), “How is the sacrifice enjoined by the Veda possible for me?” But this should not be cited as an additive metaphor, for here there is neither convention nor a special purpose. Rather, the individual is implied by the universal because of its invariable connection with the individual. Likewise in, “Do it!” an agent is implied (because there is never an action without an agent). In the case of, “Do!” some object is implied, (because there is never a transitive verb without an object). Likewise, “Enter!” implies a building (to enter into) and “Cake!” implies that one should eat.[115]

With the expression, “Fat Devadatta does not eat during the day,” nocturnal feeding is not indicated metaphorically, because the sentence comes to have that meaning by either verbal presumption or (unqualified) presumption.[116]

With the expression, “The village is on the Ganges,” the word “Ganges” gives up its literal meaning in order to establish that the village is on its bank. Expressions such as this are metaphors by commutation.

---

[115] In both cases, we might also cite the reason that a transitive verb and a direct object (an object in the accusative case) are syntactically dependant and thus invariably concomitant.

[116] Kumārila Bhāṭṭa asserted the theory of verbal presumption (*śrutārthāpatti)* to explain this type of reasoning, while Prābhākara assert unqualified presumption (*ārthāpatti).* Other classical philosophers see all such presumption as a form of inference. Mammaṭa apparently is not concerned to establish which view is right, but only to disregard this as a possible case of metaphoric indication.

These two types of metaphor are called "pure" because they do not involve the assistance (of resemblance between the indicating (or literal) meaning and the indicated (or metaphoric) meaning). However, the division between the indicated meaning and the indicating meaning is not a complete separation. For when "the bank of the Ganges" is understood by the word "Ganges," the correct interpretation is that a special purpose is meant to be communicated. If only an external relation to the Ganges were to be apprehended, "The village is on the bank of the Ganges," is what would have properly been said. Why use metaphor if denotation communicates the same information?

Comments

The basic division of metaphoric indication is pure metaphor versus qualitative metaphor. The latter type is based on similarity of meaning of the two terms, or more specifically on their sharing some quality. The former is based on some other relation between the meanings of the terms (e.g., cause - effect or part - whole). While early Mīmāṃsakas thought these were two different semantic powers, Mammaṭa combines them and uses the terminology to differentiate two subclasses of a single semantic power (metaphoric indication).

Mammaṭa begins his presentation of metaphor considering two types of pure metaphor.[117] The classification hinges on what part of literal meaning is brought into the final understanding of the sentence. When one says, "The staves enter," the metaphor

[117] Mammaṭa combines several different (overlapping) ways of classifying metaphor into a single presentation.

supplies the people carrying the staves. The meaning of "staves" becomes both the staves and the people carrying them: thus the term "additive." In, "The village is on the Ganges," the word "Ganges" gives up its meaning "river," and takes on the meaning "bank of the river." However, the loss of the original meaning is not complete, for certain qualities inherent in the original object are available for communication by suggestion.[118]

The indication of a particular ox by the term "ox," whose denotation on the Mīmāṃsā view is the universal "oxhood," does not count as metaphoric indication because the individual can be logically inferred from the universal concomitance between the universal and a particular.[119] Similarly in the case of fat Devadatta, the knowledge is gained by the means of knowledge known as presumption, which grounds negative inferences. Fatness is universally non-concomitant with fasting. Although the literal meaning seems "blocked," in both cases it is unblocked by a little logic. Such is not the case, however, with, "The cribs cry," because there is no universal concomitance between the cribs and babies. Mammaṭa returns to this type of case presently (*kārikā* 12abc).

In the tradition there is a third type: a metaphor in which the literal term (or both terms) gives up a part of its meaning, but retains another part. The most famous example is from the *Upaniṣads*, "You are that (the Absolute)." The identification is not literally true because there are differences between a human and Brahman, the Absolute. But, the text claims, a part of what is referred to by "you" is identical to part of what is referred to

---

[118] For additional details of this view, see Kunjunni Raja (1969:266).
[119] No uninstantiated universals are admitted by the Mīmāṃsakas.

by "that."[120] Mammaṭa does not treat the third type and I give a reason why he may have chosen to ignore it in the comments to *kārikā* 12d.

sāropanyā tu yatroktau viṣayī viṣayas tathā* | *(291)

āropayamāṇaḥ āropaviṣayaś ca yatrānapahnutabhedau sāmānādhikaraṇyena nirdiśyete sā lakṣaṇā sāropā ||

viṣayyantaḥ kṛte 'nyasmin sā syāt sādhyavasānikā* || *(291)

viṣayiṇāropyamāṇenāntaḥkṛte nigīrṇe anyasmin nāropaviṣaye sati sādhyavasānā syāt ||

(2.5. Impositional and Determining Metaphors Defined and Explained.)

11ab. There is another type of metaphor, the impositional, in which both the object of comparison and the subject of comparison are stated.

When (1) the imposed upon and the imposed object of comparison are expressed with the same case ending and (2) their difference is not denied, the metaphor is "impositional."

11cd. A determining metaphor occurs when the other (the subject of comparison) is made interior to the object of comparison.

When the object of comparison swallows the subject of comparison, the metaphor is "determining."

Comments

[120] Appaya Dīkṣita takes up this issue at length in the second part of his *Vṛttivārttika*.

These types of metaphor become easier to understand with the examples, which are given below.

***bhedāvimau ca sādṛśyāt saṃbandhāntaratas tathā* |**

gauṇau śuddhau ca vijñeyau (300)

imāv āropādhyavasānarūpau sādṛśyahetū bhedau gaur vāhīkaḥ ity atra gaur ayam ity atra ca | *atra hi svārthasahacāriṇo guṇā jāḍyamāndyādayo lakṣyamāṇā api gośabdasya parārthābhidhāne pravṛttinimittatvam upayānti iti kecit* | *svārthasahacāriguṇābhedena padārthagatā guṇā eva lakṣyante na parārtho 'bhidhiyate ity anye* | *sādhāraṇaguṇāśrayatvena parārtha eva lakṣyate ity apare* | *uktaṃ cānyatra abhidheyāvinābhūtapratītir lakṣaṇocyate* | *lakṣyamāṇaguṇair yogād vṛtter iṣṭā tu gauṇatā iti* | *avinābhāvo 'tra saṃbandhamātraṃ na tu nāntarīyakatvam* | *tattve hi mañcāḥ krośanti ityadau na lakṣaṇā syāt* | *avinābhāve cākṣepeṇaiva siddher lakṣaṇāyā nopayoga ity uktam* ||

āyur ghṛtam āyur evedam ityādau ca sādṛśyād anyat kāryakāraṇabhāvādi sambandhāntaram | *evamādau ca kāryakāraṇabhāvādilakṣaṇapūrve āropādhyavasāne* | *atra gauṇabhedayor bhede 'pi tādrūpyapratītiḥ sarvathaivābhedāvagamaś ca prayojanam* | *śuddhabhedayos tv anyavailakṣaṇyenāvyabhicāreṇa ca kāryakāritvādi* ||[121]

kvacit tādarthyād upacāraḥ | *yathā indrārthā sthūṇā indraḥ* | *kvacit svasvāmibhāvāt* | *yathā rājakīyaḥ purūṣo rājā* | *kvacit avayayavāyavibhāvāt* | *yathā agrahasta ityatrāgramātre 'vayave hastaḥ* | *kvacit tādkarmyāt* | *yathā atakṣā takṣā* ||

[121] The preceding two sentences, while absent in Mohan, appear in Jha, Gajendragadkar, and Dwivedi.

12abc. Furthermore, these two divisions (of metaphor) are known as qualitative when the metaphor is based on resemblance, and pure when it is based on another relation.

Examples of the two divisions, impositional and determining metaphors, when the metaphor is based on resemblance (and thus qualitative) are "The porter is an ox," and "the ox" (said of a porter).[122] (There are three prima facie explanations for this later type of metaphor.) Some say that even thought the denotation of "ox" is another object (the porter), qualities associated with the primary meaning, such as stupidity and slowness, suffice to occasion the usage (of "ox" to mean the porter).[123] Others say that only the qualities of the object are indicated metaphorically, because they are identical with the qualities associated with the primary meaning (the ox). Furthermore, the object (the porter) is not denoted. Still others say that only the object (the porter) is indicated metaphorically, because that is the substratum of the common qualities.

This is also said elsewhere, "A cognition of that which does not exist without the object denoted is called a metaphor. This process should (be called) qualitative, because

---

[122] *Vāhika* seems to be an alternate spelling of *bālhika* or *bālhīka* (Monier Williams 949). If *vāhīka* is a variation of the same word, this is a reference (and insult) to the Punjab. Gajendragadkar asserts this reading, but does not state his reasons. Dwivedi translates it as a personal name. Apte (1422) agrees that it is an alternate spelling of *bālhīka* but adds that it also means an irreligious person. Under *bālhīka* he adds "ox" as a second definition! I have taken it as a variation of *vāhika* and translated it "porter." Along similar lines, Jha's translates it "ploughman."

The second example cannot be translated, "This (guy) is an ox." To do so would make this another example of impositional metaphor. An example of this expression in a full sentence is, "This ox is taking forever with my bags."

[123] All the commentators agree that the porter is the referent of the phrase, "the other meaning". However, the passage makes more sense to me if the qualities of the porter (i.e., the individual instantiations of the universals) are what are referred to.

(the indicator – the ox) is connected to the indicated object (the porter) by the (common) qualities."[124] It has been said that by, "does not exist without," there is meant simply a connection and not an invariable concomitance. If invariable concomitance were the meant, no metaphor would occur in cases like, "The cribs cry," (or maybe, "The stands roar.") Furthermore, if there were invariable concomitance, the indicated meaning would be established by implication alone, and there would be no need of metaphor.

"Ghee is life," and "this true life" (Said of ghee) are examples (of metaphor) based on a relation other than similarity – the causality relation.[125] In such cases, the superimposition or determining is based on a relation of the cause and effect relation or the like.

The purpose (of the metaphor) in the two qualitative types of metaphor (e.g., "The porter is an ox," and "the ox" used to refer to the porter) is cognition of identity despite difference in substance (in the first type) and complete identity (in the second type). In the pure types, on the other hand, the purpose is to show that ghee sustains life in a way different from other (foodstuffs that also sustain life) or that ghee invariably sustains life.

(Four examples of pure metaphors based on other relations follow.) In some cases, the metaphor indicates (a relation of) serving another's purpose. For example a pillar dedicated to Indra is called Indra. In some cases, the metaphor indicates (a relation

---

[124] While all agree that this quote is from Kumārila Baṭṭa, Jha (1925:24) locates it in the *Ślokavārttika,* while Dwivedi correctly gives *Tantravārtika* 1.4.22. See *Tantravārttika* (1937:354).

[125] As in "the ox", the second example here cannot be translated as, "This (stuff) is life itself." To be an impositional metaphor, *idam* must be an article qualifying life, not a pronoun standing for ghee. An example of a full sentence containing this expression is, "Pour some of life itself into the fire." Compare the English expression, "He is all out of beans."

of) servant and master. For example an agent of the king is called the king's man. In some cases, the metaphor indicates (a relation of) part to whole. For example, the foremost part of the hand (i.e., the palm) is called the hand. In some cases, the metaphor indicates (a relation of) of identity of activity. For example, a person who is not a carpenter (by trade) is called a carpenter (when working wood).

Comments

There are three views of how the word “ox” can apply to the porter. All assert that the universal ox-hood is denoted by the word “ox” and that this meaning is blocked by the non-identity of the ox and the porter. The first view holds that metaphor works in three stages. After the failed denotation, the qualities of the ox (stupidity and slowness) are metaphorically indicated. Finally, the similar qualities ground the denotation of the porter. The second view also asserts that ox-hood is denoted and blocked. Then the qualities of the porter are metaphorically indicated. Finally, the porter is inferred as the substratum of the properties. The third view asserts that the blocking of the literal sense, the individual is metaphorically indicated on the basis of shared qualities.

A possible interpretation of this passage is that Mammaṭa is presenting all the possible views without taking sides (a common practice of his, as we have seen). However, I believe that the first two views are “incorrect” *(pūrvapakṣa)* and that for Mammaṭa, the third view is the “accepted and proven position” *(siddhanta).* Mammaṭa uses the Kumārila quote to give authority to his position. On this reading, Mammaṭa is

offering a highly condensed summary of the arguments put forward by Kumārila in the *Tantravārttika*.

The principle objection against the first view is the stability of meaning. Kumārila argues that the meaning of a word does not change with the invention of every new metaphor. Thus the porter cannot be part of the literal meaning of the word "ox" in the expression, "the ox" (used to refer to the porter).[126] A second objection is that denotation can only function once. If the word "ox" successfully picks out a meaning, it will go no further.[127]

The objection Kumārila brings against the second view is that many qualities are linked to the referent of the word ("ox" in this case) and only some of them are metaphorically indicated in the expression, "the ox." There is no way to determine which qualities are relevant without reference to the other object (the porter).[128] Further, the use of inference in the third step is criticized as cumbersome.[129]

The third view is the simplest of the three. The word "ox" cannot be understood literally because the universal "ox-hood" is not instantiated in the porter. Objects that do instantiate this universal, however, all share certain other qualities (like stupidity and slowness). The hearer understands the word "ox" to metaphorically mean the porter on the basis of shared qualities. The porter is thus not added to the literal meaning of the word, nor is inference needed.

---

[126] *Tantravārttika* (1937:356).
[127] See Śabara on *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.1.25 for the earliest Mīmāṃsā presentation of this common Bhaṭṭa belief.
[128] *Tantravārttika* (1937:358).
[129] Gajendragadkar (1939:202).

Kumārila's own view is that the meaning of the word "ox" is fixed to the universal ox-hood. When the primary meaning of the word is blocked, the hearer searches among the qualities associated with the primary meaning for qualities shared by the primary meaning and the object at hand (ox-hood and the porter). The literal meaning of the word "ox" is then provisionally limited to those qualities. This allows Kumārila to claim that metaphor adds no semantic content to the word. It is a process by which the total meaning of a term is provisional limited and applied to another entity for a specific purpose.[130] In the present case, the metaphor servers to ridicule the porter by exaggerating some of his qualities. Mammaṭa will discuss the special purposes of metaphor in chapter three.

Before discussing the pure metaphors, I would like to finish with the qualitative metaphor by explaining Mammaṭa's discussion of their purpose. He claims that the metaphor is used to cause a cognition of identity, which must be an identity of qualities. In an impositional metaphor, the difference of substance is still cognized, whereas in a determinative metaphor, this difference is denied. The identity is between shared qualities, not all qualities (in calling someone an ox, nobody means that he has hooves, etc.). In claiming that the porter and the ox are identical in intelligence, one indicates how exceptionally stupid the porter is by human standards.

Mammaṭa asserts that pure metaphors function by means of a relation other than resemblance. His list of types of possible relations is not exhaustive. Such list (along with

[130] *Tantravārttika* (1937:354). On the basis of Kumārila's more detail exposition, I feel Mammaṭa is using "denotation" in a more general sense in which a word can "denote" other meaning by means of metaphor.

the topic of metaphor generally) appear very early in Indian philosophy.[131] However, no general principles can be formulated for pure metaphors because the relationships are too diverse. Instead, Mammaṭa shows how one relationship (causality) can ground metaphoric use. The others could be likewise demonstrated.

Ghee (clarified butter) was considered especially capable of sustaining life. One can lay stress on its causal capacity by meanings of the metaphor, "Ghee is life." This metaphor implies that ghee is more able to sustain life than other foodstuffs. One can also use the word "life" metaphorically to refer to ghee as in, "Pour life into the fire." Mammaṭa claims that in doing so, one establishes an invariable relation between life and ghee. Think of the expression, "He gave up the ghost." As the ghost (or spirit) was thought of as the cause of life, this expression metaphorically means, "He died."

Mammaṭa rounds out this section by explaining how several other relations ground metaphoric usage. An intelligent reader could imagine motives for the metaphors that Mammaṭa gives and construct sentences with them.

lakṣaṇā tena ṣaḍvidhā* || *(322)

ādyabhedābhyāṃ saha ||

12d. Metaphor is therefore of six kinds.

(The four just described) together with the two earlier types (described in *kārikā* 10).

[131] The *Nyāyasūtra* 2.2.62 gives ten, the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.4.23 gives six, etc. Kunjunni Raja has a detailed discussion of these lists. See Kunjunni Raja (1969:233 ff).

Comments

The six are: the additive, commutative, pure superimposition, qualitative superimposition, pure determining, and qualitative determining. Thus, four pure types and two qualitative types of metaphor. The first two discussed belong to a different principle of classification than the remaining four. In particular, the commutative and the qualitative superimposition overlap to some extent. I think Mammaṭa left out the third type mentioned in the comment to *kārikā* 10 (the *jahadajahallakṣanā)* because it clearly overlaps with the qualitative superimpositional type. Mammaṭa turns now to the suggestive possibilities of metaphor.

sā ca

vyaṅgyena rahitā rūḍhau sahitā tu prayojane* | *(325)

prayojanaṃ hi vyañjanavyāpāragamyam eva ||

tac ca gūḍham agūḍhaṃ vā* | *(325)

tac ceti vyaṅgyam | *gūḍhaṃ yathā*

> *mukhaṃ vikasitasmitaṃ vaśitavakrimaprekṣitaṃ*
> *samucchalitavibhramā gatir apāstasaṃsthā matiḥ* |
> *uro mukulitastanaṃ jaghanamaṃsabandhoddharaṃ*
> *batenduvadanātanau taruṇimodgamo modate* ||

agūḍhaṃ yathā

śriparicayāj jaḍā api bhavanty abhijñā vidagdhacaritānām |
upadiśati kāminīnāṃ yauvanamada eva lalitāni ||

atropadiśatīti ||

tad eṣā kathitā tridhā ||

avyaṅgyā gūḍhavyaṅgyā agūḍhavyaṅgyā ca ||

(2.6. Purposes of Metaphor Explained.)

Furthermore,

13ab. When based on a second-order linguistic convention, a metaphor is without suggestive meaning. When based on a special purpose, it has suggested meaning.

For the special purpose is inferred only through the operation of suggestion.

13c. Furthermore, it is either oblique or obvious.

It means suggested meaning. Here is an example of oblique suggested meaning:

O moon-faced one,
blooming smile, seductive sidelong glance,
mind spinning, breasts budding,
and full thighs that excite
enticing frolics,
In you the fullness of youth bursts forth rejoicing. (9)[132]

Here is an example of obvious suggested meaning:

By piling up treasure, even the stupid grow clever.
So youth's intoxication alone teaches women their wiles. (10)[133]

[132] Attributed to Ruma by Suktimuktāvalī according to Dwivedi.
[133] Found in Ravigupta's *Subhāṣita* according to Dwivedi.

Here the word “teaches” (carries the suggestion)

13d. Thus, metaphor is declared to be three-fold.

(Namely, metaphor that is) without suggestion, with an oblique suggestion, and with an obvious suggestion.

Comments

There are many words used metaphorically in the first poem. In each case, the reader has to stop and think about what is suggested. For example, the word “blooming” in “blooming smile” suggests freshness, pleasant smell, delicateness, etc. Intoxication cannot literally teach, so “teach” is used metaphorically to mean “imparts to”. The suggestion is that all alone young women learn to be charming as easily as if they had an expert instructor.

tadbhūr lākṣaṇikaḥ* | *(339)

śabda ity saṃbadhyate | *tadbhūs tadāśrayaḥ* ||

tatra vyāpāro vyañjanātmakaḥ* | *(339)

kuta ity āha

***yasya pratītim adhātuṃ lakṣaṇā samupāsyate* ||**

phale śabdaikagamye 'tra vyañjanān nāparā kriyā* | *(339)

prayojanapratipipādayiṣayā yatra lakṣaṇayā śabdaprayogas tatra nānyatas tatpratītir api tu tasmād eva śabdāt | *na cātra vyañjanād ṛte 'nyo vyāpāraḥ* ||

14a. That which supports the metaphor is the metaphoric (word).

Word is to be connected (to the word **metaphoric**). **That which supports the metaphor** means that which is the basis of the metaphor.

(2.7. Suggestion Based on a Word.)

(2.7.1. Suggestion Based on a Metaphoric Word.)

14b. There (concerning the metaphoric word) the function (that achieves the special purpose) has the nature of suggestion.

Objection: Why?

14cd - 15ab. Reply: Metaphor is used to bring about an idea connected with that (suggestion). The purpose (of the metaphor) is inferred from the (metaphoric) word alone. There is no other semantic capacity (that could achieve this) apart from suggestion.

When a word is used metaphorically in order to set forth a special purpose, the cognition of that (purpose) does not come from another (word), but rather from that (metaphoric) word itself. And in this (type of situation), there is no (semantic) function other than suggestion (that can accomplish this).

Comments

Types of suggestion divide into two groups: those based on words and those based on meaning. Because Mammaṭa is treating the nature of words in this chapter, he begins

with the suggestions based on words. Those also divide into two groups: those based on metaphoric words and those based on literal words. Mammaṭa begins with suggestion based on metaphoric words and will treat suggestion based on literal words at the end of this chapter (*kārikā* 19). In chapter three he will take up suggestions based on meaning.

We have already seen the stock example, "The village is on the Ganges." Mammaṭa has shown that "Ganges" must be understood metaphorically to mean "bank of the Ganges." The purpose of this metaphor is traditionally understood to be communication of certain qualities, like purity and coolness. Mammaṭa will try to prove in this section that the only semantic operation that can communicate the desired meaning is suggestion. He will use an eliminative argument with the three types of meaning as candidates. By ruling out denotation and metaphor, he can conclude that suggestion is the semantic power used.

tathāhi

nābhidhā samayābhāvāt* | *(345)

gaṅgāyām ghoṣa ityādau ye pāvanatvādayo dharmās taṭādau pratīyante na tatra gaṅgādiśabdāḥ saṃketitāḥ ||

The author explains the above (claim that suggestion is needed to explain the cognition of the special purpose of a metaphor).

15c. (The required semantic capacity) is not denotation because the conditions (for denotation) are not present.

In sentences like, “The village is on the Ganges,” the properties of purifying, etc., are cognized as belonging to the bank. There is no linguistic convention for the word “Ganges” (that can account for this).

Comments

Mammaṭa presents the example of, “The village on the Ganges.” The statement causes cognition of certain qualities associated with the river, namely coolness and purity. Mammaṭa claims that denotation cannot account for such cognition because “the purity of the Ganges” is not part of the literal meaning of the word “Ganges.”

The claim is supported by Kumārila's argument from the *Tantravārttika* that Mammaṭa used earlier concerning metaphor: a word cannot change its meaning every time it is used in a new metaphor. In this example, “Ganges” cannot be said to come to mean “the purity of the Ganges.” Even if it becomes a faded metaphor (as in “London is on the Thames”), the meaning “purity” would not be included in the literal meaning of “Ganges.” In the case of faded metaphors, the new meaning is conventionally attached to the word and thus no special purpose is communicated. For example, by calling someone a maverick, you do not suggest qualities associated with the original rancher (Maverick) or his cattle.

Some believe, contra Mammaṭa, that the statement, "The village is on the bank of the Ganges," even understood only in its primary, literal sense, suggests the properties of purity, etc. The metaphorical formulation is used to emphasize the suggested meaning on this view. It does this by creating an obstacle that slows the reader down and demands an explanation (why "Ganges" and not "bank of the Ganges"). The metaphor highlights the word "Ganges," and invites the reader to reflect on its connotations. However, the suggested meaning, even on this view, could not be communicated by the literal meaning alone.[134]

hetvabhāvān na lakṣaṇā* | *(347)

mukhyārthabādhāditrayaṃ hetuḥ ||

tathā ca

***lakṣyaṃ na mukhyaṃ nāpy atra bādho yogaḥ phalena no* |**

na prayojanam etasmin na ca śabdaḥ skhaladgatiḥ* || *(347)

yathā gaṅgāśabdaḥ strotasi śabādha ity taṭaṃ lakṣayati tadvat yadi taṭe 'pi sabādhaḥ syāt tat prayojanaṃ lakṣayet | *na ca taṭaṃ mukhyo 'rthaḥ* | *nāpy atra bādhaḥ* | *na ca gaṅgāśabdārthasy taṭasya pāvanatvādyair lakṣanīyaiḥ saṃbandhaḥ* | *nāpi prayojane lakṣye kiṃcit prayojanam* | *nāpi gaṅgāśabdas taṭam iva prayojanaṃ pratipādayitum asamarthaḥ* ||

[134] See Abhinava's *Locana* on 1.4b for a more complete presentation of the argument Mammaṭa advances.

15d. (The required semantic capacity) is not metaphor because the necessary conditions are lacking.

The necessary conditions refers to the three (given in *kārikā* 9), i.e., the blocking of the literal meaning, and the rest.

16. Specifically, the metaphoric meaning is not a literal meaning. There is no blocking. There is no connection (between the metaphoric meaning) and the purpose (of the utterance). There is no (further) special purpose in this (second metaphor). Finally, the word is not powerless (to convey the purpose itself).

As the word "Ganges" indicates the bank because its (literal meaning) "river" is blocked, similarly, if the (meaning) "bank" were blocked, the word "Ganges" could indicate the special purpose (the qualities purity, etc., by a second order metaphor). But "bank" is not a literal meaning, and, further, it is not blocked. Furthermore, there is no connection between the "metaphorically indicated properties," like purifying, and the bank as the (metaphoric) meaning of the word "Ganges." Additionally, there is no (additional) special purpose for the metaphorical indication of the (first) special purpose. Finally, the word "Ganges" is not unable to set forth the special purpose, as it was unable to set forth the meaning "bank" (without metaphor).

Comments

In this nice example of *reductio ad absurdum*, Mammaṭa shows the unacceptable consequences that follow from assuming that the special purpose of a metaphor can be

communicated by a second metaphor. He does this by recalling the necessary conditions for metaphor set out in *kārikā* 9.

evam apy anavasthā syāt yā mūlakṣayakāriṇī |

evam api prayojanaṃ cel lakṣyate tat prayojanāntareṇeti tad api proyojanāntareṇety prakṛtāpratītikṛt anavasthā bhavet | *nanu pāvanatvādidharmayuktam eva taṭaṃ lakṣyate* | *gaṅgāyās taṭe ghoṣaḥ ityato 'dhikasyārthasya pratītiś ca proyojanam iti viśiṣṭe lakṣanā* | *tat kiṃ vyañjanayety āha* ||

prayojanena sahitaṃ lakṣaṇīyaṃ na yujyate **|| (355)**

17ab. Furthermore, this (the purpose of a metaphor being made known by a further metaphor) would lead to infinite regress, which would destroy the original (metaphor).

Furthermore, this means that if the purpose (of the original metaphor) had to be itself indicated metaphorically there would be another purpose of this (second metaphor) and another purpose (for the third metaphor). Thus there would be an **infinite regress** and no cognition of the matter at hand (i.e., the purpose of the first metaphor). (And as this contradicts the data of experience, the premise that the goal of metaphor is metaphoric must be false.)

Objection: The bank joined with the qualities like purity, etc., is metaphorically indicated. The purpose is cognition of additional meaning beyond (the meaning of) the

sentence, "The village is on the bank of the Ganges." Thus metaphoric indication indicates an object qualified (by certain qualities such as purity). What is the use of suggestion?

17cd. Reply: (The theory that) metaphorically indicated meaning is communicated together with the purpose (of the metaphor) is not correct.

Comments

Mammaṭa argues that if a first metaphor required a second metaphor to be understandable, the second would require a third, and so on. This regress would be vicious because it would block any understanding of the original metaphor. However, we do understand the original, so the theory is false.

The objection tries to counter by making the purpose communicated by the original metaphor along with the original metaphoric meaning. In this way, the purpose would be evident in the original metaphor without recourse to another metaphor, avoiding the regress. Mammaṭa responds in the next *kārikā*.

kuta ity āha

jñānasya viṣayo hy anyaḥ phalam anyad udāhṛtam* | *(361)

pratyakṣāder nīlādir viṣayaḥ phalaṃ tu prakaṭatā saṃvittir vā |

viśiṣte lakṣaṇā naivaṃ

vyākhyātam |

viśeṣāḥ syus tu lakṣite || (361)

taṭādau ye viśeṣāḥ pāvanatvādayas te cābhidhātātparyalakṣaṇābhyo vyāpārāntareṇa gamyāḥ | tac ca vyañjanadhvananadyotanādiśabdavācyam avaśyam eṣitavyam |

Objector: Why (is my theory not correct)?

18ab. Reply: Because the intentional object of cognition is one thing, while its result (*phala*) is said to be another.

The intentional object of perception, etc., is a blue thing, for example. But the result (of the cognition) is either "being-manifest" (i.e., the quality "being known" now belongs to the blue thing) or a cognition (i.e., "This is something blue" in the self).[135]

18c. Therefore, metaphor does not indicate a qualified object.

This has been explained.

18d. The properties would be (cognized) in the indicated (object).

For example, in the case of the bank, the qualities of purifying, etc., are understood by a semantic function different from denotation, speaker's intended meaning, and metaphor. And this function has to be the one called suggestion, semantic reverberation, and illumination, etc.

Comments

[135] The extra information in my translation of this sentence comes from the *Saṅketa* commentary.

The section starts with an argument from analogy in reply to the objection given in the previous *kārikā.* Mammaṭa states a general rule of epistemology (the intentional object of a cognition is different from its result) and claims it applies analogously to semantics (the meaning of a metaphor is different from it purpose). The analogy is as follows: A cognition stands in relation to its intentional object as a word does to its meaning. Furthermore, they both have a *phala.* "*Phala"* means "fruit," and by extension both "result" and "purpose." I am using the Sanskrit "*phala*" because the argument turns on the ambiguity of this term. The relation between the intentional object and the *phala* (result) of the cognition should be (by analogy) the same as the relation between the meaning and the *phala* (purpose) of the word. The argument fails, it seems to me, because the causal *result* of a perceptual cognition is not analogous to the human *purpose* motivating a metaphor in any obvious way.

Mammaṭa concludes the larger argument, begun in *kārikā* 14cd., by claiming that the special purpose for using a metaphor must be communicated by suggestion. He assumes that the purpose must be communicated by one of the semantic powers; it is not communicated by denotation; it is not communicated by speaker's intended meaning; it is not communicated by metaphor; therefore, it must be communicated by suggestion.

Mammaṭa does not argue against speaker's intended meaning for two reasons. First, speaker's intended meaning is used to establish the literal meaning of a sentence in cases of ambiguity, and thus falls under denotation. Second, this section only concerns suggestions based on a single word. Clearly, a semantic power based on the entire

sentence, like speaker's intended meaning, cannot account for the semantic capacity of a single word.

evaṃ lakṣaṇāmūlaṃ vyañjakatva muktam || *abhidhāmūlaṃ tv āha*

anekārthasya śabdasya vācakatve niyantrite **|**

saṃyogādyair avācyārthadhīkṛdvyāpṛtir añjanam **||** ***(372)***

saṃyogo viprayogaś ca sāhacaryaṃ virodhitā |
arthaḥ prakaraṇaṃ liṅgaṃ śabdasyānyasya saṃnidhiḥ ||
sāmarthyamaucitī deśaḥ kālo vyaktiḥ svarādayaḥ |
śabdārthasyānavacchede viśeṣasmṛtihetavaḥ ||

ity uktadiśā

saśaṅkhacakro hariḥ aśaṅkhacakro harir ity acyate | *rāmalakṣmaṇāv iti dāśarathau* | *rāmārjunagatis tayor iti bhārgavakārtavīryayoḥ* | *sthāṇuṃ bhaja bhavacchide iti hare* | *sarvaṃ jānāti deva iti yuṣmadarthe* | *kupito makaradhvaja iti kāme* | *desasya purārāter iti śaṃbhau* | *madhunā mattaḥ kokila iti vasante* | *pātu vo dayitāmukham iti sāmmukhye* | *bhāty atra parameśvara iti rājadhānīrūpāt deśād rājani* | *citrabhānur vibhātīti dine ravau rātrau vahnau* | *mitraṃ bhātīti suhṛdi mitro bhātīti ravau* | *indraśatrur ityādau vede eva na kāvye svaro viśeṣapratītikṛt* | *ādigrahaṇāt*

> *eddahamettatthaṇiā eddahamettehi acchivattehiṃ* |
> *eddahamettāvatthā eddahamettehiṃ diaehiṃ* ||[136]

ityādāv abhinayādayaḥ |

---

[136] 1. **eddahamettatthaṇiā** = etāvanmātrasthanī **eddahamettehi acchivattehiṃ** = etāvanmātrābhyām akṣipātrābhyām upalakṣita
2. **eddahamettāvatthā** = etāvanmātrāvasthā **eddahamettehiṃ diaehiṃ** = etāvanmātrair divasaiḥ

(2.7.1.) Suggestion based on metaphor is explained thus. But suggestion based on denotation is explained as follows:

19. When the referential capacity of a word with several meanings is limited by a contextual element, such as a relation, the semantic operation that creates the cognition of the non-denoted meaning is suggestion.

(Now follows a partial list of the possible contextual elements:)[137]

12. Conjunction, (2) disjunction, (3) association, (4) enmity, (5) motive, (6) situation, (7) particular quality, (8) proximity of another word, (9) capacity, (10) fitness, (11) place, (12) time, (13) gender, (14) accent. And others.

According to the direction just stated (there are these examples):

2. "Hari" with the conch and disc means "Acyate."[138]
3. "Hari" without the conch and disk means "Acyate."
4. "Rāma and Lakṣmaṇa" mean "the sons of Daśaratha."
5. "They act like Rāma and Arjuna" mean "the son of Bhṛgu and the son of Kṛtavīrya."[139]
6. "Worship the immovable for release from the world." ("The immovable") means "Hara."[140]
7. In "Lord knows all," ("lord") refers to the person addressed.

---

[137] From Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya* 2.317 - 318. This is not Bhartṛhari's own view according to his commentator Puṇyarāja, but this is disputed by others. See Kunjunni Rāja (1969:50).
[138] "Acyate" is a name for Viṣṇu.
[139] Rāma and Arjuna are famous enemies.
[140] "Hara" is a name for Śiva.

8. In “The one with the shark banner is angry,” (“the one with the shark banner”) means “the god of love.”[141]

9. In “It belong to the god, the enemy of the cities,” (by proximity to the word “enemy-of-cities,” “god”) means “Śaṃbhu.”[142]

10. “The cuckoo enraptured with (honey/wine/spring)” (the word that can mean “honey/wine/spring” is limited to) “spring,” (because spring alone has the power to enrapture the cuckoo).

11. In “May the face of the beloved drink/protect/attend to you,” (“drink/protect/attend”) means “observing” (because this meaning alone fits).[143]

12. In “The highest lord shines here,” (“the highest lord”) means the “king,” because of the place, which is the king's residence.

13. In “The bright one is shining,” (“the bright one”) means “the sun” in the day and “fire” at night.

14. In “Mitram shines, ” (“Mitram” means) “a friend.” In “Mitram shines,” (“Mitram” means “the sun.”[144]

15. In words like “Indra-killed” the accent does not cause the cognition of a particular meaning in poetry, as it does in the Vedas (where the meaning of the compound is determined by accent to be either “killer of Indra” or “killed by Indra”).

---

[141] The other bearer of a shark banner – the ocean – cannot have this particular quality.
[142] “Śaṃbhu” is a name for Śiva.
[143] The commentators disagree about the exact meaning of this example.
[144] In the first sentence, “*mitram*” is masculine, in the second, it is neuter.

By **and others** other contextual elements, such as gestures, are understood (to play a role in delimiting meaning. The following is an example of a gesture resolving the ambiguity of a term:)

> Her breasts have reduced to just this,
> Her petal-eyes have shrunk to merely this,
> She has dropped as far as this,
> In only this many days. (11)

Comments

Mammaṭa takes up the suggestive possibilities of literal usage. The goal of this section is to review the many ways a single ambiguous word can come to denote one of its meanings and not another. This list of delimiting factors comes out of the Grammarian tradition, but the use of suggestion (explained in the next section) comes from Ānandavardhana.[145] The list contains three distinct types of factor. First, there are grammatical (syntactical) factors such as gender and accent (13 and 14). Second, there are inter-textual factors that draw on the larger semantic context (1, 2, 3, 7, 8, 9, 10). Third, there are extra-textual factors that draw on a larger pragmatic context (6, 11, 12, and the poem). The Grammarians investigate the role and types of contextual figures at great length.[146]

In the poem, the word "this" is ambiguous; it could refer to many sizes. An accompanying gesture would show how the word is to be understood. That Mammaṭa

[145] Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya* 2.317 - 318. Ānandavardhana (2.21).
[146] Kunjunni Raja (1969:58).

uses an example from drama adds credibility to Edwin Gerow's claim that the distinction between drama and poetry has been obscured by this point in the Sanskrit tradition.[147]

ittham saṃyogādibhir arthāntarābhidhāyakatve nivārite 'py anekārthasya śabdasya yat kvacid arthāntarapratipādānaṃ tatra nābhidhā niyamanāt tasyāḥ | *na ca lakṣaṇā mukhyārthabādhādyabhāvāt* | *api tv añjanam eva vyāpāraḥ* | *yathā*

> *bhadrātmano duradhirohatanor viśālavaṃśonnateḥ kṛtaśilīmukhasaṃgrahasya* |
> *yasyānupaplutagateḥ paravāraṇasya dānāmbusekasubhagaḥ*
> *satataṃ karo 'bhūt* || *(395)*

A word with more than one sense is prevented from denoting another meaning by a contextual element like a relation, as was just explained. However, sometimes such a word does convey another meaning. The way the word conveys this is not denotation, because it has been delimited (to denoting a single meaning). Further, it is not metaphor, because the conditions, such as the blocking of the primary sense are not present. Rather, the semantic operation is suggestion itself. For example (the following punning poem):

Literal meaning	Suggested meaning
The hand	The trunk
Of the noble-souled one	Of the one who belongs to a good species
Whose family is great	Who is tall as bamboo
Whose body is unassailable	Who is difficult to mount
Who has gathered a stock of arrows	Who holds a swarm of bees
Whose knowledge is unclouded	Whose gait is unimpeded
Who wards off enemies	Who is an excellent elephant
That hand was ever graceful by the sprinkling of the water of gifts	That trunk was ever graceful in the sprinkling of the water of oblations. (12)

[147] Gerow (1977:252).

Comments

For lack of a better method, I have used two columns to render the apparent and the hidden meanings for each phrase in the Sanskrit original of this punning poem. One should read the left poem first, then the right, and then try to understand how they can be translations of the same text. Although there is little poetic merit in this method, at least the reader should be able to understand the example.

In the case of puns, ambiguous words convey more than one meaning. Punning received much attention in the early poetics.[148] I should note that puns play a much larger role in Sanskrit poetry that they do in English poetry, by and large. For several reasons (limited number of roots, compounding, freedom of word order, etc.), it is easier to pun in Sanskrit than English. The possibility of sustained puns (such as the poem above) enlarges the poetic scope of punning. While in English puns are mostly used for comic effect, in Sanskrit the uses are many. Mammaṭa will return to the subject several times in chapter four (poems 54 and 78) and at length in the section on ornaments (chapters nine and ten). In this section, he is presenting only the argument that the second meaning in a pun is conveyed by suggestion.

Mammaṭa use once again an eliminative argument.[149] The additional meaning cannot be conveyed by denotation because this semantic power exhausts itself in

[148] See Bhāmaha 3.17 and Daṇḍin 2.333, for example.
[149] Mammaṭa condenses a rather large argument in Ānandavardhana (Ingalls, et al. pp. 291-311), losing much of the subtlety in the process.

denoting the primary meaning.[150] It cannot be conveyed by metaphor because none of the necessary conditions for metaphor are present. Therefore, it must be conveyed by suggestion. Mammaṭa will return to other parts of Ānandavardhana's discussion in chapters three, four, and nine.

tadyukto vyañjakaḥ śabdaḥ

tadyukto vyañjanayuktaḥ |

***yat so 'rthāntarayuk tathā* |**

artho 'pi vyañjakas tatra sahakāritayā mataḥ* || *(404)

tatheti vyañjakaḥ ||

20a. The suggestive word is joined to that.

Joined to that means joined to suggestion.

20bcd. Since a word is so (i.e., suggestive) when joined with another meaning, that meaning is also thought of as suggestive, because it is an auxiliary.

So means suggestive.

---

[150] This argument dates back to Śabara's commentary on Jaimini's *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.1.25. It is only contradicted (as far as I know) by the Prabhākara school of Mīmāṃsā. See Kunjunni Raja (1969:300).

Comments

Mammaṭa's topic in this chapter has been the suggestiveness of words. But one could ask, "How are words suggestive, but not their meanings?" To this question *kārikā* 20 answers that when a word used metaphorically (like "Ganges") is joined with an additional meaning ("the bank of the Ganges"), this additional meaning can be called suggestive as long as it remains joined to the suggestive designator. This qualification avoids the objection that the meaning "bank" is not suggestive in many other case (i.e., all the cases where the word "bank" is used only literally). In the case at hand, the suggestiveness of the meaning "bank" could be called secondary suggestiveness because it is dependant on the primary suggestiveness of the word "Ganges."

Likewise, the homonymous word "*karas*" that can mean either "hand" or "trunk" in the punning example above. It suggests "trunk" only when it means "hand". Thus the meaning "hand" is called suggestive in this context. If the same word occurred in a poem with the primary meaning "trunk," that meaning could suggest "hand." As we saw above, a word can only have one literal meaning in any given usage.

Mammaṭa will consider suggestions based on meaning in the next chapter. Here it will be clear that when a meaning is primarily suggestive, the words that convey the meaning are also suggestive in a secondary way (see *kārikā* 23). Thus the general truth: neither words nor meanings are ever suggestive in isolation.

atha tṛtīya ullāsaḥ

iti śrikāvyaprākaśo 'rthavyañjakatānirṇayo nāma tṛtīya ullāsaḥ |

Chapter Three

Investigation of Suggestiveness Based on Meaning

arthāḥ proktāḥ purā teṣām (409)

arthāh vācyalakṣyavyaṅgyāḥ | *teṣāṃ vācakalākṣanikavyañjakānām* ||

arthavyañjakatocyate* | *(409)

21a. The meanings of these have been explained above (in chapter two).

The **meanings** are literal, indicative, and suggestive. **Of these** refers to literal designators, indicative designators, and suggestive designators.

21b. Suggestiveness based on meaning will now be explained.

Comments

In the previous chapter, Mammaṭa explained suggestions based on homonymous words. Each instance of such a word was said to have a single literal meaning, with the other meanings "resonating" in the mind of the reader. A poet can use such resonating meanings suggestively.

In this chapter, Mammaṭa examines poems in which the words have a single, specific meaning. Furthermore, the sentences formed from such words have a single, literal meaning. However, Mammaṭa claims that the literal meaning (both of a word and sentence), in combination with some other factor, can call forth other meanings. This process is called suggestion based on meaning, and it is elucidated by means of ten examples.

kīdṛśīty āha

***vaktṛboddhavyakākūnāṃ vākyavācyānyasaṃnidheḥ* ||**

***prastāvadeśakālāder vaiśiṣṭayāt pratibhājuṣām* |**

yo 'rthasyānyārthadhīhetur vyāpāro vyaktir eva sā* || *(413)

boddhavyaḥ pratipādyaḥ | *kākur dhvaner vikāraḥ* | *prastāvaḥ prakaraṇam* | *arthasya vācyalakṣyavyaṅgyātmanaḥ* |

Objection: "What is it like?"

21cd - 22. Reply: Suggestiveness is exactly that semantic function of the meaning which causes cognition of an additional meaning on the part of those keen on subtleties by means of particularities of speaker, person addressed, intonation, sentence, literal words, presence of another, occasion, location, time, etc.

The **person addressed** is the one communicated with. **Intonation** is variation of the voice. **Occasion** means the context (of present activities). **Of the meaning** means the literal meaning, the indicated meaning, or the suggested meaning.

krameṇodāharaṇāni ǀ

> *aipihulaṃ jalakuṃbhaṃ ghettūṇa samāgagahmi sahi turiam* ǀ
> *samaseasalilaṇīsāsaṇīsahā vīsamāmi khaṇam* ǀǀ[151]

atra cauryaratagopaṇaṃ gamyate ǀ *(419)*

(3.1.) Here are the examples in order (starting with a suggestion based on the character of the **speaker**, who we know to be a girl by the gender of the word "I" and its predicated adjectives):

> O friend, having taken a full jug of water,
> I have come swiftly.
> I am tired, sweating, and breathless.
> I will rest a moment. (13)

[151] *Gāthāsaptaśati* Weber 881. Weber's version show numerous differences (1881:478).
1. **sahi =** he sakhi – o friend, **aipihulam =** atipṛthulam - full, **jalakuṃbhaṃ =** jalakumbham – a jug of water, **ghettuṇa =** gṛhītvā – having taken, **turiam =** tvaritam - swiftly, **samāgagahmi =** samāgatāsmi - I have come,
2. **samaseasalilaṇīsāsaṇīsahā =** śrama-sveda-samlilaṇiḥ śvāsaniḥ sahā – weary, sweat-water panting with, **khaṇam =** kṣaṇam – for a moment, **vīsamāmi =** viśrāmyāmi – will rest.

Here concealment of a secret love affair is known (through suggestion).

Comments

The verse is an example of a suggestion that functions by means of particularities of the speaker. Gajendragadkar claims that the friend knows the speaker to be a "woman of disreputable character."[152] Jha also claims that "the character of the speaker is known to be that of a woman with loose morals."[153]

Gajendragadkar's claim cannot be correct, for it is not the friend, but rather the reader, that needs knowledge of the woman's character in order to understand the poem. If the reader knew that the friend considered the speaker to be a woman of loose character, the suggestiveness of the self-description would be reinforced. If the reader, in other words, knew that the friend took the sweet, etc., to be signs of a love affair, he could understand how the word "sweet" was being used suggestively. But there are two problems with this approach. First, the poem contains no information concerning the friend's opinions or beliefs. Second, it confuses suggestive literature with suggestive discourse inside literature. Is the poem suggesting additional meaning to the reader, or is the woman suggesting additional meaning to her friend? If the first, the opinion of the friend is only relevant in so far as it is adopted by the reader. To a reader knows the friend to be mistaken in her assessment of the woman's character, the poem will not be suggestive. If the second, the reader would need to understand the friend's reaction in

[152] Gajendragadkar (1939:237).
[153] Jha (1925:41).

order to understand that the woman was speaking suggestively. We can imagine that if the friends needed to communicate in the presence of others, the poet could show them speaking in code (compare poem number eight). If this were the case, the reader would need much more information than the poem conveys.

Jha does not say who knows about the woman's character. If he means the reader, he fails to explain how the reader comes to know anything about the woman's character that is not explicitly stated in the poem. The suggestion of a tryst, it should be noted, is not supposed to depend on a larger textual context. Ingalls claims that all the verses collected in the volumes of short verse (*subhāṣita)* do not depend on other verses within a drama or poem, but rather stand alone.[154] Unfortunately, some of Mammaṭa's examples do seem to depend on a larger textual environment (see, e.g., poem eighteen below).

So how does the speaker's character inform the suggestion? I speculate that this poem exemplifies a certain literary topos, poems about woman of loose morals. In a poem such as this, the genre provides the necessary background information. This solution remains within the parameters set out by Mammaṭa – word, meaning, and a cultured reader. Such a reader would recognize the genre, make the correct assumptions about the woman's character, and thus understand the suggested meaning.

Unfortunately, as I mentioned, some of Mammaṭa's examples do not work this way. The inclusion of examples that require knowledge of the text from which the verse is drawn, weakens the explanatory value of the theory of suggestion. In such cases it is difficult to rule out inference or one of the other semantic powers as the means by which

[154] Ingalls (1965:33).

the information is grasped. Furthermore, the larger textual context is not included in the parameters Mammaṭa gives as necessary to understanding suggestion (word, meaning, and a cultured reader), unless, of course, knowledge of all the major dramas and the ability to place any given verse is assumed for an educated reader.

oṇṇiddaṃ dobballaṃ ciṃtā alasattaṇaṃ saṇīsasiam ।
mahamaṃdabhāiṇīe keraṃ sahi tuha vi ahaha parihavai ।।[155]

atra dūtyās tatkāmukopabhogo vyajyate । *(424)*

(3.2. Next an example of a suggestion based on the character of the **person addressed**. The characters are two women:)

O friend! In the service of my wretched self
You too are overcome with
Sleeplessness, weakness, anxiety, fatigue, and sighs. (14)

Here it is suggested that the speaker's lover has enjoyed sex with the messenger.

Comments

In this genre of poetry, the go-between (friend, messenger, etc.) seems prone to affairs with the lover of the woman she is "helping". Knowing this, an educated reader will read

[155] 1. **oṇṇiddaṃ =** aun+nidryam - sleepelessness, **dobballaṃ =** daurbalyam - weakness, **ciṃtā =** cintā - anxiety, **alasattaṇaṃ =** alasattvam - tiredness, **saṇīsasiam =** saniśvasitam – having sighs.
2. **maha =** mama – of me, **maṃdabhāiṇīe =** mandabhāgyāyāḥ - of the unlucky one, **keraṃ =** kṛte, **sahi =** sakhi – o friend, **tuha vi =** tvām api – you too, **ahaha =** aha ha – certainly indeed, **parihavai =** paribhavati – comes over.

beyond the literal meaning (i.e., that the friend tired herself working to bring the two lovers together) and understand the suggested meaning (i.e., she tired herself having sex). See poem two in the first chapter for another example of this genre.

> *tathabhūtāṃ dṛṣṭvā nṛpasadasi pāñcālatanayāṃ*
> *vane vyādhaiḥ sārdhaṃ suciram uṣitaṃ valkaladhaiḥ* |
> *virāṭasyavāse sthitam anucitārambhanibhṛtaṃ*
> *guruḥ khedaṃ khinne mayi bhajati nādyāpi kuruṣu* ||

atra mayi na yogyaḥ khedaḥ kuruṣu tu yogya iti kākvā prakāśyate | *na ca vācyasidd hyaṅgam atra kākur iti guṇībhūtavyaṅgyatvaṃ śaṅkyam* | *praśnamatreṇāpi kākor viśrānteḥ* || *(429)*

(3.3. Next an example of a suggestion based on **intonation**:)

> Having witnessed the Panchala princess laid low,
> We left for the forest, dressed in bark,
> and lived among hunters.
> We then went to Virāta's palace,
> doing dirty work to remain unknown.
> My brother is angry with me, thus afflicted,
> And not with the Kurus? (15)[156]

The suggested meaning in this verse, i.e., "Anger towards me is not proper, but towards the Kurus it is proper," is revealed by intonation. And it should not be suspected that the intonation only serves to establish the literal meaning and that thus this is an example of

[156] *Veṇīsaṃhāra* 1.11. The English convention of question marks makes the assertion/question ambiguity impossible to reproduce in writing. This convention marks that fact that these statements are disambiguated by intonation in English, just as Mammaṭa claims for Sanskrit.

poetry of subordinate suggestion. The intonation can stop with (the suggestion of) a mere question.

Comments

The worry is that if intonation merely serves to suggest that the last line is a question, the suggestion will be subservient to the literal meaning, rendering this an example of "poetry of subordinate suggestion" (see *kārikā* 5ab). In reply, Mammaṭa agrees that the suggestion needed for completing the literal meaning is merely that the last line is a question. He also agrees that this is accomplished by proper intonation. However, the resultant meaning suggests further that the brother's anger is improper, and that he is being reprimanded. This suggestion of reprimand is the central meaning of the poem, guaranteeing that it is truly an example of suggestive poetry.

> *taiā maha gaṃḍatthalaṇimiaṃ diṭṭhiṃ ṇa ṇosi aṇṇatto* ।
> *eṇhiṃ saccea ahaṃ te a kavolā ṇa sā diṭṭhī* ॥[157]

atra matsakhīṃ kapolapratibimbitāṃ pasyatas te dṛṣṭir anyaivābhūt calitāyāṃ tu tasyāṃ anyaiva jātety aho pracchannakāmukatvaṃ te iti vyajyate ॥

[157] 1. **Taiā =** tadā - then, **maha =** mama – my, **gaṃḍatthala =** gaṇḍasthala – region of the cheek, **ṇimiaṃ =** nimagnām – sunken, immersed, fixed, **diṭṭhiṃ =** dṛṣṭim - glance, **ṇa ṇosi =** na nayasi – you do not lead, **aṇṇatto =** anyataḥ - elsewhere.
2. **eṇhiṃ =** idānīm – same, **saccea =** saiva – it too, **ahaṃ =** ahaṃ - I, **te a =** tāveva – they too, **kavolā =** kapolau - cheek, **ṇa sā diṭṭhī =** na sā dṛṣṭiḥ - not the glance.

(3.4. Next an example of a suggestion based on the **sentence**:)

(A woman to her lover upon the departure of her female friend)

Then your glance was fixed,
Immobile upon my cheek.
I am still the same,
My cheeks are the same,
But your glance is not. (16)

Here the suggestion is, “Your glance was one way when you were looking at my friend, who was reflected in my cheek. But when she moved away, it completely changed. Thus you have a hidden desire (for my friend).”

Comments

The lover's fixed glance loses its fire without any change in the woman he is supposedly admiring. This suggests that something beyond the woman was responsible for the loving glance. From the implication of the genre an educated reader might be expected to know that another woman was responsible.[158] So far, so good, but it is a big step to the knowledge that the woman's friend was reflected in her cheek and then left, occasioning the drop in the lover's passion. One could also imagine that the lover was daydreaming passionately of another woman and then stopped, occasioning the change. Or one could imagine that the lover really was looking passionately at the woman, but then remembered his vow to chastity, etc.

---

[158] Although this information seems more likely to be gained by inference.

Regardless of these problems, Mammaṭa is right to point out that the suggestiveness of the poem derives from the mysterious change in the lover's glance that is communicated very economically by the sentence as a whole. The poet first explains that the focus of the glance has not changed, then that the object of the glance has not changed, and finally that the quality of the glance has changed. The reader is left wondering why, and this mystery invites the reader to search the real cause.

uddeśo 'yaṃ sarasakadalīśreniśobhātiśāyī
kuñjutkarṣāṅkuritaramaṇīvibhramo narmadāyāḥ ׀
kiṃ caitasmin suratasuhṛdas tanvi te vānti vātā
yeṣām agre sarati kalitākāṇḍakopo manobhūḥ ׀׀

atra ratārthaṃ praviśeti vyaṅgyam ׀׀ *(443)*

(3.5. Next an example of a suggestion based on the **literal words**:)

The banks of the Narmada are stunning,
  and this place surpasses all!
Dense alluring blooms among lush banana trees
  entice a charming woman to wander.
O slender one! Feel the breezes blow –
  they are such good friends to hot lovers.
Isn't that Love himself racing before them,
  sowing passions impetuous and single-minded? (17)[159]

The suggestion here is, “Enter here for sexual enjoyment.”

[159] Attributed to Baṭṭendurāja by Sūktimuktāvalī according to Dwivedi.

Comments

The suggestion is based on the various words that point out the suitableness of the place for a sexual encounter. It differs from the previous type in that the romantic words work independently, each serving to further the suggested meaning. Cumulatively, they leave little doubt as to the desires of the speaker.

> *ṇollei aṇaddamaṇā attā maṃ gharabharammi saalammi* |
> *khaṇamettaṃ jai saṃjñāi hoi ṇa va hoi vīsāmo* ||[160]

atra saṃdhyā saṃketakāla iti taṭasthaṃ prati kayācid dyotyate || *(448)*

(3.6. Next an example of a suggestion based on the **presence of another**:)

My tough-minded mother-in-law
 pushes all the housework my way.
Only in the evening, for a moment,
 will there perchance be rest,
 or there will not be any. (18)

Here the meaning, "The evening is the time for a rendezvous," is made clear by a woman to someone standing nearby.

Comments

---

[160] 1. **ṇollei =** prerayati(?) nudati – push on **aṇaddamaṇā =** anārdramanā – whose mind is not soft, **attā =** svaśrūḥ - mother-in-law **maṃ =** māṃ - me, **gharabharammi =** gṛhabhare –to housework, **saalammi =** sakale – all,
2. **khaṇamettaṃ =** kṣaṇamatram, **jai =** yadi – if, **saṃjñāi =** sandhyāyām – in the morning, noon, or evening (one of the three transitions of the day), **hoi =** bhavati – be, **ṇa va hoi =** na vā bhavati– or not be, **vīsāmo =** viśrānaḥ - rest.

The woman is pretending to be speaking to herself, and the literal meaning of the words is clear. But her words also serve to suggest an additional meaning to a man standing nearby. This is a case of reading between the lines that can only be achieved by knowing the context. In other words, this verse, at least, cannot stand by itself. So either Mammaṭa has picked a poor example, or Ingalls is incorrect in his claim that the short verses admired by the critics (*subhāṣita)* do not depend on other verses within a drama or poem, but rather stand alone.[161] For the reasons given in the beginning of the chapter, the theory of suggestion would have greater explanatory power if the verses could be read independently of their original context.

> *suvvaha samāgamissadi tuj pio ajja paharametteṇa* ǀ
> *eme a kitti ciṭṭhasi tā sahi sajjesu karaṇijjam* ǀǀ[162]

atropapatiṃ pratyabhisartuṃ prastutā na yuktam iti kayācin nivāryate ǀǀ *(452)*

(3.7. Next an example of a suggestion based on **occasion**:)

> Your husband is supposed to come before the next gong.
> Why stand about, my friend? Prepare for his arrival. (19)

Here a woman beginning to move towards her lover is being restrained by a woman (friend with the suggestion), "It is not proper."

---

161 Ingalls (1965:33).

162 1. **suvvaha =** evaṃ śrūyate – is heard thus, **samāgamissadi =** samāgamiṣyati – coming, **tuj =** tava – your, **pio =** priyaḥ - lover/husband, **ajja =** adya – today, **paharametteṇa =** praharamātreṇa – only three hours (one strike of the gong)
2. **eme a =** evam eva, like this, **kitti =** kimiti – why, therefore, **ciṭṭhasi =** tiṣṭhasi – you stand, **tā =** tat – this, **sahi =** sakhi – friend, **sajjesu =** sajjaya – make ready, **karaṇijjam =** karaṇīyam – what is to be done.

Comments

The friend has learned that the woman's husband is coming, and wants to tell her that she does not have the time to go dally. Again, this verse requires a context, namely, one has to know that the woman intends to go meet her lover. I have not read enough Sanskrit love poetry to know whether the genre can be said to supply the premise that wives left alone will invariable cheat on the husbands.

> *anyatra yūyaṃ kusumāvacāyaṃ kurudhvam atrāsmi karomi sakhyaḥ* |
> *nāhaṃ hi dūraṃ bhramituṃ samarthā prasīdatāyaṃ racito 'ñjalir vaḥ* ||

atra vivikto 'yaṃ deśa iti pracchannakāmukas tvayābhisāryatām iti āśvastāṃ prati kayācin nivedyate || *(455)*

(3.8. Next an example of a suggestion based on **location**:)

> Collect your flowers elsewhere my friend.
> I'll collect them here, for I cannot wander far.
> Cupping my palms together,
> I salute you. Be pleased! (20)

A woman makes known (the following suggested meaning) to her confidant, “This place is solitary; therefore send my secret lover here.”

Comments

This verse is recited in a secluded, romantic, forest grove. The location leads the reader to guess the real intention of the woman. Again, I do not know if the genre can be said to supply the premise that young women always hope for the arrival of their lovers whenever they are in a solitary place.[163]

guruaṇaparavasa pia kiṃ bhaṇāmi tuhi maṃdabhāiṇī ahakam |
ajja pavāsaṃ vaccasi vacca saaṃ jevva suṇasi karaṇijam ||[164]

atrādya madhusamaye yadi vrajasi tadāhaṃ tāvat na bhavāmi tava tu na jānāmi gatim iti vyañjyate || *(459)*

(3.9. Next an example of a suggestion based on **time**:)

The elders have decided for you, o loved one,
What can I say? My luck is lost.
Today you are going abroad. Go!
Only you know what must be done. (21)

Here the woman suggests, "If you go today, in the spring time, and I know not your fate, I will die."

---

[163] I cannot think of a Sanskrit poem where a young maid and her friend remain alone in the woods without the wanted or unwanted arrival of the lover.

164 1. **guruaṇaparavasa =** gurujanaparavaśa – dependant on the will of the elders, **pia =** he priya – o loved one, **kiṃ bhaṇāmi =** kiṃ bhaṇāmi, what say I say, **tuhi =** tvām – to you, **maṃdabhāiṇī =** mandabhāgyā – who am unfortunate **ahakam =** aham – I,
2. **ajja =** adya – today, **pavāsaṃ =** pravāsam – abroad, **vaccasi =** vrajasi – you are going, **vacca =** vraja – you go!, **saaṃ jevva =** svayam eva – just yourself, **suṇasi =** jānāsi – you know **karaṇijam =** karaṇīyam – what is to be done.

Comments

This verse is recited in spring, so the rainy season is about to arrive. In the Sanskrit poetic tradition, the worst fate for lovers is to be kept apart in this season of love. If the lover leaves and there is no hope of his returning soon, the woman suggests she will not survive. This is yet another poem whose suggestion cannot be understood without understanding the larger context, for the season is not mentioned in the verse itself.

ādigrahaṇāc ceṣṭādeḥ | *tatra ceṣṭāyā yathā*

> *dvāropāntanirantare mayi tayā saundaryasārāśriyā*
> *prollāsyoruyugaṃ parasparasamāsaktaṃ samāsāditam* |
> *ānītaṃ purataḥ śiroṃśukamadhaḥ kṣipte cale locane*
> *vācas tatra nivāritaṃ prasaraṇaṃ saṃkocite dorlate* ||

atra ceṣṭayā pracchannakāntaviṣaya ākūtaviśeṣo dhvanyate ||

nirākāṅkṣapratipattaye prāptāvasaratayā ca punar punar udāhriyate | *vaktrādīnāṃ mithaḥ saṃyoge dvikādibhedena* | *anena krameṇa lakṣyavyaṅgyayoś ca vyañjakatvam udāhāryam* || *(463)*

(3.10.) From the use of **etc.** (in *kārikā* 22, above), gestures (are to be included in the list of possible contextual elements). An example of (suggestion based on) gesture:

> She shines with the very essence of beauty!
> When I come near her door,
> She rubs her thighs,
> Bringing them together,
> One upon the other.
> Through her veil

She casts stray looks,
Says little,
And folds her creeper-arms. (22)

Here, by means of gesture, a particular desire or plan is suggested for the sake of the secret lover.

Again and again a fitting example is cited to achieve understanding without expectation (of something more to come). The factors such as who is speaker and so on can be grouped into pairs with differences (in the way suggestion is achieved) according to which two, or three, etc., factors are involved. Though such a sequence (pairs of factors, triads, and so on), suggestiveness of combinations of metaphoric meaning and of suggested meaning could also be illustrated.

Comments

Mammaṭa claims that the gestures described in the poem are used to communicate information to a lover and thus to suggest a course of action. On this reading, the reader would need to understand the coded gestures to understand the suggested action. Alternatively, the woman of the poem could merely be suggesting that she desires the man who is speaking. On this simpler reading, the verse can stand alone.

Each of the factors could be combined with another factor and each of these different pairs of factors (or triplets, etc.) could be called different types of suggestion. Furthermore, examples could be given of each accordingly. Mammaṭa asserts that

examples could be similarly constructed wherein the suggestiveness of metaphoric and suggestive sentences were contained. However, he provides no examples here.

śabdapramāṇavedyo 'tho vyanakty arthāntaraṃ yataḥ* | *arthasya vyañjakatve tat śabdasya sahakāritā* || *(477)

śabdeti nahi pramāṇāntaravedyo 'rtho vyañjakaḥ ||

23. Since the meaning that suggests another meaning is known by way of words (i.e., testimony), in the suggestive function of a meaning, the word plays a role.

The suggested meaning is known by way of testimony, i.e., **words**, because a meaning known by another means of knowledge would not be suggestive.

Comments

Mammaṭa repeats the claim that both word and meaning are involved in every instance of suggestion, linking this *kārikā* to *kārikā* 20. "Other means of knowledge" refers to means of knowledge like perception, inference, etc.[165] In poetry, no means of knowledge other than verbal knowledge is necessary, according to Mammaṭa. He does not address the epistemological problems that arise from the combination of present textual information with memories of earlier textual information.

[165] Of course, there is active debate over how many means of knowledge there are. Based on his use of five means in this text and respect for the Mīmāṃsaka theories, Mammaṭa probably follows the Bhaṭṭa view that there are five.

Furthermore, it is very hard to imagine understanding poem eleven in chapter two without perceptual information. “Her breasts have reduced to just this, / Her petal-eyes have shrunk to merely this, / She has dropped as far as this, / In only this many days.” Technically, of course, the meaning of each of uses of "this" could be understood by previous textual information, but this poem is given as an example of disambiguation through gesture.

atha caturtha ullāsaḥ |

iti kāvyaprakāśo dhvaninirṇayo nāma caturtha ullāsaḥ ||[166]

Chapter Four

The Exposition of Suggestive Poetry

yady api śabdārthayor nirṇaye kṛte doṣaguṇālaṅkārāṇāṃ svarūpam abhidhānīyam tathāpi dharmiṇi pradarśite dharmāṇāṃ heyopādeyatā jñāyata iti prathamaṃ kāvyabhedān āha |

(According to the definition of poetry given above[167],) now that the exposition of word and meaning is done, the nature of blemishes, excellences, and poetic ornaments should be explained. However, the author will first state the divisions of poetry because only when the property-bearer is known can one determine which properties are to be rejected and which accepted.

---

[166] Taken from end of chapter (Mohan 1129).
[167] "Poetry consists of words and meanings that possess excellences and are free from blemishes. In some cases it lacks poetic ornaments." (*kārikā* 4ab).

Comments

Normally, in Indian philosophy, one defines the object of study and then explain each term of the definition. Mammaṭa will not return to this task until chapter seven.

Nowhere is the tension in Mammaṭa's attempt to combine the pre-*dhvani* and *dhvani* schools of poetry more clearly seen than here, where Mammaṭa reverses the essential and accidental qualities of a poem. The definition claims that qualities and faults comprise the essence of poetry, thus these terms should be explained first. Poetic ornaments should be explained next. Even though these are declared unessential in the definition, each technical term in the definition should be explained. Only then should accidental qualities be addressed.

An adequate definition applies to all sub-species of the definiendum, including sub-species of value (the three types Mammaṭa turns to now are those of best, middle, and worst). Clearly the merit of a poem is an accidental quality and, as such, does not effect the fact that it is a poem. After all, a bad poem is still a poem. If Mammaṭa had wished to follow the traditional order of investigation, he would have proceeded with chapters seven through ten, and then returned to the material of chapters four to six.

On the principle of determining what a thing is before determining its properties compare Socrates' question, "How can I know a property of something when I don't even know what it is?" (*Meno*, 71b). Many thinkers in the Indian tradition emphasized this principle. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa is particularly famous for his strict adherence to it.

The first half of this chapter (though *kārikā* 42ab) explains eighteen different types of suggestive poetry. In all these types, it the sentence as a whole, and not an individual word that is suggestive. In the second half of the chapter Mammaṭa goes through the types again with examples in which an individual word is suggestive. As it is easy to miss the forest for the trees in this chapter, I offer the following outline of the types:

A. Literal meaning unintended (*kārikā* 24).

1. Transformed into another meaning (poem 23).

2. Entirely set aside (poem 24).

B. Literal meaning intended.

B_1. Psychological sequence unnoticed.

3a. Suggests *rasa* (poems 25-26 and 30-44).

3b. Suggests pseudo-*rasas*, emotions, etc. (poems 45-53).

B_2. Psychological sequence noticed.

$B_{2.1}$. Based on the power of the word.

4. Suggesting an ornament (poems 54-57).

5. Suggesting a fact (poems 58-59).

$B_{2.2}$. Based on the power of the meaning.

$B_{2.2.1}$. The suggestor is self-existent.

6. A fact suggests a fact (poem 60).

7. A fact suggests an ornament (poem 61).

8. An ornament suggests a fact (poem 62).

9. An ornament suggests another ornament (poem 63).

$B_{2.2.2}$. The suggestor is invented by the poet.

10. A fact suggests a fact (poem 64).

11. A fact suggests an ornament (poem 65).

12. An ornament suggests a fact (poem 66).

13. An ornament suggests another ornament (poem 67).

$B_{2.2.3}$. The suggestor is invented by a character in the poem.

14. A fact suggests a fact (poem 68).

15. A fact suggests an ornament (poem 69).

16. An ornament suggests a fact (poem 70).

17. An ornament suggests another ornament (poem 71).

$B_{2.3}$. Based on the power of both the words and the meanings.

18. Suggests an ornament (poem 72).

***āvivakṣitavācyo yas tatra vācyaṃ bhaved dhvanau* |**

arthāntare saṃkramitam atyantaṃ vā tiraskṛtam* || *(481)

lakṣaṇāmūlagūḍhavyaṅgyaprādhānye saty eva avivakṣitaṃ vācyaṃ yatra sa dhvanau iti anuvādāt dhvanir iti jñeyaḥ | *tatra ca vācyaṃ kvacid anupayujyamānatvād arthāntare pariṇamitam* | *yathā*

> *tvām asmi vācmi viduṣāṃ samavāyo 'tra tiṣṭhati* |
> *ātmīyāṃ matimāsthāya sthitim atra vidhehi tat* ||

atra vacanādi upadeśādirūpatayā pariṇamati ||

kvacid anupapadyamānatayā atyantaṃ tiraskṛtam | *yathā*

upakṛtaṃ bahu tatra kim ucyate sujanatā prathā bhavatā param |
vidadhadīdṛśam eva sadā sakhe sukhitam āssva tataḥ śaradāṃ śatam ||

etad apakāriṇaṃ prati viparītalakṣaṇayā kaścid vakti ||

(4.1. Suggestive Poetry in which the Literal Meaning Is Unintended.)

24. A literal meaning that is not intended and is either shifted to another meaning or entirely set aside should be considered a type of suggestive poetry (*dhvani*).[168]

A semantic unit (*vācyaṃ*) wherein a hidden suggested meaning based on metaphorical indication is predominant, and the literal meaning (*vācyaṃ*) is not intended, should be known as **suggestive poetry** because of the use of this word in the *kārikā*.

Sometimes the literal meaning turns into **another meaning** because it is not proper in the context. For example:

I say to you, "Here stands a group of the learned
So remain here with your mind composed." (23)

Here "saying, etc." takes the form of "advising."[169]

[168] For Mammaṭa's sourse for this definition, see Ānandavardhana 2.1 and Abhinava's commentary in Ingalls, et al. (1990:200-212).

[169] The *Saṅketa* and *Sampradāyaprakāśinī* commentaries explain this suggestion by claiming that mere saying is not proper for the context, and that the speaker is hoping to help his listener with this information. The suggestion might be something like, "Take advantage and be attentive!"

[170] *Viparītalakṣaṇa*, which I translate here as "irony," is literally "metaphorical indication by means of reversed or contrary expression." Note that this is a type of metaphoric indication, not an ornament.

Sometimes the literal meaning, being not suitable for the context, **is entirely set aside**. For example:

What a great help! What can I say?
Your kindness is widely renowned.
Behaving ever like this, my friend,
May you enjoy a hundred autumns. (24)

Someone says this to an enemy with irony.[170]

Comments

In suggestive poetry, the suggested meaning stands in a relation to the literal meaning that is different from the relation of metaphoric meaning. As Mammaṭa will explain, there are many types of suggestive relations. He begins with a poem in which the suggested meaning extends the literal meaning ever so slightly. The speaker is not only trying to communicate information, but to suggest a course of action. The suggested meaning refines or colors the literal meaning.

In the second poem, the metaphorically indicated meaning is the opposite of the literal. Unlike pure metaphoric usage, the meaning arrived at by the blocking of the literal meaning is not the main point of the verse. The verse communicates a third meaning beyond the literal and metaphorically indicated. It suggests a certain attitude in the speaker and a certain relation between the speaker and the hearer.

vivakṣitaṃ cānyaparaṃ vācyaṃ yatrāparas tu saḥ | *(502)*

anyaparaṃ vyaṅgyaniṣṭham | *eṣa ca* ||

(4.2. Suggestive Poetry in which the Literal Meaning Is Intended.)

25ab. Next, when the literal meaning and another meaning are both intended, there is another type of suggestive poetry.

Another meaning refers to a suggested meaning. And this (type of suggestive poetry is divided into two based on the way the suggestion functions):

Comments

Mammaṭa begins his discussion of the most important type of suggestive poetry. One of Ānandavardhana's central theses was that good poetry communicates both a description of an event or scene and an emotional tone or *rasa*. The description is communicated, at least in part, literally. The *rasa* is suggested by the details of the literal. Mammaṭa will examine many different subtypes of this kind of suggestion.

ko 'py alakṣakramavyaṅgyo lakṣyavyaṅgyakramaḥ paraḥ || *(505)*

alakṣyeti na khalu vibhāvānubhāvavyabhicāriṇa eva rasaḥ | *api tu rasas taiḥ ity asti kramaḥ* | *sa tu lāghavān na lakṣyate* ||

25cd. Suggestion whose psychological sequence (*krama*) is unnoticed (*alakṣa*) and suggestion whose psychological sequence is noticed (*lakṣa*).[171]

By "unnoticed" we do not mean that *rasa* is the same as the determinants, the symptoms, and the auxiliaries. Rather, *rasa* exists because of them. Thus there is a psychological sequence. But it is called "unnoticed" because of the quickness (by which the hearer picks up the suggestion).[172]

Comments

Mammaṭa explains that in some types of suggestion one is aware of the process leading up to the suggestion while in others one is not. A complex literary figure, for example, has to be deciphered. When this is done, we still have to figure out the artist's intention. Mammaṭa, following Ānandavardhana, believes that by using a complex figure the artist can suggest additional meaning. In this type of suggestion, we are aware of the sequence that leads up to our understanding of it. On the other hand, when a poem suggests a mood, we often are not aware of when or how it does so. We might say, for instance, that a poem is melancholy without being able to point to any concrete part of the poem that grounds this emotion. The first half of the remainder of this chapter addresses types of

[171] Mammaṭa is following Ānandavardhana in this section. See Ānandavardhana 2.2 and Abhinava's commentary in Ingalls, et al. (1990:212-213). Ingalls, Masson, and Patwardhan translate *alakṣakrama* as "without apparent sequence." The choice of words in Sanskrit is a bit odd, but the meaning is clear. In this type of suggestion the person does not usually notice the sequential process leading to the suggested meaning.

[172] Alternatively, the last line could read, "The sequence is called 'unnoticed' because it is simpler (than saying, 'usually unnoticed')." However, experiencing the sequence is elsewhere likened to piercing a hundred leaves with a single arrow. The point seems to be that it happens so quickly it is hard to notice which leaf gets pierced first.

suggestions whose psychological sequences are unnoticed. At *kārikā* 37, Mammaṭa turns to suggestions whose psychological sequences are noticed.

To understand the shift from suggestion to *rasa*, keep in mind that the paradigm suggestion whose sequence is unnoticed is suggestion of *rasa*. Let us remember that *rasa* was originally the mood of a play. It is notoriously difficult to say exactly why the *Rāmāyaṇa* fills a responsive reader with pathos or why *Romeo and Juliet* is romantic.

In his self-commentary, Mammaṭa introduces technical vocabulary from drama theory that he will explain in *kārikā* 27 and 28.

atra

rasabhāvatadābhāsabhāvaśāntyādir akramaḥ **|**

bhinno rasādyalaṃkārad alaṃkāryatayā sthitaḥ **|| *(513)***

ādigrahaṇād bhāvodayabhāvasaṃdhibhāvaśabalatvāni | *pradhānatayā yatra sthito rasādis tatrālaṃkāryaḥ yathodāhariṣyate* | *anyatra tu pradhāne vākyārthe yatrāṅgabhūto rasādis tatra [guṇībhūtavyaṅgye rasavatpreyaūrjasvinsamāhitādayo 'laṅkārāḥ* | *te ca]*[173] *gunībhūtavyaṅgyābhidhāne udāhariṣyante* ||

(4.2.1 Suggestive Poetry in which the Psychological Sequence Is Unnoticed.)

Of these

[173] This text is not in Mohan. Frustratingly, Mohan does not say if he has reason to cut this line.

26. The type of suggestion whose sequence is unnoticed consists of *rasas*, emotions, pseudo (*rasas* and emotions), cessation of emotions, and the like. Such a suggestion is to be embellished by poetic ornaments and is different from (a poem in which) *rasa,* etc. are poetic ornaments.

By mention of "and the rest" is meant the arising of emotion, the co-existence of two emotions, and the admixture of many emotions. Where *rasa*, etc. are the main purpose of a suggestion, they are to be embellished with poetic ornaments, as will be explained and illustrated presently. But in other poems, the literal meaning is the main purpose (of the poem) and *rasa*, etc., are secondary. [In these poems there are poetic ornaments such as *rasavat*, *preyas*, *ūrjasvin*, and *samāhita.*] This type of poem will be explained and illustrated under the heading "Poems of Subordinated Suggestion" (chapter five).

Comments

Mammaṭa focuses now on those types of suggestion whose psychological sequence is unnoticed, starting with suggestion of *rasa* and emotion. He will turn to suggestion of pseudo-*rasa* and emotions in *kārikā* 36b, and to the suggestion of the cessation, arising, and mixing of emotions in *kārikā* 36cd. Finally, he will consider suggestions whose psychological sequence is noticed beginning with *kārikā* 37cd. It is important to note that all of these types of suggestion are valued both by Mammaṭa and the Sanskrit tradition generally. Many of the greatest poems suggest emotions that do not correspond to the nine *rasas*.

Some of the earlier critics (Lollaṭa, for example) dealt with this situation by claiming that there were an infinite number of *rasas*. Mammaṭa retains the limit of nine *rasas*, but accepts the poetic value of the other emotions under other titles. I will return to this point when considering suggestion of pseudo-*rasas*, etc.

The pre-Ānandavardhana writers on poetics were familiar with the concept of *rasa* but did not consider it to be the soul of poetry. De observes that the early theorists, "include it [*rasa*] in poetic ornaments or by allowing it to form an element of one of the excellences of diction."[174] Ānandavardhana recognized that *rasa* can be used this way, but claims that in the best poetry it becomes the primary focus of the poem. He writes, "When it [suggested sense] predominates, that is the soul of suggestion."[175] Mammaṭa accepts Ānandavardhana's distinction, treating poems in which the suggested sense dominates in this chapter, and poems of subordinate suggestion in the next.

The four poetic ornaments Mammaṭa mentions are found in Bhāmaha's *Kāvyālaṅkāra* 3:5 – 10. From his examples, one can surmise that they refer to poems of erotic love, devotion, misplaced passion, and happy coincidence. Udbhaṭa organized these into *rasa* poems, poems of other affections (devotion, friendship, filial love, etc.), pseudo-emotions, and cessation of passion. [176] As we will see, Mammaṭa organizes the section on suggestive poems of unnoticed psychological sequence according to Udbhaṭa's system. In poems, however, in which the suggested emotion is secondary to the literal

[174] De (1960:2:117).
[175] Ingalls, et al. (1990:214).
[176] Ingalls seems to confuse Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin on this point in his otherwise useful note on the history of these poetic ornaments in Ingalls et al. (1990:243n6).

meaning or to the structure of the poem, Mammaṭa calls the suggestion an ornament and retains the original names. Thus, if the most striking element of a devotional poem is it form, for example, Mammaṭa will say it has the poetic ornament of devotion, not the suggested emotion of devotion (see chapter ten).

Mammaṭa effectively double each of Udbhaṭa's types by considering whether the suggestion dominates the poem or not. This reduplication of the original system was necessitated by Ānandavardhana's division of poems into suggestive poems and poems of secondary suggestion.

tatra rasasvarūpam āha

***kāraṇāny atha kāryāṇi sahakārīṇi yāni ca* |**

***ratyādeḥ sthāyino loke tāni cen nāṭyakāvyayoḥ* ||**

***vibhāvā anubhāvās tat kathyante vyabhicāriṇaḥ* |**

vyaktaḥ sa tair vibhāvādyaiḥ sthāyī bhāvo rasaḥ smṛtaḥ* || *(521)

uktam hi bharatena vibhāvānubhāvavyabhicārisaṃyogād rasaniṣpattiḥ iti ||

(4.2.1.1.) Now, the nature of *rasa* is stated.

27 - 28. The causes, effects, and concurrent elements of a lasting emotion like love in the world are called "determinants," "symptoms," and "auxiliaries" in drama and poetry. An abiding emotion made manifest by the determinants, symptoms, and auxiliary states is known as *rasa*.

For it is said by Bharata, "*Rasa* arises out of the combination of the determinants, the symptoms, and the auxiliary states."

Comments

Mammaṭa introduces five important technical terms of poetics. He quotes the *Nāṭyaśāstra*, 6.31, which, however, does not mention abiding emotions. In English we do not call Romeo's love for Juliet by a different name than Abélard's love for Héloïse. But in Bharata's aesthetics, the first is "*rasa*" and the second "abiding emotion". Likewise, Héloïse is a "cause" of Abélard's love, whereas Juliet is a "determinant" of Romeo's (other determinants include the proper setting and time, i.e., the Capulet party or the garden at night). The effects of love on Abélard's behavior are call "symptoms" when found in Romeo. These are the actions undertaken for the sake of love, such as climbing garden walls, writing letters, exchanging smiles, etc. Finally, the concurrent elements in Abélard are called auxiliaries when found in Romeo. These include both secondary emotions, like the jealously Romeo feels toward Paris because of his love, and "involuntary states" that arise from being in love, like perspiration and trembling.

Bharata sets out guidelines regulating the use of these factors. For example, he explains which symptoms and auxiliaries are appropriate to each *rasa* and which are antithetical, he advises which factors can be mixed and the result of their mixing, and he shows which *rasas* can be introduced in digressions without diminishing the dominant *rasa*. Although Bharata's system can seem both mechanical and limiting, it does go a

long way towards explaining how a dramatic spectacle successful conveys meaning beyond the literal and metaphoric.

"Abiding emotion" is a technical term used to designate the nine emotions (listed below) that can be central to a poetic work. The tradition deriving from Bharata thinks that only these nine emotions are capable of transformation into *rasa*. There are other poetically viable emotions not included in this group. Poetic theorists struggle to understand the relation between the abiding emotions and the additional emotions capable of artist expression. Mammaṭa will return to this topic in *kārikā* 35cd -36ab.

The abiding emotions are sometime called the basic human emotions. Gnoli says of the abiding emotions, "They permanently exist in the mind of every man, in the form of latent impression (*vāsanā*) derived from actual experience in the present life or from inherited instinct, and, as such, they are ready to emerge into his consciousness on any occasion."[177] Aesthetics uses the supposed universal nature of these emotions to explain how a person can sympathize with the representation of emotions he has never personally experienced.

Mammaṭa will examine the technical terms one by one. To treat *rasa*, he summarizes the histories of *rasa* theory, culminating with Abhinava. Then he turns to the "determinants," etc. Before continuing, however, it is worth quoting more fully the *Nāṭyaśāstra* section excerpted by Mammaṭa. It is the root text on this topic and provides the context for the following discussion.

---

[177] Gnoli (1968:xvi).

"In that connexion I shall first explain the *rasas.* No [poetic] meaning proceeds [from speech] without [any kind of] *rasa*. Now *rasa* is produced from a combination of determinants, symptoms, and auxiliary states. Is there any instance [parallel to it]? [Yes,] it is said that as flavor (*rasa*) results from a combination of various spices, vegetables, and other articles, and as the six flavors are produced by articles such as raw sugar or spices or vegetables, so the abiding emotions, when they come together with various other psychological states attain the quality of *rasas*…It is apparent that the *rasas* arise from the psychological states and not the psychological states from the *rasas*. For [on this point] there are [traditional verses such as]: The psychological states are so called by the experts in drama for they make one feel the *rasas* in connection with various modes of dramatic representation. Just as by many articles of various kinds auxiliary cooked foods are brought forth, so the psychological states along with different kinds of histrionic representation will cause the *rasas* to be felt."[178]

We will see that the key concepts introduced by Bharata are capable of divergent interpretations. Mammaṭa now examines four.

etad vivṛṇvate । *vibhāvair lalanodyānādibhir ālambanoddīpanakāraṇaiḥ ratyādiko bhāvo janitaḥ anubhāvaiḥ kaṭākṣabhujākṣepaprabhṛtibhiḥ kāryaiḥ pratītiyogyaḥ kṛtaḥ vyabhicāribhir nirvedādibhiḥ sahakāribhir upacito mukhyayā vṛttyā rāmādāv anukārye tadrūpasaṃdhānān nartake 'pi pratīyamāno rasaḥ iti bhaṭṭalollaṭaprabhṛtayaḥ* ॥ *(534)*

[178] *Nāṭyaśāstra* 6.31-35 in M. Ghosh (1967:105-107). I have modified his translation slightly.

(4.2.1.2. A History of *Rasa* Theory)

(1.) Bhaṭṭalollaṭa and his followers explain the sūtra thus:[179] ***Rasa*** is an emotion like love that is (1) born of the **determinants**, i.e., a basic cause like a playful woman and enflaming causes like gardens, that is (2) made observable by the **symptoms**, i.e., the effects (of being in love) like sideways glances and embraces, and that is (3) further augmented by the **auxiliary states**, i.e., concurrent elements like distractedness. *Rasa* is cognized primarily in respect to someone being imitated, like Rāma, but also is also cognized by an actor when he affects the appearance of Rāma.

Comments

Mammaṭa begins his history, following Abhinavagupta's *Abhinavabhāratī*, with Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa. Lollaṭa and the second theorist Mammaṭa presents, Śrī Śaṅkuka, are thought to have lived in the ninth century, directly before, or contemporaneous with, Ānandavardhana.[180] Like Abhinava, Mammaṭa does not present Ānandavardhana's position, but rather skips to one of Ānandavardhana's tenth century critics, Bhaṭṭanāyaka. Finally, Mammaṭa presents Abhinava's late tenth century "defense" of Ānandavardhana's theory, which, as Ingalls has argued, is substantially different from Ānandavardhana's own statement of his theory.[181] Therefore, it should be clear that Mammaṭa presents not a history of *rasa* theory generally, but a partial history of the ninth and tenth century debate

[179] This is a translation of "*iti baṭṭalollaṭaprabhṛtayaḥ*" taken from the end of this presentation of his views.
[180] Gnoli (1968:xvii) and Chari (1990:xi).
[181] Ingalls, et al. (1990:18-35).

that culminated in Abhinava's theory.[182] It should be noted that the only extant sources for this debate are the *Abhinavabhāratī*, and later texts based on it. In other words, we only know the thoughts of the first three theorists through a hostile critic. When Abhinava quotes these writers we have no way of knowing whether he is really quoting their works or speaking for them. Although the later practice is common in Indian philosophy, such glosses are usually very accurate. Mammaṭa is almost undoubtedly glossing Abhinava, although he may have additional sources for the four views he presents.

In the *Abhinavabhāratī,* Lollaṭa is reported as claiming that a *rasa* is an intensified abiding emotion.[183] The erotic, for example, is an intensified form of sexual desire. The abiding emotion is intensified primarily by the artist representation of the determinants, symptoms, and auxiliaries. The *rasa* is chiefly experienced by the character represented, but is also tasted by the representing actor.

I believe that Lollaṭa, like Bharata, writes primarily to instruct playwrights and actors. Like Aristotle, his theory explains which elements need to be included in a successful plot. Lollaṭa discusses the story of Rāma's love for Sītā and claims that more than mere sexual desire must be presented. Rāma's fervor needs to be intensified by being developed through out the play. In a good romance, the lovers go through trials,

---

[182] The best general introduction to this debate is Gnoli (1968). His introduction sketches the basic positions and arguments and is followed by the text and a translation of the *Abhinavabhāratī*, the main existent source for this subject. For a more complete history that takes into account comments by Kālidāsa and the early poetic theorists, see De (1960:2:108-138). However, De's account is limited by the fact that he, like Abhinava and Mammaṭa, considers Abhinava's position to be the pinnacle of aesthetic thought. Like them, he tends to judge other theories by Abhinava's criteria, regardless of their stated goals.
[183] Gnoli (1968:26).

doubts, and frustrations that augment their ardor. The climax leaves the viewers with the impression that the couple is deeply in love and that their love will last.

Lollaṭa's theory shows how to represent a *rasa* in a manner that will convince and entertain an audience. Lollaṭa's theory strives to teach playwrights and actors how to win an audience. Lollaṭa considers a play and, more specifically, the elements of a dramatic production as causes and the audience response an effect. To achieve the desired effect, it is best to put in place the necessary causal factors.

Lollaṭa's view is criticized for leaving the audience out of the description of the aesthetic experience and for claiming that the actors feel the emotion of the characters they are representing. I feel both these criticisms miss the point of his theory. It is true that Lollaṭa ignores two possible topics of aesthetic theory. First, he has nothing to say about the psychology of audience response. Why, one can ask, is an audience moved by an artwork? While this is an interesting question, answering it is not vital to the writing of a good play.[184] Lollaṭa shows what works, without worrying about why it works. Second, one may investigate the psychological states typical of an actor. This too is an interesting topic, and a complex one. Lollaṭa claims that the actor feels the *rasa*, "by virtue of the power of realization (*amusaṃdhāna*)."[185] According to Gnoli, realization allows the actor to feel the emotion without losing his self-awareness.[186] Certainly more needs to be said, but it is an acceptable start that refutes the common criticism of Lollaṭa's theory, namely, that the actor, besotted by love, would forget his lines.

---

[184] Gnoli (1968:xix).
[185] Gnoli (1968:26).
[186] Gnoli (1968:xviii).

rāma evāyam ayam eva rāma iti na rāmo' yam ityauttarakālike bādhe rāmo 'yam iti rāmaḥ syād vā na vāyam iti rāmasadṛśo 'yam iti ca samyaṅmithyāsaṃśayasādṛśyapratītibhyo vilakṣaṇayā citraturagādinyāyena rāmo 'yam iti pratipattyā grāhye naṭe ||

> *seyaṃ mamāṅgeṣu sudhārasacchaṭā supūrakarpūraśalākikā dṛśoḥ* |
> *manorathaśrīr manasaḥ śarīriṇī prāṇeśvarī locanagocaraṃ gatā* ||
>
> *daivād aham adya tayā capalāyatanetrayā viyuktaś ca* |
> *aviralavilolajaladaḥ kālaḥ samupāgataś cāyam* ||

ityādikāvyānusaṃdhānabalāc chikṣābhyāsanirvartitasvakāryaprakaṭanena ca naṭenaiva prakāśitaiḥ kāraṇakāryasahakāribhiḥ kṛtrimair api tathānabhimanyamānair vibhāvādiśabdavyapadeśyaiḥ saṃyogat gamyagamakabhāvarūpāt anumīyamāno 'pi vastusaundaryabalād rasanīyatvenānyānumīyamānavilakṣaṇaḥ sthāyitvena saṃbhāvyamāno ratyādir bhāvas tatrāsann api sāmājikkānāṃ vāsanayā carvyamāṇo rasa iti śrīśaṅkukaḥ || *(543)*

(2.) Śrī Śaṅkuka explains Bharata's sūtra as follows:[187] In the same way a painted horse (is recognized as a horse), the actor is grasped by the cognition, "This is Rāma," which is different from (1) a factual cognition, "Rāma is he, he is Rāma," (2) a false cognition, "He is Rāma," suppressed in the next moment by, "He is not Rāma," (3) a cognition of doubt, "He may be Rāma, or not," and (4) a cognition of similarity, "He resembles Rāma."

[187] This is a translation of "*itiśrīśaṅkuka*" taken from the end of the section (Mohan 543).

Rasa is an emotion, like love, which is being cognized as enduring. It is relished by the trained[188] audience and is absent from the actors. The cause, effect, and concurrent elements are made manifest by the actor by force of close study of poems like the following and by learning and practicing his role. These three, even though artificial, are not to be thought of as such and are known by the words, **determinants**, **symptoms**, and **auxiliary states**. (By saying that ***rasa*** **arises**) **out of the combination** (of these three, Bharata means a relation), which essentially is that of the inferred to its inferential marks. The inferring of *rasa*, however, is different from the inferring of other things, because *rasa* is relishable on the strength of its inherent beauty.

(Now the examples:)

She herself – the nectar in my limbs,
The healing camphor ointment for my eyes,
The embodiment of the glorious desires of my heart,
The ruler of my life – has come into sight! (25)

Because of the gods, I am now separated from her
Of trembling broad eyes.
And the season of the thick, rolling, rain clouds has arrived. (26)[189]

Comments

Unlike Lollaṭa, Śaṅkuka is interested in how a play produces pleasure in the audience. We thus move from drama theory to aesthetics. He claims that *rasa* is not a heightened form of an emotion, but rather an artistic reproduction of the emotion. Abhinava

[188] "*Vāsanā*" is translated here as 'trained' because the idea is that the spectator must arrive at the work with the proper experiences in place. I believe Śaṅkuka simply meant the proper cultural education, but experience from past lives could also be meant.
[189] Also quoted in Rudraṭa's *Kāvyālaṅkāra* 7:29 (D).

represents him as claiming, "*Rasa* is simply a permanent state of mind, and, more precisely, the reproduction (*anukaraṇa*) of the permanent state of mind proper to the person produced – Rāma, etc."[190] For Śaṅkuka, sexual desire exists in the world, while the erotic *rasa* arises from its reproduction in art. The aesthetic experience arises in one who is trained to appreciate art by means of the perception of an artistic imitation. The *rasa* is located in the play, and not, contra Lollaṭa, in the actors. The actor makes manifest the play's *rasa* through his skill in imitating the emotions of the characters.

The audience perception of the *rasa* comes about by means of a type of inference that is unique to art.[191] According to Abhinava, Śaṅkuka says, "Representation (*abhinayana*), indeed, is nothing but a power of communication (*avagamanaśakti*) – this power differing from the one of verbal expression."[192] Śaṅkuka comes close here to Ānandavardhana's theory of suggestion and closer still to Bhaṭṭanāyaka's theory of enlivening or revelation (*bhāvanā*). But Śaṅkuka, focusing on the power of a production, not the power of words, turns to inference as the key cognitive function.[193] Abhinava quotes Śaṅkuka as saying that in aesthetic experience, "there is neither doubt, nor truth, nor error. The notion that appears is, 'This is that,' not, 'This is really that.'"[194] Mammaṭa expands this quote, giving examples of each type of cognition. In aesthetic perception, in

---

[190] Gnoli (1968:29).
[191] Gnoli (1968:xix).
[192] Gnoli (1968:31).
[193] On Abhinava's debt to this theory, see Masson and Patwardhan (1970:1:10). Clearly perception, the other main non-verbal means of knowledge, is not available for a general theory of poetics, for while reading a poem or play, you see words, not emotions.
[194] Gnoli (1968:32).

other words, there is “willing suspension of disbelief” that allows the audience to fully engage in the production in a manner distinct from normal experience.

na tāṭasthyena nātmagatatvena rasaḥ pratīyate notpadyate nābhivyajyate api tu kāvye nāṭye cābhidhāto dvitīyena vibhāvādisādhāraṇīkaraṇātmanā bhāvakatvavyāpāreṇa bhāvyamānaḥ sthāyī sattvodrekaprakāśānandamayasaṃvidviśrāntisattvena bhogena bhujyate iti bhaṭṭanāyakaḥ || *(560)*

(3.) Bhaṭṭanāyaka explains Bharata’s sūtra as follows:[195] ***Rasa*** is not cognized, produced, or manifest in either a manner unrelated to (the spectator, as in (1) above) or as a property of oneself (i.e., the spectator)[196]. Rather, in poetry and drama, ***rasa,*** which is lasting, is actualized through a special function of words (*bhāvakatva*) that is different from denotation (and indication) and essentially universalizes **the determinants,** etc. It is relished by a delight that is essentially repose and a conjunction of light and bliss resulting from the dominance of the quality of goodness (*sattvodreka*).

Comments

Bhaṭṭanāyaka was an important theorist who prefigures many of Abhinava’s most important ideas. Ingalls writes, “Most of the components of Abhinava’s new theory are

[195] This is a translation of “*iti Bhaṭṭanāyaka*” taken from the end of the section (Mohan 560).
[196] This is commonly taken to refer to Śaṅkuka, but could also refer to Ānandavardhana, or an unknown critic. The view presented in neither Śaṅkuka’s nor Ānandavardhana’s, but does resemble Abhinava’s.

borrowed, strange to say, from Ānanda's main critic (Bhaṭṭanāyaka)."[197] Most importantly, Bhaṭṭanāyaka believes that the emotions, determinants, symptoms, and auxiliary states were universalized by a special power of words called *bhāvakatva*.[198] The universalization process transforms a particular emotion and the events surrounding it into a general emotion free of context that can be shared without personal attachment. Not only is the audience "disinterested," but the plot is made generic, as well. Romeo's love for Juliet, correctly appreciated, becomes generic erotic experience.[199] Ingalls writes that Bhaṭṭanāyaka "sees *rasa* not as an object to be enjoyed, but as the ongoing process of (aesthetic) enjoyment itself."[200] This enjoyment, Abhinava represents him as saying, "is due to the emergent state of goodness (*sattva*), is pervaded by beatitude (*ānanda*) and light (*prakāśa*), and is similar to the tasting (*āsvāda*) of the supreme *brahman*."[201] As akin to supreme mystical union, Bhaṭṭanāyaka argues that the *rasa* experience is not in any particular subject (neither the character, the actor, the audience, nor some unrelated person).

In later Indian theorizing on *rasa*, all *rasa* experience is often considered identical. [202] Given his vague, mystical description of *rasa* experience, it is difficult to see how Bhaṭṭanāyaka would avoid this homogenizing of aesthetic experience. As we will

---

[197] Ingalls, et al. (1990:35).
[198] Gnoli (1968:45).
[199] Unfortunately, laking Bhaṭṭanāyaka's description of the generic experience, we cannot know he meant by a generic erotic experience.
[200] Ingalls, et al. (1990:37).
[201] Gnoli (1968:47-48).
[202] For example, B.N. Goswami (1986:21) writes that the *rasas*, "are separately listed because even though *rasa* is defined as one and undivided, it is one or the other of these nine *rasas* through which an aesthetic experience takes place." As he makes clear on p.24, the "aesthetic experience" is precisely the experience of this single, undivided *rasa*.

see, Abhinava struggles to avoid reducing the varieties aesthetic experience to a single type.

Bhaṭṭanāyaka claims, like Ānandavardhana before him, that a poem is able to produce *rasa* experience in a qualified audience by means of a special semantic power, which he calls "enlivening" or "revelation" (*bhāvanā)*. Abhinava argues that this power is not different in any important way from the semantic power that Ānanda calls suggestion. With only Abhinava's summary to go on, this seems a valid point. But as Ingalls observes, there was probably more to Bhaṭṭanāyaka's theory than Abhinava reports.[203]

loke pramadābhiḥ sthāyy anumāne 'bhāsa pāṭavavatāṃ kāvye nāṭye ca tair eva kāraṇatvādiparihāreṇa vibhāvanādivyāpāravattvād alaukika vibhāvādi śabda vyavahāryair mamaivaite śatror evaite taṭasthasyaivaite na mamaivaite na śatrorevaite na taṭasthasyaivaite iti saṃbandhaviśeṣasvīkāraparihāraniyamānadhyavasāyāt sādhāraṇyena praśatrorevaite na taṭasthasyaivaite iti saṃbandhaviśeṣasvīkāraparihāra niyamānadhyavasāyāt sādhāraṇyena pratītair abhivyaktaḥ sāmājikānāṃ vāsanātmatayā sthitaḥ sthāyī ratyādiko niyatapramātṛgatatvena sthito 'pi sādhāraṇopāyabalāt tatkālavigalitaparimitapramātṛbhāvavaśonmiṣitavedyāntara-saṃparkaśūnyāparimitabhāvena pramātrā sakalasahṛdayasaṃvādabhājā sādhāraṇyena svākāra ivābhinno 'pi gocarīkṛtaś carvyamāṇataikaprāṇo vibhāvādijīvitāvadhiḥ pānakarasanyāyena caryamāṇaḥ pura iva parisphuran hṛdayam iva praviśan

[203] Ingalls, et al. (1990:36).

sarvāṅgīṇam ivāliṅgan anyat sarvam iva tirodadhat brahmāsvādam ivānubhāvayan alaukikacamatkārakārī śṛṅgarādiko rasaḥ | *sa ca na kāryaḥ* | *vibhāvādi vināśe 'pi tasya saṃbhavaprasaṅgāt* | *nāpi jñāpyaḥ siddhasya tasyāsaṃbhavāt* | *api tu vibhāvādibhir vyañjitaś carvaṇīyaḥ* | *kārakajñāpakābhyām anyat kva dṛṣṭam iti cet na kvacit dṛṣṭam ity alaukikasiddher bhūṣaṇam etan na dūṣaṇam* | *carvaṇāniśpattyā tasya niśpattir ūpacariteti kāryo 'py ucyatām* | *laukikapratyakṣādipramāṇatāṭasthyāvaboddhaśali-mitayogijñanavedyāntarasaṃsparśarahitasvātmamātraparyavasitaparimitetarayogi-saṃvedanavilakṣaṇalokottarasvasaṃvedanagocara iti pratyeyo 'py abhidhīyatām* | *tadgrahakaṃ ca na nirvakalpakaṃ vibhāvādi parāmarśapradhānatvāt* | *nāpi savikalpaṃ carvyamāṇasyālaukikānandamayasya svasaṃvedanasiddhatvāt* | *ubhayābhāvasvarūpasya cobhayātmakatvam api pūrvavallokottaratām eva gamayati na tu virodham iti śrīmadācāryābhinavaguptapādāḥ* || *(574)*

(4.) The great teacher Abhinavagupta explains Bharata's sūtra as follows:[204]

An abiding emotion like love exists in a cultured spectator as a latent trace of previous experience (*vāsanā*). In common life, clever people repeatedly infer that women, and the like, cause an abiding emotion. In poetry and drama these causes are referred to with technical terms, such as **the determinants**, because they can bring about the effects without the normal causal conditions. The determinates, etc., are not cognized as bound by a principle of acceptance or rejection of a specific relation as in: "These are mine," "These are my enemy's," "These are belonging to a neutral person," or "These are not mine," "These are not my enemy's," "These are not belonging to a neutral person." Thus the abiding emotion is manifested by the cognitions (of the determinants, etc.) as universal. Though the emotion is restricted to the individual spectators (*niyatapramātṛ*), by the power of the universalizing process it exists as universal in a spectator who (1) has knowledge of poetics, (2) has his limited perceiverhood swallowed up for a period of time, (3) and whose emotions are not delimited, being free from connection with anything other than what is to be known and manifest (in the artwork/drama).

(The universalized emotion of sexual desire becomes) the erotic *rasa*, which has its own form, even though it is not distinct from the spectator. The life of (a *rasa* experience) is one with (the experience of artistic) relishing and thus its life span is determined by (the existence) of the determinants, etc. (In this) it is analogous to the flavor of a beverage (which lasts only as long as the beverage itself). (The *rasa* appears)

[204] This is a translation of "*iti śrīmadācāryābhinavaguptādāḥ*" at the end of the section (Mohan 574).

as if sparkling before the eyes, entering the heart, embracing the whole person, and eclipsing everything else. (*Rasa* experience is) akin to the experience of the enjoyment of Brahman and causes extraordinary wonder. *Rasa* is not an effect, because that would entail the false proposition that its existence would be possible after the determinants, etc., disappear. Nor is it cognized, because it does not exist as an independent entity. Rather it is relished as manifested by the determinants, etc.

Objection: "Where does one see that which is different from the material causes and (the ideas that) cause knowledge?" **Reply:** "It is found nowhere." Given the extraordinary nature (of *rasa*), this is a merit, not a fault.

By the production of the relishing, there is manifestation of the production of the *rasa*, so it can be figuratively called an effect. *Rasa* can even be called an object of cognition because it is within the scope of a paranormal consciousness which is distinct from (1) the normal means of knowledge, such as perception, etc., (2) the knowledge of the limited yogin, which is indifferent (to the normal objects of cognition), (3) and the self-contained knowledge of the unlimited yogin, which is free from contact with any other object of knowledge.

Furthermore the grasping of *rasa* is not a case of non-conceptual perception because of the necessity of first assimilating the determinants, etc. Neither is it a case of conceptual perception because the *rasa* experience is a self-consciousness of the extraordinary bliss of relishing (the *rasa*). Furthermore, from its nature as negation of

both and yet having the character of both, we infer its extraordinary nature, as above, and not that the claims are inconsistent.

Comments

Abhinavagupta is a complex and fascinating thinker whose thought is only touched upon here. A full presentation of his aesthetic theory can be found in the *Abhinavabhāratī* and in his commentary on Ānandavardhana, which both have excellent English translations.[205]

Abhinava accepts Bhaṭṭanāyaka's theory of universalization, both of the determinants, etc., and of the abiding emotion. He maintains that the universalized emotion must be perceived, not inferred, by the individual spectator. He provides three conditions that the spectator must meet to be fit for the *rasa* experience: he must be trained in the arts, he must be in a state of willing suspense of disbelief and self-forgetting, and he must be disinterested. These conditions are necessary to enter the state of sympathetic union that Abhinava describes. He further agrees that *rasa* is an experience, not an object, affirming that *rasa* exists only in the spectator.

Abhinava also agrees that the *rasa* experience is akin to the mystic union with Brahman. However, he differentiates the aesthetic from the yogic by insisting that the aesthetic experience has an object, namely the artwork. This is very important, for it provides Abhinava a way of avoiding Bhaṭṭanāyaka's homogenizing of aesthetic

[205] Gnoli (1968) and Ingalls, et al. (1990). Masson and Patwardhan (1969 and 1970) are both invaluable. The secondary literature on *rasa* far outweighs that on any other topic in Sanskrit poetics.

experience. Unfortunately, modern theorists tend to ignore, even to misrepresent, this merit of Abhinava's theory.

When one tries to understand just what type of experience aesthetic experience is, the complications begin. Abhinava carefully distinguishes it from other forms of experience. He insists that it is neither a perceptual experience nor a purely cognitive experience, although it shares qualities with both of these. Furthermore, although it is a paranormal experience, it is not a yogic experience. Abhinava further claims that the *rasa* experience is different from non-conceptual and conceptual perceptual experience. He may be referring to the experience of raw sense data (*nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa*) and concept-laden experience (*savikalpaka pratyakṣa*). If so, Abhinava has argued that all aesthetic experience occurs by means of a psychological sequence, so its content cannot be momentary sense data. On the other hand, its nature as self-consciousness of bliss precludes conceptual perception. Ultimately Abhinava's description has the effect of urging the reader to attend to his own aesthetic experience to appreciate its unique character.

As should be clear from Mammaṭa's gloss, this failure of reason to explain *rasa* does not bother Abhinava. Indeed, he considers it a good thing that art is "beyond" all rational explanation. However, upon reading his works, one discovers that Abhinava is not an irrationalist. He seeks to establish *rasa* experience as a separate form of experience that has qualities distinct from the forms of experience identified by the philosophers. His position is finely argued with great attention to minute distinctions. Furthermore, he

points out many difficulties facing anyone desiring an explanation of aesthetic experience that reduces it to one of the other types.[206]

Mammaṭa, who seems ever in awe of Abhinava, is content to allow him the final word on *rasa*. Rather than attempting to reproduce the details of Abhinava's lengthy arguments, Mammaṭa focuses on Abhinava's description of the experience (*rasa* appears, "as if sparkling before the eyes, entering the heart, embracing the whole person, and eclipsing everything else"). This slightly erotic description ties in nicely with the earlier claim that poetry teaches like a lover.[207] Mammaṭa neither explains Abhinava nor attempts to improve upon him; instead, he passes on to other technical terms within Bharata's *sūtra*.

vyāghrādayo vibhāvā bhayānakasyeva vīrādbhutaraudrāṇāṃ aśrupātādayo 'nubhāvāḥ śṛṅgārasyeva karuṇabhayānakayoḥ cintādaye vyabhicāriṇaḥ śṛṅgārasyeva vīrakaruṇakānām iti pṛthag anaikāntikatvāt sutre militā nirdiṣṭāḥ ||

Such things as tigers are **determinants**, as it were, with respect to the heroic, the marvelous, and the furious *rasas*, as well as to the frightful. Shedding tears and such are **symptoms** of the pathetic and frightful *rasas*, as well as the erotic. Reflection is an **auxiliary state** connected with the heroic, the pathetic, and the frightful *rasas*, as well as

[206] There were writers who did, mostly from the Logicians. Chari (1963) tries to give a rational explanation of *rasa* in modern analytic terms.
[207] Chapter one, *kārikā* 2.

the erotic. These three are pointed out together in the sūtra because separately they are not connected to one (*rasa)*.

Comments

Having treated *rasa*, Mammaṭa explains the other technical terms of *kārikās* 27-28 by means of examples. The crux is the phrase, "because separately they are not connected to one" (*pṛthag anaikāntikatvāt*). In the context of this passage, it seems to mean that a determinant is not limited to being a determinant for only one *rasa.* The same is true for a symptom and an auxiliary state. In the context of the following passage, it seems to mean that no determinant, symptom, or auxiliary state can bring about a *rasa* experience without the other two. Both claims are part of Mammaṭa's poetics.

> *viyadalimalināmbugarbhameghyaṃ madhukarakokilakūjitair dirśāṃ śrīḥ* ।
> *dharaṇir abhinavāṅkurāṅkaṭaṅkā praṇatipare dayite prasīda mugdhe* ॥

ity ādau

(**Objection:** Not all verses contain all three elements stated in the sūtra – the determinants, etc. For example,) the following verse and others like it:

> The swarming swollen monsoon clouds are beautiful!
> The coos of the cuckoos too are beautiful!
> Beautiful also is the buzz of the honeybees.
> Beauty herself has come – sashed with the earth's tender shoots.
> Come along too, sweet girl, be pleased with your adoring lover. (27)[208]

[208] Indian vegetation is reborn each year with the monsoon. Before it arrives, all is parched and brown. The rainy season is also the traditional season of romance.

Comments

An objector points out that not all *rasa* poems contain the three elements supposed necessary to *rasa* experience. Indeed, the objector gives examples of good poems in which only one of the three factors is present. The first example shows only the determinants of the erotic, i.e., a pair of lovers, a beautiful setting in nature, and the season of spring. No symptoms, such as romantic interaction (sidelong glances, holding hands, etc.) are described.[209] Neither are any auxiliary states mentioned. This seems to prove that the explanation in *kārikā* 27-28 is incorrect insofar as it states that *rasa* arises from all three factors together.

> *parimṛditamṛaṇālīmlānam aṅgaṃ pravṛttiḥ*
> *katham api parivāraprārthanābhiḥ kriyāsu* |
> *kalayati ca himāṃśorniṣkalaṅkasya lakṣmīm*
> *abhinavakaridantacchedakāntaḥ kapolaḥ* ||

ity ādau

The following verse and others like it (state only the symptoms. They mention neither the determinants nor the auxiliaries.)

> Her weakened limbs are threshed lotus stems.
> Barely, by the urging of friends, she manages to move,
> Her cheeks gleaming like spotless ivory,
> Lit only by the cold-rayed moon. (28)[210]

[209] One might object that the lover's invitation to his beloved is a symptom.
[210] *Mālatīmādhava* 1.25 (D).

Comments

This poem focuses on the symptoms of separation. The woman has grown thin, weak, and pale. No determinants are described (except, of course, the woman herself). Neither is any emphasis placed on the auxiliaries. One could argue that several auxiliaries, as depression, exhaustion, and lifelessness, are described. However, when these states arise as a direct result of the abiding emotion, they are included as symptoms. A proper auxiliary in this case would be, for example, anxiously looking about, or fits of anger. In so far as the poem focuses only on the symptoms, it acts as a second counter-example to the claim that all three factors must be present.

dūrād utsukam āgate vivalitaṃ saṃbhāṣiṇi sphāritaṃ
saṃśliṣyaty aruṇaṃ gṛhītavasane kiṃcāñcitabhrūlatam ।
māninyāś caraṇānativyatikare bāṣpāmbupūrṇekṣaṇaṃ
cakṣurjātam aho prapañcacaturaṃ jātāg asi preyasi ।।

ity ādau ca

The following verse and others like it (state only the auxiliaries.)

How the eyes of a jealous woman work to capture a lover who has strayed!
They search about when he's far, but look elsewhere when he draws near,
Grow wide when he speaks, and redden when he reaches out for her.
They arch their creeper-brows as he touches her clothes,
But flood with tears as he falls at her feet. (29)[211]

[211] *Amaruśataka* 49. Also found in the *Subhāṣitaratnakoṣa* 641, where it is attributed to Ratipāla. Ingalls interprets this poem differently (1965:513).

Comments

Finally, a third counter example that presents only the auxiliaries, and neither the determinants nor the symptoms. Because a woman is a determinant for the erotic, the example is not perfect (although only her eyes appear in the poem, not the woman herself). Among the auxiliaries shown are suspicion, envy, pride, joy, and confusion. The complete list of auxiliaries is given below in *kārikās* 31-34.

yady api vibhāvānām anubhāvānām autsukyavrīḍāharṣakopāsūyāprasādānāṃ ca vyabhicāriṇāṃ kevalānām atra sthitiḥ tathāpy eteṣām asādhāraṇatvam ity anyatamadvayākṣepakatve sati nānaikāntikatvam iti ||

Reply: Even though the determinants, the symptoms, and the auxiliary states – such as eagerness, embarrassment, joy, anger, carping, reconciliation – stand alone in each of these examples, because of the interdependence of their natures, the other two of the three are inferred. Thus our definition does not succumb to counterexamples.

Comments

Mammaṭa nicely shows how to adapt the traditional drama theory to poetry. In drama, of course, all three factors are easily presented, often more than once. In a short poem, the available space can make the presentation of all three factors problematic. Furthermore, a poem may gain in power by deliberately focusing on only a single element. Mammaṭa

overcomes these problems by explaining that while only a single factor may be mentioned, the other two are invariably inferred from what is directly communicated, taken together, we might point out, with considerable practical and literary background knowledge. Only when the necessary inference has occurred, can one experience *rasa*. From the literal content of poem 27, for example, we infer symptoms, such as the lovers looking at one another, conversing romantically, the man's urging, and the woman's shy reluctance. We also infer auxiliary states, such as rashness, joy, excitement, pride, and longing. Indeed, Mammaṭa would claim that if we fail to infer this we miss the sense of the poem and it seems unlikely that it will produce a *rasa* experience.

Mammaṭa's adaptation, however, weakens considerably the explanatory power of the theory. By no longer pointing exclusively to factors objectively present in the artwork, Mammaṭa opens his theory to the threat of subjectivism. As we have seen, the critics believe that the aesthetic response to a given artwork is uniform across cultured audiences. This allows them to maintain that the factors that produce the suggestion are objective despite the fact that some of them are inferred. Surprisingly, no major figure objects to the claim of uniform aesthetic response.

It is remarkable how differently the theory functions in the two art forms. As we saw in the introduction (section 3), the *rasa* is developed in a play by means of a series of reinforcing scenes. Layer upon layer, it gains intensity by showing the heroes' consistency in different situations. The poem, on the other hand, focuses on a single

moment, concentrating all its force to create an image striking enough to suggest the *rasa* all at once.

tad viśeṣān āha |

śṛṅgārahāsyakaruṇaraudravīrabhayānakāḥ **|**

bībhatsādbhutasaṃjñau cety aṣṭau nāṭye rasāḥ smṛtā **||** ***(641)***

(4.2.1.3.) The types of *rasa* are now given:

29. The erotic, the comic, the pathetic, the wrathful, the heroic, the frightful, the disgusting, and the wondrous are called the eight *rasas* of drama.[212]

Comments

This list of eight comes from Bharata's *Nāṭyaśāstra* 6.15. The ninth *rasa*, added to the system early in the tradition, is discussed in *kārikā* 35ab. The list purports to contain all the emotions that can be the central theme of a play or an epic poem. We have already seen that when this theory is applied to all poetry, including isolated verses, a great number more emotions have to be admitted. Rudraṭa argued that any emotion, if developed by determinants, etc., can become a *rasa*.[213] Coupled with the view that the emotions are infinite in number, this leads to the view, attributed to Lollaṭa by Abhinava,

[212] Ingalls translates the eight *rasas* as: the erotic, the comic, the tragic, the furious or cruel, the heroic, the fearsome or timorous, the gruesome or loathsome, and the wondrous (Ingalls, et al. 1990:16). Gnoli translates: the erotic, the comic, the pathetic, the furious, the heroic, the terrible, the odious, and the marvelous (Gnoli 1968:xvi).

[213] Rudraṭa, *Kāvyālaṅkāra* 12:3-4, discussed in Raghavan (1967:127).

that the *rasas* are infinite.[214] Mammaṭa seems to take the line put forward by Pratīhārendurāja that the original list should be maintained for tradition's sake and the other emotions dealt with under different catagories.[215] Jagannātha takes this view to the extreme by claiming that the original system should be retain for convenience's sake.[216] As the nature of the individual *rasas* and the additional artistic emotions only become clear with illustration, I will discuss them separately below.

tatra śṛṅgārasya dvau bhedau | *sambhogo vipralambhaś ca* | *tatrādyaḥ parasparāvalokanāliṅganādharapānaparicumbanādy anantatvād aparicchedya eka eva gaṇyate* | *yathā*

> *śūnyaṃ vāsagṛhaṃ vilokya śayanād utthāya kiṃcicchair*
> *nidrāvyājam upāgatasya suciraṃ nirvarṇya patyur mukham* |
> *vistrabdhaṃ paricumbya jātapulakām ālokya gaṇḍasthalīṃ*
> *lajjānamramukhī priyeṇa lasatā bālā cire cumbitā* || *(653)*

Here the erotic is divided in two: love-in-enjoyment and love-in-separation. The first of these is counted as one only and is not to be broken into types because (the possibilities), such as exchanging glances, embracing, drinking the lips, kissing the entire body, are unlimited. For example:

> Seeing the inner rooms empty,
> She sits up slowly and carefully in the bed
> To study the face of her husband.
> Believing him asleep, she kisses his cheek.

[214] In the *Abhinavabhāratī,* vol. 1, 346.
[215] Raghavan (1967:129).
[216] Raghavan (1967:142).

Seeing the kissed hair quiver,
She hangs her head, abashed.
After only a moment, her smiling lover pulls her near.

Comments

Poems producing the erotic *rasa* are divided in two: those in which the lovers are able to realize their love and those in which they are frustrated by some obstacle. Mammaṭa declines to introduce further subcategories of love-in-enjoyment, claiming they would be endless. He will give the subcategories of love-in-separation below.

The poems of love-in-enjoyment tend to be charming in their innocent affirmation of love in all its forms. Always sexual, but rarely overtly descriptive of sexual acts, the poems are celebrations of this essential activity. The poem here shows a shy young wife attempting to express her love without waking her husband. He pretends to be asleep to enjoy her affection, but the hairs on his cheek rise in excitement, giving him away. He allows her a moment of shame for her forwardness, but this only increases his excitement. So he takes her in his arms.

The poem includes the three factors that evoke *rasa*. The determinants are the lovers and the bedchamber. The symptoms include such acts as the woman's kissing her lovers cheek and the lovers pulling her close. Shyness is an auxiliary state when present in a woman and the hair standing on end is a classic involuntary state for both the erotic and the frightful *rasas*. These details combine together, like the details of a painting, to present a powerful image of a moment of realized love.

tathā

> *tvaṃ mugdhākṣi vinaiva kañculikayā dhatse manohāriṇīṃ*
> *lakṣmīm ity abhidhāyini priyatame tadvīṭikāsaṃspṛśi* |

śayyupāntaniviṣṭasasmitasakhīnetrotsavāndito
niryātaḥ śanakair alīkavacanopanyāsamālījanāḥ || *(662)*

"O sweet-eyed girl!
You would be ravishing
Even without this tight corset."
So saying, the lover starts toying with its knot.
Their friends, thrilled with the passion in the eyes
Of the smiling couple edging toward the bed,
Slip out, giving welcome excuses. (31)[217]

Comments

Mammaṭa gives a second example of the innocent pleasures of erotic love. The poet cleverly mixes in determinants (the busty woman and the bedroom), symptoms (amorous speech), and auxiliaries (anxiousness). For more examples of this genre in translation, see Merwin and Masson's *Sanskrit Love Poetry*, Bailey and Gombrich's *Love Lyrics*, and Martha Selby's *Grow Long, Blessed Night*, are all excellent introductions.[218]

aparas tu abhilāṣaviraherṣyāpravāsaśāpahetuka iti pañcavidhiḥ | *krameṇodāharaṇam* |

premārdrāḥ praṇayaspṛśaḥ paricayād udgādharagodayāstās
tā mugdhadṛśo nisargamadhurā ceṣṭā bhaveyur mayi |
yāsv antaḥkaraṇasya bāhyakaraṇavyāpātarodhi
kṣaṇādāśaṃsāparikalpitāsv api bhavaty ānandasāndro layaḥ || *(667)*

The other (love-in-separation) has five types: longing, estrangement, jealousy, dwelling apart, and love blocked by a curse. An example of each in order:

---

[217] *Amaru* 27.
[218] Merwin and Masson (1977); Bailey and Gombrich (2005); Selby (2000).

Her soft eyes light up with love,
Fanned by intimacy, they smolder with desire.
Immediately my senses fail,
My mind is consumed with bliss,
Simply dreaming that she is here, loving me. (32)[219]

Comments

The critics are divided about the sub-types of love-in-separation. Most list four, but argue over their natures. Mammaṭa is alone in including "separation caused by jealousy" in the list.[220] It is also notable that Mammaṭa does not include the sorrow of separation caused by death (*karuṇavipralambha*). Many include separation caused by a curse under the category separation caused by dwelling apart, for this is the normal result of the curse (but consider *Sakuntalā*). Regardless of the sub-types, the separation must include a chance of reunion to be included in the erotic *rasa*. Permanent separation evokes the pathetic *rasa*.

In the poem, a man dreams of the woman he deeply desires. By exalting the pleasure of imagining, instead of the realization, the poet suggests a far greater pleasure in realization. It is interesting that this genre is not limited to male longing. Consider the following poem, "When he comes back / to my arms / I'll make him feel / what nobody ever felt / everywhere / me / vanishing into him / like water / into the clay of a new jar."[221] This contrasts nicely with the young bride's shyness in poem 30.

---

[219] Found in the *Mālatīmādhava* 5.7 (D). The Sanskrit poem focuses on the actions of the fair-eyed girl, which I could not successfully bring into English.
[220] Raghavan (1967:171).
[221] Translated by Merwin and Masson (1977:107).

anyatra vrajatīti kā khalu kathā nāpy asya tādṛk suhṛd
yo māṃ necchati nāgataś ca hahahā ko 'yaṃ vidheḥ prakramaḥ |
ity alpetarakalpaṇākavalitasvāntā niśāntāntare
bālā vṛttavivartanavyatikarā nāpnoti nidrāṃ niśi ||

esā virahotkaṇṭhitā || *(677)*

(Next an example of estrangement:)

"He's gone off somewhere. What's the story?
All his friends are on my side. Yet still, he hasn't come.
O damn it! What's happening?"
Sleepless, alone in her bed, the girl feels abandoned.
And little by little,
Her tormenting doubts
Devour her. (33)[222]

This woman is longing for an estranged lover.

Comments

Unlike the first type of longing, this genre treats estranged lovers. The main character is always a woman who has quarreled with her lover and isolated herself. The poems describe both the anger of the woman and her longing for reconciliation.[223] Most often, the focus is on the physical suffering the woman feels because of the separation from her lover. Here is a second example from the *Subhāṣitaratnakoṣa*: "Ah, cursed moon, touch not even in jest / my wasted body, burning with the heat / of separation from my dear

[222] Some compromises have been made to make the girl's words to herself sound believable to modern ears. Literally the third line reads, "Alas! What new move of destiny is this?"
[223] Ingalls et al. (1990:264n2).

one, / for when your rays fall on me, / though fair as ripened lotus stalks, / they hurt me like burning brands."[224] Here the moon reminds the woman of the man she longs for.

sā patyuḥ prathamāparādhasamye sakhopadeśaṃ vinā
no jānāti savibramāṅgavalanāvakroktaṃ sasūcanam |
svacchair icchakapolamulagalitaiḥ paryasta netrotpalā
bālā kevalam eva rodhiti luṭhal lolālakair aśrubhiḥ || *(681)*

(Next an example of jealousy:)

When her husband first strays,
She has no friend to teach her
The armaments and insults of betrayal.

She merely weeps,
Her lotus eyes filling with crystal tears
Which trickle down her bright cheeks
And roll into her flowing curls. (34)[225]

Comments

This genre expresses the feelings of a woman confronting competition. The poems focus either on her rage and sorrow of a betrayed woman (as in this poem) or on the beauty her anger lends. Here is a charming example of the later from the *Subhaṣitaratnakoṣa*: "The same side-stepping of her glance and unclear words, / the same shrugging me away when

224 Translated by Ingalls (1965:234 poem 714).
225 *Amaruśataka* 29.

I embrace her body; / again the contradicting of every word and stubborn shaking of her head: / my wife by anger has become a bride again."[226]

Male jealousy is not proper, so it is relegated to either pseudo-*rasa*, or the comic. The point is not that men do not feel jealousy, rather, it is that such jealousy is not a proper theme for erotic art. Men were expected to have affairs and doing so did not lessen their worth. Unfaithful women, on the other hand, were scorned. One can feel jealous when another has what one wants, and nobody wants an unfaithful wife.[227] One who does is ridiculous, not erotic, as in Molière's *Tartuffe*.

Many have commented on the essentially optimistic nature of Indian poetry and its lack of tragedy.[228] But their poetics is not without resources for analyzing such plays. Certainly, the male ego is little comforted by scene like *Othello*, Act 3, Scene 3, when Iago is first seeding the grains of doubt, "O curse of marriage, / that we can call these delicate creatures ours, / and not their appetites." The Indian theorist could treat this play as evoking the frightful *rasa*, from the perspective of Desdemona, or the pseudo-heroic, from the perspective of Othello. In either case, it would be seen less as the downfall of a great man and more as showing human emotion gone frightfully wrong.

prasthānaṃ valayaiḥ kṛtaṃ priyasakhair asrair ajasraṃ gataṃ
dhṛtyā na ksaṇam āsitaṃ vyavasitaṃ cittena gantuṃ puraḥ |
yātuṃ niścitacetasi priyatame sarve samaṃ prasthitā
gantavye sati jīvita priyasuhṛtsārthaḥ kim u tyajyate || *(686)*

[226] Ingalls (1965:218 poem 637).
[227] Think of Rāma's concerns over Sītā's purity, for example.
[228] J.A.B. van Buitenen (1974:82-83).

(Next an example of travel:)

My bracelets are gone,
Tears, my sweet friends, have freely fallen,
My courage stayed not an instant,
And my heart went first of all.
When my love decided to leave,
Everything left together.
O my life, if you must go to hurry!
Why fall behind your dear friends? (35)[229]

Comments

The man must leave his beloved, but neither wants to part. The woman is so distraught that she want to die.

tvām ālikhya praṇayakupitāṃ dhāturāgaiḥ śilāyām
ātmānaṃ te caraṇapatitaṃ yāvad icchāmi kartuṃ |
asrais tāvan muhur upacitair dṛśṭir ālupyate me
krūras tasminn api na sahate saṃgamaṃ nau kṛtāntaḥ *(690)*

(Next an example of love blocked by a curse:)

On a stone I painted you
Pretending to be angry.
I wanted to put myself, too,
Falling at your feet.
But I could no longer see through
The flowing of my tears.
Even here pitiless fate
Will not let us be together. (36)[230]

[229] *Amaruśataka* 35.

Comments

This genre depicts “a pair of star-cross’d lovers” held apart by a curse. This example comes from near the end of Kālidāsa’s long poem (*mahākāvya*), *The Cloud Messenger*. The lover, “who had grossly swerved from his duty and was deprived of his greatness by his lord’s curse…” sends a cloud home to his lonely wife bearing a message.[231] The curse keeps the lovers apart for a whole year. Part of the message the lover sends home is this description of his sorry state and the power of the curse to separate them even in painting.

This theme is very popular in Sanskrit literature, as it is in world literature generally. The curse is a good literary method of separating two lovers without either of them incurring any blame. Cursed lovers are also found in the epic poems (e.g., Rāma and Sītā) and in the classical drama (e.g., Duḥṣanta and Śakuntala).

hāsyādīnāṃ krameṇodāharaṇam

> *ākuñcya pāṇim asuciṃ mama mūrdhniveśyā*
> *mantrāmbhasāṃ pratipadaṃ pṛśataiḥ pavitre* |
> *tārasvanaṃ prathitathūtkamadāt prahāraṃ*
> *hāhāhato 'ham iti rodhiti viśṇuśarmā* ||

Now for examples of the comic, etc., in order:

> Drops of water made holy by sacred verses
> May purify my head,

[230] *Meghadūta* 2.45.
[231] *Meghadūta* 1.1, translated by M.R. Kale (1969:2).

But that whore clenched her dirty hand
And give it a loud smack anyway.
How wretched am I, Viṣṇu the Protector! (37)

Comments

The speaker of the poem is named "Viṣṇu," people being commonly named after gods in India. There is a humorous contrast of the speaker's namesake and situation in the poem. Pretending to actually be the god Viṣṇu, the speaker mocks his own "sanctity" and feigns helplessness to the onslaught of a prostitute.

Bharata claimed the comic arises from mimicry of the erotic.[232] It is hard to believe that this could have been the sole source of comedy for classical drama. Indeed, Bharata was criticized for this view before Mammaṭa's time.[233] In poetry, as we can see in Mammaṭa's example, there is no such restriction. Three centuries after Mammaṭa, Viśvanātha claims that the comic is, "whatever a person laughs at, when he beholds it distorted in respect of form, speech, or gesture."[234]

hā mātas tvaritāsi kutra kim idaṃ hā devatāḥ kvāśiṣaḥ
dhik prāṇān patito 'śanir hutavahas te aṅgeṣu dagdhe dṛsau |
ittham ghargharamadhyaruddhakaruṇāḥ paurāṅganānāṃ giraś
citrasthān api rodayanti śatadhā kurvanti bhittīr api || *(701)*

(Next an example of the pathetic:)

[232] *Nāṭyaśāstra* 6.40.
[233] By Bhoja (11th century) according to Ghosh (1967:107).
[234] *Śahityadarpaṇa* 228, translated in Ballantyne and Dāsa Mitra (1875:122).

Mom! Where are you running?
What is going on?
Life is hell! Lightning strikes.
Your arms are on fire, your eyes scorched.
O god, where is thy protection?
These lamenting cries of the village women,
    Half muffled by their moans,
Brake the walls and make the painted statues weep. (38)[235]

Comments

Poems that express the pathetic describe situations of extreme sorrow, usually due to physical injury or death. Viśvanātha says the pathetic arises from the loss of what is loved.[236] He adds that the corpse of the loved one is a good determinant for this *rasa*. In the poem the speaker describes her dying mother. Poem 116 in chapter five is another good example. Modern usage would call these situations tragic, and they do arouse Aristotelian "pity and fear." However, they lack some of the elements of tragedy that Aristotle discusses in the *Poetics,* most notably the plot development from a state of ignorance to recognition. Furthermore, there is no "tragic flaw" in the characters of Sanskrit poems – a concept that came to be essential to later western tragedy (Shakespeare and Racine, *inter alios*). For these reasons, I find it more accurate to call

[235] By Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa (D). But is he confusing this with the following poem?
[236] *Śahityadarpaṇa* 230, translated in Ballantyne and Dāsa Mitra (1875:123).

this genre, following Gnoli, "the pathetic."[237] The poems certainly do arouse sympathy and pity.

kṛtam anumataṃ dṛṣṭaṃ vā yair idaṃ gurupātakaṃ
manujapaśubhir nirmaryādair bhavadbhar udāyudhaiḥ |
narakaripuṇā sardhaṃ teṣāṃ sabhīmakirīṭinām
ayam aham asṛṅmedomāṃsaiḥ karomi diśāṃ balim || *(705)*

(Next an example of the wrathful:)

Kṛṣṇa, Bhīma, and Arjuna!
With weapons drawn you violated the bounds of morality.
I will offer to the four quarters of the earth
Your blood, fat, and flesh – all of you
Who committed, accepted, or witnessed this outrage! (39)[238]

Comments

The wrath of the speaker shines forth in his intention to revenge the death of Droṇa, wrongfully killed by those who owed him respect. The story of Baṭṭanārāyaṇa's play comes from the Mahābhārata. Bhīma has sworn to revenge the outrage done to Draupadi by killing Duḥśāsana. In the family feud that follows, Bhīma and his brothers are forced to kill their teacher, Droṇa, provoking the wrath expressed in the poem.

kṣudrāḥ saṃtrāmete vijahata harayaḥ kṣuṇṇaśakrebhakumbhā

[237] Gnoli (1967:xvi). Remembering that the *rasa* experience, although it is enjoyed by the spectator, still has as its object the artistic expression of the abiding emotion of the characters in the artwork, one has to reject a spectator based translation like, "the sympathetic."
[238] *Veṇīsaṃhāra* 3.24.

yuṣmaddeheṣu lajjāṃ dadhati paramamī sāyakā niṣpatantaḥ |
saumitre tiṣṭa pātraṃ tvam asi na hi rupāṃ nanv ahaṃ meghanādaḥ
kiṃcid bhrūbhaṅgalīlāniyamitajaladhiṃ rāmam anveṣayāmi || *(709)*

(Next an example of the heroic:)

O you useless monkeys, control your fear!
My arrows have pierced the forehead of Indra's elephant,
They would be ashamed to end up in you.
Son of Sumitra, stay where you are,
You are not worth my wraith.
Rāma subdues the very ocean with a mere play of his brows,
I, Meghanāda, seek only him. (40)[239]

Comments

Rāma has led an army of monkeys and bears across the ocean to Sri Lanka to fight the demon army of Rāvaṇa. Here Rāvaṇa's son Meghanāda seeks a worthy foe and scorns those unequal to him. We also find this genre displayed in *Henry IV, part I* (act 5, scene 4), where the prince challenges Hotspur to single combat ("Two stars keep not their motion in one sphere"). Not only the foe but also the occasion must be correct for the heroic. Compare Achilles' unwillingness to fight Hector at the beginning of the *Iliad*.

grīvābhaṅgābhirāmaṃ muhur anupatati syandane baddhadṛṣṭiḥ
paścārdhena praviṣṭaḥ śarapatanabhayād bhūyasā pūrvakāyam |
darbhair ardhāvalīḍaiḥ śramavivṛtamukhabhraṃśibhiḥ kīrṇavartmā
paśyod agraplutatvād viyati bahutaraṃ stokam urvyā prayāti || *(716)*

[239] Dwivedi writes, "*Hanumannāṭaka*?"

(Next an example of the frightful:)

The antelope turns slightly in a graceful manner
  Glancing back at our speeding chariot,
Then it tucks its haunches in and bounds off
  for fear of a falling arrow.
Its panting mouth scatters half-eaten grass
  onto the track.
Look! Jumping so high, it moves
  more through the sky than on the earth. (41)

Comments

Viśvanātha writes that this genre displays a woman or a mean person in fright or panic.[240] As such it is close to the pathetic, but here there is no lasting damage. From the present example, we see that portraying the fear of an animal is also possible. This verse from the *Abhijñānaśākuntala* portrays King Duḥṣanta out hunting at the beginning of the play. The king thrills in the chase, clearly enjoying the fear of his prey.

The emphasis of the verse is clearly on the king's pleasure at seeing the terrorized animal, not on the animal itself. Viśvanātha's description and his example also indicate that pleasure in another's fear is the object of this genre. He quotes the following verse from the *Ratnāvali* that mocks the fear of base people: "The eunuchs fled, having abandoned shame, because of their not being counted among men; the dwarf, in terror, ensconces himself within the loose and wide trousers of the chamberlain; the mountaineers, the guardians of the bounds, act in a style accordant with their name (i.e., the scatter); while the hump-backs, fearing they may be seen by the monkey, cowering

[240] *Śahitadarpaṇa* 235, translated in Ballantyne and Dāsa Mitra (1875:126).

down, slink quietly off."[241] The reader is supposed to share this mixture of mockery and scorn for the fear caused by a mere monkey.

Given that it is much more natural to identify with the king, if the reader actually does so, the poem is not really frightful, for the king is not in a state of fright. The abiding emotion coinciding with the frightful *rasa* is supposed to be fear, not pleasure in the fear of others. This *rasa* serves two distinct ends in Sanskrit literature, as far as I know. First, the fear of the base acts as a foil to the valor of the great and is thus used to develop the heroic *rasa*. Second, the fear of women is thought to increase their beauty and is thus used to develop the erotic *rasa*. These are roughly parallel to the fear of common people and in early westerns, "The Outlaw," for example. Unfortunately we do not have a whole drama devoted to this *rasa* that could help illuminate Bharata's original idea. Ironically, the modern suspense novel, in which the reader shares the protagonist's fear, fits the definition better than the verses given here.

utkṛtyotkṛtya kṛttiṃ prathamam atha pṛthūtsedhabhūyāṃsi
māṃsānyaṃsasphikpṛṣṭhapiṇḍyādyavayavasulabhānyagrapūtīni jagdhvā |
ārttaḥ paryastanetraḥ prakaṭitadaśanaḥ pretaraṅkaḥ
karaṅkādaṅkasthādasthisaṃsthaṃ sthapuṭagatamapi kravyam avyagramatti ||
(720)

(Next an example of the disgusting:)

Having butchered and stripped the skin,
And devoured the swollen and putrid lumps of flesh
    Easily torn from the shoulders, hips, and buttocks,
The hungry ghost bares its teeth and looks about,

[241] Ballantyne and Dāsa Mitra (1875:127).

Drawing out the tendons, guts, and eyes,
Then deliberately picking out the meat that remains
In the joints and bones of the corpse in his lap. (42)[242]

Comments

This genre is a component in the modern genre, "horror." These poems focus on the decaying human corpses and the ghosts and vultures that feed on them. They are intended to shock the reader and fill him with disgust. Viśvanātha list the determinants as, "stinking flesh and fibre and fat."[243] Death is among the auxiliaries, but note that death itself is not disgusting, but rather the consumption of a decaying corpse. Death figures in many other genres (the wrathful, heroic, and pathetic). Vidyākara has a small section devoted to burial grounds in his *Subhāṣitaratnakoṣa* that contains this verse and thirteen other examples of this *rasa*.

citraṃ mahān eṣa batāvatāraḥ kva kāntir eṣābhinavaiva bhaṅgiḥ |
lokottaraṃ dhairyamaho prabhāvaḥ kāpy ākṛtir nūtana eṣa sargaḥ ||

(Next an example of the wondrous:)

How marvelous! Superb! O, what a divine incarnation!
How lovely indeed, this novel sight!
What extraordinary poise! What splendor!
How shapely indeed is this new creature! (43)

---

[242] *Mālatatīmādhava* 5.16.
[243] *Śahitadarpaṇa* 236, translated in Ballantyne and Dāsa Mitra (1875:127).

Comments

The unexpected, irrational, or unexplainable can evoke a sense of wonder. Viśvanātha claims that anything supernatural can cause wonder.[244] However, here and in the *Nāgānanda* (1.13 +1) the wonder is inspired by artistic creation.[245] Abhinava provides one of his own verses as an example in which the poet wonders at an old man's stupidity: "This is not mere age; the angry spitting snake of Death sprinkles his white venom on this man's head. He sees this and still seem happy of heart and does not seek refuge in Śiva: ah, how brave he is!"[246] The old man, being so close to death, should have thoughts of the afterlife. The poet is amazed that the man is oblivious to his fate.

eṣāṃ sthāyibhāvān āha ।

***ratir hāsaś ca śokaś ca krodhotsāhau bhayaṃ tathā* ।**

jugupsā vismayaś ceti sthāyibhāvāḥ prakīrtitāḥ* ॥ *(728)

spaṣṭam ।

(4.2.1.4) The abiding emotion of each *rasa* is stated:

30. The abiding emotions are as follows: sexual desire, mirth, sorrow or grief, anger, heroic energy, fear, disgust, and wonder.

The meaning of the verse is clear.

[244] *Śahitadarpaṇa* 237, translated in Ballantyne and Dāsa Mitra (1875:128).
[245] Ingalls, et al. (1990:519-520).
[246] Ingalls, et al. (1990:700). I have modified the translation slightly.

Comments

Mammaṭa continues by quoting the *Nāṭyaśāstra* 6:17, which follows the *rasa* verse Mammaṭa quoted in the previous *kārikā* (29). Having given examples of each *rasa* that make clear the nature of the abiding emotions, he apparently feels that additional comment is unnecessary. The list, however, is not without problems.

The first problem is that often the characters in the poems do not feel the emotion that grounds the *rasa*. For example, we saw that a jealous woman can ground the erotic even though she herself feels no sexual desire. Likewise the characters in humorous poems are rarely themselves amused. Unlike descriptions of love or heroism, the origin of the emotion in these poems is in the external reaction to the scene. The poet judges the jealous woman sexy or the clumsy person funny and the spectators agree. In wonder we saw one case (Mammaṭa's example) where we share the wonder of the character and one case (Abhinava's example) where we wonder at the character's stupidity.

In the case of fear the same problem of audience reaction occurs. However, we also saw that with fear the audience is not supposed to enjoy a universalized essence of fear, but rather the spectacle of another's fear.

Unfortunately the original eight *rasas* and their abiding emotions have received very little attention in modern scholarship. Most writers merely list the *rasas*, provide a few examples, and then move on to other points. Raghavan provides a starting point the

investigation by listing the subcategories suggested for each *rasa*.[247] A full historic investigation of each *rasa* with many examples is sorely needed.

***nirvedaglāniśaṅkākhyās tathāsūyā madaśramāḥ* |**
***ālasyaṃ caiva dainyaṃ ca cintā mohaḥ smṛtir dhṛtiḥ* ||**
***vrīḍā capalatā harṣa āvego jaḍatā tathā* |**
***garvo viṣāda autsukyaṃ nidrāpasmāra eva ca* ||**
***suptaṃ prabodho 'marś cāpy avahittham athogratā* |**
***matir vyādhis tathonmādas tathā maraṇam eva ca* ||**
***trāsas caiva vitarkaś ca vijñeyā vyabhicāriṇaḥ* |**
trayaṃstraśadamī bhāvāḥ samākhyātās tu nāmataḥ* || *(738)

nirvedasyāmaṅgalaprāyasya pathamam anupādeyatve 'py upādānaṃ vyabhicāritve 'pi sthāyitābhidhānārtham |

31 - 34. The thirty-three auxiliary states are known by name as: world-weariness, exhaustion, suspicion, envy, intoxication, fatigue, indolence, depression, worry, confusion, remembrance, peace of mind, shame, rashness, joy, excitement, lifelessness, pride, dejection, anxiety, sleeping, apoplexy, dreaming, awakening, resentment, dissimulation, violence, attentiveness, sickness, insanity, dying, fright, and perplexity.

[247] Raghavan (1967:chap. 7).

Of world-weariness, which is generally inauspicious and thus not to be mentioned first, it is listed (first) in order to denote that it is an abiding emotion even though it is listed in the auxiliary states.

Comments

If you read this *kārikā* directly after the proceeding one, you see that this list begins where the other leaves off. It is the same in the *Nāṭyaśāstra*, where these verses occur as 6:19-22. We will discuss the ninth *rasa* and its abiding emotion at greater length below. Here I would like to focus on the argument for world-weariness being the abiding emotion for tranquility. This argument predates Abhinava, who discusses it in his commentary on Bharata.[248] The problem confronting anyone who argued for an additional *rasa* was finding textual evidence for the abiding emotion in the *Nāṭyaśāstra*. There is a seemly corrupt version of the *Nāṭyaśāstra* that lists the ninth *rasa* and an abiding emotion (*śama*), but many critics either did not know of this version or did not accept it. The argument Mammaṭa repeats tries to locate world-weariness in both lists: by means of its location it can be read as the final item on the proceeding list and the first item on the following. The argument claims that this explains why world-weariness is listed first among the auxiliaries, which would otherwise be inauspicious. Raghavan

[248] *Abhinavabhāratī* (1956:1:334).

objects that world-weariness was not considered inauspicious and that this reveals the *ad hoc* nature of the argument.[249] Abhinava also rejects this argument.[250]

Pundits are very reluctant to put themselves above their teachers or the sages of earlier generations. Probably out of deference to Bharata, Mammaṭa accepts the attempt to explain away the difference. It should be considered more a sign of respect than a flaw in reasoning. Concerning the ninth *rasa*, Mammaṭa appears unaware of Abhinava's theories. This could lead one to speculate that Mammaṭa knew Abhinava's commentary on Ānandavardhana but not his commentary on Bharata (in which his theories of the ninth *rasa* are developed). For whatever reason, this is the only subject about which Mammaṭa does not follow or even discuss Abhinava's theories.

tena ।

nirvedasthāyibhāvo 'sti śānto 'pi navamo rasaḥ* । *(778)

yathā ।

> *ahau vā hāre vā kūsumśayane vā dṛṣadi vā*
> *manau vā loṣṭe vā balavati ripau vā suhṛdi vā* ।
> *tṛṇe vā straiṇe vā mama samadṛśo yānti divasāḥ*
> *kvacitpuṇyāraṇye śiva śiva śiveti pralopataḥ* ॥

(4.2.1.5. The Ninth *Rasa*.) Accordingly,

35ab. The ninth *rasa* is tranquility, whose abiding emotion is world-weariness.

[249] Raghavan (1967:79).
[250] Translated by Gerow (1994:195-196).

For example:

A snake or pearls around my neck,
Flowers or rock slab for my bed,
A jewel or a stone,
A deadly foe or a friend,
A woman or a mere blade of grass:
They are all the same for me.
In a sacred grove I pass my days
Chanting and chanting softly, "Śiva, Śiva, Śiva" (44)[251]

Comments

Mammaṭa adds the ninth *rasa* (and it corresponding abiding emotion) to Bharata's list of eight (given above in *kārikā* 29). It was probably introduce soon after Bharata, perhaps to account for the dominant mood of the *Mahābhārata*, and perhaps because of religious works such as Aśvaghoṣa's long poem (*mahākāvya*), the *Buddhacarita* (first century). Made famous by Ānandavardhana, the ninth *rasa* was already accepted by many writers.[252]

The poem shows an ascetic who has no concerns for material good. He has left the world and enjoys the equanimity of liberated experience. His peace is perfect; nothing alters his internal state. The crux of this poem is the "*kvacit*" in the final line. I have taken it to mean that the speaker moves about, from grove to grove, thinking that his snake, etc. are just as good as a string of pearls, etc. However, it could also be taken to suggest that the speaker lives in the world (with pearls, etc.), but in his indifference he is like an

[251] Dwivedi writes, "By Utpala, Vairāgyaśataka?"
[252] Raghavan explores the origin and reception of the ninth *rasa* at length (1967:1 – 103). Bhattacarya's more recent book on this subject adds many datail and examples (1976).

ascetic in some grove. Jha resolves this by making the whole poem a wish on the part of the speaker, but I do not see how this reading is possible without an optative verb.

Abhinava disagrees with the theory put forth here in his commentary on the *Nāṭyaśāstra*. He argues at length that world-weariness cannot be the abiding emotion of tranquility and proposes the essential self (*atman*) instead. As can easily be imagined, this gives the *rasa* of tranquility a privileged place in his system. For Abhinava it grounds and makes possible all the other *rasas*. As we have seen, he takes the parallel between the experience of the *rasa* of tranquility and the experience of *Brahman* very seriously. Indeed, Masson and Patwardhan claim that Abhinava based his aesthetics on the philosophy of his *Kāśmīri Śaiva* religious tradition.[253] Gerow argues convincingly that this view needs to be questioned. He proposes that Abhinava's aesthetics predates and informs his metaphysical writings, not the reverse.[254] He shows that Abhinava's conception of the self as active self-awareness allows both involvement with the artwork and detachment from individual emotions.[255]

ratir devādi viṣayā vyabhicārī tathāñjitaḥ ||

bhāvaḥ proktaḥ (789)

ādiśabdān munigurunṛpaputrādiviṣayā | *kāntāviṣayā tu vyaktā śṛṅgāraḥ* | *udāharaṇam* |

kaṇṭhakoṇaviniviṣṭam īśa te kālakūṭam api mahāmṛtam |

[253] Masson and Patwardhan (1970:32-33).
[254] Gerow (1994:186-188).
[255] Gerow (1994:199-201, especially the notes).

apy upāttam amṛtaṃ bhavad vapur bhedavṛtti yadi me na rocate ||

haraty aghaṃ samprati hetuṛ eṣyataḥ śubhasya pūrvācaritaiḥ kṛtaṃ śubhaiḥ |
śarīrabhājāṃ bhavadīyadarśanaṃ vyanakti kālatritaye 'pi yogyatām ||

evam anyad apy udāhāryam |

(4.2.1.6. The Emotions, Auxiliaries, Pseudo-*Rasas*, Etc.)

35cd - 36a. Love, when directed towards a god, etc., and the auxiliary states are called "emotions" when suggested.

By **etc.** is meant (love) directed toward a sage, a teacher, a king, a son, etc. Love of a woman, on the other hand, evokes the erotic (*rasa*). Examples:

O Lord! When sheltered in the curve of you neck,
Even poison is the nectar of eternal life.
But eternal life apart from your heavenly body,
Has for me no taste. (45)

Your mere existence, O sage Nārada,
Destroys present evil,
Brings about future rectitude,
And testifies to virtues past.
Your very presence
Proves the worthiness of earthly beings
In all the three times. (46)[256]

The others (i.e., love for a teacher, etc.) could similarly be exemplified.

Comments

Mammaṭa address the other affections (*preyas*) here. Traditionally they are held to be four: love of friends (*rudraṭa*), love of family (*vātsalya*), love between a social superior

[256] I have followed Jha in identifying the great sage Nārada as the object of this poem.

and inferior (*prīti)* and love of a god (*bhakti*).[257] Each of these affections can be (and actually had been) developed into a full drama, and as such each could ground a tenth *rasa*. Mammaṭa here denies that this should be done, claiming instead that the *rasas* should be limited to nine. Mammaṭa gives no justification for the seemingly arbitrary decision to include one new *rasa* (tranquility) and exclude the others.[258] Clearly the criterion cannot be duration, as the technical term "abiding emotion" suggests, for major works of poetry had been written evoking these emotions (e.g., the *Gītagovinda*). As we saw above, there was a movement in Sanskrit poetics to open the list of *rasas* to all poetically developable emotions that was resisted in favor of the tradition.

Mammaṭa, like all major late critics, restricts the number of emotions that can become *rasas* and includes suggestion of the other emotions under other headings. So whereas Mammaṭa's system is usually descriptive and inclusive, here it is prescriptive and exclusive. However, Mammaṭa does not deny the value of the poems. They remain in the highest category – poems in which suggestion is dominant. Indeed, one can see that the concept of *rasa* is not absolutely central in the late poetics.

Although I cannot defend my theory here, I believe that *rasa* theory, when incorporated into poetics, helped develop the theory of suggestion, and that suggestion, being the more useful concept to criticism, soon outgrew *rasa*. Of the seventy-nine suggestive poems that Mammaṭa gives in this chapter, only eighteen are cited as

---

[257] I do not understand why Mammaṭa uses *rati* and not *preya* to discuss these affections. While literally *rati* can mean affections of the type discussed, its sexual connotations and its use as the abiding emotion for the erotic *rasa* make it seem a poor choice.
[258] Raghavan discusses this issue at length (1967:119 – 162).

examples of *rasa*. The others are used to exemplify other types of suggestion. Indeed, Mammaṭa will tell us at the end of this chapter that there are 10,455 types of suggestion. After Ānandavardhana, suggestion, not *rasa,* is central to the discussion of the nature of poetry and the quality of individual poems.

Chari presents the opposite view. He writes, "*Rasa* is the most important concept in Sanskrit criticism and one that is central to all discourse about literature…*rasa* is the relishable quality inherent in an artistic work – which…is its emotive content."[259] Chari express the common view that the concept of *rasa* covers all that can be suggested in an artwork. We see here that this claim is historically false. The concept of *rasa* failed to grow into a comprehensive theory of poetic emotive content.[260] Mammaṭa gives many examples of emotionally rich poems that do not fall under of the rubric of *rasa*. Let us return to these.

añjitavyabhicārī yathā |

> *jāne kopaparāṅmukhī priyatamā svapne 'dya dṛṣṭā mayā*
> *mā māṃ saṃspṛśa pāṇineti rudatī gantuṃ pravṛttā puraḥ* |
> *no yāvat parirabhya cāṭuśatakair āśvāsayāmi priyāṃ*
> *bhrātas tāvad ahaṃ śaṭhena vidhinā nidrādaridrīkṛtaḥ* ||

atra vidhiṃ pratyasūyā |

An example of a suggested auxiliary state (becoming the dominant element):

> O my brother! Today I saw in dreams

[259] Chari (1990:9).
[260] *Rasa* did become central to Indian aesthetics outside of poetics (in music, for example).

The face of my best beloved averted in anger.
"Don't touch me" she wept and turned to go.
I went to comfort her with endless entreaties and embraces,
But just then sly Fate robbed me of my sleep. (47)

Here grumbling bitterly against fate is suggested.

Comments

The auxiliary state of frustration in the poem dominates the *rasa* (the frustrated erotic) by means of the striking striking personification of fate in the last line. The trope of the first four lines portrays a lover pretending to reunite with his beloved in a dream. Although it is farely cliché in Sanskri poetry, it can be used to good effect.[261] Take the following poem for example: "Have mercy, sleep, / and show me once again / my darling though it be but for a moment; / for when I see her / I shall hold her in my arms so tightly / she shall not go, or if she goes / she must take me too."[262] In this poem the focus falls squarely on the lover's passion for his beloved. In the poem Mammaṭa gives, however, the image of the sly noctural robber holds more interest than the beloved. One is distracted from the lover's sentiment towards his beloved by such questions as, "What would Fate look like and how does he steal the lover's sleep?" Mammaṭa correctly points out that this poem suggests more about the character of the lover than his love.

tadābhāsā anaucityapravartitāḥ | (806)

[261] See poems 762, 763, and 779 in the *Subhāṣitaratnakoṣa* for more instance of this trope.
[262] *Subhāṣitaratnakoṣa* 806. Translated by Ingalls (1965:251). I added "she" to the final line, being unable to read it otherwise.

tadābhāsā rasābhāsā bhāvābhāsāś ca | *tatra rasābhāso yathā* |

> *stumaḥ kiṃ vāmākṣi kṣaṇam api vinā yaṃ na ramase*
> *vilebhe kaḥ praṇān raṇamakhamukhe yaṃ mṛgayase* |
> *sulagne ko jātaḥ śaśimukhi yam āliṅgasi balāt*
> *tapaḥśrīḥ kasyaiṣā madananagari dhyāyasi tu yam* ||

atrānekakāmukaviṣayam abhilāṣaṃ tasyāḥ stuma ityādyanugataṃ bahuvyāparopādānaṃ vyanakti ||

36b. Manifestations (of *rasas* and emotions) that are deficient are pseudo-occurrences of them.

By **pseudo-occurrences of them** is meant pseudo-occurrences of *rasa* and pseudo occurrences of emotion. Here is an example of a pseudo-occurrence of *rasa*:

> Whom should we praise, O fair-eyed one,
> such that without him you are not happy even for a moment?
> Who readily offered his life on the altar of war,
> such that you seek him now?
> Who was born at an auspicious moment, O moon-faced one,
> such that you embrace him so strongly?
> Who has such a treasure of religious merit, O incarnation of Love,
> such that you meditate upon him so profoundly? (48)

Here the many activities of the woman are inferred by the phrases, "Whom should we praise," etc. These activities suggest a desire for more than one lover.

Comments

Indian philosophy resorts to the concept "pseudo" to describe a close imitator of what is being investigated. Thus in logic there are "provers" (*hetus*) which are sufficient to

establish the desired inference and "pseudo-provers" (*hetu-ābhāsas*) which appear to be provers, but fall short under close scrutiny. Abhinava uses the common example of seeing pseudo-silver that turns out to be mother-of-pearl.[263] Likewise in poetry, there are emotions that seem transformable into *rasas*, but fail to do so on closer inspection. To take a contemporary example, we often read of the "courage" of people who blindly enter danger. This would count as pseudo-courage, because although the action would be courageous if the agent were aware, the necessary awareness is absent.

Raghavan suggests that the category of pseudo-*rasa* may have been invented to handle Rāvaṇa's illicit passion for Rāma's wife Sītā.[264] Abhinava cites an earlier critic who claimed that Rāvaṇa's lust should be counted as a new *rasa* (*laulya*), with the abiding emotion covetousness (*gardha*).[265] Abhinava rejects this view, claiming instead that until we realize the inappropriateness of an artistically represented emotion, we experience it as *rasa*, after the realization, however, our experience changes according to which emotion is portrayed.[266] Abhinava cites Bharata's view that the erotic leads to the comic in cases like these.[267] However, it is hard to understand what is funny about the lust that leads to the abduction of another's wife.

The *rasa* in the poem is not genuine because the man's love for a woman of loose character is improper and thus not erotic (according to classical sensibilities). Whatever one thinks of this moral judgment, the general point that the perverse is no longer erotic

[263] Ingalls, et al. (1990:217).
[264] Raghavan (1969:125).
[265] *Abhinavabhāratī* (1956:1:342).
[266] Ingalls, et al., (1990:107).
[267] *Nāṭyaśāstra* 6.40. Abhinava seems to be forcing Bharata a bit here.

seems correct. But then again, what is the dominant mood of the opening parts of *Lolita* if not the erotic?

bhāvābhāso yathā |

> *rākāsudhākaramukhī taralāyatākṣī*
> *sā smerayauvanataraṅgitavibhramāṅgī* |
> *tat kim karomi vidadhe katham atra maitrīṃ*
> *tatsvīkṛtivyatikare ka ivābhyupāyaḥ* ||

atra cintā anaucityapravartitā | *evam anye 'py udāhāryāḥ* ||

Here is an example of a pseudo occurrence of an emotion:

> Her face resembles the full moon, her eyes are large and trembling,
> Her body quivers with budding youth.
> What should I do? How can I win her affection? (49)

Here "worry" is improperly employed. Similarly the other emotions could be illustrated.

Comments

The auxiliary emotion of worry (number nine on the list from *kārikā* 31 - 34) is not proper for a man to feel towards a woman until a relationship has been established, and thus this is not a genuine case of worry.[268] While Abhinava specifically denies that auxiliary emotional states can be suggested, Mammṭa chooses several examples of suggested auxiliaries (e.g., poems 47, 50, and 51).[269]

---

[268] Jha (1925:73).
[269] Ingalls, et al. (1990:217).

It is worth repeating that while Mammaṭa is denying that these poems actually suggest the emotion or *rasa* they seem to suggest, he is not denying that they are suggestive poems of the highest order. Indeed, the *Subhāṣitaratnakoṣa*, an anthology of short verse compiled in Mammaṭa's time, shows a great interest in verses that suggest emotions other than the nine that can become *rasa.*[270] Mammaṭa might be reflecting a larger awareness of the broad powers of suggestion.

bhāvasya śāntir udayaḥ saṃdhiḥ śabalatā tathā* || *(818)

krameṇodāharaṇam |

> *tasyāḥ sāndravilepanastanataṭapraśleṣamudrāṅkataṃ*
> *kim vakṣaś caraṇānativyatikaravyājena gopāyyate* |
> *ity ukte kva tad ity udīrya sahasā tat saṃpramārṣṭuṃ mayā*
> *sāśliṣṭā rabhasena tatsukhavaśāt tanvyā ca tadvismṛtam* ||

atra kopasya ||

(Additional ways a poem can be suggestive.)

36cd. There is pacification, arising, co-existing, and mixing of emotions.

Examples will be given in order (starting with pacification):

> "Are you falling at my feet just to hide your chest?
> Did the pressure of some girl's rounded breast,
> thick with sandal-paste, leave marks?"
> "Do you see any?" I ask and quickly embrace her,
> vigorously rubbing the traces away.

[270] Ingalls puts its date at "shortly before the year 1100." Mammaṭa is believed to have written in the second half of the eleventh century (see Introduction). Vidyākara includes a whole section on adulterous women and myriad other poems that fail the standards of *rasa*.

Enraptured, the slender one forgets all about them. (50)[271]

Here (there is pacification) of anger.[272]

Comments

Mammaṭa lists more elements that can be suggested in a poem. He moves from a static suggestion of a *rasa* or an emotion to the suggestion of emotive processes. We can see here a subtle understanding of both human emotions and how they can be suggested.

In the poem, anger subsides to sexual desire. According to V.K. Chari, this can only be the case if the anger is weaker than the desire, for if they were equal, anger would win out.[273] This verse could easily be worked into a larger framework and used to help suggest the erotic *rasa*. However when it is considered in isolation, it is the calming of the woman's anger that dominates.

ekasmiñ śayane vipakṣaramanīnām agrahe mugdhayā
sadyo mānaparigrahaglapitayā cāṭūni kurvann api |
āvegād avadhīritaḥ priyatamas tūṣṇīṃ sthitas tatkṣaṇaṃ
mā bhūt supta ivety amandavalitagrīvaṃ punar vīkṣitaḥ ||

atrautsukyasya || *(823)*

(Next an example of the arising of emotion:)

When he whispers the name of her rival in bed,

[271] *Amaruśataka* 26.
[272] I am reading *kopa* as a synonym of *krodha*.
[273] Chari (1990:68).

The sweet girl withers and turns away.
Furious, she ignores her lover's coaxing.
But when he stops, she thinks, "He mustn't fall asleep."
And quickly turns back to face him. (51)[274]

Here (the arising) of anxiety.

Comments

"Anxiety" is one of the auxiliary states (number twenty on the list from *kārikā* 31 - 34). Here the girl is anxious that if her lover falls asleep without reconciliation she will lose him. Despite the righteous anger of the woman, in a larger context the dominant *rasa* would be the erotic. There are so many Sanskrit poems about lovers slipping up and mentioning other women in bed that a separate section in often given to them in the anthologies![275]

utsiktasya tapaḥparākramanidher abhyāgamād ekataḥ
satsaṃgapriyatā ca vīrarabhasotphālaś ca māṃ karṣataḥ |
vaidehīparirambha eṣa ca muhuṣ caitanyam āmīlayan
ānandī haricandanenduṣiṣir asnigdho rūṇaddhy anyataḥ ||

atrāvegaharṣayoḥ | *(826)*

(Next an example of co-existing of two emotions:)

The arrival of one so rich in austerity and penance
    Urges me on to a flowering of heroism
    And to the joy of good company.
But the blissful embrace of the Videha princess,

[274] *Amaruśataka* 23.
[275] Ingalls (1965:217).

Sticky as a drop of yellow sandal paste in early spring,
Envelopes and captures my very soul. (52)[276]

Here (the co-existence) of enthusiasm and joy.

Comments

As Masson points out, “vacillation between love and asceticism” is a very common theme in Sanskrit poetry.[277] He quotes Jagannātha’s: “I have drunk deep of the *Upaniṣads* and the *Bhagavadgītā* has traveled the highway of my mind. And yet, from out of the house of my heart, she will not go.”[278] Mammaṭa seems right that this type of poem possesses a charm distinct from the charm of poems expressing a single *rasa*.

kvākāryaṃ śaśalakṣmaṇaḥ kva ca kulaṃ bhūyo 'pi dṛśyeta sā
doṣāṇāṃ praśamāya na śrutam aho kope 'pi kāntaṃ mukham |
kiṃ vakṣyanty apakalmaṣāḥ kṛtadhiyaḥ svapne 'pi sā durlabhā
cetaḥ svāsthyam upaihi kaḥ khalu yuvā dhanyo 'dharaṃ dhāsyati ||

atra vitarkautsukyam atismaraṇaśaṅkādainyadhṛticintānāṃ śabalatā | *bhāvasthitis tūktā udāhṛtā ca* || *(830)*

(Next an example of the mixing of several emotions)

What a shameful act for my lunar race!
    But to see her again!
I learned the scriptures to extinguish all faults,

[276] Bhavabhūti, *Mahāvīracarita* 2.22. The princess of Videha is, of course, Sītā.
[277] Merwin and Masson (1977:4).
[278] Merwin and Masson (1990:4), slightly altered.

Yet even in anger her face was beautiful!
What would my faultless teachers say?
But she is so rare, even in dreams!
Be calm, my heart. (Try not to wonder)
Which happy youth will drink her lips? (53)[279]

Here are mixed together deliberation, longing, resolve, recollection, doubt, dejection, self-control, and anxiety.

Existence of an emotion has already been discussed and illustrated (in *kārikā* 35c-36a).

Comments

This category is an extension of the previous one. Notice that the theme is similar: a battle between the "higher" and "lower" emotions. The man knows he should leave the woman, but is too besotted to do so. Rather than simple vacillation, the poet evokes several allies on each side. The auxiliaries of the erotic — longing, recollection, dejection, and anxiety counter the auxiliaries of the tranquil — deliberation, shame, doubt, and resolve. The poet skillfully leaves the result unstated, focusing instead on the man's torment. Ingalls reports that the poem is about a king who falls in love with a brahmin woman despite the caste restrictions placed on such a relationship.[280]

mukhe rase 'pi te 'ṅgitvaṃ prāpnuvanti kadācana* | *(835)

te bhāvaśāntyādayaḥ | *aṅgitvaṃ rājānugatavivāhapravṛttabhṛtyavat* ||

[279] Quoted in the *Dhvanyāloka* 2.3.
[280] Ingalls, et al. (1990:219).

37ab. Even while *rasa* is primary, these sometimes gain predominance.

The word **These** means the pacification of emotion, etc. **Predominance** means like that of a royal subject who, during his marriage, is followed by the king.

Comments

Mammaṭa very briefly explains the relation between the suggestion of *rasa* and suggestion of non–*rasa* producing emotive states by analogy. Just as the king retains his authority even when allowing his subject to occupy the place of honor, so the *rasa* is primary, even when the suggestion of one of the other emotive states dominates a poem. The crux is understanding what is meant by "primary." While Abhinava had stretched Ānandavardhana's system to acknowledge these types of suggestion, he still considers them subservient to the development of *rasa* in a larger context.[281] Although Mammaṭa follows Abhinava's ranking, his point seems to be that while suggestions whose sequences are unnoticed are paradigmatically suggestions of *rasa*, many other such suggestions are possible. *Rasa* suggestion dominates the field, even though there are times when it cedes power to some other type of suggestion.

Here ends the lengthy discussion of suggestion whose psychological sequence is not noticed. Mammaṭa has considered many types of suggestion that arise without the reader being able to pin down exactly why. They could be called suggestions of mood.

[281] Ingalls, et al. (1990:117 and especially 215-217).

He will now move on to suggestion that require a deliberate mental process on the part of the reader. Roughly put, in these suggests the reader becomes aware that the poet has created some semantic or stylistic effect and when he figures out why, he has understood the suggestion. Hopefully this will be made clearer and more precise by the discussion and examples that follow.

***anusvānābhasaṃlakṣyakramavyaṅgyasthitis tu yaḥ* ||**

śabdārthobhayaśaktyuthas tridhā sa kathito dhvaniḥ* | *(839)

śabdaśaktimūlānuraṇanarūpavyaṅgyaḥ arthaśaktimūlānuraṇanarūpavyaṅgyaḥ ubhayaśaktimūlānuraṇanarūpavyaṅgyaś ceti trividhaḥ |

(4.2.2. Suggestive Poetry in which the Psychological Sequence Noticeable.)

37cd - 38ab. Suggestions wherein the psychological sequence (connecting the suggested meaning with the literal meaning) is noticeable – like an echo – are said to be of three types: those arising from the power of the word, the meaning, or both.

The **three types** are echo-like suggestions based on the power of the word, echo-like suggestions based on the power of the meaning, and echo-like suggestions based on the power of both.

Comments

These suggestions are called echo-like because one understands the literal meaning first and only afterwards the suggested meaning, hearing, as it where, the same thing differently. An example (in English) would be the pun, “He gave me a laurel and hardy handshake.” You understand the literal meaning first, and then the punning meaning hits you. The sounds remain the same (as in an echo), but the meaning changes. The independence of the two levels of meaning accounts for the sequence in understanding. You can flip back and forth between them, but you cannot read both at once (like Wittgenstein’s “rabbit-duck”).

tatra

alaṃkāro 'tha vastv eva śabdād yatrāvabhāsate **||**

pradhānatvena sa jñeyaḥ śabdaśaktyubhdāvo dvidhā **|** ***(844)***

vastv eveti analaṃkāraṃ vastumātram | *ādyo yathā*

> *ullāśya kālakaravālamahāmbuvāham*
> *devena yena jaraṭhor jitagarjitena* |
> *nirvāpitaḥ sakala eva raṇe ripūṇāṃ*
> *dhārājalais trijagati jvalitaḥ pratāpaḥ* ||

atra vākyasyāsaṃbaddhārthābhidhāyaktvaṃ mā prasāṅkṣīd iti prākaraṇikāprākaraṇikayor upamānopameyabhāvaḥ kalpanīya ity atropamālaṅkāro vyaṅgyaḥ ||

(4.2.2.1. Suggestive Poetry Based on the Power of the Word.)

Of these (three types of sequential suggestion),

38cd - 39ab. Suggestions based on the power of the word are known to be of two types, based on whether a poetic ornament or a mere fact is made manifest by the word principally.

Mere fact means the fact only, without a poetic ornament. To illustrate the first (i.e., where a poetic ornament is made manifest):

<u>Apparent Meaning</u>	<u>Hidden Meaning</u>	
The king	The king	
Brings up the large cloud	raises his sword	
Dark and fresh	with a fierce roar	
And extinguishes	and destroys	
With torrents of rain	with its flickering edge	
The heat of destructive fires	the glory of enemies	
Pervading the three worlds.	extending over the three worlds.	(54)[282]

Here a relation of simile is understood between the subject of the sentence (Indra) and another object (the king) in order to avoid an irrelevant sentence meaning. Thus the suggested meaning is a poetic ornament, in this case a simile.

Comments

Please recall that I have used two columns to render the apparent and the hidden meanings for each phrase in the Sanskrit original of punning poems. One should read the left poem first, then the right, and then try to understand how they can be translations of the same text. Although this method has no poetic merit, at least the reader should be able to understand the examples.

[282] I am indebted to Jha (1925:77-78) for this reading of this, and the following, punning poems.

This and the following five poems can be read literally, so there is no reason to invoke metaphoric indication. But the literal meaning does not mesh with the context, which pushes the attentive reader to search for another meaning. The first four poems suggest poetic ornaments, while the final two suggest facts. These suggestions arise from the words, because in each case the effect would be ruined if synonyms were substituted.

The word "fact" is being used by Mammaṭa to indicate any state-of affair described in a poem. The opposite category is not that of fiction, but that of ornament. Thus the heat of the sun and Romeo and Juliet's love are "facts." On the other hand, the claim that the Pope is the shepherd of the faithful is an ornament (a metaphor), not a "fact." The metaphor suggests the "fact" that he leads and protects the faithful. It is important to keep this in mind for the rest of this chapter.

The current example describes Indra, the Vedic god of rain and king of the heaven. Indra is a symbol of generous heroism for several reasons. First, his rain both extinguishes forest fires and allows the earth to produce food. Second, Indra uses his thunderbolt to fight the demons of darkness, thus protecting mankind. The poem ties in a third aspect of Indra in the final line. In Vedānta Indra is equated with the Supreme Being.[283] Thus, in Dvaita Vedānta at least, he could be called on for aid in quenching the fires of desire that keep one from realizing his identity with Brahman.

Although the apparent reading is coherent, it fails to fit the context. The poem is about a king in battle, and his army raising huge rain-clouds, etc., is not literally possible.

---

[283] Monier Williams (1899:166).

But when one understands that the king's conduct in battle is being compared to Indra's conduct in fighting the harmful fires, the relevance becomes clear. The comparison is never, however, directly stated. Rather, it is suggested by the attributing actions to the king that are usually connected with Indra.

tigmaruchirapratāpo vidhuraniśākṛd vibho madhuralīlaḥ |
matimān atattvavṛttiḥ pratipadapakṣāgraṇīr vibhāti bhavān ||

atraikaikasya padasya dvipadatve virodhābhāsaḥ || *(857)*

Apparent Meaning	Hidden Meaning[284]
O lord! Your splendor is fierce and sweet,	Fierce splendor without splendor.
You destroy your enemies,	The moon and not the night maker
Your actions are pleasing,	The spring and devoid of beauty
You act with intelligence and magnanimity,	Intelligent and acting blankly,
You are brilliant at the front of your army.	The first day of the fortnight and not the first day. (55)

By taking each compound in this poem as two words, there is "pseudo- paradox."

Comments

Each line in the above literal translation translates one Sanskrit compound by reading the compound as a single phrase. However, if you read the compound as two phrases, they

[284] The compounds should be divided as follows for the apparent contradiction:
tigmaruchirapratāpo becomes *tigmaruchir + apratāpo;*
vidhuraniśākṛd becomes *vidhur + aniśākṛd;*
madhuralīlaḥ becomes *madhur + alīlaḥ;*
matimānatattvavṛttiḥ becomes *matimān + atattvavṛttiḥ;*
pratipadapakṣāgraṇīr becomes *pratipad + apakṣāgraṇīr.*

contradict one another in each case. "Pseud-paradox" is a poetic ornament in which the apparent paradox is dissolved once one understands the pun. This example is odd in that the paradoxical reading is more difficult to arrive at than the non-paradoxical one. The following poem has two more orthodox "pseudo-paradoxes." Although the degree of virtuosity evidenced here is rarely appreciated in European criticism, this sort of poem has an honored place in Sanskrit poetry.

> *amitaḥ samitaḥ prāptair utkarṣair harṣada prabho* |
> *ahitaḥ sahitaḥ sādhuyaṣobhir asatām asi* ||

atrāpi virodhābhāsaḥ | *(862)*

> In wars for peace my lord excelled,
> Honorably renowned for kindly killing the wicked. (56)

Here too there is "pseudo-paradox."

Comments

I have incorporated two pseudo-contradictions into this loose translation (war/peace and kindly/killing). The fact that the first two words of each line of the original seem to contradict each other is quite apparent ("*a*" is a privative prefix, whereas "*sa*" is a possessive prefix). However, as one continues each line, one quickly realizes that the contradiction is only apparent. Gerow, in his discussion of this ornament, quotes Wilde: "Until yesterday I had no idea there were any families or persons whose origin was a

Terminus."[285] The pseudo-paradox dissolves when one understands that it is a railroad terminus that is meant.

nirupādānasaṃbhāram abhittāv eva tanvate |
jagac citraṃ namas tasmai kalāślāghyāya śūline ||

atra vyatirekaḥ | *alaṃkāryasyāpi brāhmaṇaśramaṇanyāyenālaṃkāratā* || *(865)*

Honor the trident god's artistic prowess!
Even without color or canvas,
He paints the wondrous world. (57)[286]

Here the poetic ornament of "distinction" *(vyatireka)* (is suggested).

Even that which is to be ornamented is (here called) an ornament, by the maxim of the Brahman-Buddhist monk.

Comments

Gerow defines the ornament "distinction" as follows: "a figure in which two notoriously similar things are said to be subject to a point of difference; usually the subject of comparison is stated to excel the object, surpassing the norm of its comparability; hence an inverted simile."[287] In the inverted simile of the poem Śiva is compared to an artist, only to show that the comparision cannot hold. No artist can paint without medium (colors) or support (canvas), so Śiva's creation excels. In is interesting to note that

[285] Gerow (1971:269).
[286] Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa, *Stavacintāmaṇi* 9 (D).
[287] Gerow (1971:276).

comparing the artists and the divine creator, which is often considered revolution of romantic criticism in the West, was a commonplace in Sanskrit criticism.[288]

Although a person loses caste in becoming a Buddhist monk, the caste had previously can still be used to distinguish him from other monks. Thus calling him a Brahman, while literally false, is possible in an extended sense: thus the maxim. Here in chapter four generally, and in the previous four poem specifically, the topic of discussion is suggestion, not ornaments. Mammaṭa believes that suggestion is the primary goal of these poems, and as such, is to be established first and then decorated by poetic ornaments. Dhvani School critics often use the analogy of a woman (the essence) and jewelry (the decoration). Naming a type of suggestion after the ornament it suggests, like naming a woman after the jewelry she wears, is correct only in the extended sense illustrated by the maxim.

An Alaṅkāra School critic would claim that the utterance becomes a poem through the presence of the ornament, which is thus essential. They admit that the ornament is suggestive, but insist that this feature remains secondary. In the given poem, both types of analysis seem equally applicable.

vastumātraṃ yathā

> *paṃthia ṇa ettha sattharamattha maṇam pattharatthale gāme* |
> *aṇṇaapaoharaṃ pekhkhiūṇa jai vasasi tā vasasu* ||[289]

[288] See Abram (1983), for example.

[289] The *Saṅketaḥ* commentary gives the following Sanskrit translation:

> pathika nātra saṃstaro 'sti manāk prastarasthale grāme |

atra yady upabhogakṣamo 'si tadā āssveti vyajyate || *(871)*

Now an example (of a suggestions based on the power of the word in which a) fact (is principally made manifest by the word):

> O traveler, this barren plateau has no inn.
> Feel the charged atmosphere!
> If you want to stay with me, then please do. (58)[290]

Here, "If you want to make love, stay" is suggested (by a certain word used by the woman).

Comments

The word in question could be translated, "large clouds," but it can also mean, "swelling breasts." I have tried to capture the ambiguity with the expression "charged atmosphere," which could be charged emotionally as well as meteorologically.

> *śanir aśaniś ca tam uccair nihanti kupyasi narendra yasmai tvam* |
> *yatra prasīdasi punaḥ sa bhāty udhāro 'nudāraś ca* ||

aviruddhāv api tvadanuvartanārtham ekaṃ kārya kuruta iti dhvanyate || *(876)*

> O lord of men! The evil stars and thunderbolts
> Strike fiercely he who raises your wrath.
> While he who pleases you gains both
> Brilliant fame and a loyal wife. (59)

---

unnatapayodharaṃ prekṣya yadi vasasi tad vasa ||

[290] Dwivedi writes, "*Gāthāsaptaśatī*?"

Here (the speaker) suggests that even opposed forces work together to please the king.

Comments

The opposed forces are expressed in two pairs of apparently contradictory words in Sanskrit (*śani* – *aśani* and *udāra* – *anudāra*). Thus this could seem to be a case of "pseudo-paradox." However, the opposed terms refer to the allies of the king and the rewards of the faithful. There is no paradox in having two allies that oppose one another (the British and the Soviets in WWII), nor in receiving two things that seem contrary (a water heater and a freezer). Rather, the poem is another example of suggestion of a fact, in this case the king's power. The sensitive reader understands that forces normally at odds are working together, and then that this suggests that the king's power is so great it can force these enemies' coöperation.

This ends the section on suggestions based on the words whose sequences are noticed. The poems given in this section all relied on the double meaning or antonym of a particular word. Changing the word for a synonym would ruin the effect. To return to the example from Wilde ("Until yesterday I had no idea there were any families or persons whose origin was a Terminus."), its effect would be lost if one replaced "terminus" with "train station." Mammaṭa now turns to poems in which the suggestion in based on the meaning of the words, not the words themselves.

***arthaśaktyudbhavo 'py artho vyañjakaḥ saṃbhavī svataḥ* ||**

***prauḍhoktimātrāt siddho vā kaves tenombhitasya vā* |**

***vastu vālaṃkṛtir veti ṣaḍbhedo 'sau vyanakti yat* ||**

vastvalaṃkāram atha vā tenāyam dvādaśātmakaḥ* | *(880)

svataḥsaṃbhavī na kevalaṃ bhaṇitimātraniṣpanno yāvad bahir apy aucityena saṃbhāvyamānaḥ | *kavinā pratibhāmātreṇa bahir asann api nirmitaḥ kavinibaddhena vaktreti vā dvividho 'para iti trividhaḥ* | *vastu vālaṃkāro vāsāv iti śoḍhā vyañjakaḥ* | *tasya vastu vālaṃkāro vā vyaṅgya iti dvādaśabhedo 'rthaśaktyubhdavo dhvaniḥ* ||

(4.2.2.2. Suggestive Poetry Based on the Power of the Meaning.)

39c - 41b. Suggestive meaning based on semantic power is self-existent, established by a creative expression of the poet, or established by an expression of some poetic character. Each of these (suggested meanings) is either a mere fact or a poetic ornament; thus there are six types. Each of these six further suggests either a mere fact or a poetic ornament, making for twelve kinds.

Self-existent means having an externality (objectivity) not established by the mere words (of the poet). The other, which does not exist externally, is two-fold: it is either a creation of the poet's imagination, or of a character portrayed by him. Thus we arrive at three types. These three being either factual description or poetic ornament, we arrive at six types of suggestor. The suggested meaning of each of these being either factual

description or poetic ornament, we arrive at twelve types of suggestive poetry based on semantic power.

Comments

To discern the logic of this twelve-fold division we need to look closely at the twelve examples that follow. In the first four poems, the suggestor is self-existent, in the second quatrad it is a creation of the poet, and in the final group it is based on a character of the poem. We shall see that in each group of four, the first two examples illustrate suggestive facts, the second two suggestive poetic ornaments. Finally, with each of these pairs, the first example suggests a fact, the second, an ornament.

krameṇodāharaṇam

> *alasaśiromaṇi dhuttāṇam aggimo putti dhaṇasamiddhimao* |
> *ia bhaṇieṇa ṇaaṅgī papphullaviloaṇā jāā* ||[291]

atra mamaivopabhogya iti vastunā vastu vyañjate | *(889)*

(4.2.2.2.1. Suggestive Poetry in which the Suggestor is Self-Existent.)

Examples are now given in order:

> My daughter, here is a leader of the virtuous, a paragon of taste,
> And a man of exceptional riches –
> Hearing this, the eyes of the shapely girl bloomed. (60)

[291] The *Saṅketaḥ* commentary gives the following Sanskrit translation:
arasaśiromaṇir dhūrttānāmagrayaḥ yutri dhanasamṛddhimayaḥ |
iti bhaṇitena natāṅgī praphullavilocanā jātā ||

In this example, the fact, “(This man) is just right for my love”, is suggested by the fact (of her eyes blooming).

Comments

The category “self-existent” includes all objective things or events in the world. It contrasts with the category of fantastical things invented either directly by the poet, or indirectly by a character in the poem. People do reacted by widening their eyes, and this reaction suggests excitement or fear universally. In the context of the poem, it suggests the young woman’s enthusiasm for the man described.

The crux is how a man who is “*arasa*” (flavorless, weak, without culture) can be a perfect lover. The *Saṅketaḥ* glosses “*arasa*” with “*arocakinaḥ*,” which can mean someone with fastidious or cultivated tastes.[292] Alternatively, the man could be a rich old saint who has lost his taste for the world. In this case the father might be suggesting a marriage of interest to his greedy daughter.

dhanyāsi yā kathayasi priyasaṃgame 'pi
visrabdhacāṭukaśatāni ratāntareṣu ।
nīvīm prati praṇihite tu kare priyeṇa
sakhyaḥ śapāmi yadi kiṃcid api smarāmi ॥

atra tvam adhanyā ahaṃ tu dhanyeti vyatirekālaṃkāraḥ । *(893)*

How fortunate you are to be able to recall
All the sweet seductions

[292] Monier-Williams (1899:89).

Whispered in the height of passion by your lover.
I swear, my friend, that after my lover
Starts to fondle the knot of my sash,
I remember nothing. (61)[293]

In this example the poetic ornament of "distinction" is suggested (by the self-existent fact described). The suggestion is, "It is I, not you, who is fortunate."

Comments

As we saw with poem 57, the ornament "distinction" is inverted simile. Two similar things or experiences are brought together to point out the dissimilarity. Usually the object compared is shown to be superior in some way to the object of comparison. Thus Dwivedi is justified in calling this ornament "comparative excellence."[294] Here the sexual pleasures of the two women are compared. The ecstasy of the speaker, whose intensity precludes any memory of it, is clearly superior to the pleasure of the second woman who can remember all the details.

darpāndhagandhagajakumbhakapāṭakūṭa -
saṃkrāntinighnaghanaśoṇitaśoṇaśociḥ |
vīrair vyaloki yudhi kopakaṣāyakāntiḥ
kālīkaṭākṣa iva yasya kare kṛpāṇaḥ ||

atropamālaṃkāreṇa sakalaripubalakṣayaḥ kśaṇāt kariṣyate iti vastu || *(897)*

[293] Dwivedi writes, "Vijjākā, according to Śëktimuktāvalī."
[294] Dwevedi (1967:103).

Having split the heads of elephants raging, rutting, and blind with lust,
His sword did shine a thick blood red.
He searches out his foes upon the field of war,
Like Kālī with burning, wraith-red eyes. (62)[295]

Here the fact that he will quickly kill the entire enemy army is suggested by the (self-existent) poetic ornament of simile.

Comments

Kālī (or Durgā, wife of Śiva) is a most potent force of destruction. If the king is like her, surely he can kill the whole enemy army, as Mammaṭa explains.

The simile is "self-existent" because a real king is being compared to a real goddess (or so it was believed). The two terms of the simile have objective existence and the king really is like Kālī. The poet has invented nothing, he is merely making artisitic use of an objective state of affairs.

gāḍhakāntadaśanakṣatavyathāsaṃkaṭāt arivadhūjanasya yaḥ |
auṣṭhavidrumadalānyamocayan nirdaśan yudhi ruṣā nijādharam ||

atra virodholaṃkāreṇādharanirdaśanasamakālam eva śatravo vyāpāditā iti tulyayogitā mama kṣatyāpy anyasya kṣatir nirvar tām iti tadbuddhir utprekṣyate ity utprekṣā ca | *esūdāharaṇeṣu svataḥ saṃbhavī vyañjakaḥ* || *(902)*

Biting down on his lip in battle rage,
He frees the coral lips of his enemies' wives
From their lovers' teeth,

[295] Dwivedi writes, "Vijjākā, acc. to Śuktimuktāvalī" (1967:102).

And any wounds they might inflict. (63)

The (self-existent) poetic ornament in the poem is a "contradiction," i.e., "the enemies are killed as soon as the lip is bitten." (The ornament) suggests the poetic ornaments of "equal joining" and "fancy." The suggestion by "equal joining" is, "May my wound remove the wounds of others." The suggestion by "fancy" is the king's thought, since it is fanciful.

In each of the preceding four examples, the suggestor was self-existent.

Comments

"Contradiction" is an ornament in which the poet includes an apparent contradiction. Here the king is both wounding himself and wounding others. The contradiction is only apparent because the king bites his lip while engaged in battle. The death of the enemies comes about in fighting that is not explicitly described.

"Equal joining" is an ornament usually akin to the Greek zeugma. The poem gives an inverted example, in which the king's biting stops the enemies from biting their wives in love-making. There is a parallelism here, but not full zeugma. A charming and simple example of the ornament is found in the verse, "The young men enjoyed the shady terraces along with their wives."[296] One can interpret the verse to mean that the men and their wives enjoyed the terraces. But by "equal pairing," one can also interpret it to mean that the men enjoyed both the terraces and their wives.

[296] Māgha, *Śiśupālavadha* 3.35. Quoted in Ingalls, et al. (1990:345).

The king hopes his wound, which is strictly incapable of activity, will remove the wounds of others. The ornament "fancy" pertains to imaginary ideas such as this, especially to the personification of inanimate or abstract things.

kailāsasya prathamaśikhare veṇusaṃmūrchanābhiḥ
srutvā kīrtiṃ vibudharamaṇīgīyamānāṃ yadīyām |
srastāpāṅgāḥ sarasabisinīkāṇḍasaṃjātaśaṅkā
diṅmātaṅgāḥ śravaṇapuline hastam āvartayanti ||

atra vastunā yeṣām apy arthādhigamo nāsti teṣām apy evamādibuddhijananena camatkāraṃ karoti tvatkīrtir iti vastu dhanyate | *(908)*

(4.2.2.2.2. Suggestive Poetry in which the Suggestor is Invented by the Poet.)

All the earth's elephants,
Hearing tender flutes and sweet goddesses
Sing your praise on Mount Kailasa,
Mistake the sounds for juicy lotus stems
And search their ears with hungry trunks. (64)

"Your fame is especially wondrous because it creates such ideas even in those creatures who do not understand (the words sung)." This (fact) is suggested by the "fact" (created by the poet).

Comments

The suggesting fact – that the sound of the song is so sweet that the elephants raise their trunks to try to eat it – does not exist in the real world. It is a creation of the poet's imagination. Mammaṭa claims that it suggests that the fame of the king is especially

wondrous. The primary suggestion, it seems to me, is that the music is especially sweet. Only this accounts for why the elephants want to eat it. The most obvious reason for the sweetness is that the music is played by goddesses. The glory of goddesses is thus suggested. Mammaṭa would have to argue that part of the music's sweetness is due to the content of the song in order for the fame of the king to be suggested.

> *kesesu balāmoḍia teṇa a samarambhi jaasirī gahia* |
> *jaha kandarāhim vihurā tassa daḍhaṃ kamṭhaammi samṭhaviāṃ* ||[297]

atra keśagrahaṇāvalokanod dīpitamadanā iva kandarās tadvidhurān kaṇṭhe gṛhṇanti ity utprekṣā | *ekatra saṃgrāme vijayadarśanāt tasyārayaḥ palāyya guhāsu tiṣṭhantīti kāvyahetur alaṃkāraḥ* | *na palāyya gatās tadvairiṇo 'pi tu tataḥ parābhavaṃ saṃbhāvya tān kandarā na tyajantīti apahnutiś ca* || *(912)*

> In the battle, the King forcibly took
> The goddess Victory by the hair.
> So the caves passionately embraced
> The necks of his enemies. (65)

Here (the imagined fact suggests) the ornament "fancy." The suggestion is, "The caves embrace his enemies by the neck as if their lust were aroused by the seizure of Victory's hair." (The imagined fact also suggests) the ornament "poetic cause," with the suggestion as, "His enemies ran away and remained in a hidden place because they saw him

[297] The *Saṅketaḥ* commentary gives the following Sanskrit translation:
> keśeṣu balāt kāreṇa tena ca samare jayaśrīrgṛhītā |
> yathā kandarābhir vidhurāstasya dṛḍhaṃ kaṇṭhe saṃsthāpitāḥ ||

victorious in an engagement.” (The imagined fact also suggests) the ornament “denial.” Here the suggestion is, “The enemies did not run away; rather, the caves, fearing the king would defeat them, did not let them out.”

Comments

In the real world, caves do not embrace men, so the “fact” described in an invention of the poet. The poet gently mocks the cowardly behavior of the king’s enemies. As Mammaṭa explains, the poet’s use of this image suggests one of three ornaments. As we saw with poem 63, “fancy” often involves the personification of inanimate objects, in this case the caves. Caves, like victory, are often personified as women. Here they are both seen as enamored woman. The desire of the caves is aroused by the king’s passion for Victory. I have followed this interpretation in my translation.

The second option merely establishes a “poetic cause.” The enemies run away and hide because they are afraid of the king’s passion for, and control over, Victory. This option, while adding an interesting twist, does not do justice to the image of the caves embracing the enemies.

The third option sees a “denial” that the enemies ran away. Rather, they are already in the caves and the caves embrace them out of fear, stopping them from leaving. While this option seems better than the second, it does leave unexplained why the enemies are in the caves to begin with.

Mammaṭa does not directly discuss the relation of these three mutually contradictory suggestions. By allowing that there are three he acknowledges that the poem cannot be paraphrased without deflating the interpretive tension. He neither affirms nor denies that part of the beauty of the poem arises from the tension. However, he does make this claim with regards to poem 111, below.

gāḍhāliṃgaṇarahasujjuammi daie lahuṃ samosarai |
māṇaṃsiṇīṇa māṇo pīlaṇabhīa vva hiaāhiṃ ||[298]

atrotprekṣayā pratyāliṅganādi tatra vijṛmbhate iti vastu | *(918)*

When the lover moves in impetuously
For an earnest embrace,
Pride quickly flees, as if afraid to suffer,
From the hearts of the cheerful girls. (66)

Here the poetic ornament "fancy" suggests the fact that there was a swelling of reciprocal embraces, etc.

Comments

The "fancy" here is the personification of pride and its imaginary fleeing. The ornament

[298] The *Darpaṇa* commentary has the following Sanskrit translation:
gāḍhāliṅganarabhasodyate dayīte laghusamapasarati |
manasvinīnāṃ mānaḥ pīḍanabhīta iva hṛdayāt ||
The *Sampradāyakāśinī* commentary replaces "*pīḍanabhīta*" with "*preraṇabhīta*," which seems inferior to me.

is created by the imagination of the poet and suggests that the lovers really do embrace. I have not tried to capture the sexual punning of the first compound, which sounds like *gādha* + *liṅga* + *nara*, which could be rendered, “the man whose penis is large or deeply entered.” The punning accounts for part of why pride is so ready to flee.

jā ṭheraṃ va hasantā kaivaaṇaṃburuhabaddhaviṇivesā |
dāvei bhuaṇamaṃḍalamaṇṇaṃ via jaai sā vāṇī ||[299]

atrotprekṣayā camatkāraikakāraṇaṃ navaṃ navaṃ jagat ajaḍāsanasthā nirmimīte iti vyatirekaḥ | *eṣu kavipraudhoktimātraniṣpanno vyañjakaḥ* | *(921)*

Seated in the lotus-like mouths of poets, Speech is victorious,
Portraying wonderful worlds to mock the Creator. (67)

In this example, “fancy” suggests the ornament “distinction.” The suggestion is, “Speech has a sentient seat and creates worlds ever new and of unmixed delight.”

In each of the preceding four examples, the suggestor is based only in the poet’s imaginative assertion.

Comments

Speech here is both a goddess and the human faculty. Through “fancy” it is personified and enthroned on a living throne. The Creator (Brahma) sits on a lotus and creates but

[299] The *Saṅketaḥ* commentary has the following Sanskrit translation:
yā brahmāṇam iva hasanti kavivadanāmburuhabaddhaviniveśā |
darśayati bhuvanamaṇḍalam anyad eva jayati sā vāṇī ||

one world that is both pleasant and painful. Thus the implicit comparison is drawn to illustrate the comparative excellence of Speech through an implicit inverted simile.

This poem recalls poem 57, in which the painter is shown to be inferior to the divine creater because of his dependance on materials. Here, the poet is shown to be superior to the divine creator, because his creation is more abundant (many worlds) and pleasant. In poems the comparision is not fully spelled out, which suggests to me that it was a common trope.

> *je laṃkāgirimehalāsu khaliā saṃbhogakhiṇṇorari -*
> *phārupphullaphaṇāvalīkavalaṇe pattā dariddataṇam* |
> *te eṃhiṇa malaānilā virahiṇīṇīsāsasaṃpakkiṇo*
> *jādā itti sisuttaṇe vi bahalā tāruṇṇapuṇṇā via* ||[300]

atra niḥśvāsaiḥ prāptaiś varyā vāyavaḥ kiṃ kiṃ na kurvantīti vastunā vastu vyajyate | *(925)*

(4.2.2.2.3. Suggestive Poetry in which the Suggestor is Invented by a Character in the Poem.)

> "Gaunt the is wind off the Western Ghats.
> Upon the gold-crowned mountain slopes,
> Open-hooded cobras drank it down,
> Exhausted in ecstasy."
> "And yet it is reborn,

[300] The *Saṅketaḥ* commentary has the following Sanskrit translation:
> ye laṅkāgirimekhalāyāścalitāḥ saṃbhogakhinnoragī
> sphārotphullaphaṇāvalīkavalane prāptā daridratvam |
> ta idānīṃ malayānimā virahiṇīniḥśvāsasamparkiṇo
> jātā igiti śiśutve 'pi bahalāstāruṇyapūrṇā iva ||

Other commentaries (e.g., the *Śārabodhinī*) substitute iṭiti for igiti in the final line.

Regaining its full strength
From the suffering sighs
Of women separated from their lovers." (68)[301]

Here the fact suggests another fact, namely, "Made bold by sighs, the wind will do anything."

Comments

Following the tradition, Mammaṭa separates poems in which the poet speaks in first person from those in which he speaks through a character. In this and the follow three examples, the suggestion arises from the words of a character in the poem. The first example comes from a drama. The suggesting "fact" is the fanciful description of the wind given by a character of the drama. The suggested "fact" is that the wind is now very strong.

sahi viraiūṇa māṇassa majjha dhīrattaṇeṇa āsāsam ।
piaṃdasaṇavihaṃlakhalakhaṇammi sahasatti teṇa osariam ॥[302]

atra vastunākṛte 'pi prārthane prasanneti vibhāvanā priyadarśanasya saubhāgyabalaṃ dhairyeṇa soḍhuṃ na śakyate ity utprekṣā vā ॥ *(930)*

My pride swelled strong,
Pushing me to stand up for myself.
But it abandoned me, o friend,
The moment I actually saw my lover. (69)[303]

---

[301] *Karpūramañjarī* 1.20 (D).
[302] The *Saṅketaḥ* commentary has the following Sanskrit translation:
sakhi viracayya mānasya mama dhīratveṇāsvāsam ।
priyadarśanaviṣṛṅkhalakṣaṇe sahaseti tenāpasṛtam ॥

In this example a fact suggests either an "unusual cause" or "fancy." In the first case the suggestion is, "She is appeased even without any entreaty by her lover." In the second case it is, "Pride cannot withstand the powerful pleasure of seeing one's lover."

Comments

Again, the suggesting fact is given in the voice of a woman, not in that of the poet. It suggests one of the two ornaments. "The woman betrayed" (*māninī*) is such a common theme in the erotic poetry that it became a sub-genre. Normally the lover needs to entreat the woman he has betrayed before she will be appeased. The first ornament, "unusual cause," occurs when the effect is present without its usual cause. A lover's entreats, explanation, and begging are usually needed to appease a betrayed woman, but here the woman is reconciled by the mere sight of her lover. This case of "fancy" differs little from those we have already seen. The woman's pride and her pleasure are both personified and pleasure proves itself stronger.

> *ollollakaraaraakhkhaehi tuha loaṇesu maha diṇṇam* |
> *raṃttasuaṃ paāo koveṇa puṇo ime ṇa akkamiā* ||[304]

atra kim iti locane kupite vahasi iti uttarālaṃkāreṇa na kevalamārdranakhakṣatāni gopāyasi yāvat teṣām ahaṃ prasādapātraṃ jāteti vastu || *(934)*

[303] Literally: The production of my pride was encouraged by my suppression of jealousy,
But the moment I really saw my love, I was suddenly abandoned by it.

[304] The *Saṅketaḥ* commentary has the following Sanskrit translation:
ārdrārdrakarajadaśanakṣataistava locanayor mama dattam |
raktāṃsukaṃ prasādaṃ kopenā punarime nākrānte ||

My eyes are not eclipsed with anger.
Their red clothing is a generous gift
Given by your body's fresh scratches and bites. (70)

Here the ornament "reply" implies the question, "Why is there anger in your eyes?" This suggests the fact that, "Not only are you trying to hide the fresh nail and teeth marks, but I am grateful for the gift they give."

Comments

The ornament "reply" urges the reader to reconstruct a previous question or statement. The woman in the poem explains that her eyes are red with anger, which leads the reader to suppose that the lover asked something like, "Why are your eyes red with anger?" The scene implied by the ornament suggests the fact that the woman is grateful to the marks because they reveal her lover's misconduct. We see here that the "fact" suggested can be as fanciful as some of the suggestor "facts" we have seen.

mahilāsahassabhaie tuha hiae suhaa sā amāanti |
aṇudiṇamaṇaṇṇakammā aṅgaṃ taṇuaṃ vi taṇuei ||[305]

atra hetvalaṃkāreṇa tano stanūkaraṇe 'pi tava hṛdaye na vartate iti viśeṣokti | eṣu kavinibaddhavaktṛprauḍhoktimātraniṣpannaśarīro vyañjakaḥ | evaṃ dvādaśa bhedāḥ ||

(939)

[305] The *Saṅketaḥ* commentary has the following Sanskrit translation:
mahilāsahasrabharite tava hṛdaye subhaga sā āmāntī |
anudinamananyakarmā aṅga tanu kamapi tanayati ||

O lucky one! Your heart is so
Crowded with women
That she cannot find a place.
So giving up all else
She spends her days getting thinner and thinner.
But still she cannot squeeze in! (71)[306]

In this example the ornament of "cause" suggests the ornament "remarked difference," namely, "Even though she becomes skinny, she find no place in your heart."

In each of the proceeding four examples, the suggestor was based on the words of one of the characters in the poem.

These are the twelve types (of suggestion based on the power of the meaning).

Comments

"Cause" is the ornament that describes a cause for the described action or state-of-affairs. There is usually something striking about the cause given.[307] The girl is getting thinner and thinner. The real reason is that her anxiety and dejection over not being able to win the heart of her beloved. However, the character in the poem invents a different cause, namely that the woman is getting thin to fit more easily in her beloved's heart.

"Remarked difference" is an ornament in which either a cause is present without the expected effect (as here) or the effect without the cause. According to the character's first trope, if the girl gets thin enough, she ought to fit anywhere, even in her beloved's

---

[306] *Gāthāsaptaśati* 2.82.
[307] This ornament is controversial. Gerow reports that Mammaṭa rejects it, probably because he does not include it in the chapters on ornaments (1971:327).

crowded heart. However, the causal relation has failed. The girl has become thin, but still finds no place in his heart. Thus the character uses an ornament to suggest another ornament.

Mammaṭa finishes the example of poems in which the suggestor is invented by a character in the poem. These poems contrast with the preceding group in which the suggestor is invented by the poet. Both these groups contrast with the first group in which the suggestor is not invented, but naturally occurring. Poems of the first group can be either narrative or put in the mouth of a character. As we saw, each of the group has four types, giving a total of twelve.

śabdārthobhayabhūr ekaḥ | *(944)*

yathā

> *atandracandrābharaṇā samuddīpitamanmathā* |
> *tārakātaralā śyāmā sānandaṃ na karoti kam* ||

atropamā vyaṅgyā ||

(4.3. Suggestive Poetry Based on Both the Words and the Meanings.)

41c. There is a (type of suggestion) based on both word and meaning.

For example:

First Meaning	Shared Meaning	Second meaning
beautiful girl	Who is not delighted by the	dark night

Adorned with the
bright head-jewel The clear moon

Who kindles love with twinkling
eyes? stars? (72)

Here a simile is suggested.

Comments

The simile in the poem compares the girl with the moon. It turns on three expressions with double sense. Thus it is a suggestion based on the power of the words. But understanding not only the punning expressions, but also the meaning of the other words is necessary to understand the simile. Thus it is based on both word and meaning. The punning poems we have seen up to this point were comprised of long Sanskrit compound words that could be broken in two ways, thus every semantic unit in the poem had double meanings. This poem resembles more closely an English punning poem in that only three of the words have double meanings while the structure remains the same on both readings (“Who is not delighted by an X, adorned with a Y, which kindles love with Z”).

bhedā aṣṭādaśāsya tat ||

asyeti dhvaneḥ |

nanu rasādināṃ bahubhedatvena katham aṣṭādaśety ata āha |

rasādīnām anantatvād bheda eko hi gaṇyate | *(950)*

anantatvād iti | *tathā hi nava rasāḥ* | *tatra śṛṅgārasya dvau bhedau* | *saṃbhogo vipralambhaś ca* | *saṃbhogasyāpi parasparāvalokanāliṅganaparicumbanādi-kusumoccayajalakelisūryāstamayacandrodayaṣaḍṛtuvarṇanādayo bahavo bhedāḥ* | *vipralambhasyābhilāṣādaya uktāḥ* | *tayor api vibhāvānubhāvavyabhicārivaicitryam* | *tatrāpi nāyakayor uttamamadhyamādhamaprakṛtitvam* | *tatrāpi deśakālāvasthādibhedā ity ekasyaiva rasasyānantyam* | *kā gaṇanā tv anyeṣām* | *asaṃlakṣyakramatvaṃ tu sāmānyam āśritya rasādidhvanibheda eka eva gaṇyate* ||

41d. Thus there are eighteen type of it.

It means suggestive poetry.

(4.4.) **Objection:** With so many types of *rasas*, etc., how can you claim there are (only) eighteen (types of suggestive poetry)?

42ab. Reply: That there is a single type is acknowledged because of the infinite number of *rasas* and the rest.

Infinite is explained as follows. There are nine *rasas*. The erotic has two types: consummated and frustrated. Love-in-enjoyment has many types such as mutual glances, embraces, kissing, flower-picking, amorous water sports, descriptions of sunsets, moon rises, the six seasons, etc. Love-in-separation has already been divided into longing, etc. There is also the variety of the determinants of the emotion, the symptoms of the

emotion, and the auxiliary states. Furthermore, the couple may be of upper, middle, or lower class. Finally, there are variations of place, time, and circumstance. Thus even the erotic *rasa* alone is infinite. How could one count the others? But the suggestive poetry of *rasa*, etc. is counted as a single type, because (all these poems) share the common feature of having the psychological sequence (of suggestion) unnoticeable.

Comments

The objector questions the logic of the classificatory system regarding *rasa*. Mammaṭa discusses suggestion of *rasa* under the third type of suggestion: poetry whose suggestion is unnoticed. As we saw this category contains other types of poem, e.g., poems that suggest emotions not capable of become *rasa*. If poetry that suggests *rasa* is the most important type, it should at least have its own category, and not be confined to a single type among eighteen. In fact, the objector urges that there should be a category for each type of *rasa*. The objector is correct that system conceals the relative importance of *rasa* poetry.

Mammaṭa reminds his objector that suggestions were first divided according to whether the literal meaning was set aside and then according to whether the suggestive sequence was usually noticed. In the resulting classificatory system *rasa* suggestions are all of a kind. Mammaṭa urges that this system must be maintained, for if the subtypes of *rasa* were allowed separate categories the system would be endless. Mammaṭa assumes

that if you allow a first level of sub-types (the nine *rasas*), you must allow further levels of sub-types (e.g., the two sub-types of the erotic and their sub-types).

The reply ignores the middle ground. Ten sub-types could have been given to the present third category, one for each of the *rasas*, and one for unnoticed suggestions that suggest something other than *rasa*. In this manner the importance of *rasa* could be shown without destroying the system.

It is worth reviewing the list (at the beginning of the chapter) of the eighteen basic types of suggestion, for their exposition has been spread out over the entire chapter to this point and the rest of the chapter consists in further permutations of each type. The next section gives poems in which the suggestion is based on a single word or compound.

A. Literal meaning unintended.

1. Transformed into another meaning (poem 73).

2. Entirely set aside (poem 74).

B. Literal meaning intended.

B_1. Psychological sequence unnoticed.

3a. Suggests *rasa* (poems 75-76).

3b. Suggests pseudo-*rasas*, emotions, etc. (not much charm added, no examples).

B_2. Psychological sequence noticed.

$B_{2.1}$. Based on the power of the word.

4. Suggesting an ornament (poem 77).

5. Suggesting a fact (poem 78).

$B_{2.2}$. Based on the power of the meaning.

$B_{2.2.1}$. Where the suggestor is self-existent.

6. A fact suggests a fact (poem 79).

7.A fact suggests an ornament (poem 80).

8. An ornament suggests a fact (poems 81-82).

9. An ornament suggests another ornament (poem 83).

$B_{2.2.2}$. Where the suggestor is invented by the poet.

10. A fact suggests a fact (poem 84).

11. A fact suggests an ornament (poem 85).

12. An ornament suggests a fact (poem 86).

13. An ornament suggests another ornament (poem 87).

$B_{2.2.3}$. Where the suggestor is invented by a character in the poem.

14. A fact suggests a fact (poem 88).

15. A fact suggests an ornament (poem 89).

16. An ornament suggests a fact (poem 90-91).

17. An ornament suggests another ornament (poem 92).

$B_{2.3}$. Based on the power of both the words and the meanings.

18. Suggests an ornament (not possible).

vākye dvyutthaḥ

dvyuttha iti śabdārthobhayaśaktimūlaḥ |

pade 'py anye

api śabdād vākye 'pi | *ekāvayavasthitena bhūṣaṇena kāminīva padadyotyena vyaṅgyena vākyavyaṅgyāpi bhāratī bhāsate* | *tatra padaprakāśyatve krameṇodāharaṇāni* |

> *yasya mitrāṇi mitrāṇi śatravaḥ śatravas tathā* |
> *anukampyo 'nukampyaś ca sa jātaḥ sa ca jīvati* ||

atra dvitīyamitrādiśabdā āsvastatvaniyantraṇīyatvasnehapātratvādisaṃkramitavācyāḥ ||

(957)

(4.5. Suggestive Poetry in which a Suggestive Word Adds to the Charm.)

42c. Suggestion based on both is found in a sentence.

On both means on both words and meanings.

42c. The others are found in a word also.

Also means, "also in a sentence." Just as a charming woman sparkles on account of a gem worn on her finger, so a statement, although suggested by the sentence, sparkles on account of individually suggestive words. The following, in order, are examples in which there is also suggestiveness of a word.

(4.5.1. Secondary Suggestion in which the Literal Meaning Is Unintended.)

> He is born and lives
> Whose friends are friends,
> Whose enemies are enemies,
> And whose loved ones are loved. (73)

In the poem the literal meaning of the second occurrence of the word friend is changed into "encouraging," that of enemy into "reprehensible," and that of loved into "lovable."

Comments

Mammaṭa gave an example of suggestion based on both word and sentence meaning in poem 72. It comprised the eighteenth type of suggestion. This combination can obviously be found only at the level of the sentence, not in an individual word. The other seventeen types, however, are found in individual words. Mammaṭa thus begins to gives examples of types of suggestion that are parallel to the first seventeen types, but function at the level of individual words instead of at the level of the sentence.

Mammaṭa express the theory of primary and decorative suggestion by means of an analogy with a bejeweled woman. As is so often the case, Ānandavardhana uses the same analogy to sum up his detailed presentation of this theory.[308] The analogy functions on two levels of beauty. The beauty of the woman is analogous with the beauty of the sentence-level suggestion, while the beauty of the gem is analogous with the suggestion based on a single word. Ānandavardhana explains that, "there is beauty in all those varieties of suggestion which appear in a single word, even though a single word serves only as a reminder."[309] The assumption is that a decoration serves to point out and augment the beauty of the thing it decorates, not the other way around. If a decoration becomes prominent, it is not longer a decoration, but rather a rival to the thing it is

[308] *Dhvanyāloka* 3.1j. See Ingalls, et al. (1990:387).
[309] Ingalls, et al. (1990:387).

supposed to decorate. In the poems that follow, the second suggestion remains subservient to the primary. Thus these poems are properly included in this chapter, which treats poems in which sentence-level suggestion is primary.[310]

The poem given here can be read literally as a series of tautologies. However, if the literal meanings of three words are shifted, but not entirely set aside, the poem takes on more interest. Each takes on a metaphoric meaning that intensifies the original meaning. A paraphrase of the poem would then read: He is born and lives a worthy life, whose friends are truly friends, whose enemies deserve enmity, and whose loved ones both merit and reciprocate his love.

It is a bit difficult to see the difference between the suggestion of this poem and that of poem 23 ("I say to you, 'Here stands a group of the learned / So remain here with your mind composed.'"). Supposedly, the sentence meaning (semantic content + speaker's intention) of the earlier poem changed: a declarative sentence became an advisory sentence. In the poem given here, on the other hand, the meanings of three words change without radically altering the sentence meaning. But there are two difficulties in this explanation. First, by pointing out that the meaning of the word "say" shifts to "advise," Mammaṭa gives us the impression that the first example also showed the alteration of individual words, not of the whole sentence. Second, changing the meanings of three words radically alters the sentence meaning in the poem given here. Fortunately, the differences are much clearer in the other sixteen cases.

[310] If the suggestion of a word becomes the prominent element of a poem, the suggestion is called a poetic ornament, and the poem becomes a poem of subordinate suggestion. Mammaṭa discusses these issues in chapters five and ten.

khalavavahārā dīsanti dāruṇā jahavi tahavi dhīraṇam |
hiaavaassavahumaa ṇa hu vavasāā vimujjhanti ||[311]

atra vimuhyantīti || *(965)*

Just as the conduct of a villain is seen to be vile,
So the heart-felt efforts of the wise are never stupefied. (74)

Here stupefied (has its literal meaning completely replaced by a metaphoric meaning).

Comments

Actions, unlike people, cannot literally be stupefied. The suggestion is that the efforts of the wise are never blocked or in need of changing. We need to compare this suggestion to the irony of poem 24 ("What a great help! What can I say? / Your kindness is widely renowned. / Behaving ever like this, my friend, / May you enjoy a hundred autumns."). In poem 24, the literal sentence meaning is blocked by the context and is inverted, while here only the meaning of a word is blocked and changed. Of course, this change does alter the sentence meaning, but not to the same degree as in poem 24. If you rewrote the two poems without metaphor, the first poem would lose its irony, which is essential to its force. The poem here would only lose a decorative detail; the meaning of the whole would remain the same.

---

[311] The *Saṅketaḥ* commentary has the following Sanskrit translation:
khalavyavahārā dṛśyante dāruṇā yady api tathāpi dhīraṇām |
hṛdayavayasya bahumatā na khalu vyavasāyā vimuhyanti ||

There is also a play on the word for villain, which derives from a word for "threshing floor" and the word for vile, which derives from a word for "wood." Thus one can to read the first line, "Just as the material of the threshing floor is seen to be wood." This reinforces image of steadfast efforts of the honest.

lāvaṇyaṃ tad asau kāntis tad rūpaṃ sa vacaḥkramaḥ |
tadā sudhāspadam abhūd adhunā tu jvaro mahān ||

atra tadādipadair anubhavaikagocarā arthāḥ prakāśyante || *(969)*

(4.5.2. Secondary Suggestion of *Rasa*.)

That zest, that flare, that beauty, that voice,
All — like ambrosia at the time —
Are now some deadly disease. (75)

Words such as that suggests that the objects belong to the realm of experience.

Comments

The primary suggestion here is of the erotic *rasa*, more specifically the type of love-in-separation in which the lover longs for his beloved. Sometimes these poem lack visual detail, but here the repetition of word "that" makes the lover's words concrete, adding an extra charm to the poem. The phrasing suggests that he has sharp memories of his beloved's specific qualities. This lend force to the reader's conviction that the love is both real and intense. Of a similar poem Abhinava says, "the word "those" serves as a

special cause of the [erotic] *rasa* by suggesting various memory-pictures of the qualities…which are indescribable and which can only be felt by the speaker."[312]

yathā vā

> *mugdhe mugdhatayaiva netum akhilaḥ kālaḥ kim ārabhyate*
> *mānaṃ dhatsva dhṛtiṃ badhāna ṛjutāṃ dūre kuru preyasi* |
> *sakhyaivaṃ pratibodhitā prativacastām āha bhītānanā*
> *nīcaiḥ śaṃsa hṛdi sthito hi nanu me praṇeśvaraḥ śroṣyati* ||

atra bhītānaneti | *etena hi nīcaiḥśaṃsanavidhānasya yuktatā gamyate* | *bhāvādīnāṃ padaprakaśyatve 'dhikaṃ na vaicitryam iti na tad udahriyate* || *(972)*

Another example (of the third type of suggestion):

> "O sweet one! Why do you cling so to mere sweetness?
> Be proud! Be courageous! Cast off your coyness with your lover!"
> To her friend's prodding she replied, fear-faced,
> "Whisper! My best-beloved may hear you from within my heart!" (76)[313]

Here fear-faced suggests the appropriateness of the request to whisper.

In the suggestion by a word of the emotions, the pseudo-emotions, etc., no beauty is gained. Thus no examples of this are given.

Comments

[312] Ingalls, et al. (1990:393).
[313] *Amaruśataka* 70.

The primary suggestion in this poem is again of the erotic *rasa*. The suggestion is ornamented by the suggestive phrase, "fear-faced." It suggests that the young woman is so deeply in love that she feels her lover abides in her heart and thus might overhear the friend's council. This detail adds credibility to the woman's love and thus charm to the poem.

Mammaṭa gives no justification of the claim that no beauty is gained by additional suggestion of the emotions, etc., by a word. Although he is probably following Ānandavardhana or Abhinava, I have been unable to locate a likely passage. They discuss this issue in detail at 3.4a, where they address only suggestion of *rasa* by a single word. Perhaps Mammaṭa is making explicit a point the earlier writers made by omission.

In any case, the claim makes sense in Ānadavardhana's system, where all genuine suggestion is suggestion of *rasa*. If one believes this, one could argue that secondary suggestions of other elements will not contribute to the dominant suggestion. However, if one admits that the dominant suggestion can suggest emotions other than those that can become *rasas*, the current claim is difficult to justify.

None of Mammaṭa's commentators included in Mohan considered this claim worthy of serious attention. They are content to repeat that these other suggestions based on a word are possible in poetry, but unlike *rasa* suggestions, they add no charm.

This sentence could be used as evidence against the claim that Mammaṭa no longer thought of *rasa* as the sole essence of suggestion. If Mammaṭa's notion of suggestion were indeed broader than that of earlier critics, we would expect him to

continue. For example, a poem in which a single word suggestion of piety adds charm to its devotional mood would be appropriate.

rudhira visaraprasādhitakaravālakarālarucirabhujaparighiḥ |
iṭiti bhrukuṭiviṭaṅkitalalāṭapaddo vibhāsi nṛpa bhīma ||

atra bhīṣaṇīyasya bhīmasena upamānaṃ || *(977)*

(4.5.3. Secondary Suggestion Based on the Power of the Word.)

How you shine, my dread king!
Your bent brows furrow your broad forehead,
Your frightful iron arms beautifully
Wielding the reddened, blood-spilling sword! (77)

In this example, the dreadfulness (of the king) is compared to that of Bhīmasena.

Comments

Mammaṭa moves on the fourth type of suggestion (of the eighteen given at the beginning of the chapter). This type uses a homonymic word (or words) to suggest a poetic ornament. In the description of the king, the word "*bhīma*" (dread) reminds the reader of Bhīmasena and thus suggests the poetic ornament of simile, "You are mighty like Bhīmasena, the legendary warrior of the *Mahābhārata*." The suggestion of this simile adds charm to the main suggestion of the heroic *rasa*.

bhuktimuktikṛd ekāntasamādeśanatatparaḥ |

kasya nānandanisyandaṃ vidadhāti sadāgamaḥ ||

kācit saṃketadāyinam evaṃ mukhyayā vṛttyā śaṃsati || *(980)*

Primary Meaning	Common Meaning	Secondary Meaning	
	Who is not flooded with delight		
By the good scripture!		By a lover's visit!	
	Always intent on		
Moral advice		Enjoyment	
And leading to final salvation		And release from frustration	
In a heavenly place.		In a secluded place.	(78)

In this poem the woman approves of the proposed rendezvous by a homonymic expression.

Comments

Mammaṭa illustrates the fifth type of suggestion, in which homonymic words are used to suggest a fact. Here a woman uses the extended pun to secretly communicate the fact that she agrees to the lover's proposed tryst. The main suggestion on the first reading is devotional enthusiasm, on the second it is the erotic *rasa*.

Next are the twelve suggestions based on meaning, beginning with a self-existent fact that suggests another fact.

sāyaṃ snānam upāsitaṃ malayajenāṅgaṃ samālepitaṃ
yāto 'stācalamaulim ambaramaṇir visrabdham atrāgatiḥ |
āścaryaṃ tava saukumāryam abhitaḥ klāntāsi yenādhunā
netradvandvamamīlanavyatikaraṃ śaknoti tenāsitum ||

atra vastunā kṛtapuruṣaparicayā klāntāsīti vastu adhunāpadadyotyaṃ vyajyate | *(984)*

(4.5.4. Secondary Suggestion Based on the Power of the Meaning.)

A hot bath and a sandal-oil massage,
Then you came here languidly,
While the sky-jewel set over the Western Ghats.
Yet still you are completely exhausted.
How amazingly delicate you must be!
Your eyes will not stay open for long. (79)

Here the fact that his fatigue is due to his having gone to another woman is suggested by the facts (described in the poem) and made manifest by the word still.

Comments

The woman in the poem mentions various reasons why the man should not be tired: the bath, the massage, the slow travel, and the coolness of the evening. The woman highlights the incongruity between the man's story and his fatigue by using the word "still." It shows that the woman suspects the man's other activities and pushes the reader to look deeper. The fact that he is still tired after such a calm day suggests that he must have done more than he admits, i.e., gone to see another woman, taken a bath and put oil to hide her smell, and then traveled quickly to make up time.

Next Mammaṭa gives a pair of verses that form an example of a self-existent fact suggesting an ornament.

tadaprāptimahāduḥkhavilīnāśeṣapātakā ।
taccintāvipulāhlādakṣīṇapuṇyacayā tathā ॥
cintayantī jagatsūtiṃ parabrasvarūpiṇam ।
nirucchvāsatayā muktiṃ gatānyā gopakanyakā ॥

atra janmasahasrair upabhoktavyāni dukṛtasukṛtaphalāni viyogaduḥkhacintanāhlādābhyām anubhūtānīty uktam । *evaṃ cāśeṣacayapadadyotye atiśayoktī* ॥ *(988)*

All her sin dissolves through the immense pain of not having him.
All her merit evaporates into ecstatic dreams of him.
Thus another milkmaid is released into salvation
By contemplating the source of the world — Kṛṣṇa! (80 & 81)[314]

Here the fruit of good and bad actions, which should take thousands of lives to experience, is used up in the pain of separation and the joy of contemplation. This hyperbole is made apparent by the word all (*aśeṣacayapada*).

Comments

The scene of the poem comes from one of the favorite parts of the Kṛṣṇa myth. While the *avatāra* is young, he dallies with milkmaids, who fall deeply in love with him. The poet

[314] From the *Viṣṇupurāṇa*, according to Dwivedi.

uses the love to suggest the ornament of hyperbole. The use of the word "all" adds force to the ornament.

The poem is based on the belief that one will suffer for one's bad deeds and be rewarded for the good ones, either in this life or a future one. During the process of atonement one commits new deeds that cause the karmic process to continue. Escape is only possible if one can atone for all one's past without accumulating new karma. Here the girl suffers so intensely and experiences so much joy that she burns all her karma instantly, thus being released from the world. The similarity between erotic love and love of a god is a theme familiar to Western poetry as well (e.g., St. John of the Cross and St. Theresa). If the two types of love were not so closely associated in the Indian tradition, the poem would lose much of its force.

Next a poem in which a self-existent ornament suggests a fact.

kśaṇadāsāv akṣanadā vanam avanaṃ vyasanam asyasanam |
bata vīra tava dviṣatāṃ parāṅmukhe tvayi parāṅmukhaṃ sarvaṃ ||

atra śabdaśaktimūlavirodhāṅgenārthāntaranyāsena vidhir api tvām anuvartate iti sarvapadadyotyaṃ vastu || *(993)*

The pleasure-givers (i.e., the nights) give them no pleasure,
The shelterless (i.e., the forest) is their shelter,
Their occupation is doing nothing (or watching the sheep).
O king! When you are hostile to your adversaries,
Everything is adverse to them. (82)

Here the fact, "Destiny itself follows your lead, (o king!)" is suggested by the ornament apodixis and also by the subservient ornament "contradiction" taken with respect to the primary sense of the words. The suggestion is made apparent by the word **everything**.

Comments

The poem primarily suggests that destiny itself follows the king's will by means of apodixis: a figure in which the concluding line(s) of a poem or stanza explains the proceeding ones. Here the new facts introduced in the concluding two lines of the translation explain and justify the events of the first three lines. The ornament is augmented by another ornament, namely the ornament "contradiction." A casual inspection of the first line of the original will reveal the three "contradictions" that are the basis for the poetic ornament ("*a-*" is a privative prefix). One member of each pair, however, has a second meaning, which I have given in brackets. Thus the contradictions are only apparent, which is key for this ornament. Compare, "The cat wolfed down the jumbo shrimp on the mini grand piano." If the contradiction were not only apparent there would be a blocking of the literal meaning that might trigger metaphor. The "contradictions" add to the apodixis by suggesting that the king's power is so great that it brings about the impossible.

The use of the word "everything" (itself a hyperbole) suggests that all the world and destiny itself side with the king. The apodixis does not depend on this word because

the final line could be written with a different word without losing the ornament. However, it does bring the ornament to light.

Next comes an example of a self-existent ornament suggesting another ornament.

tuha vallahassa gosammi āsi aharo milāṇakamaladala |
ia ṇavavahuā souṇa kuṇai vaaṇaṃ mahisaṃmuham ||[315]

atra rūpakeṇa tvayāsya muhur muhuḥ paricumbanaṃ tathā kṛtam yena mlānatvam iti milāṇādipadadyotyaṃ kāvyaliṅgam | *eṣu svataḥsaṃbhavī vyañjakaḥ* || *(997)*

"This morning your lover's lips are
faded lotus petals."
At this, the new bride let fall her face, blushing. (83)

Here the metaphor, based on the words, **faded lotus petals**, suggests a "poetic cause," namely, "Your lovers lips are faded because you kissed them continually."

In these (four previous examples) the suggestor is self-existent.

Comments

This charming example of love-in-enjoyment uses a metaphor in which the two terms (lips and lotus petals) are objects one finds in the world, thus for Mammaṭa, this is a "self-existent" metaphor. The metaphor leaves the reader wondering in what why the

[315] The *Darpaṇaḥ* commentary has the following Sanskrit translation:
tava vallabhasya prabhāte āsīdadharo mlānakamaladalam |
iti navavadhūḥ śrutvā karoti vadanaṃ mahīsaṃmukham ||

lover's lips are like faded lotus petals. The woman's bashfulness in the final line suggests that the cause is the young woman's intense kissing.

Gerow explains that "poetic cause" is an ornament only found in Mammaṭa and opines that Mammaṭa invented it to remedy problems with the more common ornament "cause" (*hetu*).[316] If this is the case, Mammaṭa does so, in my opinion, to indicate that the causal relation in a poem should hold some special interest. Here it suggests the passion of the lovers.

The metaphor is dependant only on the object of comparison. The poem could be rewritten: "'This morning your lover's lips are worn out.' At this, the new bride let fall her face, blushing." This would not effect the second ornament and shows that the first ornament in based on a single compound word (faded-lotus-petals), not on the sentence as a whole.

In the four previous examples the suggestor was self-existent fact, i.e., a description of an actual or possible state of affairs. Now Mammaṭa turns to poems in which the suggestor is invented by the poet, starting with an invented fact that suggests a further fact. The "facts" invented by the poet do not exist in the world, but are described as if they did.

> *rāirsu caṃdadhavalāsu laliamapphāliuṇa jo cāvam* |
> *ekacchattaṃ via kuṇai bhuaṇarajjaṃ vijaṃbhaṃto* ||[317]

[316] Gerow (1971:174-175). But, contra Gerow, Mammaṭa does use the common ornament "*hetu*" (e.g., in poems 86 and 90 below).
[317] The *Saṅkeraḥ* commentary has the following Sanskrit translation:

atra vastunā yeṣāṃ kāminām asau rājā smaras tebhyo na kiścid api tadādeśaparāṅmukha iti jāgradbhir upabhogaparair eva tair niśātivāhyate iti bhuaṇarajjapadadyotyaṃ vastu prakāsyate || *(1001)*

Love, wantonly strumming his bow, so spreads his kingdom
That the moonlit nights become his royal parasol. (84)

Here the fact that, "Those ruled by love stay awake enjoying sensual pleasure at night, because none contradict his command (to do so)," is suggested by the fact (invented by the poet) expressed in the word **kingdom**.

Comments

In this erotic poem, the poet imagines a fictitious kingdom ruled by the god of love. By means of the night sky-parasol metaphor, he implies that Love's sovereignty extends over the whole earth at night. The description of Love's dominion suggests that those under the influence of love must obey devote themselves to love-making all night long.

niśitaśaradhiyārpayaty anaṅgo dṛśi sudṛśaḥ svabalaṃ vayasyarāle |
diśi nipatati yatra sā ca tatra vyatikarametyasamundmiṣanty avasthāḥ ||

---

rātriṣu candradhavalāsu lalitamāsphālya yaścāpam |
ekacchatram iva karoti bhuvanarājyaṃ vijṛmbhamāṇaḥ ||

atra vastunā yugapadavasthāḥ parasparaviruddhā api prabhavantīti vyatikarapadadyotyo virodhaḥ || *(1006)*

> The glances of a nubile girl are Love's whimsical arrows.
> Mixed feelings spring up wherever her sexy eyes take aim. (85)

Here the fact suggests, by means of the word **mixed**, the ornament "apparent contradiction," i.e., that even contradictory emotions appear simultaneously (in those circumstances).

Comments

Mammaṭa chooses another erotic poem. The poet invents the "fact" that the woman's glances are Love's arrows. Note that Mammaṭa does not consider this to be a metaphor: the poet imagines that the god of love really shoots through such eyes. The poet claims that the arrows arouse mixed feelings in the men they strike. This suggests a poetic ornament, namely, "apparent contradiction." The expression "mixed feelings," usually means "opposed feelings" (i.e., "I had mixed feeling about his coming"). But the contradiction is only apparent, because what arises from love's arrows is a mixture of various feelings linked both to the erotic and to a sense of *dharma* (ethical duty) as well.

> *vārijjaṃto vi puṇo saṃdāvakadatthieṇa hiaeṇa* |
> *thaṇaharavaassaeṇa visuddhajāir ṇa calai se hāro* ||[318]

[318] The *Saṅketaḥ* commentary has the following Sanskrit translation:
> vāryamāṇo 'pi punaḥ santāpakadarthitena hṛdayena |

atra viśuddhajātitvalakṣaṇahetvalaṃkāreṇa hāro 'navarataṃ kampamāna evāste iti ṇa calaipadadyotyaṃ vastu || *(1009)*

Even though repudiated by her enflamed heart,
The noble necklace will not abandon
Its closest friends — her swelling breasts. (86)

By the use of the words **will not abandon** in this poem, the ornament "cause" — which is the nobility (of the necklace) — suggests the fact that the necklace holds fast, even though trembling (from her heart's suffering).

Comments

The basic idea is that the necklace blocks a potential embrace, for it would cause pain if crushed against the chest. The poet uses the ornament "cause" to convey the fanciful idea that the nobility of the necklace causes it to guard the young girl's chastity. In so doing, the necklace foils the heart, which suffers a burning longing for the embrace. The necklace trembles as it reveals the tension.[319]

so muddhasāmalaṃgo ammillo kalialaliaṇiadeho |

---

stanabharavayasyena viśuddhajātirna calatyasyā hāraḥ ||

[319] I have followed the *Ādarśaḥ* commentary here. It says, "*hārakampakatāpena,*" thus resolving the ambiguity as to what is trembling and why.

Alternately, the necklace serves the suffering heart by warding off an unwanted embrace (this is what Jha seems to think (1925:99)). And even though constantly scintillating, it does not move. I can see no way to incorporate *vāryamāṇo* into this reading. Jha translates "Even though *forbidden* by the heart…" This is a possible translation, but nonsense in the context.

tīe khaṃdhāhi balaṃ gahia saro suraasaṃgare jaai ||[320]

atra rupakeṇa muhurmuhurākarṣaṇenā tathā keśapāśaḥ skandhayoṛ prāpto yathā rativiratāv apy anivṛttābhilāṣaḥ kāmuko 'bhūd iti khaṃdhapadyotyā vibhāvanā ||

eṣu kavipraudhoktimātraniśpannaśarīraḥ || *(1013)*

Her black braid swirls seductively,
    becoming the home of Love.
Seconded by her shoulders,
    Fearless it faces passion's duel. (87)[321]

In this poem, the word **reinforced** is metaphorically employed to suggest the ornament "unusual cause," namely, that the lover has repeatedly pulled her braid such that it has reached her shoulder and that (her shoulders are so sexy that) the lover is not sated, even after sex.

In the four preceding examples the suggestion is based on the imagination of the poet.

Comments

The erotic *rasa*, which is primary, is enhanced with the metaphoric use of "reinforced," whereby a military theme is introduced into the poem. The woman's shoulders provide

---

[320] The *Saṅketaḥ* commentary has the following Sanskrit translation:
    sa mugdhaśyāmalāṅgo dhammillaḥ kalitalalitanijadehaḥ |
    tasyāḥ skandenā balaṃ labdhvā smaraḥ suratasaṃgare jayati ||

[321] The Sanskrit uses the word for shoulder, which also denotes a division of an army, to ground a erotic/military metaphor. "Seconded" is the best I could find in English, altering the metaphor to one of dueling. Some metaphor must be present, of course, for the example to work.

extra sexual artillery to her already powerful hair, enticing the man to desire more lovemaking. The ornament of "unusual cause" occurs when an effect is present without its normal cause. The poem's context is that the couple has been making love and furthermore that normally the man should be sated. The standard conditions for sexual desire are thus absent, and yet desire is present. Thus the reader searches for the unusual cause, i.e., the extraordinary attractiveness of the woman's hair and shoulders.

Mammaṭa turns now to poems in which words spoken by characters suggest further information (either facts or ornaments).

> *ṇavapuṇṇimāmiaṃkassa suhaa ko ttaṃ si bhaṇasu maha saccam* |
> *kā sohaggasamaggā paosaraaṇi vva tuha ajja* ||[322]

atra vastunā mayīvānyasyām api prathamam anuraktastvaṃ na tata iti ṇavetyādi paosetyādipadadyotyaṃ vastu vyajyate ||

> O happy one!
> Tell me truly, are you the full moon, newly risen?
> And who, like the early evening sky, do you now love? (88)

Here the fact (that the lover has a new beloved) suggests, "You will love her only for a while, like you did me." This is done by the use of words like **newly** and **early**.

Comments

[322] The *Saṅketaḥ* commentary has the following Sanskrit translation:
> navapūrṇimā śaśāṅkasya subhagaḥ kas tvam asi bhaṇa mama satyam |
> kā saubhāgyasamagrā pradoṣarajanīva tavādya ||

Mammaṭa separates poems in which the poet speaks in the first person from those in which he speaks through his characters. In the following four poems the poet speaks in the third person. Also, the “facts” discussed here are descriptions of possible states of affairs, not necessarily actual states of affairs. They contrast with ornaments, not with fictions. Fictitious descriptions of states of affairs are considered facts, being, so to say, of the same genus as facts.

Mammaṭa begins with a poem in which a woman chides a man who was her lover. Her fictional description suggests his fickle nature. Jha explains as follows; “During the early part of the evening the full moon appears 'red'; this redness is regarded figuratively as representing the moon's love toward the evening; it is fleeting, disappearing with the advent of night; and the indignant wife insinuates that her husband's love for this new found lady will be as fleeting.”[323] It is hard to know whether “happy one” is used ironically or not.

> *sahi ṇavaṇihuvaṇasamarammi aṃkavālīsahīe ṇibiḍie* |
> *hāro ṇivārio via uccheranto tado kahaṃ ramiam* ||[324]

atra vastunā hāraccedānantaram anyadeva ratam avaśyam abhūt tat kathaya kīdṛg iti vyatirekaḥ kahaṃpadagamyaḥ || *(1022)*

---

[323] Jha (1925:100).

[324] The *Darpaṇaḥ* commentary has the following Sanskrit translation:

> sakhi navanidhuvanasamare aṃkapālisakhyā nibiḍayā |
> hāro nivārita evocchriyamāṇastataḥ kathaṃ ramitam ||

(My copy of the *Saṅketaḥ* drops the second word of the first line. Given the sense and the meter, this must be a copying error.) The *Sāhityacūḍāmaṇiḥ* changes *ucchriyamaṇaḥ* to *udvartamaṇaḥ,* which may better capture the sense.

Early in love's struggle
Your necklace snapped
Under your man's tight embrace!
What happened next? (89)

In this poem the fact (described by the female friend suggests the poetic ornament) "dissimilitude." From the term **what** one understands, "after the snapping of the necklace, the love-play must surely have been different. What was it like?"

Comments

Here the fiction described by the woman suggests the poetic ornament "dissimilitude." The woman suggests an inverted simile: the passion of the couple after the incident described was unlike the passion before it occurred. The point of this ornament is to convey the comparative excellence of the later passion.

pravisaṃtī gharavāraṃ vivaliaaṇā viloiuṇa paham |
khaṃdhe ghettūṇa ghaṃi hā hā ṇaṭhṭhotti ruasi sahi kiṃ ti ||[325]

atra hetvalaṃkāreṇa saṃketaniketanaṃ gacchantaṃ dṛṣṭvā yadi tatra gantum icchasi tadā aparaṃ ghaṭaṃ gṛhitvā gaccheti vastu kimitipadadyotyam || *(1026)*

As you came in the door,
Your eyes turned,

[325] The *Sampradāyaprakāśinī* commentary has the following Sanskrit translation:
praviśāntī gṛhadvāraṃ vivalitanayanā vilokya panthānam |
skandhād gṛhītvā kuṭaṃ hāhā naṣṭa iti rodiṣi sakhi kim iti ||

Glancing back at the path.
Having shouldered a water pot,
You wail, “Damn, it’s broken!”
Why do you weep, my friend? (90)

By the use of the words **why do you weep** in this poem the ornament “cause” suggests the fact, “Knowing that he has gone to the rendezvous, if you want to go there, grab another pot and go!”

Comments

When the girl's friend asks why she weeps, the implication is both that she seems to do so because her water pot is broken and that there has to be a second reason. A condition (noticing the broken pot) and its effect (weeping) described together constitute the ornament known as “cause.” Often there is something striking or irregular about such a cause.[326] The friend uses the ornament to suggest that the woman is really weeping because she wants to go to her rendezvous at the riverside. She has just seen her lover on his way and the water pot that was supposed to justify her trip is broken. However, she can still go by taking another pot. This example shows, to my mind, that the “fact” suggested can be rather complex.

yathā vā

vihataṃkhalaṃ tumaṃ sahi daṭṭūṇa kuḍeṇa taralataradiṭṭhim |
vārapphaṃ samiseṇa ā appā guruotti pāḍia vihiṇo ||[327]

[326] Gerow (1971:327).
[327] The *Saṅketaḥ* commentary has the following Sanskrit translation:

atra nadīkūle latāgahane kṛtasaṃketam aprāptaṃ gṛhapraveśāvasare paścād āgataṃ dṛṣṭvā punar nadīgamanāya dvāropaghātavyājena buddhipūrvaṃ vyākulatayā tvayā ghaṭaḥ sphoṭita iti mayā cintitam tatkim iti nāśvasiṣi tatsamīhitasiddhaye vraja aham te śvaśrūnikaṭe sarvam samarthayiṣye iti dvārasparśanavyājenety apahnutyā vastu || *(1030)*

Or this example (of an ornament suggesting a fact):

Seeing your exasperation,
My trembling-eyed friend,
Your water pot, thinking itself too heavy,
Pushed off from the door to fall, smashing. (91)

Here the fact is: "You made a rendezvous in the canes by the riverbank (and so went to get water). Just when you were coming back into the house, you saw him finally coming. Wanting to return to the river, you have broken the water pot by pretending to hit it against the door. All this I understand. Why are you not confident? Go fulfill your desires! I will explain everything to your mother-in-law." (All of) this is suggested by the ornament "denial" in the phrase, **Pushed off from the door.**

---

viśṛṅkhalāṃ tvā sakhi dṛṣṭvā kuṭena taralataradṛṣṭim |
dvāraparśamiṣeṇa cātmā guruka iti pātayitvā bhinnaḥ ||

The *Sampradāyaprakāśinī* commentary uses *vihvalāṃ kṣaṇaṃ* in place of *viśṛṅkhalāṃ*, which tones down the poem considerably. It also replaces *pātayitvā bhinnaḥ* with *pātitavibhinnaḥ*, which only seems to obscure the image.

Comments

This poem is a second example of a fact being suggested by an ornament. It gains charm in Sanskrit by the ambiguity of the first line. Is the girl tired from carrying the pot and thus exasperated by her clumsiness, or is she exasperated because she wants to go back to the river? The key word (if we can trust the commentators) is "unchained," which can mean "undone" or "uninhibited." The first meaning is more natural, but the second is needed to explain the feeling of the water pot. Thus this word sets in the reader's mind the idea that the girl is in a state of heightened passion. Unfortunately, I fear the reverse is true for "exasperate:" one thinks first of the meaning "taxed to the limit" and only when pushed by context of the meaning "to increase the intensity (of a passion or pain)."

The ornament "denial" is defined according to Gerow as "a figure in which the object of comparison is affirmed in place of the subject of comparison."[328] He quotes the following verse from Bhāmaha as an example: "It is not a swarm of bees, humming incessantly of honey; it is the sound of the Love-hunter's bow being drawn." Here the sound of the bees is likened to that of Love's bow, but the poet adds the trope of denying the subject (the bees) and affirming the object (the bow).

The poem offers a rather tenuous example of this ornament, for there is no real comparison between the young wife (subject) and the pot (object). Rather the action of dropping the pot through knocking it against the door is likened to the pot knocking itself against the door in order to smash. Of course, the pot, being inanimate cannot knock itself against the door. Thus by assigning the action to the pot rather than to the woman, the

[328] Gerow (1971:110).

speaker suggests that she knows the woman's secret motive for breaking the pot. Furthermore, she suggests that she will play along.

johaṇāi mahurasen̩a a viiṇṇatāruṇṇautsuamaṇā sā |
buhua vi ṇavoḍhavvia parahuā ahaha harai tuha hiaam ||[329]

atra kāvyaliṅgena vṛddhāṃ paravadhūṃ tvam asmānujjhitvābhilaṣasīti tvadīyam ācaritaṃ vaktuṃ na śakyam ity ākṣepaḥ paravahūpadaprakāśyaḥ ||

eṣu kavinibaddhavaktṛprauḍhoktimātraniṣpannasarīraḥ | *vākyaprakāśye tu pūrvam udāhṛtam śabdārthobhayaśaktyudbhavas tu padaprakāśyo na bhavatīti pañcatriṃśadbhedāḥ* || *(1034)*

The moonbeams and wine
Lend to her a newlywed's youthful lust
Even though she is so very old.
Alas! Another's wife has won your heart. (92)

The ornament "poetic reason" suggests the ornament "hinting" by the words **another's wife**. The hint is, "You desire another's old wife and abandon us (young women); your action is unexplainable."

In these last five examples, the suggestion is established by an expression of a poetic character. Suggestion arising from a sentence has already been illustrated, and that

[329] The *Saṅketaḥ* commentary has the following Sanskrit translation:
jyotsnayā madhurasenāvatīrṇa tāruṇyotsukamanāḥ sā |
vṛddha 'pi navoḍheva paravadhūr ahaha harati tava hṛdayam ||

arising from the power of both the word and the meaning is never found in the word (alone). Thus there are thirty-five types.

Comments

The ornament "poetic reason" implies that the man has fallen for the woman only because she is another man's wife, and thus taboo.[330] This is done by denying her the qualities that usually captivate men: youth and beauty. The hint is that such a reason is not the proper one, and therefore incomprehensible to the young beauties.

Mammaṭa concludes the presentation of suggestion by a single word (or Sanskrit compound). Of the original eighteen types of suggestion by phrases or sentences, only seventeen can be brought about by a single word. Together they make the thirty-five types Mammaṭa mentions.

prabandhe 'py arthasaktibhūḥ* || *(1039)

yathā gṛdhragomāyusaṃvādādau |

> *alaṃ sthitvā śmaśāne 'smin gṛdhragomāyusaṃkule* |
> *kaṅkālabahale ghore sarvaprāṇibhayaṃkare* ||
> *na ceha jīvitaḥ kaścit kāladharmam upagataḥ* |
> *priyo vā yadi vā dveṣyaḥ prāṇināṃ gatir īdṛśī* ||

iti divā prabhavato gṛdhrasya puruṣavisarjanaparam idaṃ vacanam |

> *ādityo 'yaṃ sthito mūḍhāḥ snehaṃ kuruta sāmpratam* |
> *bahuvighno muhūrto 'yaṃ jīved api kadācana* ||

[330] The other possible interpretation, that the man seeks to hurt his enemy by seducing his wife, is made improbable by two details: a seducer's heart would not be "won" and the other woman might well understand such plotting.

amuṃ kanakavarṇābhaṃ bālam aprāptayauvanam |
gṛdhravākyāt kathaṃ mūḍhāsty ajadhvam aviśaṅkitāḥ ||

iti niśi vijṛmbhamāṇasya gomāyor janavyāvartananiṣṭham ca vacanam iti prabandha eva prathate | anye tv ekādaśa bhedā granthavistarabhayān nodāhṛtāḥ svayaṃ tu lakṣaṇato 'nusartavyāḥ | apiśabdāt padavākyayoḥ || (1039)

(4.6. Suggestion Based on Context.)

42d. Suggestion based on meaning exists in context also.

For example, in the following dialogue of a vulture and a jackal:

Skeletons crowd these burial grounds,
Vultures and jackals lurk everywhere.
Everyone is scared here — you shouldn't stay!
Neither the loved nor the hated
Come back from death.
Such is the fate of mortals. (93&94)[331]

These words aim to make people leave. They are spoken by a vulture, who is diurnal.

Fools! The sun holds fast.
Now is the time for love!
The present moment is inauspicious,
But later the dead might be revived.
How could you rashly leave this boy,
    This golden skinned bud of youth,
On the words of a mere vulture? (95&96)[332]

These words aim to make the people stay. They are spoken by a jackal, who is nocturnal.

The suggestions appear only in the context.

[331] *Mahābhārata, Śāntiparvan*, according to Dwivedi, but I have not found this dialogue.
[332] *Mahābhārata, Śāntiparvan*. Ditto previous note.

The eleven further kinds (of suggestion by context) are not illustrated for fear prolixity. However, they can easily be produced from the definition itself.

The word **also** means, "(in addition to being found) in the sentence and the word."

Comments

There are only twelve types, and not eighteen, because only the twelve types of suggestion whose sequence is noticed and which arise from meaning can arise from the meaning of the context. It might prove helpful to keep the list of the eighteen types ready for the following discussion. It is found at the very beginning of this chapter.

The two types of suggestion based on metaphor (types 1 & 2) are excluded by the very nature of metaphoric indication. Context is considered part of the literal meaning of a text. Metaphoric indication comes into play when the literal meaning is blocked. When the context is blocked, it cannot also be suggestive. The fact that the contextual information is often used to arrive at the metaphoric meaning (as in irony) does not affect this point. These two types of suggestion treat the suggestiveness of the metaphoric meaning. That such poems might be otherwise suggestive and thus capable of serving as examples of other types of suggestion is not relevant. The metaphoric meaning, strictly speaking, is not contextual.

We saw that suggestions of the third type, suggestions whose sequences are not noticed, are akin to moods that permeate a poem. Mammaṭa probably excludes this type because Ānandavardhana had argued that all contextual understanding has a noticed

sequence.[333] For example, in the poems, one first understands the words of the vulture and jackal, and then, with the help of the context, the suggestion that the people should leave or stay. This marked sequence is absent in suggestions of *rasa*, etc.

Types four, five, and eighteen depend of punning words, so they are excluded as well. Once again, the fact that contextual information might be necessary if one is to understand the puns does not vitiate Mammaṭa's point. It is the punning word itself that is suggestive, not the various factors that are necessary to understanding it.

This leaves types six to seventeen, which were illustrated above both for sentence meaning and word meaning. Both the vulture and the jackal describe "facts" (situations) that suggest "facts" (courses of action). Thus these are examples of the fourteenth type on the list at the beginning of the chapter. Mammaṭa claims that given the definition (and the poems already given), it would be easy for an enthusiastic reader to find examples of the other eleven types.

Suggestion is not easily mapped onto the syntactic/semantic/pragmatic division of Western linguistics. As Mammaṭa's mention of context shows, it seems to include parts of both semantics and pragmatics. Both Bharata and Ānandavardhana go into great detail about the suggestiveness of larger semantic units. Indeed, in its earliest recorded aesthetic uses, *rasa* refers to the mood of an entire play. Bharata often explains how details can contribute to the overall *rasa*. Ānandavardhana also addresses these issues.[334] However, reflecting his interest in short poetry, Ānandavardhana treats primarily of suggestive

[333] Ānandavardhana, *Dhvanyāloka* 3.33b, translated in Ingalls, et al. (1990:542).
[334] *Dhvanyāloka* 3.10-14.

sentences or verses. However, he devotes several long sections to the suggestive possibilities of texture (*saṅghaṭanā*) and style or structure (*racanā*).[335] Maybe because shorter verse had gained prominence in poetics, Mammaṭa omits these topics and turns instead to even smaller semantic units: parts of words. In chapter eight, he continues the discussion of the suggestiveness of certain sound combinations (alliteration, etc.). Finally, in chapter nine he focuses on the relative merit of different regional dialects and their suggestive power.

padaikadeśaracanāvarṇeṣv api rasādayaḥ* || *(1046)

tatra prakṛtyā yathā

> *raikelihiaṇiasaṇakarakisalaaruddhaṇaaṇajualassa* |
> *ruddassa taiaṇaaṇaṃ parvvaiparicuṃbiaṃ jaai* ||[336]

atha jayatīti na tu śobhate ityādi | *samāne 'pi hi sthaganavyāpāre lokottareṇaiva vyāpāreṇāsya pidhānam iti tad evotkṛṣṭam* ||

(4.7. Suggestion Based on Word Parts.)

43ab. *Rasa*, etc. are (found) in parts of words, in style, in letters, etc.

Here is an example (of suggestion found) in the (verbal) stem:

> Stripped of her clothes during sex,
> Pārvatī covers Śiva's eyes with her lotus like hands.
> But his third eye, blinded with passionate kisses,

[335] E.g., *Dhvanyāloka* 3.5-8 and 3.33.

[336] The *Saṅketaḥ* commentary has the following Sanskrit translation:

> ratikelihṛtanivasanakarakisalayaruddhanayugalasya |
> rudrasya tṛtīyanayanaṃ pārvatīparicumbitaṃ jayati ||

Triumphs. (97)[337]

Here **triumphs** is used instead of "shines" or some other synonym. Even though (all three eyes) are similarly closed, the method of closing (the third) is extraordinary; thus it outdoes the others.

Comments

"In parts of words" means in the choice of root or stem, in the choice of conjugation or number, and in the choice of prefixes and/or affixes. Ānandavardhana writes, "suggested meaning…shines forth in phonemes, words, etc., as well as in a sentence, in texture, and in a complete work."[338] Mammaṭa's exposition follows the reverse order. As we saw, he ignores the suggestiveness of a complete work and that of the texture and structure of larger passages. Chapter four began with suggestive sentences, continued with suggestive words, and will now finish with suggestive parts of words. Whereas Ānandavardhana treated suggestive phonemes apart from suggestive prefixes and conjugations, Mammaṭa groups them all together in this section.

The erotic poem here uses a particular stem to effect its suggestion. The poet could have chosen many adjectives to describe Śiva's third eye; that "triumphs" is used suggests that the eye is not only victorious in its normal ways, but also luckier than the other two. This in turn suggests the value of Pārvatī's kisses.

[337] *Gāthāsaptaśatī* 5.55.
[338] *Dhvanyāloka* 3.2, translated by Ingalls, et al. (1990:389).

Taxonomically, this is the least obvious of the examples from the section because it seems to turn on whole words ("triumphs" rather than "shines"), not parts of words. However, as Sanskrit verbs conjugate, any synonymous verb stem would have roughly the same ending. In other words, only the first half of the word would change if the verb "triumph" were replaced by "shine."

yathā vā

> *preyān so 'yam apākṛtaḥ saśapathaṃ pādānātaḥ kāntayā*
> *dvitrāṇy eva padāni vāsabhavanād yavan na yāty unmanāḥ* |
> *tāvat pratyuta pāṇisaṃpuṭagalannīvīnibandhaṃ dhṛto*
> *dhāvitv eva kṛtapraṇāmakam aho premṇo vicitrā gatiḥ* ||

atra padānīti na tu dvārāṇīti | *(1055)*

Or this example (of suggestion by the choice of the stem):

> She scorns her lover groveling at her feet,
> But when he goes from her chambers,
> Not even two or three steps,
> She runs, dropping the knots of her loosened skirts,
> And falls worshipfully at his feet.
> Such are the wonderful ways of love! (98)[339]

Here (the suggestion comes from the use of) **steps** and not "doors".

Comments

In this erotic poem, a self-existent fact suggests a fact. The phrase, "not even two or three steps," suggests that the lady, no less than the groveling man, is full of intense passion. If

[339] Dwivedi writes, "Cited in Vāmana's KASV."

she had waited until he had reached the doors, instead of only a few steps, it would show greater patience, and thus less passion.

As in the last example, the poet could have substituted other stems without changing the syntax of the sentence. As several different stems could have similar endings, only part of the word would change. Mammaṭa suggests substituting "doors" (*dvārāni*) for steps (*padāni*). The form of plural accusative ending (*-āni*) is the same in both words, so only part of the word would change.

pathi pathi śukacañcūcārurābhāṅkurāṇāṃ
diśi diśi pavamāno vīrudhāṃ lāsakaś ca |
nari nari kirati drāk sāyakān puṣpadhanvā
puri puri vinivṛttā māninīmānacarcā ||

atra kiratīti kiraṇasy sādhyamānatvaṃ nivṛtteti nivartanasya siddhatvaṃ tiṅā supā ca tatrāpi ktapratyayenātītatvaṃ dyotyate | *(1059)*

O the paths! the paths that shine with tender shoots as brilliant as parrot beaks!
From the east, from the west, the winds make dance the vines to and fro.
Man after man receives swift arrows showering from the flowered bow.
In town after town honorable women have quit speaking of honor renounced.
(99)

In this poem the progressive ending (-ing) in **showering** shows that the shower (of arrows) is in mid-process. Likewise the pluperfect tense in **have quit** shows that the quitting is already finished. (The having finished is also shown another way in Sanskrit).

Comments

I have tried to translate or hint at the line-initial repetitions of the Sanskrit, which might sound more odd in English than they do in Sanskrit. However, some of the charm of the poem derives from this unusual construction, which occurs in other traditions as well. Ezra Pound does a wonderful job translating a Chinese poem of similar construction that he calls, "The Beautiful Toilet." He begins, "Blue, blue is the grass by the river / And the willows overfill the closed garden."[340]

The verb tenses suggest that love-play has begun and will continue. One could substitute "have stopped" or "have let off" for "have quit" without loosing the suggestion. And as in the English, only part of the compound verb would change.

yathā vā

likhann āste bhūmiṃ bahir avanataḥ prāṇadayitaḥ
nirāhārāḥ sakhyaḥ satataruditocchūnanayanāḥ |
parityaktaṃ sarvaṃ hasitapaṭhitaṃ pañjaraśukaiḥ
tavāvasthā ceyaṃ visṛja kaṭhine mānam adhunā ||

atra likhann iti na tu likhatīti tathā āste iti na tu āsīta iti api tu prasādaparthantam āste iti bhūmim iti na tu bhūmāv iti na hi buddhipurvakam aparaṃ kiñcil likhatīti tiṅsubvibhaktīnāṃ vyaṅgyam | *(1064)*

The love of your life sits, scratching the dust with head bowed,
Your friends won't eat, their eyes swollen from endless weeping,
Even the parrots have abandoned their funny calls:

[340] Pound (2003:249).

This is your situation. Cast off you anger, cruel girl! (100)[341]

In this poem the conjugations and declensions are suggestive: **scratching** (the present participle) is used and not "scratches" (to suggest an ongoing activity), **sits** is used and not "is seated" to suggest that he will stay until you show favor. **The dust** is used instead of "in the dust" to suggest that he is not writing something deliberate.

Comments

Mammaṭa shows that three of the words could have been conjugated or declined differently. The poet uses these particular forms to suggest that the lover is penitent and the woman should forgive him and give her love again. The verb forms suggest that the lover has been seated for some time and will go on doing so. The poet has the lover idly scratching the dust itself, not scratching something in the dust. The use of the accusative instead of the locative with the word "dust" effectively removes the intentionality from the scratching.

saṃbandhasya yathā

> *gāmāruhammi gāme vasāmi ṇaaraṭhṭhiiṃ ṇa jāṇāmi* |
> *ṇāariāṇaṃ paiṇo haremi jā homi sā homi* ||[342]

[341] *Amaruśataka* 7.
[342] The *Saṅketaḥ* commentary has the following Sanskrit translation:
> grāmaruhā 'smi grāme vasāmi nagarasthitiṃ na jānāmi |
> nāgarikāṇāṃ patīn harāmi yā bhavāmi sā bhavāmi ||

atra nāgarikāṇām iti ṣaṣṭhyāḥ |

ramaṇīyaḥ kśatriyakumāra āsīt iti kālasya | *eṣā hi bhagnamaheśvarakārmukaṃ dāśarathiṃ pratikupitasya bhārgavasyoktiḥ* | *(1068)*

Now an example of (the suggestiveness of) a relation:

> I was raised in a village,
> I live in a village,
> I don't know the ways of the city.
> I am what I am
> I steal the men of city women. (101)

Here **of city women** is in the genitive case.

In the verse, “The warrior prince was lovely,” the past tense (is suggestive). This was said by the son of Bhṛgu to the son of Daśaratha after the latter had broken Śiva's bow.

Comments

Here the genitive case is used to show possession: the men belong to the city women, either as spouses or lovers. By means of the usage, the poet suggests that despite the common impression that city women are superior, this country girl outdoes them by seducing their men. Contra Jha, I doubt it is primarily the girl's cleverness that is being suggested. I take it that the girl, by acknowledging her inferior cleverness, suggests that such cleverness is not all important in sexual matters.[343]

[343] Jha (925:109).

Paraśurāma, the son of Bhṛgu, uses the past tense to refer to Rāma, the son of Daśaratha, to suggest that he is as good as dead. The story comes from the famous epic, the *Rāmāyaṇa*. Rāma has broken Śiva's bow. Thus enrages Paraśurāma, who swears to kill Rāma in revenge. Ānandavardhana uses an episode from the same poem to explain the suggestiveness of declinations and conjugation in the *Dhvanyāloka*, 3.16.

vacanasya yathā

> *tāṇaṃ guṇaggahaṇāṇaṃ tāṇukkaṃṭhāṇaṃ tassa pemmassa* ।
> *tāṇāṃ bhaṇiaṇaṃ suṃdara erisiaṃ jāamavasāṇam* ॥[344]

atra guṇagrahaṇādīnāṃ bahutvam premṇaś caikatvaṃ dyotyate । *(1074)*

An example of (the suggestiveness) of grammatical number:

O beautiful beloved!
My adorations,
My longings,
My soft words,
And my love
All find their home in you. (102)

In this poem the plural of **adorations**, etc., and the singular of **love** are suggestive.

Comments

In grammar, *vacana* means grammatical number. I believe that the plural suggests that each individual act of admiring, etc., has a beginning and an end, whereas the singular

[344] The *Saṅketaḥ* commentary has the following Sanskrit translation:
teṣāṃ guṇagrahaṇānāṃ tāsāmutkaṇṭhānāṃ tasya premṇaḥ ।
teṣāṃ bhaṇitānāṃ sundara irdṛśaṃ jātamavasānaṃ ॥

suggests the unchanging nature of the love. It could also suggest that the man has but a single beloved. In either case, it is the grammatical number that grounds the suggestion. Examples of the suggestiveness of number are easy to find in English. Compare "He loves his woman." And, "He loves his women."

puruṣavyatyayasya yathā

> *re re cañcalalocanāñcitaruce cetaḥ pramucya sthirapremāṇaṃ*
> *mahimānameṇanayanām ālokya kiṃ nṛtyasi |*
> *kiṃ manye vihariṣyase bata hatāṃ muñcāntarāśām imām eṣā*
> *kaṇṭhataṭe kṛtā khalu śilā saṃsāravārāṃnidhau ||*

atra prahāsaḥ | (1078)

An example of (the suggestiveness) of change in grammatical person:

> O heart, lover of the tremulous eyed maiden!
> Why renounce the glory of abiding devotion
> And dance at the sight of this gazelle-eyed one?
> Are we thinking of wandering for pleasure?
> Fool! Give up this despicable craving,
> This drowning-stone in the ocean of the world! (103)

Here ridicule is suggested.

Comments

According to the *Bālacittānurañcanī* commentary, Pāṇini 1:4:106 states that a shift into the first person when referring to someone else implies ridicule. The Sanskrit has, "do I

think that you will wander for pleasure," where both "I" and "you" refer to the heart, not the speaker. Through suggestion, the poet is mocking his heart's claim to control him.

To attempt this effect in English, I have used the plural "we" to refer to the heart instead of the singular "you." Compare: "Are *we* thinking naughty thoughts?" when said to a child.

pūrvanipātasya yathā

> *yeṣāṃ dorbalam eva dorbalatayā te saṃmatās tair api*
> *prāyaḥ kevalanītirītiśaraṇaiḥ kāryaṃ kim urvīśvaraiḥ* |
> *ye kṣmāśakra punaḥ parākramanayasvīkārakāntakramās*
> *te syur naiva bhavādṛśās trijagati dvitrāḥ pavitrāḥ paraṃ* ||

atra parākramasya prādhānyam avagamyate | *(1082)*

Now an example of (suggestion based on) irregular order (of the words in a compound):

> Those armed only with their arms are weak,
> And what is accomplished by diplomacy alone?
> O Indra incarnate! In the three worlds there are only a few
> Who in both valor and politics like you excels! (104)

Here the superior value of valor is understood.

Comments

The superior value of valor is suggest by the fact that the word for "valor" precedes the word for "diplomacy" in the compound even though it is longer, and would thus normally come second. The poem flatters a king by likening him to Indra, the king of heaven. The "three worlds" are heaven, the intermediate realm, and earth.

vibhaktiviśeṣasya yathā

> *pradhanādhvani dhīradhanurdhvanibhṛti vidhurair ayodhi tava divasam* |
> *divasena tu narapa bhavān ayuddha vidhisiddhasādhuvādapadam* ||

atra divasenety apavargatṛtīyā phalaprāptiṃ dyotayati || *(1085)*

The following shows a special use of case-ending (to effect a suggestion):

> On battlegrounds twanging with bravely born bows,
> Your foes did fight all the day long.
> But by this day, O protector of men,
> You won praise from the gods and the good! (105)

In this poem, the instrumental case ending in the expression **by this day** suggests that the (king's) goal was achieved.[345]

Comments

The instrumental case communicates that the day was used by the king. That the king was able to use the day suggests, without explicitly stating it, that the king won the battle. In the original, the immediate repetition of the "day" at the line end and the line beginning positions (*divasam / divasena tu*) highlights the contrast between the struggling enemies and the victorious king. This type of suggestion is subtler in Sanskrit, where the case ending have less poetic presence than prepositions do in English.

> *bhūyo bhūyaḥ savidhanagarīrathyayā paryaṭantaṃ*

[345] The *Bālavittānurañjanī* quotes Pāṇini 2.3.6 [apavrge tṛtīyām] to underpin this example.

dṛṣṭvā dṛṣṭvā bhavanavalabhītūṅgavātāyanasthā |
sākṣātkāmaṃ navam iva ratir mālatī mādhavaṃ yat
gāḍhotkaṇṭhālulitalulitair aṅgakais tāmyatīti ||

atrānukampāvṛtteḥ karūpataddhitasya | *(1088)*

From the high windows of her palace, Malitī watches Mādhava,
Like the goddess Passion watching the young god Love.
Each time he passes in the street below,
Her slender legs tremble more. (106)[346]

Here the use of the nominal suffix **ka** (added to the word for "legs") signifies pitifulness (with regards to the legs).

Comments

The use of the particular suffix to signify weakness, together with the situation, suggests that Mālitī's passion is so great that it weakens her limbs. Compare the English expression, "become weak at the knees."

The *Bālavittānurañjan*ī quotes Pāṇini 5.3.67 [*anukampāyām*] to explain how the suffix "ka" can have this meaning.

paricchedātītaḥ sakalavacanānām aviṣayaḥ
punarjanmany asminn anubhavapathaṃ yo na gatavān |
vivekapradhvaṃsād upacitamahāmohagahano
vikāraḥ ko 'pyantar jaḍayati ca tāpaṃ ca kurute ||

atra praśābdasyopasargasya | *(1091)*

[346] *Mālatīmādhava* 1.15 (D).

My passion burns and freezes me!
My reason crumbles away,
Deep stupor sets in steadily.

Never in my life have my feelings gone
Beyond the power of words —
And even beyond understanding. (107)[347]

The *pra*- prefix (in "*pradhvaṃsād*" — "away-crumbles") is suggestive.

Comments

The *Saṅketaḥ* commentary explains that the prefix suggests that the suffering described is rooted in the mind.[348] Jha says it suggests "the erotic in separation."[349] These two opinions can be combined: the suggestion is that the cause of the suffering is mental and thus an absent lover. The prefix, which very generally connotes "forward-, forth-," suggests that the lover is away.

kṛtaṃ ca garvābhimukhaṃ manas tvayā kim anyad evaṃ nihatāś ca no dviṣaḥ |
tamāṃsi tiṣṭhanti hi tāvad aṃśumān na yāvad āyāty udayādrimaulitām ||

atra tulyayogitādyotakasya ca iti nipātasya | *(1094)*

You set your mind upon glory
And your enemies were destroyed.
What else was there?
When sunbeams summit the eastern peaks

347 *Mālatīmādhava* 1.30 (D).
348 Mohan (1995:1091).
349 Jha (1925:112).

Darkness is no more. (108)

The particle **and** suggests the ornament "equal joining" (*tulyayogitā*).

Comments

"Equal joining" is an ornament in which two things are equated in order to praise the lesser. Here the king is equated with the sun to praise his might. Just as the sun effortlessly destroys the darkness with its mere presence, the king had but to set his mind on glory and his enemies were destroyed. This ornament suggests the effortlessness of the king's victory and thus his extreme prowess. The final result is the evocation of the heroic *rasa*.

rāmo 'sau bhuvaneṣu vikramagunaiḥ prāptaḥ prasiddhim parām asmad -
bhāgyaviparyayād yadi paraṃ devo na jānāti tam |
bandīvaiṣa yaśāṃsi gāyati marud yasyaikabāṇāhatiśreṇībhūta-
viśālatālavivarodgīrṇaiḥ svaraiḥ saptabhiḥ ||

atrāsāv iti bhuvaneṣv iti sarvanāmapratipadikavacanānāṃ na tvad iti na mad iti api asmad ity asya sarvākṣepiṇaḥ bhāgyaviparyayād ity anyathāsaṃpattimukhena na tv abhāvamukhenābhidhānasya | *(1097)*

The valorous virtues of Rāma, *the* Rāma,
Across many lands resound.
By a twist of our fate, you do not know him,
But his single shaft pierced those seven ancient palms
Fashioning a flute for the wind. Listen, my lord,

Like a minstrel, it plays the seven tones to glorify him! (109)[350]

There are several suggestive elements in this poem: the use of **the Rāma**, the use of **across many lands**, the use of **virtues**, the use **our (fate)**, which implies "all," rather than "your" or "my," and in the expression **twist of fate**, which does not imply a lack of fate, but rather that our fate has gone astray.

Comments

The character in the poem address Rāvaṇa, the demon king. By means of extreme austerities, Rāvaṇa provoked the supreme deity to grant him invulnerability from the gods, demons, and other immortals. Through distain, he failed to ask for protection from men. To curb his increasing arrogance, Nārāyaṇa accepts to be born in human form as prince Rāma. In this form he is destine to fight and kill Rāvaṇa. Rāvaṇa first hears of him after Rāma single-handedly slays a great army of demons.

The poet uses the phrase "the Rāma" to suggest that he is already well known. There is a similar usage in English. Consider the following dialogue: "Bill Clinton was there. Which Bill Clinton? *The* Bill Clinton." That his virtues resound not just in a limit place, but, "across many lands," suggests that Rāma has already achieved great feats of heroism. The use of the plural in "virtues" suggests that Rāma's capacities are numerous. That it is not accidental that Rāvaṇa does not know Rāma is suggested by the expression "twist of fate." That "our fate" is spoken of, not Rāvaṇa's fate or the character's fate,

[350] Found in the *Rāghavānandanāṭaka*, according to Dwivedi.

suggests that Rāvaṇa's whole army will suffer from fate's working. These suggestions work together to evoke the heroic *rasa*.

taruṇimani kalayati kalām anumadanadhanurbhruvoḥ paṭhaty agre |
adhivasati sakalalalanāmaulim iyaṃ cakitahariṇacalanayanā ||

atra imanijavyayībhāvakarmabhūtādhārāṇāṃ svarūpasya taruṇatve iti dhanuṣaḥ samīpe iti maulau vasatīti tvādibhistulye eṣāṃ vācakatve asti kaścit svarūpasya viśeṣo yaś camatkārakārī sa eva vyañjakatvaṃ prāpnoti | *(1102)*

Eyebrows taught by Love's own bow
To mimic the skittish eyes of a doe.
She is beyond comparison
In youth's full flush! (110)

In this poem, suggestion appears from the use of certain grammatical forms: the -*imanic* affix, the use of an *avyayībhava* compound, and the use of the locative as an accusative. The same meaning could be communicated by other forms, but the forms chosen by the poet possess a certain beauty.

Comments

The forms add to the charm of the poem, but this is not the main point. In an erotic poem like this, the forms are aesthetically justified because they are more effective in suggesting the erotic *rasa*. The *Bālacittānurañjanī* commentary explain the details of the individual suggestions in the Sanskrit, which presuppose too many Sanskrit grammatical categories to be usefully elucidated here. The forms work together to suggest the intensity

of the lover's emotion. A comparable effect in English is found when a lover says to his beloved, "You are my world," rather than, "You are the most important person in my world."

evam anyeṣām api boddhavyam | *varṇaracanānāṃ vyañjakatvaṃ guṇasvarūpanirūpaṇe udāhariṣyate* | *apiśabdāt prabandheṣu nāṭakādiṣu* | *evaṃ rasādīnāṃ pūrvagaṇitabhedābhyāṃ saha ṣadbhedāḥ* ||

(The suggestiveness) in other (forms of words) should be understood likewise.

The suggestiveness of certain sound combinations (*varṇa*) and styles (*racanā*) will be described in the chapter on qualities (chapter eight). The word **etc.** (in *kārikā* 43ab.) means that *rasa*, etc., are found in literary works and in dance. Thus, along with the two types already described, there are six types of suggestion of *rasa*, etc.

Comments

The first two types were: suggestion arising from a word and that arising from a sentence. In the two types we have just seen suggestion arises from context and from parts of words. Adding the two types that will be examined in chapter eight (suggestion from sound combinations and regional dialects), we arrive at six, the number mentioned.

***bhedās tad ekapañcāśat* |**

vyākhyātāḥ ||

***teṣāṃ cānyonyayojane* ||**

***saṃkareṇa trirūpeṇa saṃsṛṣṭyā caikarūpayā* |**

na kevalaṃ śuddhā evaikapañcāśaḍbhedā bhavanti yāvat teṣāṃ svaprabhedair ekapañcāśatā saṃśayāspadatvenānugrāhyānugrāhakatayaikavyañjakānupraveśena ceti trividhena saṃkareṇa parasparanirapekṣarūpayaikaprakārayā saṃsṛṣṭyā ceti caturbhir guṇane |

vedakhābdhiviyaccandrāḥ

śuddhabhedaiḥ saha

śareṣuyugakhendavaḥ* || *(1107)

tatra diṅmātram udāhriyate |

(4.8. Poems with More than One Suggestion.)

43c. There are fifty-one types of suggestion.

They have been explained.

43d - 44abc. When these fifty-one are squared by means of the three forms of fusion and that of association they come to number 10,404.

There are not only the pure types. Each type can be combined with (a second suggestive factor of any of) the fifty-one types. These combinations are possible in four ways: when it doubtful which (suggestive factor) is dominant, when one factor serves the other, when

both work equally together, and when both are independent, thus multiplying the number (of suggestive types) by four.

When these are combined with the pure types,

44d. (The total number of types of suggestion) are 10,455.

These will be only partially illustrated.

Comments

Each of the fifty-one types Mammaṭa discusses can be combined with any other. This results in fifty-one squared or 2,601 types. However, each combination can be done in four ways, resulting in 4 times 2,601 or 10,404 types. Add to that the original 51 simple types and we arrive at Mammaṭa's 10,455 types. The point seems to be that the suggestive power of words is practically pervasive since there are so many types.

Both of Mammaṭa's examples of complex suggestion are taken from Ānandavardhana. Indeed, Mammaṭa devotes far less attention to poems of complex suggestion than does Ānandavardhana. For his detailed exposition, please refer to the *Dhvanyāloka* 3.43.

khaṇapāhuṇiā deara jāāe suhaa kiṃapi de bhaṇiā |
ruai paḍoharavalahīgharammi aṇuṇijjau varāri ||[351]

[351] The *Saṅketaḥ* commentary has the following Sanskrit translation:
kṣaṇapraghuṇikā devarajāyayā subhaga kim api te bhaṇitā |
roditi śūnyavalabhīgṛhe anunīyatāṃ varākī ||

atrānunayaḥ kim upabhogalakṣaṇe 'rthāntare saṃkramitaḥ kim anuraṇananyāyenopabhoge eva vyaṅgaye vyañjakaḥ iti saṃdehaḥ ||[352]

Brother-in-law, your dear wife
Somehow insulted your festival guest.
Now she hides in the empty loft.
Go comfort the unfortunate girl. (111)

In this poem the reader cannot decide if the phrase **go comfort** has its meaning transformed into another meaning, i.e., go sexually enjoy, or if the suggestor suggests the dalliance, like an echo.

Comments

Abhinavagupta explains that the woman here speaking loves her brother-in-law, who has been having an affair with this guest.[353] She is either suggesting that he go make love to her in order to make him fight with his wife, and thus come to her, or she is showing him that she knows about the affair and hopes that he will return to her instead of cavorting with the new woman. Both readings are possible, and the outcome (that the speaker wants the brother-in-law to be her lover) is the same, thus the reader is left in a pleasurable state of doubt. Otherwise put, the poem profits from the ambiguity.

On the first reading there is a total transfer of meaning. The speaker does not want her brother-in-law to comfort the guest, merely to sleep with her. On the second, the

[352] I have separated this poem and commentary from the *kārikā* text above, departing from Mohan in order to make the comments easier to follow.
[353] For an alternate translation of the poem and Abhinavagupta's commentary, see Ingalls (1990:645&647).

meaning of comfort is retained, but the suggested knowledge is dominant. Thus the doubt includes which form of suggestion is intended.

snigdhaṣyāmalakāntiliptaviyato velladbalākā ghanāḥ
vātāḥ śīkariṇaḥ payodasuhṛdām ānandakekāḥ kalāḥ |
kāmaṃ santu dṛḍhaṃ kaṭhorahṛdayo rāmo 'smi sarvaṃ sahe
vaidehī tu kathaṃ bhaviṣyati ha hā hā devi dhīrā bhava ||

atra lipteti payodasuhṛdām iti ca atyantatiraskṛtavācyayoḥ saṃsṛaṣṭiḥ | *tābhyāṃ saha rāmo 'smīty arthāntarasaṃkramitavācyasyānugrāhyānugrāhakabhāvena rāmapadalakṣaṇaikavyañjakānupraveśena cārthāntarasaṃkramitavācyarasadhvanyoḥ saṃkaraḥ* | *evam anyad apy udāhāryam* ||

iti kāvyaprakāśo dhvaninirṇayo nāma caturtha ullāsaḥ || *(1129)*

White herons circle against dark clouds
That paint the sky with their wet lustre.
Winds carry the small rain.
The peacocks, friends of the clouds, cry out with joy.
Let all this be: my heart is hard;
I am Rāma and can bear it all.
But Vaidehī, how shall she live?
Alas, my queen, alas, be brave! (112)[354]

In the expressions **paint** and **friends of the clouds** there is a fusion (of two suggestions) in which the literal meaning is given up. With this there is also a fusion (in which one suggestion) serves another, namely in the expression, **I am Rāma**, where the literal

[354] This translation is from Ingalls, et al. (1990:204). Judging it admirable, I have not attempted to improve on it (however, line three could be better rendered, it seems to me, "Already soft showers are blowing in.") Clearly the poet, in painting the arrival of the rainy season, wants to present those delicate first showers that precede the real rains. As Abhinava points out, these light rains are pleasant to the skin.

meaning leads to another meaning. (Finally) there is a fusion of the suggestion of *rasa* and the (suggestion brought about by) transferring the literal meaning by combining (all that is) indicated by the word **Rāma** into a single sentence[355].

The other (thousands of) varieties could be similarly illustrated.

Comments

In the previous poem, Mammaṭa illustrated a fusion of two suggestions in which there is doubt about which form of suggestion is meant. In this poem he illustrates three other types of fusion. First, there is a fusion of two independent suggestions. Both the word "paint" and the compound "friends of the clouds" are used metaphorically. Nothing can either literally paint the sky or be friends with the clouds. Each metaphor suggests a further meaning: women are "*lipta*" – "painted" or "decorated," and lovers are also said to be friends of the clouds, for the rainy season is the season of love. These suggestions reinforce one another in suggesting love, while remaining semantically independent.

Second, there is a fusion in which one suggestion helps or serves another. In "I am Rāma," the literal meaning is the person named. This is of course the Rāma of the *Rāmāyaṇa*, who is separated from Sītā, his wife. The name "Rāma" suggests all the qualities that the hero is known to possess. In this case (in conjunction with the expression, "my heart is hard," as Abhinava points out)[356], the quality that is suggested is Rāma's steadfastness. This, however, serves to suggest that he will be able to endure the

[355] Mammaṭa's description of the final form of fusion is both terse and ambiguous. I have been guided in my rendition by the corresponding Abhinava passage as translated by Ingalls, et al. (1990:204 - 206).
[356] Ingalls, et al. (1990:204 – 206).

separation from Sīta during the rainy season, which help clarify the contrast given in the last two lines.

Finally, there is fusion of the poem's *rasa* and the many other possible suggestive meanings of the word "Rāma." In this fusion both the *rasa* and the reverberations of the word "Rāma" play an equal and combined role. Abhinava explains that the many qualities of Rāma are all indistinctly suggested in a single cognition, just as the various ingredients of a cake are simultaneously, yet indistinctly, present when tasting the cake. Indeed, the flavor of the cake and the combined flavors of all the ingredients are mutually dependant (if not identical). Likewise in the poem, there is a *rasa* that is gained by the richness of the name itself. This *rasa* arises exactly because the literal sense bursts in every direction with reverberations from the rest of the legend.[357]

This concludes Mammaṭa's exposition of what he considers to be the best type of poetry: poetry in which the suggested sense predominates. Instead of exploring the many forms of combined suggestion, he moves on to the second best type of poetry, poetry of subordinate suggestion. In the next chapter he will first explain the ways in which suggestion, although present, can become secondary. Once the subtypes of suggestion are fully explained, he will turn to a philosophic defense of the necessity of suggestion as a semantic tool.

---

[357] Given that Mammaṭa clearly had Abhinava in mind in this section, I would need a good reason to adopt any reading other than Abhinava's. Jha claims that the suggestion referred to is the suggestion of frustrated love conveyed by the whole sentence (1925:118). Unfortunately, he does not explain how he ties this in with the richness of the word "Rāma", so it is impossible to judge the merit of his claim.

atha pañcama ullāsaḥ

iti kāvyaprakāśe dhvanigunībhūtavyaṅgyasaṅkīrṇabhedanirṇayo

nāma pañcama ullāsaḥ |[358]

Chapter Five

Investigation of the Types of Combinations of

Suggestive Poetry and Poetry of Subordinate Suggestion.

evaṃ dvanau nirṇīte guṇībhūtavyaṅgyasya prabhedān āha

agūḍham aparasyāṅgaṃ vācyasiddhyaṅgam asphuṭam **|**

sandigdhatulyaprādhānye kākvākṣiptam asundaram **||**

vyaṅgyam evaṃ guṇibhūtavyaṅgyasyāṣṭau bhidāḥ smṛtāḥ **| *(1143)***

(5.1. The Eight Types of Poetry of Subordinate Suggestion.)

[358] This line is found at the end of the chapter (Mohan 1409).

Having investigated suggestive poetry, we now state the types of poetry of subordinate suggestion:

45 - 46ab. There are eight types of poetry of subordinate suggestion (classified according to whether the suggestion is) (1) non-concealed, (2) dependant on another, (3) dependant on the establishment of the literal meaning, (4) unclear, (5) of doubtful prominence (compared to the literal meaning), (6) of equal prominence (to the literal meaning), (7) implied by intonation, and (8) non-striking.

Comments

This chapter is broken into two large sections. The first explains poetry of subordinate suggestion, as the chapter title announces. The second gives a general defense of "suggestion" against various philosophic efforts to eliminate the concept by showing it to be unnecessary in linguistic analysis. The defense is relevant to both chapters four and five and might have claimed a chapter of its own.

Mammaṭa criticizes all the poems of subordinate suggestion on one point or another. Thus they might better be called poems of flawed suggestion. A suggestion can be flawed either because another semantic factor dominates (thus the name "subordinate") or because of a weakness in the suggestion itself. Mammaṭa divides the flaws into eight basic types, but examines several auxiliary types in addition to the big eight. He defines each type of flaw and provides examples. I will comment on them individually.

As explained in the notes to chapter one, Mammaṭa's desire to incorporate Ānandavardhana's system of *rasa* into the older poetics inspired him to rank the poems according to the prominence of their suggestive content. This sometimes leads to the unfortunate result of depreciation of some very fine poems and oversight of important flaws in others.

kāminīkucakalaśavat gūḍhaṃ camatkaroti agūḍhaṃ tu sphuṭatayā vācyāyamānam iti guṇībhūtam eva | *agūḍhaṃ yathā*

> *yasyāsuhṛtkṛtatiraskṛatir etya tapasūcīvyadhavyatikareṇa yunakti karnau* |
> *kāñcīguṇagrathanabhājanam eśa so 'smi jīvan na samprati bhavāmi kim āvahāmi* ||

atra 'jīvannity arthāntarasaṃkramitavācyasya |

> *unnidrikokanadareṇupiśāṅgitāṅgā gāyanti mañju madhupā gṛhadīrghikāsu* |
> *etac cakāsti ca raver navabandhujīvapuṣpacchadābhamudayācalacumbi bimbam* ||

atra cumbanasyātyantatiraskṛtavācyasya || *(1148)*

(5.1.1. Poetry of Non-Concealed Suggestion.)

Like the jug-shaped breasts of a maiden, the hidden (suggestion) gives pleasure, while the obvious (suggestion), being totally clear, is like the literal meaning. Thus it is called subordinate. (Three) examples of this follow.

> The insults of my enemies are scalding needles
> Burning my ears!
> But what can I do?
> Though living, I am not alive.
> I might as well be knitting lacy lingerie. (113)

In this poem the transfer of the meaning of **living** to another meaning (is too obvious).

The rising sun
A dandelion[359]
Kissing the eastern mountains.

Our garden pond
Whose dark pink
Lotus blossoms attract

The buzzing bees
Usually black
Now by pollen turned red. (114)

Here the complete setting aside of the literal meaning of the word **kissing** (is too obvious).

Comments

The word "living" in the first poem has its literal meaning of being alive transferred into mean living is such a lamentable state. The word "kissing" in the second poem completely loses its literal meaning and comes to mean only touching. Both of these are considered too artless to have any charm. While I agree with Mammaṭa in the first case, the main fault of the poem appears to me to be the failed connection between the needle like insults and knitting as a symbol of impotence. This connection fails, of course, because the poem insists on the scalding nature of the insults, a quality notably lacking in knitting needles. It would have been better to focus on the pointedness of the insults and carry over the image into embroidery.

[359] The flower in question here is not a dandelion, but a *Bandhjīva*, which, according to Dwivedi is a *Pentapetes Phoenicea* (1977:139). A dandelion is an appropriate substitute because it is familiar and resembles the sun.

Mammaṭa's analysis of the second poem seems equally weak. The literally meaning of "kissing" is completely blocked, giving rise to a metaphor: the sun is touching the ridge like a lover's mouth touches his beloved. This metaphor suggests the erotic *rasa*, reinforcing the tone that is everywhere present in the poem. If this metaphor fails (as I think it does), it is not because the analogy is too obvious, but rather because it is too weak. The caressing motion of kissing is too different from that steady progress of the sun. Furthermore, at dawn the sun moves away from the ridge, making it a possible metaphor for a parting kiss, but not for consummated love. The metaphor evokes no clear mental image and thus adds no visual detail to the poem. Finally, gratuitously comparing the sun to a flower utterly ruins the metaphor.[360]

atrāsīt phaṇipāśabandhanavidhiḥ śaktyā bhavad devare
gāḍhaṃ vakṣasi tāḍite hanumatā droṇādritratrāhṛtaḥ |
divyair indrajidatra lakṣmaṇaśarair lokāntaraṃ prāpitaḥ
kenāpy atra mṛgākṣiḥ rākṣasapateḥ kṛttā ca kaṇṭhāṭavī ||

atra kenāpyatretyarthaśaktimūlānuraṇanarūpasya | *tasyāpyatreti yuktaḥ pāṭhaḥ* || *(1155)*

My gazelle-eyed one,
Here the serpent coil bound your brother-in-law,
Deeply wounded in the chest by an arrow.
Hanuman brought the Droṇa Mountains here.
Here the divine arrows of Lakṣmaṇa sent to heaven Indrajit.

[360] A similar metaphor is used with great force by Han-shan. Compare: "On a bed of stone I sit, alone in the night / While the round moon climbs up Cold Mountain." Here the personification of the moon adds a clear image. The fact that the rising moon appears to be climbing the ridge Cold Mountain conveys to the reader the shape and steepness of the mountain. The personification also resonates with the lone spectator. Han-shan reverses the traditional idea that the moon is a friend to hermits. Here the moon is off climbing a mountain and only serves to heighten his sense of loneliness.

And here someone felled the Demon King's forest of necks. (115)[361]

In this poem the suggestion is based on the literal meaning of **And by someone here**. A better reading would be **And here, of that**.

Comments

The point is that the suggestion is too obvious. Rāma is speaking and refers to himself with the word "someone." The suggested improvement would change the pronoun to the impersonal **that** and change the case from the instrumental to the genitive — here used to indicated the topic (as in "Of that there is redness" instead of "That is red"). Thus the final line could read, "The felling of the forest of the Demon King's necks occurred here." The overall effect of the change in Sanskrit would be to make the suggested reference more abstract and thus more humble and appealing.

Aparasya rasāder vācyasya vā (vācyārthībhūtasya) aṅgaṃ rasādi anuraṇanarūpaṃ vā |

yathā |

ayaṃ sa raśanotkarṣī pīnastanavimardanaḥ |
nābhyūrujaghanasparśī nīvīvistraṃsanaḥ karaḥ

atra śṛṅgaraḥ karuṇasya | *(1159)*

(5.1.2. Poetry of Dependant Suggestion.)

[361] From the *Bālarāmāyaṇa* according to Dwivedi.

(The second type of poetry of subordinate suggestion is that in which) the *rasa* is subservient to either the literal meaning of the sentence or to the suggestion of another *rasa*. For example, (a poem in which a wife of Bhūriśravas is gazing at the hand of her dead husband):

> This hand used to loosen my belt,
> And the folds of my skirts it used to untie.
> This hand caressed my breasts,
> Slid down across my navel,
> Around my thighs and into my treasure. (116)[362]

In this poem the erotic is subservient to the pathetic.

Comments

It is true that the overtly erotic description here is subordinate to the portrayal of a pathetic situation. However, it is hard to see this as a failure. This portrayal of a deeply confused emotional response to deep shock is not only vivid and realistic but also moving. Mammaṭa's analysis of *rasa* subservience misses the fact that the erotic language here does not suggest the erotic *rasa* (how perverse!). The language works to reveal the confusion, shock, love, and woundedness of the woman. Properly read, the poem shows only one *rasa*: the pathetic *rasa*. Ānandavardhana seems to advance a similar position when he writes of this very verse, "Even if this tragic *rasa* is made

[362] *Mahābhārata* 11.24.17. For an alternate translation, see Merwin and Masson (1977:3).

predominant, the joining to it of an erotic element by some special turn of speech will work toward the strengthening of the tragic *rasa.*"[363]

kailāsālayabhālalocanarucā nirvartitālaktakavyaktiḥ
pādanakhadyutir giribhuvaḥ sā vaḥ sadā trāyatām ।
spardhābandhasamṛddhayeva sudṛḍhaṃ rūḍhā yayā netrayoḥ
kānti kolanadānukārasarasā sadyaḥ samutsāryate ॥

atra bhāvasya rasaḥ । *(1164)*

May the brilliant red of Pārvatī's toenails protect you forever!
They shine ever stronger in the light of Śiva's third eye,
Defiantly draining away
Her eyes' lotus-red luster. (117)

Here *rasa* is subservient to the emotion (of devotion).

Comments

Mammaṭa's judgment seems to be driven by the classificatory system. This is a devotional poem, and, as we saw in chapter four, devotion is not considered a *rasa*. Whatever the poem's faults, the problem is not the subservience of the *rasa* to an emotion. Given that the poem is devotional, the subservient *rasa*, the erotic, is intentionally and successfully subservient. The poem succeeds in placing emphasis exactly where a devoté would want it, i.e., on the surge of faith the poet feels for Pārvatī. The poem's real "fault" seems to be that the conceit is too recherché. Allow me to explain.

[363] Translated by Ingalls, et al. (1990:499).

Although complicated, the conceit is well-constructed and admirably daring in its total identification of an emotion with one of its symptoms. Pārvatī is angry and her eyes burn lotus-red from rage. Śiva is trying to assuage her. As he bows to her feet, the fire from his third eye falls on the red paint of her toenail. The poet cleverly hopes that the growing red of the nails will suck dry the wrathful red of the eyes through poetic color alchemy. The anger is equated with it symptom, the fiery red of the eyes. Red is red, whether in the eyes or in the nails. If the fire of the red goes from the eyes to the toenails, it can no longer be equated with anger. Thus Śiva is saved by the nail polish, which, of course, receives its power from Pārvatī's touch. May it protect you too!

atyuccāḥ paritaḥ sphuranti girayaḥ sphārās tathāmbhodhayas
tān etān api bibhratī kim api na klāntā'si tubhyaṃ namaḥ |
āścaryeṇa muhur muhuḥ stutim iti prastaumi yāvadbhuva -
stāvadbibhradimāṃ smṛtas tava bhujo vācas tato mudritāḥ ||
atra bhūviṣayo ratyākhyo bhāvo rājaviṣayasya ratibhāvasya || *(1168)*

Lofty mountains encircle us.
Vast oceans yawn before us.
All these you support without fatigue,
All honor to you!
With awe I sing and sing these praises,
Until I remember your arm,
Which bears even this earth,
And my lips are sealed. (118)[364]

Here the emotion of love of the earth is subservient to the emotion of love of the king.

364 From the *Pañcākṣarī*, according to Dwivedi.

Comments

The first half of the poem praises the strength of earth, which bears all things. However, in Sanskrit, the king is often called the bearer of the earth. This allows the poet to claim that the mere arm of the king is mightier than the whole of the earth. The effect is a hyperbolic praise of the king's power. Like all hyperbole, the effect rests in the audacity of the comparison, which must yet remain comprehensible. The currency of the expression "king as earth-bearer" allows this figure to work better in the original than in translation. Note that the poet does not use the expression to refer to the king, thus avoiding the fault of non-concealed suggestion.

It is curious to find this poem, and several that follow, in this section on poetry of subservient *rasa*, as love (*rati*) is not considered a *rasa* unless directed toward a woman. Mammaṭa himself correctly calls them emotions in his explanation. We saw in chapter four (*kārikās* 35bc-36a) that these emotions can ground suggestive poetry. Mammaṭa seems to be claiming that love of the earth could ground a *rasa* but that it is overshadowed by devotion to the king. Despite what he says, I do not think this was his intention.

I believe that Mammaṭa chose this poem as an example of the heroic *rasa* being overshadowed by either the poet's love of the earth or his love of the king. As a eulogy, the poem suffers from being too personal. The poem should praise the king, not focus on the poet and his admiration. As we saw in the introduction, Sanskrit poetry does not generally serve as an expressive medium for the poet's emotions.

bandīkṛtya nṛpa dviṣāṃ mṛgadṛśastāḥ paśyatāṃ preyasāṃ
sliṣyanti praṇamanti lānti paritaś cumbanti te sainikāḥ |
asmākaṃ sukṛtair dṛśornipatito'syaucityavārāṃnidhe
vidhvastā vipado'khilāstaditi taiḥ pratyarthibhiḥ stūyase ||

atra bhāvasya rasābhāsabhāvābhāsau prathamārdhadvitīyārdhadyotyau || *(1170)*

O King, with their husbands looking on,
Your troops have seized their doe-eyed women,
Embracing and praising them,
Carrying them off and kissing them.

Yet these very foes praise you saying,
"Sea of virtue, our past goodness has brought you before our eyes.
All our troubles are destroyed!" (119)

Here pseudo-*rasa* in the first stanza and pseudo-emotion in the second stanza are secondary to the emotion (of the poet for the king).

Comments

The erotic *rasa* of the first stanza is called pseudo-erotic because of its inappropriateness. Likewise the admiration of the enemies is an aberration of genuine admiration, given the situation. The poem is intended as hyperbolic praise of the king. Indeed, a king would have to be truly great for his enemies to sing his praises while his troops raped their women. However, if this hyperbole is supposed to convey the heroic *rasa*, Mammaṭa seems right that it fails. As in the preceding poem, the heroic *rasa* does not shine forth, being secondary to the poet's patriotism.

Aviralakaravālakampanair bhrukuṭītarjanagarjair muhuḥ |
dadṛśe tava vairiṇāṃ madaḥ sa gataḥ kvāpi tavekṣaṇe kṣaṇāt ||

atra bhāvasya bhāvapraśamaḥ || (1173)

Waving swords,
Arching eyebrows,
Defiant cries,
All show your enemies' valor.
But with one look at you,
It flees. (120)

Here the disappearance of emotion is subservient to the (poet's) emotion.

Comments

The description of the disappearance of the enemies' valor is used as a means to assert the valor of the king. Mammaṭa rightly recognizes that the goal of this poem is to evoke the king's heroism, and is not a parody of the enemies' valor: strength needs a strong enemy to prove its strength. Unfortunately, the poet gives us only three external signs of valor and a description of valor failing. It is hard (even in the Sanskrit) to resist the feeling that the signs are mere pretense. The poem would be more effective with three examples of past valor (victorious here, resisted these, survived that, etc.) or three signs of past valor (scares, blood, dented weapons, etc.). After all, brave words, grimacing, and sword-waving do not make a man brave. As Mammaṭa points out, missing its true goal the emphasis of the poem falls on the poet's enthusiasm.

sākaṃ kuraṅgakadṛśā madhupānalīlāṃ kartuṃ suhṛdbhir api vairiṇi te pravṛtte |
anyābhidhāyi tava nāma vibho gṛhītaṃ kenāpi tatra viṣamāmakarod avasthām ||

atra trāsodayaḥ || (1176)

With his friends
And his antelope-eyed woman
Your foe reveled in drink.
But your name,
Mentioned in passing,
Terrified him. (121)

Here the arising of terror is subservient (to the poet's delight in the king).

Comments

The poet seeks to portray the fear on the part of the king's enemy. The king is so mighty that even mention of his name can ruin a beautiful, safe, and happy moment. However, the poem winds up eulogizing the king, with the poet's enthusiasm again unfortunately dominating.

asoḍhā tatkālollasadasahabhāvasya tapasaḥ
kathānāṃ viśrambheṣv atha ca rasikaḥ śailaduhituḥ |
pramodaṃ vo diśyāt kapaṭabaṭuveṣāpanayane
tvarāsaithilyābhyāṃ yugapad abhiyuktaḥ smaraharaḥ ||

atrāvegadhair yoyoḥ sandhiḥ || (1178)

Unable to abide the Mountain Daughter's weakening austerity
And yet uncontrollably delighted with her loving advances,
The Slayer of Love was both anxious and reluctant
To remove his young-priest disguise.

May he command your joy! (122)

Here there is a combination of emotional haste and steadfast calm.

Comments

The Slayer of Love, Śiva, is in love with the Mountain Daughter, Pārvatī, who is proving herself through austerities. Thus Śiva wants to keep his disguise and help her succeed in her task, but he also want to throw it off so that she will come to him. The poem tries to capture this state of contrary desire by expressing the desires' simultaneity in terms of the simultaneity of two much simpler actions, removing or retaining the disguise.

The poet has exploited the relative freedom of word order of Sanskrit to mix the expression of the two desires, thus adding to the effect. The story is familiar enough to Sanskrit readers for the poem to stand on its own.

We encountered vacillation between love and asceticism in chapter four (poem 52 and notes), where it was praised. The flaw here, once again, is that the Śiva's emotional tension comes across as secondary to the poet's devotion. The poem falls unhappily between the erotic and the fully devotional.

paśyet kaścic cala capala re kā tvarā 'haṃ kumārī
hastālambaṃ vitara ha ha hā vyutkramaḥ kvāsī yāsi |
itthaṃ pṛthvīparivṛḍha bhavadvidviṣo'raṇyavṛtteḥ
kanyā kañcitphalakisalayānyādadānā 'bhidhatte ||

atra śaṅkāsūyādhṛtismṛtiśramadainyavibodhautsukyānāṃ śabalatā ||

ete ca rasavadādyalaṅkārāḥ | *yadyapi bhāvodayabhāvasandhibhāvaśabalatvāni nālaṅkāratayā uktāni tathāpi kaścid brūyād ityevam uktam* | *yadyāpi na nāsti kaścid viṣayaḥyatra dhvaniguṇībhūtavyaṅgyayoḥ svaprabedādibhiḥ saha saṅkaraḥ saṃsṛṣṭir vā nāsti tathāpi prādhānyena vyapadeśā bhavantīti kvacitkenacidvyavahāraḥ* || *(1181)*

The daughter of your enemy lives in the forest.
She speaks with someone while gathering fruits and buds:
Someone might see!
Get away, you impertinent!
What's your hurry?
I am a virgin.
Lend me your arm.
O! What an outrage!
But now you leave like this?
Where are you Lord of the Earth? (123)

Here (several emotions) are mixed together: doubt, displeasure, respect, remembrance, fatigue, depression, realization, and desire. These are poetic ornaments such as the ornament "having *rasa*." And even if the arising of emotion, the joining of emotions, and the mixing of emotions should not be spoken of as ornaments, this has been said in case someone does speak this way.

Even though poetry of subordinate suggestion and suggestive poetry, along with their subclasses, are never found not mixed, still, poems are classified as one or the other according to the maxim: names are (given) by predominance (of one quality over the others).

Comments

The poem itself merits little comment. Although one of its compounds (*bhavadvidviṣo)* is delightfully assonant, it has been chosen because of the variety of emotions. The confusion of the young woman is shown by her successive statements. However, the girl's statements are not woven together into a convincing whole. As Mammaṭa points out, the various emotions evoked remain mere decorations.

Mammaṭa has discussed the arising, joining, and mixing of emotion in chapter four (*kārikā* 36cd). There he claims that they can serve as the basis of successful suggestive poetry. In this capacity, they are the suggestive essence of the poem. However, any emotion, even those that can become *rasas*, can become a mere ornament if treated in a superficial manner. Mammaṭa returns to the point in chapter ten where he takes these ornaments.

The final statement admits the delicate nature of the entire classificatory enterprise and points to the skill necessary do evaluate poems. Mammaṭa shows the reader that poetics is more art than science and that quality depends on far more than pure *rasa*.

janasthāne bhrāntaṃ kanakamṛgatṛṣṇāndhitadhiyā
vaco vaidehīti pratipadam udaśru pralapitam |
kṛtālaṅkābhartur vadanaparipāṭīṣu ghaṭanā
mayāptaṃ rāmatvaṃ kuśalavasutā na tv adhigatā ||

atra śabdaśaktimūlānuraṇanarūpo rāmeṇa sahopamānopameyabhāvo vācyāṅgatāṃ nītaḥ || *(1192)*

I have wandered
The cities of men,
My mind deluded
By visions of gold.
With tearful eyes I cry at every step
"Give me, please!"
I tried enough to flatter
The niggardly rich.
I am depressed,[365]
and I have not
gotten rich.

I have wandered
In the Janastāna forest
My mind deluded
By golden deer.
With tearful eyes I cry at every step
"Princess of Videhi!"
I shot arrows at the many heads of
Laṅkā's king
I am truly Rāma,
but I have not
found the mother of Kuśa and Lava
(124)[366]

Here there is a relation of the object compared with the object of comparison — Rāma — based on the power of the words to echo (several meanings). However, it is subordinate to the literal meaning.

Comments

The speaker of the poem is probably the poet himself; there is a tradition of poets complaining about their lack of worldly success. Through the complex punning, the speaker is compared to Rāma during his chase of the magic deer that Rāvaṇa sent to trick him and his subsequent loss of, and search for, his wife Sītā. The suggestion is that if the poet had stuck to honest work, he would not be in his present miserable position.

Mammaṭa claims that the literal meaning overshadows the pun and the suggestion. As he pointed out in the preceding section, deciding whether the literal sense

[365] The second meaning of *mayāptaṃ rāmatvaṃ* = darkness (or pleasure) is obtained by me.
[366] Dwivedi reports, "Baṭṭa Vācaspati, acc. to Sūktimuktāvalī."

or the suggestion dominates in a given poem requires skill and judgment on the part of the critic. Mammaṭa's judgment may be based on the personal nature of the literal meaning, which is not generally accepted in Sanskrit poetry. The theme of this poem, however, is common. Ingalls notes that many of the most personal poems in Sanskrit treat the disillusionment and poverty of poets.[367]

āgatya samprati viyogavisaṃṣṭhulāṅgīmam
bhojināṃkvacid api kṣapitatriyāmaḥ |
etāṃ prasādayati paśya śanaiḥ prabhāte
tanvaṅgi pādapatanena sahasraraśmiḥ ||

atra nāyakavṛttānto 'rthaśaktimūlo vasturūpo

nirapekṣaravikamalinīvṛttāntādhyāropeṇaiva sthitaḥ || *(1198)*

The thousand-rayed sun
Passed the night elsewhere.
Forlorn, the water-born lotus
Closed herself in fear.
But look my slender-limbed one!
Now he comes to reassure her,
Gently falling at her stem. (125)

Here the behavior of the lovers, grounded in the literal meaning, is erroneously transferred to the behavior of the sun and lotus, which is independent.

[367] Ingalls (1965:385-386).

Comments

The poet compares the lovers to the sun and lotus. Just as the lotus folds itself into a skinny bud each night in the absence of the sun and opens back up at the sun's first rays, the lady is said to have grown thin worrying that her lover was elsewhere for the night but will take heart as he throws himself at her feet and pleads forgiveness. Many of the words have double meanings, but the poem is not a punning poem, because neither the word for sun, nor that for lotus, has double meaning.

Mammaṭa rightly claims that the objects of comparison are described with words only applicable to the subjects of comparison. The poet uses actions appropriate only for lovers in his description of the sun and lotus (giving joy, bowing at the feet, etc.). Having done so he uses the (personified) sun and lotus to describe the lovers. The process is as circular as claiming that bricks are brick red. Mammaṭa agrees that the sun and lotus can by metaphorically described as lovers, i.e., "The sun, after passing the night elsewhere, returns to comfort the lotus." However, to go on to say that the lover is similar to the sun so indicated closes the circle.

We see here that this chapter includes not only poems in which the suggestion is subordinate to another poetic element, but also some in which it is subordinate to a poetic flaw. The following four poems all contain flaws that mar their suggestive power.

vācyasiddhyaṅga yathā

> *bhramimaratimalasahṛdayatāṃ pralayaṃ mūrcchā tamaḥ śarīrasādam* |
> *maraṇañ ca jalagabhujagajaṃ prasahya kurute viṣaṃ viyoginīnām* ||

atra hālāhalaṃ vyaṅgyaṃ bhujagarūpasya vācyasya siddhikṛt | *yathā vā*

gacchāmy acyuta darśanena bhavataḥ kiṃ tṛptir utpadyate
kiṃ tv evaṃ vijanasthayor hatajanaḥ sambhāvayaty anyathā |
ity āmantraṇabhaṅgisūcitavṛthāvasthānakhedālasām
āśliṣyanpulakotkarāñcitatanur gopīṃ hariḥ pātu vaḥ ||

atrācyutādipadavyaṅgyam āmantraṇetyādivācyasya | *etac caikatraikavaktṛgatatvena aparatra bhinnavaktṛgatatvenety anayor bhedaḥ* || *(1204)*

(5.1.3. Poetry Whose Suggestion) Depends on an Established Literal Meaning.

The poison-water from serpentine clouds
Violently strikes separated women with
Dizziness, apathy, sloth, and stupor,
Prostration, paralysis, coma, and death. (126)[368]

Here the suggestion of deadly poison makes clear or present the literal meaning of **serpentine**.

"I am going, O incorruptible one!
What's the fun of just looking at you?
If we stay here alone together,
Base people will imagine things."
Thus the cowgirl,
Expressing the deep sorrow
Of her sterile visit by an epithet.
Then Hari embraces her,
His body hair tingling.
May He protect you! (127)

[368] Ingalls, et al., attribute this verse to Śakavṛddhi (1990:298). The list of symptoms is, of course, quasi-medical. I have changed the order of the eight to more closely resemble an English list. The repetition of *j* and *g* in the third *pāda* provids striking consonance.

The suggestion of **incorruptible one** makes clear or present the literal meaning of **by an epithet, etc.**[369]

The difference between these two poems (126 and 127) is that in the first there is a single speaker, while in the second there are distinct speakers.

Comments

Mammaṭa rightly points out that the word "*viśaṃ*" (poison water) is too strongly suggestive of snakes to be used as a word for rain in the first verse. It ruins the metaphor by forcing the secondary meaning to overshadow the primary meaning. The poem would be more successful either as a simile ("Rain from serpentine clouds is like poison to a woman alone…"), or with a word that really evoked both rain and snakes ("Cobra clouds spit rain / Striking forlorn woman with…"). Abhinava quotes this verse twice in the *Dhvanyālokalocana*. Interestingly, the second time he specifically asserts that the pun does not flaw the suggestion, because the *rasa* is firmly established.[370]

Mammaṭa claims that the second verse lacks charm because the suggestion of the first half is subordinate to the explanation of the second half. To my ear it is the second half that is at fault. The cowgirl seeks to dally with Hari, another name for Kṛṣṇa, and expresses her desire and frustration in the epithet, "incorruptible one." Hari is charmed by the wit of the cowgirl and embraces her. Both the epithet and the explanation ("Thus the

[369] The words "make clear or present" are elided in this sentence. I have carried them over from the explanation of the last example, which parallels this one.
[370] Translated in Ingalls, et al. (1990:490).

cowgirl…") are necessary for the suggestion to function. However, the suggestion would be stronger without the heavy-handed phrase, "by an epithet."

In the first example only the poet speaks, while in the second the cowgirl's words are followed by the poet's. As we saw in chapter four, this difference is relevant to Mammaṭa's classificatory system.

asphuṭaṃ yathā

> *adṛṣṭe darśanotkaṇṭhā dṛṣṭe vicchedabhīrutā* |
> *nādṛṣṭe na dṛṣṭena bhavatā labhyate sukham* ||

atrādṛṣṭo yathā na bhavasi viyogabhayaṃ ca yathā notpadyate tathā kuryā iti kliṣṭam ||

(1213)

(5.1.4. Poetry Whose Suggestion) is Unclear.

> When I see you not, I long to see you.
> When I see you, I am afraid of separation.
> Thus seen or unseen, I have no happiness. (128)

The suggestion here is that your actions should be such that neither do you remain unseen nor is there fear of separation. The suggestion is tortured and obscure (*kliṣṭam)*.

Comments

Mammaṭa hits the nail on the head here. There are other possible meanings suggested by the concluding phrase (I have no happiness). Thus the desired suggestion becomes

obscure and hard to find. Mammaṭa cleverly describes the poem with an adjective ("*kliṣṭam")* that plays on the same sound pattern as the poem itself.

sandigdhaprādhānyaṃ yathā

> *haras tu kiñcitparivṛttadhairyaś candrodayārambha ivāmburāśiḥ* |
> *umāmukhe bimbaphalādharoṣṭhe vyāpārayām āsa vilocanāni* ||

atra paricumbitum aicchad iti kiṃ pratīyamānam kiṃ vā vilocanavyāpāraṇaṃ vācyaṃ pradhānam iti sandehaḥ || *(1216)*

(5.1.5. Poetry Whose Suggestion is) of Doubtful Prominence.

> Hara, his calm slightly disturbed,
> like the ocean at moonrise,
> Focused his eyes upon Umā's face
> and her sweet, full lower lip. (129)[371]

Here it is doubtful whether the suggested sense, that he wants to kiss her, or the literal sense, that the eyes were turned, is prominent.

Comments

Hara, literally "seizer" or "destroyer," is a name for Śiva. In this episode of the *Kumārasaṃbhava,* Śiva is mourning his previous wife Satī. Satī, however, has been reborn as Umā, and is destine to remarry Śiva. She appears before Śiva and her beauty

[371] *Kumārasaṃbhava* 3.67. The poem literally speaks of the "*bimba* fruit lower lip." This is a common trope in Sanskrit. I could not include it in the translation without calling too much attention to it, thus ruining the poem's value as an example. The focus of the translation must remain on the simile.

shakes his ascetic resolve and fills him with a desire to kiss her. Kālidāsa compares Śiva's asceticism to the night ocean: both are vast, unaffected by the world, and seemingly utterly tranquil. Against the rising moon, however, one can see the gentle undulation of the ocean, giving rise to the idea that the moon causes the ocean's undulations. As a beautiful woman's face is often likened to the moon in Sanskrit poetry, Kālidāsa has no difficulty extending the comparison: Umā's appearance is analogous to moonrise. So finally, as the moon "disturbs" the ocean, the moonfaced one is said to disturb Śiva's ocean of tranquility.

The simile is striking and Mammaṭa claims it may overpower the suggestion that Śiva wants to kiss the goddess. If it does, it would become a case in which an ornament (the simile) overpowers the ornamented (the erotic *rasa*). This would be a fault because the essential must dominate the accidental, as we saw with the analogy of a woman and her jewelry. The uncertainty as to which is dominant leads Mammaṭa to claim that the suggestion of the *rasa* is of "doubtful prominence." As this example shows, together with the next, the suggested sense must be clearly prominent in order for a poem to qualify for the highest category.

tulyaprādhānyaṃ yathā

> *brāhmaṇātikramatyāgo bhavatām eva bhūtaye* ।
> *jāmadagnyas ca vo mitram anyathā durmanāyate* ॥

atra jāmadagnyaḥ sarveṣāṃ kṣatriyāṇām iva rakṣasāṃ kṣaṇāt kṣayam kariṣyatīti vyaṅgyasya vācyasya ca samaṃ prādhānyam ॥ *(1219)*

(5.1.6. Poetry Whose Suggestion and Literal Sense are of) Equal Prominence.

> You have better
> Quit offending the priests, so that
> Jāmadagnya remains your friend!
> Otherwise, he will get angry. (130)[372]

The suggested meaning that Jāmadagnya will kill all the demons like he killed the warriors (*kṣatriya*) and the literal meaning are equally prominent.

Comments

Jāmadagnya is another name for Paraśurāma, son of Jamad-agni and sixth *avatāra* of Viṣṇu. He fought for the priestly caste (*brāhmaṇa*) against the warrior caste (*kṣatriyas*), according to Purāṇic legend. Here he has written a letter to Mālyavant, a minister of the demon king Rāvaṇa, to warn him that if the demons do not respecting their truce he will become angry. The suggestion is that he will slaughter them has he previously slaughtered a group of warriors hostile to the priests.

Mammaṭa points out that the literal meaning that Paraśurāma will be angry and the suggested meaning that he will slaughter the demons are equally charming.

kākvākṣiptaṃ yathā

> *mathnāmi kauravaśataṃ samare na kopād*
> *duḥśāsanasya rudhiraṃ na piṣāmyur astaḥ* |

[372] *Mahāviracarita* 2.10.

sañcūrṇayāmi gadayā na suyodhanorū
sandhiṃ karotu bhavatāṃ nṛpatiḥ paṇena ||

atra mathnāmyevetyādivyaṅgyaṃ vācyaniṣedhasahabhāvena sthitam || *(1222)*

(5.1.7. Poetry Whose Suggestion is) Implied by Intonation.

I will not wrathfully bash the hundred Kauravas in battle,
Nor will I drink the blood of Duḥśāsana from his heart.
Duryodhana's thighs I will not shatter with my club.
Make our king sue for a peaceful settlement! (131)[373]

In this poem the suggestion that he will bash the hundred Kauravas, etc., remains connected to the literal denial (of these activities).

Comments

Before the grand battle between the Pāndavas and Kauravas, Kṛṣṇa attempts to make a truce between the two sides. One of the Pāndava brothers, Bhīmasena, outraged by the proposal, recites the poem above. Literally he expresses his willingness to follow his duty and respect his elder brother's desire for peace. But if read with an ironic intonation, it suggests Bhīmasena's intention to fight the Kauravas regardless of whether the truce is successfully arranged. The two possible meanings remain in tension because neither is blocked by textual or contextual information. Perhaps Bhīma is still fixed on revenge, perhaps he has reconsidered. Only the actor's intonation informs the audience that the second meaning is meant.

[373] *Veṇīsaṃhāra* 1.15.

This poem can be compared with poem 24 ("What a great help! What can I say? / Your kindness is widely renowned. / Behaving ever like this, my friend, / May you enjoy a hundred autumns.") In the earlier poem the literal meaning is blocked by contextual information and completely set aside. The suggestion arises when one searches for the reason for the indirect speech. The literal meaning of the current poem, on the other hand, is not blocked. Intonation alone carries the suggestion.

asundaraṃ yathā

> *vāṇīrakuḍaṃguḍḍīṇasauṇikolāhalaṃ suṇaṃtīe* |
> *gharakammavāvaḍāe bahue sīanti aṅgāiṃ* ||[374]

atra dattasaṅketaḥ kaścillatāgahanaṃ praviṣṭa iti vyaṅgyāt sīdanty aṅgānīti vācyaṃ sacamatkāram || *(1227)*

(5.1.8. Poetry Whose Suggestion is) Non-Striking.

> The confusion of sparrows
> In the cane thicket
> Teases the daughter-in-law.
> Busy with housework,
> Her limbs droop dejectedly. (132)[375]

Here the literal meaning of **her limbs droop dejectedly** is more striking than the suggestion that someone intent on a rendezvous has entered the thicket of creepers.

---

[374] The *Saṅketaḥ* commentary has the follow Sanskrit translation:
> vānīrakuñjoḍḍīnaśakunikolāhalaṃ śṛṇvantyāḥ |
> gṛhakarmavyāpṛtāyā vadhvāḥ sīdanty aṅgānī ||

[375] Hāla, *Sattasaī* 874 (Weber). This verse is also cited in the *Dhvanyāloka*. See Ingalls, et al. (1990:361).

Comments

The confusion of sparrows suggests that the lover has arrived at the romantic rendezvous in the cane thicket, but housework prevents the young wife from going to meet him. With her desires frustrated, the work becomes doubly hard and her enthusiasm for it dissipates. There is no particular charm in the suggestion that the lover has arrived. The description of the young wife's reaction holds far more interest.

***eṣāṃ bhedā yathāyogaṃ veditavyās ca pūrvavat* || (1232)**

yathāyogam iti

> *vyañyante vastumātreṇa yadā 'laṅkṛtayas tadā |*
> *dhruvaṃ dhvanyaṅgatā tāsāṃ kāvyavṛttes tadāśrayāt ||*

iti dhvanikāroktadiśā vastumātreṇa yatrālaṅkāro vyajyate na tatra guṇībhūtavyaṅgyatvam ||

46cd. These types (of suggestion) should be understood, as far as possible, like the former case (i.e., as suggestive poetry).

We should understand **as far as possible** according to the following:

> When the ornaments are suggested by the very thing or situation,
> They invariably form a variety of suggestive poetry,
> Because the workings of poetry is founded on these (ornaments).[376]

[376] Dhvanyāloka 2:29.

As indicated by the words of the author of the *Dhvani (āloka,* i.e., Ānandavardhana), there is no subordination of suggestion when the poetic ornament is **suggested by the very thing or situation** (described in the poem).

Comments

Ānandavardhana adds, in his self-commentary, that if this sort of ornament is absent, we are left with a mere statement of fact. Ingalls explains the reasoning as follows, "When one *alaṇkāra* (directly expressed) suggests another *alaṇkāra*, the question can arise whether the second *alaṇkāra* is predominant or the first. But when the mere fact or situation suggests an *alaṇkāra*, the suggested *alaṇkāra* must be predominant, for if it were not, the verse would not be poetry at all."[377]

Mammaṭa's point is that one should not consider a suggestion subordinate without clear reason. Usually a poem in which the ornament is predominant will fall into poetry of subordinate suggestion. As we have seen, if a metaphor, for example, is the most striking element of a poem, the poem is classified as poetry of subordinate suggestion. However, Mammaṭa, following Ānandavardhana, says this is not the case if the ornament is suggested by the literal meaning of the poem. Mammaṭa gave many examples of such poems in chapter four (poems 61, 65, 69, etc.). More generally, Mammaṭa urges that any poem that might fall into one of the eight types of poetry of subordinate suggestion

---

[377] Ingalls, et al. (1990:356).

should first be considered as suggestive poetry. In other words, the aspiring critic should follow the principle of charity.

This concludes Mammaṭa's presentation of eight basic types of poetry of subordinate suggestion. Allow me to list them again here: (1) non-concealed or overly obvious suggestion, (2) suggestion dependant on another *rasa* or emotion, (3) suggestion dependant on the establishment of the literal meaning, (4) unclear suggestion, (5) suggestion of doubtful prominence compared to the literal meaning, (6) suggestion of equal prominence to the literal meaning, (7) suggestion implied by intonation, and (8) non-striking suggestion.

sālaṅkārair dhvanes taiś ca yogaḥ saṃsṛṣṭisaṅkaraiḥ | (1239)

sālaṅkārair iti tair evālaṅkārair alaṅkārayuktaiś ca taiḥ | tad uktam dhvanikṛtā |

> *sa guṇībhūtavyaṅgyaiḥ sālaṅkāraiḥ saha prabhedaiḥ svaiḥ |*
> *saṅkarasaṃsṛṣṭibhyāṃ punar apy udyotate bahudhā ||*

iti |

(5.1.9. Further Varieties of Suggestive Poetry.)

47ab. Suggestive poetry is joined with (these eight forms of subordinate suggestion) as ornaments, and these can be joined by either fusion or association.

As ornaments means that these (subordinate suggestions) can be ornaments, or that they can be joined to (other) ornaments. As put by the author of the *Dhvani (āloka)*:

Suggestive poetry appears by fusion and association with its own sub-divisions, with poetry of subordinate suggestions, with ornaments, and in many other ways.

Comments

Mammaṭa adopts Abhinava's use of the technical words "fusion" and "association." Interested readers are referred to the *Dhvanyāloka* 3:43, which is far too long to summarize here (30+ pages in translation).[378] The overall result is to multiply greatly the number of possible types of both suggestive poetry and poetry of subordinate suggestion.

anyonyayogād evaṃ syād bhedasaṅkhyātibhūyaso* || *(1245)

evam anena prakāreṇa avāntarabhedagaṇane 'tiprabhūtatarā gaṇanā | *tathā hi śṛṅgārasyaiva bhedaprabhedagaṇāyām ānantyam kā gaṇanā tu sarveṣām* ||

47cd. Thus by combining with each other the number of types (of suggestion) becomes extremely large.

Thus by counting all the sub-divisions (of suggestion) by the above method, the number (of types) would become extremely large. For example, there are an infinite number of types of the erotic *rasa* alone, what of all the others?

Comments

[378] I have followed Ingalls, et al., in the translations of "*saṃsṛṣṭi*" and "*saṅkara*."

Mammaṭa calculated 10,455 types of suggestion in chapter four. Here he points out that these can be further combined with subordinate suggestions. For all practical purposes, the possible types of suggestion are endless.

saṅkalanena punar asya dhvanes trayo bhedāḥ vyaṅgyasya trirūpatvāt | *tathā hi kiñcid vācyatāṃ sahate kiñcit tv anyathā* | *tatra vācyatāsaham avicitraṃ vicitraṃ ceti* | *avicitraṃ vastumātram vicitraṃ tv alaṅkārarūpam* | *yady api prādhānyena tadalaṅkāryaṃ tathāpi brāhmaṇaśramaṇanyāyena tathocyate* ||
rasādilakṣaṇas tv arthaḥ svapne 'pi na vācyaḥ | *sa hi rasādiśabdena śṛṅgārādiśabdena vābhidhīyeta* | *na cābhidhīyate* | *tatprayoge 'pi vibhāvādyaprayoge tasyāpratipattes tadaprayoge 'pi vibhāvādiprayoge tasya pratipatteś cety anvayavyatirekābhyāṃ vibhāvādyabhidhānadvāreṇaiva pratīyate iti niścīyate* | *tenāsau vyaṅgya eva* | *mukhyārthabādhādyabhāvān na punar lakṣaṇīyaḥ* || *(1245)*

(5.2. Demonstration that Suggestion is Necessary.)

In brief, there are three types of suggestive poetry, because there are three kinds of things suggested (simple objects, ornamented objects, and passions/*rasas*, etc.). Of these (three), some are denotable (simple objects and ornamented objects), while some are otherwise (passions/*rasas*, etc.). The denotable is either non-decorated or decorated. Mere facts comprise the non-decorated, while the ornaments comprise the decorated. Even though the object is principally the one embellished, it is called that (an ornament) on analogy with the brāhmaṇa-monk.

However, the meaning whose scope is *rasa*, etc., is not denotable, even in a dream.[379] (If it were) it would be denoted by the words "*rasa*," etc. or by the words "erotic," etc. But it is not so denoted. Even when you use such words, if you do not use the determinants of emotion, etc., there is no cognition of *rasa*, etc. (Furthermore,) even when you do not use such words, if you use determinants of emotion, etc., (the *rasa*, etc.) is cognized. Hence, by both negative and positive correlation, it is proven with certainty that the cognition (of *rasa*, etc.) is only brought about by the denotation of the determinants of emotion, etc.

It is not metaphorically indicated because the necessary conditions of metaphoric indication, such as the blocking of the literal meaning, are absent.

From these (considerations), it follows that *rasa*, etc., are suggested.

Comments

The maxim of the Brahman monk was introduced while discussing poem 57 in chapter four. Although a man loses caste in becoming a Buddhist monk, mention of his previous caste can still be used to distinguish him from other monks. Thus calling him a Brahman, while literally false, is permissible in an extended sense.

In this passage, Mammaṭa distinguishes denotation of non-decorated objects (mere facts) from denotation of objects qualified by some ornament. The latter objects are called "ornaments," even though they are not ornaments but rather objects ornamented, in order to distinguish them from the non-decorated objects.

[379] For this use of *lakṣaṇa*, see Monier Williams (1899:892).

The passage echoes the chapter-four summary of Abhinava's view, in particular, the claims that *rasa* is not an object and that *rasa* experience does not involve cognition of an object, either simple or complex. However, Mammaṭa makes clear that Abhinava's description applies only to the most important type of suggestion, suggestion whose psychological sequence is not cognized (e.g., suggestion of *rasa* and of certain emotions). We saw in the second half of chapter four many types of suggestion that suggest a fact or a figure, either of which could be denoted. In the rest of chapter five, Mammaṭa will try to prove that the linguistic power of suggestion is necessary for all the original eighteen types of suggestion. Furthermore, he will try to do so according to both schools of Mīmāṃsā.

Mammaṭa starts with a simplified presentation of his proof, focusing on the necessity of suggestion for *rasa*. Are other semantic powers capable of communicating *rasa*? The method of positive and negative correlation to disqualifies denotation. Not all poems that use the names of the *rasas* evoke cognition of *rasa*. Furthermore, many poems that do not explicitly mention *rasa* do evoke cognition of them. These facts show that the theory that *rasa* is denoted is both too narrow and too wide.

Mammaṭa then observes that in many poems that evoke cognition of *rasa*, the necessary conditions for metaphor are absent. Mammaṭa will develop this point while addressing the fourth objection below. For now, he only states briefly a single reason why metaphoric use of language cannot account for all *rasa* experience: *rasa* is sometimes evoked even when there is no blocking of denoted meaning.

Given that there are only three serious candidates for semantic powers (denotation, metaphoric indication, and suggestion), and given that the first two are not eligible, the semantic power that communicates *rasa* must be suggestion. Mammaṭa will now develop this eliminative argument in greater detail, considering a number of objections.

arthāntarasaṃkramitātyantatiraskṛtavācyayor vastumātrarūpaṃ vyaṅgyaṃ vinā lakṣaṇaiva na bhavatīti prāk pratipāditam | *śabdaśaktimūle tu abhidhāyā niyantraṇenānabhidheyasyārthāntarasya tena sahopamāder alaṅkārasya ca nirvivādaṃ vyaṅgatvam* | *arthaśāktimūle 'pi viśeṣe saṅketaḥ kartuṃ na yujyata iti sāmānyarūpāṇāṃ padārthānām ākāṃkṣāsannidhiyogyatāvaśāt parasparasaṃsargo yatrāpadārtho 'pi viśeṣarūpo vākyārthas tatrābhihitānvayavāde kā vārttā vyaṅgyasyābhidheyatāyām* || *(1258)*

It has been explained above (in *kārikā* 10) that a metaphor in which the literal meaning is either transferred to another meaning or completely abandoned is not possible without suggestion of a fact.

But with respect to suggestions based in the power of an individual word, any additional meaning that the literal meaning is too limited to denote undoubtedly results from suggestion. Likewise, ornaments like simile and such, when they are not denoted, result from suggestion.

According to those who hold the “relation-of-the-designated” theory *(abhihitānvayavādin)*, the sentence meaning is a unit different from the word meanings. It is the mutual relation of the word meanings, which are universal in character. The relation results from (the linguistic requirements being met, viz.,) syntactic expectation, semantic fittingness, and correct diction. As linguistic conventions cannot function with respect to individual words, how could a suggestion based on the power of the meaning of an individual word be denoted?

Comments

Mammaṭa takes up the two types of suggestion that top his list of chapter four (see above). These two are based on certain types of metaphor, which Mammaṭa claims always contain a suggestion. Mammaṭa does not repeat the argument for this claim, which filled most of the second half of the second chapter (*kārikā* 14c-18d).

Mammaṭa has just addressed his third type of suggestion in the proceeding paragraph.

Mammaṭa presents his argument that suggestions based on an individual word (type four and five) cannot be communicated by denotation. He will prove this according to both Mīmāṃsā views, and starts here with the Bhāṭṭa view. He has already introduced the “relation-of-the-designated” theory in *kārikā* 6d (see that section and comments for more details about this view as well as its rival). Mammaṭa points out that according to the Bhāṭṭa theory, denotation functions through linguistic conventions that cannot

function with respect to an individual word. Therefore, when a particular word is found to communicate a meaning, the semantic power cannot be denotation. Although Mammaṭa does not explicitly state it here, metaphoric indication never functions with respect to an individual word. This leaves only the semantic power suggestion.

He continues with the second Mīmāṃsaka view.

ye 'py āhuḥ

> *śabdavṛddhābhidheyāṃś ca pratyakṣeṇātra paśyati* |
> *śrotuś ca pratipannatvam anumānena ceṣṭayā* ||
> *anyathā 'nupapattyā tu bodhec chaktim dvayātmakām* |
> *arthāpattyā 'vabodheta sambandhaṃ tripramāṇakam* ||

iti pratipāditadiśā devadatta gām ānaya ityādy uttamavṛddhavāktaprayogād deśād deśāntaraṃ sāsnādimantam arthaṃ madyamavṛddhe nayati sati anenāsmād vākyād evaṃ vidhe 'rthaḥ pratipannaḥ iti tacceṣṭayā 'numāya tayor akhaṇḍavākyārthayor arthāpattyā vākyavācakabhāvalakṣaṇaṃ sambandham avadhārya bālas tatra vyutpadyate || *parataḥ caitra gām ānaya devadatta aśvam ānaya devadatta gāṃ naya ityādi vākyaprayoge tasya tasya śabdasya taṃ tam artham avadhārayatīti anvayavyatirekābhyāṃ pravṛttinivṛttikārivākyam eva prayogyam iti vākyasthitānām eva padānām anvitaiḥ padārthair anvitānām eva saṅketo gṛhyate iti viśiṣṭā eva padārthā vākyārtho na tu padārthāṇāṃ vaisiṣṭyam* || *(1266)*

Others (those who hold the "designation-of-the-already-related" theory *(anvitābhidhānavādin)* on the other hand) claim the following (concerning denoted meaning):

> The word, the elderly man speaking, and the object denoted are perceived here (in the process of learning) through sense perception. The listener gains understanding from the actions by inference. The twofold power (of the word to connect objects and utterances) is cognized by presumption because the situation is inexplicable otherwise. Thus the relationship (between word and meaning) is cognized by three means of knowledge.[380]

According to this account, when a **elderly man** utters a sentence like, "Devadatta, bring the cow," and a middle-aged man leads from one place to another an object with such features as a dewlap, etc., another (the student) **infers from his actions** that he (the middle-aged man) understands a certain meaning from the sentence. Then (the student) having **ascertained by presumption** the existence of a relationship of designating-designated between the whole sentence and the object understands this relationship. Thus a youth is educated. Later, when he hears such sentences used as "Caitra bring the cow," "Devadatta bring the horse," and, "Devadatta take the cow away," he comes to ascertain the meaning of this and that individual word. Thus by positive and negative

[380] No one, to my knowledge, has identified the source of this quote. Several commentators point out that it must be an *anvitābhidhānavādin.* This could be a quote from the founder of the view, Prabhākara, but it could equally be from a follower.

concomitance it is established that the sentence alone is appropriate to urge an effort to act or not to act. Because of this, the linguistic conventions (pertaining to individual words) are grasped among words related together in a sentence and objects bound together in a situation (or fact). We conclude that only the (already) qualified objects provide the sentence meaning, and not the relation of individual objects (meant by individual words).

Comments

Both schools of Mīmāṃsā accepted not only the four means of knowledge accepted by the Logicians (perception, inference, analogy, and testimony), but also a means they called "presumption". Thus the "three means of knowledge" in the quote refer to perception, inference, and presumption.

According to Prabhākara's "designation-of-the-already-related" view, humans experience only complex facts. These facts can be denoted by sentences. Language users can learn to use individual words to refer to individual objects by learning to abstract individual meanings from their complex employments. However, the objects thus referred to are considered abstract objects and words thus used have as many possible meanings as there are sentences containing them. Words need to be embedded in sentences to have specific meaning.

The distinction in the last sentence differentiates the view developed here that the meaning of a sentence is a complex fact from the view that the sentence meaning is a

relation among semantically independent units. According to Prabhākara, the complex fact consists of "already qualified objects." These objects have no independent existence and gain definite meaning when related together in a sentence.

The "designation-of-the-already-related" view is further developed in the next section.

yady apy vākyāntaraprayujyamānāny api pratyabhijñāpratyayena tāny evaitāni padāni niścīyante iti padārthāntaramātreṇānvitaḥ pardārthaḥ saṅketagocaraḥ tathāpi sāmānyāvacchādito viśeṣarūpa evāsau pratipadyate vyatiṣaktānāṃ padārthānāṃ tathābhūtatvād ity anvitābhidhānavādinaḥ | *tesām api mate sāmānyaviśeṣarūpaḥ padārthaḥ saṅketaviṣaya ity ativiśeśabhūto vākyārthāntargato 'saṅketitatvād avācya eva yatra padārthaḥ pratipadyate tatra dūre 'rthāntarabhūtasya niḥśeṣacyutety ādau vidhyādeś carcā* | *ananvito 'rtho 'bhihitānvaye padārthāntaramātreṇānvitas tv anvitābhidhāne anvitaviśeṣas tv avācya eva ity ubhayanaye 'py apadārtha eva vākyārthaḥ* || *(1277)*

These words are known to be the very same words by means of recognition, also when (they are) used in other sentences. This shows that the scope of the linguistic convention is a meaning as connected only other with other meanings (and not with particular objects like Devadatta, a cow, etc.). Nevertheless, it is the particular as qualified by a universal that is understood, because that is the very nature of mutually dependant meanings. This

is the view of those who hold the “designation-of-the-already-related” theory *(anvitābhidhānavādin).*

So on this view the referent of a linguist convention is a (complex) object, being composed (at a minimum) of a universal and a particular. Thus when the meaning (of a word) in a sentence is a particular object, it cannot be denoted because there is no linguistic convention (tying the word to this peculiar entity). And when the understood meaning is not even denoted, then the other (i.e., suggested) meaning is far (from being denoted), in such poems as, “The sandal paste is washed clean off, etc.” (Poem 2, wherein the word “wretch” refers to a peculiar man and suggests his affair with the messenger). And the above reasoning is repeated in order to show that it is not possible, on this view, to denote normative commands like injunctions, etc.

To sum up, according to those who hold the “relation-of-the-designated” theory *(abhihitānvayavādin)*, the meaning (of a word) is unrelated to (or independent from, the meaning of any other word), whereas the proponents of the “designation-of-the-already-related” theory *(anvitābhidhānavādin)* hold that the meaning (of a word) is related only to other meanings and that the unqualified particular is never denoted. So both schools agree that sentence meaning is not denoted.

Comments

The objection raised by Mammaṭa in the second paragraph (“So on this view, etc.”) builds on the related claims that all words are unsaturated and that a particular meaning

cannot be denoted by an individual word. Mammaṭa argues that if a single word has semantic content (as in the case of suggestion by a word) and denotation does not function as a power of single words, then the semantic function that communicates the meaning cannot be denotation. In other words, an additional semantic power is required to account for suggestion based on a single word. As metaphoric indication does not function on individual words, the semantic power of suggestion must be accepted.

Believers in "designation-of-the-already-related" theory hold that uninstantiated universals cannot exist. The *Saṅketaḥ* commentary reminds us of the maxim; "A universal without a particular cannot exist. Such a thing is like the horn of a rabbit." They also hold that bare particulars cannot be denoted. Mammaṭa does not commit them to any belief on the existence of bare particulars.

The point of the last sentence is to consider the remaining types of suggestion on Mammaṭa's chapter-four list. Types six to seventeen are based on sentence meaning, and both schools hold that sentence meaning is not denoted, so the additional meaning found in these poems must be communicated by means of a different semantic power. As there are examples without blocking of the literal meaning, metaphoric indication cannot account for the additional meaning. Therefore a third semantic power must be accepted: suggestion.

Finally, it follows that it is doubly impossible for denotation to account for type eighteen, which is based on both word and sentence meaning.

Having shown that neither denotation nor metaphoric indication can account for the cognitive content communicated by suggestion, Mammaṭa now turns to objections.

yad apy ucyate naimittikānusārṇa nimittāni kalpyante iti | *tatra nimittatvaṃ kārakatvaṃ jñāpakatvaṃ vā* | *śabdasya prakāśakatvān na kārakatvaṃ* | *jñāpakatvaṃ tu ajñātasya kathaṃ* | *jñātatvaṃ ca saṅketenaiva sa cānvitamātre* | *evaṃ ca nimittasya niyatanimittatvaṃ yāvan na niścitaṃ tāvan naimittikasya pratītir eva katham iti naimittikānusāreṇa nimittāni kalpyante ity avicāraitābhidhānam* || *(1286)*

(5.2.1. First Objection: A Single Semantic Power is Sufficient.)

Objection: It is said, "Causes are conceptualized according to their effects."

Reply: In the case of words, being the cause means either being the producer of the meaning or being the source of knowing the meaning. The word is not the producer of the meaning because it is the expresser of the meaning. As to being the source of knowing the meaning, how can what is unknown (make anything else known)? The word is known to have a certain meaning only by convention, and furthermore only as related to other words in a sentence. So long as the precise causal process of the cause is not known, how can its effects be known?

Thus the rule, "Causes are known in by their effects," is improperly adduced (in this case).

Comments

The objector seeks to establish that all semantic content is caused to be cognized by words, and that a single semantic power can explain all meaning. For example, if someone says, “Plato,” we understand that he is referring to the philosopher. From our understanding, which is an effect, we can infer that the word is the cause. Mammaṭa responds with the general claim that if you do not understand the causal process, you will not be able to determine exactly what effect follows from a particular cause. He then applies this claim to the case at hand, showing that the objector does not understand the linguistic causal processes, and thus has no right to call a cognition an effect of an utterance of a word. Without establishing the causal process, the objector is not justified in working backwards from the cognition to the word.

As the *Saṅketaḥ* commentary makes clear, the objector is a proponent of the “designation-of-the-already-related” theory *(anvitābhidhānavādin)*. He hopes to show that suggestion and metaphoric indication are unnecessary by means of the claim that in every case of verbally excited understanding we can infer that the words are the cause. If the causal relationship between words and meanings is uniform, there is no need for three different semantic functions.

Mammaṭa uses an aspect of the “designation-of-the-already-related” theory to refute the objector. He reminds him that conventions apply only to words already linked in a sentence. This should not be taken as an indication that he endorses the one Mīmāṃsaka view. He is simply arguing that a proponent of the “designation-of-the-

already-related" theory cannot, within the bounds of his own theory, argue against suggestion.

ye tv abhidadhati so 'yam iṣor iva dīrghadīrghataro vyāpāraḥ iti yatparaḥ śabdaḥ sa śabdārthaḥ iti ca vidhir evātra vācya iti | te 'py atātparyajñās tātparyavācoyukter devānāmpriyāḥ | tathā hi bhūtabhavyasamuccāraṇe bhūtaṃ bhavyāyopadiśyate iti kārakapadārthāḥ kriyāpadārthenānvīyamānāḥ pradhānakriyānirvartakasvakriyābhi-sambandhāt sādhyāyamānatāṃ prāpnuvanti ||
tatas cādagdhadahananyāyena yāvad aprāptaṃ tāvad vidhīyate | yathā ṛtvikpracaraṇe pramāṇāntarāt siddhe lohitoṣṇīṣā ṛtvijaḥ pracaranti ity atra lohitoṣṇīṣatvamātraṃ vidheyaṃ | havanasyānyataḥ siddheḥ dadhnā juhotī ityādau dadhyādeḥ karaṇatvamātraṃ vidheyam | kvacid ubhayavidhiḥ kvacit trividhir api yathā raktaṃ paṭaṃ vayaḥ ityādau ekavidhir dvividhir trividhir vā | tatas ca yad eva vidheyaṃ tatraiva tātparyam ity upāttasyaiva śabdasyārthe tātparyan na tu pratītamātre | evaṃ hi pūrvo dhāvatītyād āvaparādyarthe 'pi kvacit tātparyaṃ syāt | (1292)

(5.2.2. Second Objection: Denotation is Sufficient.)

Objection: It is said, "The function (of a word) is like an arrow; it goes on and on (until it reaches the intended meaning)." And, "That which a word intends is its literal meaning." Thus in the case of poem 2, the literal meaning is the assertion (that the messenger did go see and make love to the woman's lover).

Reply: You are silly and do not understanding the theory of intended meaning according to the true view. On this it is said, "When the object and the action are mentioned together, the object is governed by the action." Thus when substantives are related to verbs they gain the character of being a necessary part of that which is to be asserted (*sādhyāyamānatāṃ*) because their own action helps the principal action. Therefore, following the maxim, "Burn the unburned," that which is not established is asserted. For example, when it is already established by some other source that the priests are walking, the assertion, "The priests with red headbands are walking," only asserts (that the priests) have red headbands. Likewise, when it is established elsewhere that there is an offering, a statement like, "Offer curd," only asserts the instrument, in this case, curd.

Sometimes (however), an assertion is double or triple. For example, "Weave some red cloth," is either a single, double, or triple assertion (depending on what is already established).

Thus only what is asserted is the intended meaning of a sentence. Thus there is intended meaning only in the meaning of the given words, not in what is merely acknowledged (to have some connection with the words). If it were otherwise, the intended meaning of "The follower runs," could be even something like, "The leader runs."

Comments

The objection is raised by a proponent of the "designation-of-the-already-related" theory *(anvitābhidhānavādin)*. It puts forth the claim that denotation is capable of conveying several meanings, as a single arrow is able to pierce several things. However, as Mammaṭa points out, the theory was developed to explain a different linguistic phenomenon. If one tries to apply it to suggested meaning, anything will be able to suggest anything else. Abhinava considers the same objection at greater length, claiming that such a scholar might as well claim to be the child of his great-grandson.[381] The objector neglects the generally accepted opinion that denotation works by linguistic convention. The fact is that there is no convention for most suggestions.

yat tu viṣaṃ bhakśaya mā cāsya gṛhe bhuṅkthāḥ ity atra etadgṛhe na bhoktavyam ity atra tātparyam iti sa eva vākyārtha iti ucyate tatra cakāra ekavākyatāsūcanārthaḥ | *na cākhyātavākyayor dvayor aṅgāṅgibhāva iti viṣabhakṣaṇavākyasya suhṛdvākyatvenāṅgatā kalpanīyeti viṣabhakṣaṇād api duṣṭam etadgṛhe bhojanam iti sarvathā māsya gṛhe bhuṅkthāḥ ity upāttaśabdārthe eva tātparyam* | *(1303)*

(5.2.3. Third Objection: The Power of the Speaker's Intended Meaning Is Sufficient.)

Objection: "Do not eat in that house" is the intended meaning of the sentence, "Eat poison and do not eat in his house." And this intended meaning alone is the meaning of the sentence.

[381] Ingalls, et al. (1990:89).

Reply: The word "and" serves to express the unity of the sentence. Given that the verb structure makes neither phrase dependant, one understands the phrase, "eat poison" to be subordinate because it is pronounced by a friend. Thus, the intended meaning is, "Eating in that house is worse than eating poison; therefore, never eat in that house." And this intended meaning is just the meaning of the given words.

Comments

The objector shows that the literal meaning of the given sentence is dual (Eat poison *and* do not eat in that house), while the intended prohibition is singular (Do not eat in that house). It is assumed that the singular prohibition must result from a linguistic process different from denotation, namely semantic power of the speaker's intended meaning (*tātparyavṛtti*). If this semantic power is allowed, why not explain all suggested meaning as intended meaning?

The reply is lengthy and will occupy several sections. Mammaṭa raises many counter-objections to the theory that intended meaning alone can account for all poetic suggestion. The first reply attempts to show that the power of intended meaning serves to complete the literal meaning, not give a suggested meaning. The theory of intended meaning was developed primarily to resolve cases of ambiguity. If the hearer cannot determine which of the two literal meaning is expressed, an obvious solution is to ask the speaker which he meant. The response would reveal the speaker's intended meaning. The intended meaning is derived from the meaning of the words, it is a tool for reducing

meaning, not adding it. In the current example, either sentence could be the desired injunction. If pronounced by an enemy, "Eat poison," would be the intended meaning. The key claim, "because pronounced by a friend," shows that, "Do not eat in that house," is the intended meaning. Thus, the prohibition arrived at is the intended meaning of the sentence.

Mammaṭa is attempting to prove that suggestion cannot be explained by intended meaning. By showing that intended meaning always follows from the words themselves, he shows that it cannot account for the suggested meanings. The intended prohibition could also have asuggested meaning, such as, "The man living there, who you thought was your friend is really your enemy." This can only be attained after a proper understanding of the intended meaning. As in the previous objection, a semantic power is believed to exhaust itself in a single meaning. So in this case, the power of intended meaning could not communicate the prohibition and then go on to communicate the suggestion as well.

Mammaṭa may be presenting the view of Dhanaṃjaya and his commentator Dhanika in this section. They reject the principle that a semantic power can only communicate a single meaning, and thus hold that intended meaning is sufficient to account for all suggested meanings.[382] According to Kunjunni Raja, some later theorists use intended meaning and suggested meaning interchangeably.[383] He does not specify

[382] Kunjunni Raja (1969:302).
[383] Kunjunni Raja (1969:302).

who is referring to, but it cannot be Jagannātha. Mammaṭa seems correct to insist that these two semantic powers, having different objectives, should be kept separate.

yadi ca śabdaśruter anantaraṃ yāvān artho labhyate tāvati śabdasyābhidhaiva vyāpāraḥ tataḥ kathaṃ brāhmaṇa putras te jātaḥ brāhmaṇa kanyā te garbhiṇī ityādau harṣaśokādīnām api na vācyatvam | kasmāc ca lakṣaṇā lakṣaṇīye 'py arthe dīrghadīrghatarābhidhāvācyapāreṇaiva pratītisiddheḥ | kim iti ca śrutiliṅgavākyaprakaraṇasthānasamākhyānāṃ pūrvapūrvabalīyastvam ity anvitābhidhānavāde 'pi vidher api siddhaṃ vyaṅgyatvam || (1308)

If any meaning cognized upon hearing a word were caused by the denotative function of the word, why would joy and sorrow not also be among the literal meanings of "O brahman, a son is born to you" and "O brahman, your unwed daughter is pregnant" respectively? And why is there metaphorical indication? You would get the indicated meaning too by the far-reaching power of denotation. Finally, why is there stepwise decreasing authority in the following: Vedic declaration, indication, syntactical connection, context, position, and name? From the proceeding it is established that the assertion (that she has been to the lover in poem 2) is established by suggestion according to the "designation-of-the-already-related" theory.

Comments

Mammaṭa continues his counterattack on those who hold that suggestion is otiose. There are three untoward consequences to the objector's version of the "designation-of-the-already-related" theory. First, the emotional response of the listener would become part of the literal meaning. Second, there would be no reason to admit indication, but Bhāṭṭas do. And third, the Mīmāṃsaka hierarchy of reliability (essential to resolving ambiguity in the Vedic texts) would become unjustifiable on the thesis that all sources of meaning are denotative. Once again, Mammaṭa is less interested in establishing or refuting the "designation-of-the-already-related" theory than in showing that its followers must also admit suggestion.

kiñ ca kuru rucim iti padayor vaiparītye kāvyāntarvartinī kathaṃ duṣṭatvam | *na hy atrāsabhyo 'rthaḥ padārthāntarair anvitaḥ ity anabhidheya eveti evam ādi aparityājyaṃ syāt* ||

yadi ca vācyavācakatvavyatirekeṇa vyaṅgyavyañjakabhāvo nābhyupeyate tadāsādhutvādīnāṃ nityadoṣatvaṃ kaṣṭatvādīnām anityadoṣatvam iti vibhāgakaraṇam anupapannaṃ syāt | *na cānupapannaṃ sarvasyaiva vibhaktatayā pratibhāsāt* | *vācyavācakabhāvavyatirekeṇa vyaṅgyavyañjakatāśrayaṇe tu vyaṅgyasya bahuvidhatvāt kvacid eva kasyacid evaucityenopapadyata eva vibhāgavyavasthā* ||

dvayaṃ gataṃ samprati śocanīyatāṃ samāgamaprārthanayā kapālinaḥ |

kalā ca sā kāntimatī kalāvatas tvam asya lokasya ca netrakaumudī ||[384]

ityadau pinākyādipadavailakṣaṇyena kim iti kapālyādipadānāṃ kāvyānuguṇatvaṃ || *(1337)*

Moreover, why is the inversion of the expression "having the pleasure" a defect in a poem? For in this case, the indecent meaning is not connected with the other words and so is not denoted. Therefore there should be no reason for avoiding such an expression.

Moreover, if one does not accept the existence of suggestion distinct from denotation, then it would be impossible to make the distinction between mistakes that are always errors *(nityadoṣatvam)*, such as faulty grammar, and the mistakes that are only mistakes because of the given context *(anityadoṣatvam)*, like harshness. But the possibility (of making this distinction) is manifestly evident to everyone. When one accepts suggestion, as distinct from denotation, such a division into different types is possible because many things are asserted though suggestion, only some of which are appropriate to a given situation.

Both have now become pitiful through desire for
Union with the holder of the begging bowl.
The brilliant sliver moon
And you — moonlight in the eyes of the people. (132.5)[385]

[384] I have changed *pinākinaḥ* to *kapālinaḥ* and added the second half of this verse following Maheśwar's Ādarśaḥ commentary (Mohan 1344). As Mammaṭa does not usually present half a verse, I suspect the text is corrupt here. However, if this is the case, it must have happened fairly early, for neither Jha and Dwivedi have the second line. On the other hand, both have the *kapālinaḥ* reading, which is clearly more suited to the argument in the following line.

[385] I have numbered this verse 132.5 to keep my numbers in agreement with Mohan, Dwivedi, and Jha, who all fail to number this verse.

In this poem, for example, (if you do not admit suggestion) why should the expression "the holder of the begging bowl" be poetically more appropriate than an expression like "the holder of the trident" (whose referent is the same god)?

Comments

The inversion of *kuru ruchim* "having the pleasure" is *ruchiṅkuru*. Although this inversion has the same denotation, in the middle of this combination is the word *"chiṅku,"* which is apparently a vulgar word for the female genitals.[386] As Mammaṭa points out, the word, embedded by the chance meeting of two other words, is not syntactically connected to the sentence, and thus could not be denoted (much less implied) on the "designation-of-the-already-related" theory. Thus this Mīmāṃsaka camp would have no way to explain how such a phrase would be a fault in poetry.

The second part of the passage asserts that without suggestion there is no way to distinguish the two faults, the unchanging and the occasional. Unchanging faults consist of incorrect syntax or word choice (on a literal level). Occasional faults comprise errors based on choosing a word with inappropriate suggestions. The word is literally correct, but a poetic blunder. Mammaṭa gives as an example a poem that uses the epithet "the holder of the begging bowl" to refer to Śiva. The poet could have used a different epithet without making a literal mistake. Indeed, the two epithets given after the poem have the same referent (Śiva) and the same metrical value, so if there is no semantic power other

[386] Jha (1925:146). I could not find this word in the standard dictionaries.

than denotation, they should be equivalent. However, “the holder of the begging bowl” suggests a poverty that reinforces the emotion of pitifulness, whereas “the holder of the trident” suggests a bellicosity entirely out of place with the sentiment of the verse. Thus the first is recognized to be poetically appropriate, while use of the second would constitute an occasional fault (occasional because in another poem the epitaph might be appropriate). Again, the main point is that without suggestion there is no way to account for a great number of distinctions that are poetically important.

api ca vācyo 'rthaḥ sarvān pratipattṛn prati ekarūpa eveti niyato 'sau | *na hi gato 'stam arkaḥ ityādau vāckyo 'rthaḥ kvacid anyathā bhavati* | *pratīyamānas tu tattatprakaraṇavaktṛpratipattrādiviśeṣasahāyatayā nānātvaṃ bhajate* | *tathā ca gato 'stam arkaḥ ity ataḥ sapatnaṃ pratyavaskandanāvasara iti abhisaraṇam upakramyatām iti praptaprāyas te preyān iti karmakaraṇān nivartāmaha iti sāndhyo vidhir upakramyatām iti dūraṃ mā gā iti surabhayo gṛhaṃ praveṣyantām iti santāpo 'dhunā na bhavatīti vikreyavastūni saṃhriyantām iti nāgato 'dyāpi preyān ityādir anavadhir vyaṅgyo 'rthas tatra pratibhāti* || *(1346)*

The literal meaning is uniform because it is always the same to everyone who understands (the word or phrase). The literal meaning of “The sun has set” is never different. But its cognized meaning varies according to the specific conditions (of its use), such as the particular context, the person saying it, the person hearing it, etc. So in the case of “The sun has set,” unlimited suggested meanings arise in various contexts:

"Now is the time to attack the enemy," "You should go meet your lover," "Your lover is about to come," "We shall stop our work," "Let us begin the vespers," "Don't go far," "Bring the cows to their shed," "He will no longer suffer from heat," "Let us pack up our goods," and "Even today my love has not returned."

Comments

The intended meaning completes the literal meaning by removing ambiguity. Mammaṭa shows that suggestion meaning works in the opposite direction. There is no ambiguity in the sentence, "The sun has set." The denotation is clear. Suggestion accounts for the varied connotations a sentence can have in different context by adding a level of meaning beyond the denoted.

vācyavyaṅgyayoḥ niḥśeṣetyādau niṣedhaviḍhyātmanā ||

> *mātsaryam utsārya vicārya kāryam āryāḥ samaryādam udāharantu* |
> *sevyā nitambāḥ kim u bhūdharāṇām uta smarasmeravilāsinīnām* ||

ityādau saṃśayaśāntaśṛṅgāryantaragataniścayarūpeṇa |

> *katham avanipa darpo yanniśātāsidhārā-*
> *dalanagalitamūrdhnā vidviṣāṃ svīkṛtā śrīḥ* |
> *nanu tava nihatārer apy asau kiṃ na nītā*
> *tridivam apagatāṅgair vallabhā kīrtir ebhiḥ* ||

ityādau nindāstutivapuṣā svarūpasya | *pūrvapaścādbhāvena pratīteḥ kālasya* | *śabdāśrayatvena śabdatadekadeśatadarthavarṇasaṃghatanāśrāyatvena ca āśrayasya* | *śabdānuśāsanajñānena prakaraṇādisahāyapratibhānair malyasahitena tena cāvagama*

iti nimittasya | boddṛmātravidagdhavyapadeśayoḥ pratītimātracamatkṛtyoś ca karaṇāt kāryasya | gato 'stam arka ityādau pradarśitanayena saṃkhyāyāḥ |

> *kassa vā ṇā hoi roi roso daḍṭhūṇa piāi savvaṇaṃ aharaṃ |*
> *sabhamarapaḍamagghāiṇi vāriavāme sahasu eṃṇiha ||*[387]

ityādau sakhītatkāntādigatatvena viṣayasya ca | bhede 'pi yady ekatvaṃ tat kvacid api nīlapītādau bhedo na syāt | uktaṃ hi ayam eva hi bhedo bhedahetur vā yadviruddhadharmādhyāsaḥ kāraṇabhedaś ca iti || (1351)

In verse two, for example, the literal and suggested meanings have the nature of denial and affirmation (that the messenger went to see the lover).

> After giving due thought to morality
> And freeing yourself from partiality,
> Tell us, O noble one,
> Is it better to live on barren mountain slopes,
> Or to enjoy the buttocks of eager, smiling, love-filled girls? (133)[388]

In verses like this one, the literal meaning expresses indecision between religious peace and erotic pleasure, while the suggested meaning is certainty (as to which is better).

> Your sword's sharp edge cut off their heads!
> But why be proud of earthly spoils?
> For even as they did lose their limbs,
> Your rivals carried off to heaven
> Your much loved fame. (134)

---

[387] The *Sampradāyaprakāśinī* commentary has the following Sanskrit translation:
> kasyaiva na bhavati roṣo dṛṣṭvā priyāyāḥ savraṇamadharam |
> sabhramarapadmādhrāṇanaśīle vāritavāme sahasvedānīm ||

[388] *Śṛṅgāraśataka* 36 (D). In a different context one could give a much more ribald translation of this poem. The pun is in the expression *sevyā nitambhāḥ* which can mean "living of the slopes" or "enjoying (having intercourse with) the buttocks."

In verses like this the literal meaning is blame but the suggested meaning is praise. The expressed meaning and the suggested meaning are also distinct in point of time, for the expressed meaning comes before the suggested. They are also distinct in terms of medium, for the expressed meaning is conveyed by words, whereas the suggested meaning is conveyed by words, parts of words, the meanings of words, the letters, and the sound patterns. They are further distinct in terms of their ground; literal meaning is grounded in knowledge of the rules governing a language, whereas suggested meaning is grounded in cognition of the context and other supplementary conditions, as well as in knowledge of linguistic rules. They are also distinct in their effects, the literal meaning causes knowledge of the denoted in all who understand it, while the suggested meaning brings pleasure to the cultured alone. The fact they are distinct in terms of number has already been shown with the example of "The sun has set."

> Who wouldn't be enraged
> To see his wife with such swollen lips?
> I told you not to smell the lotus with the bee in it.
> Look how you suffer now! (135)[389]

(Finally) they are distinct in terms of intended audience. This poem, for example, is literally directed at the girlfriend, but her lover is the intended audience of the suggested meaning (that the girl has not been bitten by another lover). If denotation and suggestion are one despite these differences, then even blue and yellow are not different. On this it is said, "There is difference, or the justification of difference, just in case there is difference in properties and difference in cause."

[389] This verse is cited in the *Dhvanyāloka* 3.6 and translated by Ingalls, et al. (1990:403).

Comments

Mammaṭa gives four examples in which the literal meaning and the suggested meaning oppose one another. In all four, there is no way to reduce the suggested meaning to the literal meaning. The first example states one thing and suggests the opposite. The second poem has the form of a rhetorical question: "Is it better, etc.?" The answer is suggested by the repellent description of the mountains and the appealing description of the women.[390]

The third poem has the form of a reproach, but the suggestion is that the king's fame will reach even heaven. That this suggestion is achieved by a blocking of the literal sense (stealing fame), does not obscure Mammaṭa's point. The ironic blame is not blocked, so the literal and suggested meanings remain distinct.

The fourth poem portrays a friend trying to help a woman deceive her husband. The words are spoken to the woman, but are intended to be overheard by her husband. The friend hopes to undermine the husband's legitimate belief that another man has been violently kissing his wife by providing an alternate explanation for her swollen lips. Thus the suggestion (she has not been sleeping around) is distinct from the literal meaning (she was stung).

vācakānām arthāpekṣā vyañjakānān tu na tadapekṣatvam iti na vācakatvam eva vyañjakatvam | *kiñca vāṇīr akuṅgv ityādau pratīyamānām artham abhivyajya vācyaṃ*

[390] Jha claims that the suggested meaning depends on the character of either the speaker or the hearer (1925:150). However, one does not need to know either's character to understand the suggestion.

svarūpa eva yatra viśrāmyati tatra guṇībhūtavyaṅgye 'tātparyabhūto 'py arthaḥ svaśabdānabhidheyaḥ pratītipatham avataran kasya vyāpārasya viṣayatām avalambatām iti | *(1364)*

Literal words depend on a (fixed) meaning, but suggestive ones do not (always) depend on a (fixed) meaning; thus suggestion is not mere denotation.

In some poems of subordinate suggestion, such as poem 132, the literal meaning remains primary even after yielding the suggested meaning. The non-denoted (i.e., suggested) meaning is cognized, even though it falls outside the (literal) import of the words. By what semantic function is it communicated (if suggestion is denied)?

Comments

This concludes the demonstration that suggested meaning is distinct from intended literal meaning. With "The sun has set" and the like, literal meaning is fixed by convention, while suggested meaning is not. The open nature of suggestion allows for poetic creativity. Mammaṭa now turns to other objections against admitting suggestion as a separate semantic power.

nanu rāmo 'sti sarvaṃ sahe iti rāmeṇa priyajīvitena tu kṛtaṃ premṇaḥ priye nocitam iti rāmo 'sau bhuvaneṣu vikramaguṇaiḥ prāptaḥ prasiddhiṃ parām ityādau lakṣaṇīyo 'py artho nānātvaṃ bhajate viśeṣavyapadeśahetuś ca bhavati | *tadavagamaś ca śabdārthāyattaḥ prakaraṇādisavyapekṣaś ceti ko 'yaṃ nūtanaḥ pratīyamāno nāma* ||

ucyate lakṣaṇīyasyārthasya nānātve 'pi anekārthaśabdābhidheyavan niyatatvam eva | na khalu mukhyenārthenāniyatasambandho lakṣayituṃ śakyate | pratīyamānas tu prakaraṇādiviśeṣayavaśena niyatasambandhaḥ aniyatasambandhaḥ sambandhasambaddhaś ca dyotyate ||

na ca

> *attā ettha ṇimajjai ettha ahaṃ diahae paloehi |*
> *mā pahia rattiandhaa sejjāe maha ṇimajjahisi ||*[391]

ityādau vivakṣitānyaparavācye dvanau mukhyārthabādhaḥ tat katham atra lakṣaṇā | lakṣaṇāyām api vyañjanam avaśyam āśrayitavyam iti pratipāditam | yathā ca samayasavyapekṣā abhidhā tathā mukhyārthabādhāditrayasamayaviśeṣasavyapekṣā lakṣaṇā | ata evābhidhāpucchabhūtā setyāhuḥ || (1370)

(5.2.4. Fourth Objection: Metaphorical Indication is Sufficient.)

Objection: In sentences like, “I am Rāma, I will endure everything,” and, “O beloved! What is proper in love was not done by Rāma, who loves his own life,” and, “Rāma, who has obtained universal fame in the worlds through his great valor,” even the metaphorically indicated sense becomes manifold and fits the various categories (of suggestion). It is known by means of the words and their meanings and requires knowledge of supplementary conditions like context, etc. So why this new thing called suggestion?

---

[391] The *Saṅketaḥ* commentary offer the following Sanskrit translation:

> śvaśrūratra śete atrāhaṃ divasaṃ pralokaya |
> mā pathika rātryandha śayyāyāṃ mama śayiṣṭhāḥ ||

Reply: Even when the metaphorically indicated meanings are manifold, they are limited, like homonymous words. Furthermore, a word is not capable of indicating something that has no relation to the primary meaning. But suggestion, by means of context and other supplementary conditions, can be with or without a definite relation to the literal meaning, as well as related to the literal meaning by a chain of relations.

> My mother in-law sleeps over here,
> Look well in the light! I sleep over here.
> Blinded by the night, O traveler,
> You must not tumble into my bed. (136)[392]

In poems like this, where the suggestion comes from the literal meaning giving another meaning (as well), the primary meaning is not blocked. So how could this be indication? And we have already shown (in chapter 2) that even in indication, suggestion must play a role. Moreover, just as denotation is dependent on linguistic convention, so indication is dependent on the particular conventions of the three conditions: the blocking of the primary meaning, etc. For this very reason, it is called the tail of denotation.

Comments

At the end of the passage Mammaṭa reminds the reader that the functioning of metaphoric indication requires three conditions: blocking of the literal meaning, a related alternative meaning, and a motive. It is called the tail of denotation because it comes after, yet is related to, the literal meaning. With this in mind, let us look at the debate.

[392] *Gāthāsaptaśatī* 7.67. This verse is cited in the *Dhvanyāloka* and translated by Ingalls, et al. (1990:98).

The objector claims that the semantic power of metaphoric indication has many of the properties that were assigned to suggestion in the previous section, and that it results from the same set of causes. The hope is that by showing that all its distinguishing features are shared by indication, suggestion will be seen as otiose.

Mammaṭa brings up a series of objections to this strategy. First, the scope of metaphorical indication is smaller than that of suggestion. Second, there needs to be a definite relation between the two parts of a metaphor, whereas suggestion can work without a relation, with a relation, or with a series of relations between the two meanings. Third, metaphor requires a blocking of the literal meaning, whereas suggestion does not. The third difference is illustrated by the poem, where the suggestion is that the traveler *should* tumble into her bed. Fourth, metaphor requires suggestion, because the motive of indirect speech is often to suggest something. Fifth, metaphor stands in a different relation to the literal meaning than suggestion. For all these reason, the desired parallel between metaphor and suggestion is not established.

Mammaṭa continues to develop his objections in the next section.

na ca lakṣaṇātmakam eva dvananaṃ tadanugamena tasya darśanāt | *na ca tadanugatam eva abhidhāvalambanenāpi tasya bhāvāt* | *na cobhayānusāry eva avācakavarṇānusāreṇāpi tasya dṛṣṭeḥ* | *na ca śabdānusāry eva aśabdātmakanetratribhāgāvalokanādigatatvenāpi tasya prasiddheḥ iti abhidhātātparyalakṣaṇātmakavyāpāratrayātivarttī dvananādiparyāyo vyāpāro 'napahnavanīya eva* ||

tatra attā ettha ityādau niyatasambandhaḥ | *kassa vāṇa hoi raso ityādāv aniyatasambandhaḥ* |

> *viparīarae lacchī bramhaṃ daṭṭhūṇa ṇāhikamalaṭṭhaṃ* |
> *hariṇo dāhiṇaṇaaṇaṃ rasāulā itti ḍakkei* ||[393]

ityādau sambaddhasambandhaḥ | *atra hi haripadena daksiṇanayanasya sūryātmakatā vyajyate tan nimīlanena sūryās tamayaḥ* | *tena padmasya saṃkocaḥ* | *tato brahmaṇaḥ sthaganaṃ* | *tatra sati gopy āṅgasyādarśanena aniryantraṇaṃ nidhuvanavilasitam iti* || *(1383)*

Furthermore, suggestion is not identical to metaphoric indication, because it is seen to arise from metaphoric indication. But suggestion does not always arise from metaphoric indication, for it can also be based on denotation. It also does not always arise from these two (indication and denotation), for it is seen to follow from the letters, which are not themselves denotative. It is not even the case that suggestion is always verbal; sometimes it appears even in glances from the corner of the eye, which are non-verbal in nature. For these reasons, one should not refuse a semantic function called suggestion, or some synonym, which is beyond the three semantic powers of denotation, intended meaning, and metaphoric indication.

In verse 136, the connection (between the suggested meaning and the literal meaning) is fixed (*niyata*). In verse 135, the connection is indefinite (*aniyata*).

---

[393] The *Darpaṇaḥ* commentary translates as follows: viparīarae - viparītasurate, lacchī - lakṣmīḥ, bamhaṃ - brāhmāṇaṃ, daṭṭhūṇa - dṛṣṭvā, ṇāhikamalaṭṭhaṃ - nābhikamalasthaṃ, hariṇo - hareḥ, dāhiṇaṇaaṇaṃ - dakṣiṇanayanaṃ, rasāulā - rasākulā, itti ḍakkei - iṭiti sthagayati ||

Full of sexual pleasure astride Hari,
Lakṣmī saw Brahmā in his navel-lotus
But quickly shut her husband's right eye. (137)[394]

In poems like this the literal and suggested meanings are connected by a chain of relations. Here the word **Hari** suggests that his right eye is the sun. The closing of this eye suggests sunset. Sunset suggests the closing of the lotus, which suggests that Brahmā is covered. With her private part unseen, the final suggestion is that Lakṣmī can fornicate without restraint.

Comments

Mammaṭa continues the list of suggestion distinctive features from the previous section: the suggested meaning often arises after the metaphoric meaning, showing the two are different. Suggested meaning can arise in sentences with no metaphor, showing there is no concomitance between them. Indeed, it can arise from linguistic phenomena that are not semantic, or even from non-verbal phenomena.

Before he moves on to other objections, Mammaṭa develops his claim that, "suggestion can be with or without a definite relation (to the literal meaning), as well as related (to the literal meaning) by a chain of relations." He gives poem 136 as an example of a definite relation. The literal meaning "don't tumble into my bed" is negated by the suggested meaning "do tumble into my bed." Thus the two stand in the relation of opposites. The two meanings of poem 135, however, stand in no clear relation. The literal

[394] *Vajjalaggam* 661 (D).

meaning “she has been stung by a bee” is an alternate explanation for the state of her lips. The suggested meaning “her lips were not worn out in sex” stands in no logical relation to the literal meaning.

Poem 137 is Mammaṭa’s example of a suggestion working through a series of relationships. Understanding the poem requires some background. Hari, literally tawny or yellow, is a name for Viṣṇu. Viṣṇu’s right eye is the sun and out of his navel grows a lotus, within which sit Brahmā. Lotuses close up at night. Lakṣmī feels timid having sex with Viṣṇu in the presence of Brahmā. With all this in mind, the sequence of suggestions is easy to follow: The shutting of Viṣṇu’s eye suggest sunset; sunset suggests the closing of the lotus; the closing of the lotus suggests that Brahmā will no longer be able to see Lakṣmī; being unseen suggests that Lakṣmī will be able to enjoy having sex.

akhyaṇḍabuddhinirgrāhyo vākyārtha eve vācyaḥ vākyam eva ca vācakam iti ye 'pi āhuḥ | *tair apy avidyāpadapatitaiḥ padapadārthakalpanā kartavyaiveti tatpakṣe 'py avaśyam uktodāharaṇādau vidhyādivyaṅgya eva* || *(1394)*

(5.2.5. Fifth Objection: Denotation of the Sentence is Sufficient.)

Objection: The sentence meaning, grasped in an undivided cognition, is the literal meaning. Only the sentence can denote.

Reply: Even you (Vedāntins), when you descend to the realm of illusion, make the assumption that words and word meanings exist. Thus, even on your view, in the example given above (poem 2), the affirmation is suggested.

Comments

Mammaṭa gives short shrift to the theory that only the entire sentence is denoted. The theory is so briefly stated that it is difficult to identify with certainty. Given Mammaṭa's reply, the objection probably comes from a Vedāntin. The *Bālacittānurañjanīḥ* commentary attributes it to a Vedāntin (*brahmavādin*).[395] The famous Vedāntin Rāmānuja held that all words denote Brahmā. The objector seems to hold that reality is one and that the only true statements point to this fact. All perception of division is illusory, so all descriptions of limited facts are false. Thus individual words have no veridical application. Mammaṭa replies that this theory cannot explain everyday linguistic phenomena. Indeed, the subject at hand is poetry, not metaphysics. Even if poetry is ultimately false its structure and types can be described. In doing so, we need a more robust theory of meaning than the objector admits.

nanu vācyād asambaddhaṃ tāvan na pratīyate yataḥ kutaścit yasya kasyacid arthasya pratīteḥ prasaṅgāt | *evaṃ ca sambandhāt vyaṅgyavyañjakabhāvo 'pratibandhe 'vaśyaṃ na bhavatīti vyāptatvena niyatadharminiṣṭhatvena ca trirūpāl liṅgāl liṅgijñānam anumānaṃ yat tadrūpaḥ paryavasyati* | *tathā hi*

[395] Mohan (1997:1395).

bhama dhammia vīsaddho so suṇaho ajja mārio teṇa |
golāaḍavaiḍakuḍaṅgavāsiṇā dariasīheṇa ||[396]

atra gṛhe śvanivṛttyā bhramaṇaṃ vihitaṃ godāvarītīre siṃhopalabdher abhramaṇam anumāpayati | yat yat bhīrubhramaṇaṃ tat tad bhayakaraṇanivṛttyupalabdhipūrvakaṃ | godāvarītīre ca siṃhopalabdhir iti vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhiḥ || (1394)

atrocyate bhīrur api guroḥ prabhor vā nideśena priyānurāgeṇa anyena caivaṃ bhūtena hetunā saty api bhayakāraṇe bhramatīty anaikāntiko hetuḥ | śuno vibhyad api vīratvena siṃhān na vibhetīti viruddo 'pi | godāvarītīre siṃhasadbhāvaḥ pratyakṣād anumānād vā na niścitaḥ api tu vacanāt na ca vacanasya prāmāṇyam asti | arthenāpratibandhād ity asiddhaś ca tat katham evaṃ vidhād dhetoḥ sādhyasiddhiḥ | tātha niḥśeṣacyutetyādau gamakatayā yāni candanacyavanādīny upāttāni tāni karaṇāntarato 'pi bhavanti ataś catraiva snānakāryatvenoktānīti nopabhoge eva pratibaddhānīty anaikāntikāni ||

vyaktivādinā cādhamapadasahāyānām eṣāṃ vyañjakatvam uktam | na cātrādhamatvaṃ pramāṇapratipannam iti katham anumānaṃ ||

evaṃ vidhād arthād evaṃ vidho 'rtha upapatty anapekṣatve 'pi prakāśate iti vyaktivādināḥ punas tat adūṣaṇām ||

(5.2.6. Sixth Objection: The Nyāya View that Inference is Sufficient.)

Objection: Something unrelated to the literal meaning is not cognized, or else there would be the untoward consequence that any meaning could be cognized in any which

---

[396] Ingalls (ibid.) gives the following Sanskrit translation:
bhrama dhārmika viśradbhaḥ sa śunako 'dya māritas tena |
godāvarītaṭavikaṭakuñjavāsinā daryasiṃheṇa ||

way. And because of (the necessity of) a relation, suggestion is not possible without a connection (to the literal meaning). There is cognition of what you want to establish by means of a concomitance with a law-bound prover having the required three characteristics. An inference of such a form is established (as the real cause of "suggested" meaning). To illustrate:

> Go your rounds freely, gentle monk.
> That dog has been killed today
> By the fierce lion that
> Lives in the thickets of the Godāvarī. (138)[397]

Here the encouragement to wander the banks of the Godāvarī because of the removal of the dog in the house leads the monk to infer that he should not wander, because the assertion also teaches him about the lion. A coward wanders only if he already knows that the cause of fear is gone. In the case of wandering on the banks of the Godāvarī, the lion-knowledge is contrary to the consequent of the above conditional. (Thus the knowledge that he should not wander is inferred, not suggested.)

Reply: Even a coward wanders in dangerous places when ordered by his teacher or master, or from love of his wife, or some other cause; thus the prover is deviating. Even though the man addressed is scared of the dog, because he is a hero he may not be afraid of a lion; thus the prover is contradictory. The presence of a lion on the bank of the Godāvarī is not established through perception or inference, but merely through words that are not a source of knowledge. Because the (putative) prover is thus not (known to

[397] I have followed Ingalls, et al., who follows the Weber edition of the *Sattasaī* (1990:83). Dwivedi identifies the poem as *Gāthāsaptaśatī* 2.75 (1977:182).

be) connected with the object, it is not established (as a true prover). How could such a (faulty) prover establish the desired conclusion?

In poem 2, the inferential marks, like the sandal paste being removed, could also be caused by something else. In fact, in this poem they are said to be the effects of a bath; thus they are not invariably related to sexual dalliance.

The upholders of suggestion have explained the suggestiveness of these marks together with the word "wretch." And here the wretchedness is not established by a valid source of knowledge. So how could there be inference?

You claim that (if the theory of suggestion were true) any meaning could flash forth from any other meaning without regard to reason. The upholders of suggestion do not take this to be a problem.

Comments

Mammaṭa presents the Nyāya attack on suggestion. The Naiyāyikas agree that there are two linguistic powers, denotation and metaphoric indication. Moreover, they claim that inference can provide a great deal more additional information than most people realize. They try to make explicit the (often unconscious) reasoning we employ to establish our beliefs. In particular, they argue that no additional semantic power is necessary to understand poetry. Although already established in the ninth century, this theory is most forcefully set out by Mammaṭa's contemporary, Mahimabhaṭṭa.[398]

[398] Ānandavardhana replies to the Nyāya objection in the ninth century. Despite the fact that Mammaṭa and Mahimabhaṭṭa both probably hailed from Kashmir, there is no evidence that they knew each other.

Mahimabhaṭṭa argues that any additional meaning "suggested" by a poem can be deduced from the literal meaning by the ordinary process of inference. Inference is based in the inference grounding-pervasion (*vyāpti*) by property to be proved (*sādhya*) of the prover property (*sādhana*) and the presence of the prover in the inferential subject (*pakṣa*).[399] The inferential subject in the case of poetry is a certain verse, the prover property is "having literal meaning," the property to be proved is, "having the desired additional meaning." Mahimabhaṭṭa argues that the pervasion can be established by non-cognition (*anupalabdhi*) of additional meaning in the absence of literal meaning, identity (*tādātmya*) of the locus of the literal and the supplementary meanings, and causation (*tadutpatti*) of the cognition of the supplementary meaning by the literal meaning.[400]

The objector gives one example of how inference functions in his analysis of the poem. He shows how the "suggested meaning" is a complex web of inferred information. The prover property is the literal meaning of the poem. The property to be proved is, "not desiring to go into the reeds by the river." The objector asserts that if the monk is afraid of a dog, he is also afraid of lions. There is an implicit rule of pervasion: anyone afraid of dogs is also afraid of lions. Thus that the absence of fear that should arise from the absence of the dog is replaced by a fear of the lion. The second rule of pervasion is: where one is afraid to go, there one does not go. The conclusion is that the monk will not go to the river because he is afraid of the lion. It is important to note that the inferences use not only information given in the poem, but also "world-knowledge." This is not

[399] Phillips (2002:8-12).
[400] De (1960:2:197).

problematic on the Nyāya view of inference.[401] Indeed, the Naiyāyikas could assert that all of the genre information we have seen Mammaṭa rely on is part of the "world-knowledge" of a cultured person.

In his reply, Mammaṭa shows that the inferential process, as spelled out by the Nyāya philosophy, will not account for the suggested meaning, even in the chosen example. He does this by pointing out that the prover property is not invariably concomitant with the property to be proved.[402] He claims that the prover property can exist without the property to be prover: one can be afraid and still go, if strong motivation exists. Furthermore, the first rule of pervasion does not hold: a hero might be afraid of a dog, but not a lion. Finally, the woman speaking is not a reliable source of verbal knowledge, as she has motive to lie.

Mammaṭa adds a second critique. Not only are the "prover quality" and "quality to be proved" not invariably linked in poetry, they sometimes contradict each other. Let us consider the poem he cites;

> O false messenger!
> You know not the pain you bring.
> The sandal paste is washed clean off your rounded breasts,
> And the rouge from your lips is completely rubbed off.
> Gone is the makeup from the corners of your eyes,
> And your slender body still shakes.
> So you went for a bath in the tank,
> And not to be with that wretch?

---

[401] For a basic Nyāya presentation of inference see the *Tarkasaṅgraha* with the *Dīpikā* of Annaṃbhaṭṭa in Bhattacharya (1976:189ff).

[402] Mammaṭa is summarizing the arguments found in the *Dhanyāloka* 1.4b and Abhinava's comments thereon.

The poem affirms that the young woman has gone to bathe, but its suggested meaning is that she has gone to make love and not to bathe. Here the supposed prover proves its own negation; clearly not a desirable outcome. The same might be said for poem 57, in which the literal comparison suggests that the objects are incomparable.

Mammaṭa also discusses poems that suggest several mutually incompatible meanings and leave the reader in an intentional state of doubt as to which is intended (see poem 111, for example). Mammaṭa claims that part of the aesthetic pleasure of these poems is the unresolved ambiguity. This Naiyāyikas would be hard pressed to explain how this is possible within their system of inference for two reasons. First, if two alternative meanings could be inferred from the literal meaning, the speaker's intended meaning would normally be evoked to resolve the ambiguity. Second, two contrary effects (the suggested meanings) cannot be simultaneously produced by one cause (the literal meaning).

Although the defenders of suggestion do not convince all Naiyāyikas to adopt it, at least one famous late Naiyāyika, Jagannātha, did. Furthermore, they are generally credited with causing other late Naiyāyikas to expand their conception of "the speakers intended meaning" (*tātparyajñāna*), which, as we saw above, was introduced primarily to resolve instances of ambiguity.[403] Kunjunni Raja writes, "According to some of the later Naiyāyikas a general knowledge of the meaning intended by the speaker is an essential factor in all cases of verbal comprehension."[404] Indeed, the theory of suggestion and this

[403] Kunjunni Raja (1963:176-178 and 290-292).
[404] Kunjunni Raja (1963:176).

broad theory of the speaker's intended meaning cover much of the same theoretical territory.

This concludes the three chapters on suggestion. Chapter three treats suggestion from a linguistic perspective, chapter four explains how suggestion functions in poetry, and chapter five treats poetry of subordinate suggestion and defends suggestion against its critics. Thus Mammaṭa's investigation consists of theoretic presentation, classification of the subtypes and examples, and refutation of objections. With this completed, he briefly addresses poems without suggestion in the sixth chapter. Then he turns to poetic faults, excellences, and ornaments for the rest of the work.

atha ṣaṣṭha ullāsaḥ

iti kāvyaprakāśe śabdārthacitranirūpaṇaṃ nāma ṣaṣṭa ullāsaḥ |

Chapter Six

Definition of Poetry Based on Verbal or Semantic Display

***śabdārthacitraṃ yatpūrvaṃ kāvyadvayam udāhṛtam* |**

gunaprādhānyatas tatra sthitiś citrārthaśabdayoḥ* || *(1422)

na tu śabdacitre 'rthasyācitratvam arthacitre vā śabdasya |

48. The two types of poetry, that based of verbal display and that based on semantic display, have been mentioned before. A poem (as an example of) semantic or verbal display is established by a predominance of the one over the other.

It is not the case that in poetry based on semantic display there is no verbal display, or no semantic display in poetry based on verbal display.

Comments

This chapter deals with poems that excel formally rather than because of their suggestive content. Mammaṭa considers this the lowest type of poetry, and distinguishes two subtypes. The subtypes are distinguished by the nature of the most striking ornament. Sanskrit criticism divides poetic ornaments into verbal ornaments (e.g., alliteration) and semantic ornaments (e.g., metaphor). Mammaṭa points out that poems of one subtype do not always lack ornaments of the other subtype.

tathā coktam

> *rūpakādir alaṅkāras tasyānyair bahudhoditaḥ* |
> *na kāntam api nirbhūṣaṃ vibhāti vanitānanam* ||
> *rūpakādim alaṅkāraṃ bāhyam ācakṣate pare* |
> *supāṃ tiṅāṃ ca vyutpattiṃ vācāṃ vāñchanty alaṃkṛtim* ||
> *tad etad āhuḥ sauśabdyaṃ nārthavyutpattir īdṛśī* |
> *śabdābhidheyālaṅkārabhedādiṣṭaṃ dvayaṃ tu naḥ* ||

iti ||

The following has been said on this subject (by Bhāmaha):

> Some strongly maintain that metaphor, etc. are the ornaments of poetry.
> Even the beautiful face of a young woman does not shine without ornaments.
> Others maintain that metaphor, etc. are external to poetry,
> And that nouns and verbs, properly placed, are the ornaments of speech.
> It is this they call elegance of composition, elegance of meanings is not accepted.
> We accept both types of ornaments, semantic and verbal.[405]

[405] *Kāvyālaṅkāra* 1.13-15. I have used Śastry's translation, but changed it considerably (1970).

Comments

Mammaṭa takes up the two types of poetic ornaments in chapters nine and ten. He quotes the seventh century *Alaṅkāra* School critic Bhāmaha to justify the division of technically brilliant poems in this way.

śabdacitraṃ yathā

> *prathamam aruṇacchāyas tāvat tataḥ kanakaprabhas –*
> *tad anu virahottāmyattanvī kapolataladyutiḥ* |
> *udayati tato dhvāntadhvaṃsakṣamaḥ kṣaṇadāmukhe*
> *sarasabisinīkandacchedacchavirmṛgalāñchanaḥ* ||

(6.1.) An example of a poem based on verbal display:

> The moon first rises glowing red
> Then cools to a golden hue,
> Growing pale like the cheek of a slender woman
> pining her lover.
> At nightfall, like a lotus bulb, it shines a splendid white,
> Destroying the darkness. (139)[406]

Comments

The *Bālacittānuñjanī* commentary explains that the verbal display is based on the repetition of certain syllables, namely, *ma, ta, ka, dha, kṣa, sa,* and *ccha*. The well-conceived description of the moon's transformation as it rises is less striking than the difficult repetition.

[406] *Sarasvatīkaṇṭhābharaṇa* 1.27 (D).

This subtype indcludes poems that explicitly play with structure, e.g., poems that can be read forward and backward, poems in which an entire class of consonants is missing, poems arranged in a crossword-puzzle-like grid, etc. Indeed, the expression "verbal display" (*śabdacitra*) refers originally to poems that could be arranged in the form of a wheel with six spokes. Each of the first three lines was split to make the six spokes. Each spoke had to start with the same syllable, which made the hub of the wheel. Finally, the fourth line was written circularly outside the spokes. It had to contain the final syllables of all six spokes at even intervals.[407]

arthacitraṃ yathā

> *te dṛṣṭimātrapatitā api kasya nātra kṣobhāya pakṣmaladṛśāmalakāḥ khalāś ca* |
> *nīcāḥ sadaiva savilāsamalīkalagnā ye kālatāṃ kuṭilatām iva na tyajanti* ||

yady api sarvatra kāvye 'ntataḥ vibhāvādirūpatayaiva paryavasānam tathāpi sphuṭasya rasasyānupalambhād avyaṅgyam etat kāvyadvayam uktam | *atra ca śabdārthālaṅkārabhedād bahavo bhedāḥ te cālaṅkāranirṇaye nirṇeṣyante* ||

(6.2.) An example of a poem based on semantic display:

First Meaning	Common Meaning	Second Meaning
	Who is not agitated by	
The locks of her with beautiful eye lashes		Wicked people
	When they	

[407] Ingalls, et al. (1990:637).

Curl over the eyes | Are seen
Hanging low | To be cruel,
Lying gracefully on the front | Happily telling lies

And never abandoning

Their blackness | Their fraudulence

And their twisted nature?

(140)[408]

Even though all poetry depends upon the determinants of emotion, etc., these two types of poetry are said to be non-suggestive because there is no striking *rasa*.

There are many subcategories of poetry based on semantic and verbal display. These will be investigated during the investigation of poetic ornaments.

Comments

Poems of semantic display consist of witty puns or other surprising turns of meaning. According to Mammaṭa, there is nothing inherently flawed in punning, as we have seen in the previous chapters (e.g., poems 12, 54, 78). However, if semantic wit is all a poem has to offer, the poem is devalued. Mammaṭa objects to the poem because the punning does not suggest a *rasa*. He seems to read the poem as two separate strands of meaning that are cleverly combined without emotional connection.

One can read the poem differently, however. Almost all punning poems suggest the ornament of metaphor. One looks for points of comparison between the two strands of meaning. In this case the comparison can suggest that women (or at least their hair) are

[408] I am indebted to Jha's translation of the puns (1925:163).

deceptive and filled with evil intentions. This suggestion can easily be extended to suggest the erotic under the rubric of poems that deal with temptresses. Such a reading removes this poem from the category of semantic display by establishing that the suggestion is sufficiently striking.

As all poetry is said to depend on the determinants of emotion, etc., it follows that all poetry must involve the suggestion of an emotion which might be transformable either into a *rasa* or into some other aesthetic experience, as in devotional poetry, etc. Mammaṭa realizes this and says the third type of poetry is termed "non-suggestive" because the suggestion (of the *rasa*, etc.) never really surfaces. In other words, the three types of poetry form a continuum with different degrees of suggestiveness. In poems of technical brilliance, the suggestion of *rasa* has faded from being primary, through being secondary, into being unremarkable.

This concludes not only the shortest chapter of the *Kāvyaprakāśa*, but also Mammaṭa's presentation of the poetics of suggestion invented by Ānandavardhana. However, as Mammaṭa points out, poems of verbal and semantic display can be broken into many subtypes according to which poetic ornament is prominent. Rather than exploring the subtypes in the current chapter, Mammaṭa decides to do so while defining the poetic ornaments. He treats the verbal and semantic ornaments in chapters nine and ten, respectively. This strategy allows him to tie together the poetics of suggestion worked out in the first six chapters with the more traditional lists of flaws, excellences, and ornaments taken up in the final four.

Appendix - Corrections to the Mohan Text

Page	Line	Change from	Change to
33	1	bold text	plain text
41	4	dhāvākādīnām	dhāvakādīnām
63	1	bold text	plain text
81	1	bold text	plain text
81	9	indented text	plain text (see transliteration tactic #8)
145	2	apratīyamānartha	apratīyamānārtha
161	3	vyañjakasridhā	vyañjakastridhā
166	7	bold text	normal text
192	3	non-indented text	indented text
192	5	bhūd	bhūr
208	3	tathāpyanantyād	eliminate virāma under second y.
208	11	ḍitthādiśabdānam	ḍitthādiśabdānām
208	11	vaktrāyadṛcchayā	vaktrā yadṛcchayā
208	13	śuklakaś	śuklaś
291	5	sādhyavāsānā	sādhyavasānā
299	4	??āt	syāt
300	16	add two lines of text before ‘kvacit’	
300	17	avayayayavāyavibhāvāt	avayavāyavibhāvāt
345	4	saṃkititāḥ	saṃketitāḥ
347	2&3	bold text	plain text
372	8	bold text	plain text
372	9	ucyate	acyate
372	16-19	bold text	plain text
395	4&5	bold text	plain text
429	1&4	bold text	plain text

438	1	diṭhṭhiṃ	diṭṭhiṃ
438	2	kavālā	kavolā
438	2	diṭhṭhī	diṭṭhī
448	1	aṇollamaṇā	aṇaddamaṇā
452	2	ciṭhṭhasi	ciṭṭhasi
463	2	suppress daṇḍa at the end of line.	
463	4	śiroṃ 'śukamadhaḥ	śiroṃśukamadhaḥ
463	4	suppress daṇḍa at the end of line.	
513	6	vyangyabhidhāne	vyangyābhidhāne
513	6	text dropped?	
534	1	etaddvivṛṇvate	etadvivṛṇvate
534	3	upacitto	upacito
574	2	vyavahāraryair	vyavahāryair
574	11	śṛṅgaradiko	śṛṅgarādiko
667	5	varaṇasya	karaṇasaya
705	3	samīmakirīṭinām	sabhīmakirīṭinām
716	3	bhraṃśimiḥ	bhraṃśibhiḥ
718	3	jumupsā	jugupsā
738	2-3	delete indenting.	
738	7	mati	matir
768	9	trayaṃstraṃśadamī	trayaṃstraśadamī
789	2	normal text	bold text
806	4	kā	kaḥ
818	3	vilepanastaṭa	vilepanastanataṭa
818	5	ityukyate	ityukte
826	3	vaidaihī	vaidehī
830	1	kvākārya	kvākāryaṃ
934	9	masa	mama

988	6	eṣaṃ	evaṃ
1001	4	bhuaṇarujjapada	bhuaṇarajjapada
1017	9	mana	mama
1023	3	mumurmuhur	muhurmuhur
1030	1	bold text	normal text
1055	4	dhṛtā	dhṛto
1064	2	prānadayita	prānadayito
1064	6	likhinniti	likhanniti
1078	4	hata	hatāṃ
1078	4	eliminate the danda	
1088	2	dṛṣṭavā dṛṣṭavā	dṛṣṭvā dṛṣṭvā
1107	1	bold text	normal text
1129	2	eliminate the danda	
1143	2	bold text	normal text
1143	2	vācyasiddhyaṅgagam	vācyasiddhyaṅgam
1143	4	normal text	bold text
1219	3	tathā	ca vo[409]
1245	1	atibhūyaso	atibhūyasī
1245	4	dhvanesrayo	dhvanestrayo
1245	11	vyaṅgyaṃ	vyaṅgya
1258	1	atyantiraskṛta	atyantatiraskṛta
1277	2	add padārthaḥ before saṅketagocaraḥ (Jha & Dvivedi)	
1277	6	vākyārthantargato	Dvivedi (but not Jha) has vākyānantargato, which seems less likely.
1303	3		cut anusvāra near end of line.
1337	6	vācya vācakabhāva…	vācyavācakabhāvavyatirekeṇa
1337	9	pinākinaḥ	kapālinaḥ (see note in text)

[409] Grimal (1989:88).

1370	11	sā	mā
1370	13+	add two line of text found in Jha and Dwivedi.	
1394	12	viraddhopalabdhiḥ	viruddhopalabdhiḥ

Bibliography

Sanskrit Philosophy and Poetics: Texts and Translations

Abhinavagupta: see also Ānandavardhana and Bharata.
The Aesthetic Experience According to Abhinava, ed. & tr. Raniero Gnoli, Chowkhamba Sanstrit Series Office, Calcutta, 1968.
Aesthetic Rapture: The Rasādhyāya of the Nāṭyaśāstra, 2 vols., tr. Masson and Patwardhan, Deccan College Postgraduate & Research Institute, Poona, 1970.
"Abhinava's Aesthetics as a Speculative Paradigm," *Journal of the American Oriental Society,* 114.2, pp. 186-208, 1994.

Ānandavardhana
Ānandavardhana's Dhvanyāloka, ed. & tr. K. Krishnamoorty, Karnatak University, Dharwar, 1974.
The Dhvanyāloka of Ānandavardhana with Locana of Abhinavagupta, Harvard Oriental Series 49, tr. Ingalls, Masson & Patwardhan, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1990.

Annaṃbhaṭṭa
Tarkasaṅgraha-Dīpikā on Tarkasaṃgraha, translated and elucidated by Gopinath Bhattacharya, Progressive Publishers, Calcutta, 1976.

Appaya Dīkṣita
The Vṛttivārttika or Commentary on the Functions of Words of Appaya Dīkṣita, editied and translated by Edwin Gerow, America Oriental Series #87, American Oriental Society, New Haven, 2001.

Bhāmaha
Kāvyālaṅkāra of Bhāmaha, tr. Śastry, P. V. N., Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1970.

Bharata
Nāṭyaśāstra with the Abhinavabhāratī, 4 vols., ed. Manavalli Ramakrishna Kavi, Gaekwad's Oriental Series, Oriental Institute, Baroda, vol. 1, 1956: vol. 2, 1934: vol. 3, 1954: vol. 4, 1964.
Aesthetic Rapture: The Rasādhyāya of the Nāṭyaśāstra, 2 vols., tr. Masson and Patwardhan, Deccan College Postgraduate & Research Institute, Poona, 1970.
Nāṭyaśāstra, Vol 1, chaps. 1-27, ed. & tr. Manomohan Ghosh, Manisha Granthalaya, Calcutta, 1967.

Bhartṛhari

The Vākyapadīya, cantos 1 & 2, ed. & tr. Raghavan Pillai, Motilal Banarsidass, Varanasi, 1971.

Daṇḍin
Kāvyādarśaḥ, ed. and tr. K.Ray, Oriental Book Center, Delhi, 2004.

Gaṅgeśa
Tattvacintāmaṇi, vol.1, *pratyakṣa-khaṇḍa,* ed. Ramanuja Tatacharya. Kendriya Sanskrit Vidpeetha Series 20, Tirupati, 1972.

Gautama
Nyāyasūtra (Nyāyadarśanam). With four commentaries, the Nyāyasūtra-bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana, the Nyāyasūtra-vārttika of Uddyotakara, the Nyāyasūtravarttika-tātpāryaṭīkā of Vācaspati Miśra, and the Vṛtti of Viśvanātha, ed. A. M. Tarkatirtha, Taranatha Nyayatarkatirtha, and H. K. Tarkatirtha, Calcutta Sanskrit Series 18, 1936-44, reprint, Munshiram Manoharlal, New Delhi, 1985.
Nyāyadarśanam, with the Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana, 2nd edition, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Varanasi, 1970.
Nyāya Philosophy, Literal Translation of Gautama's Nyāya Sūtra &

Vātsyāyana's

Bhāṣya, tr. M. Gangopadhyaya, Indian Series, R. D. Press, Calcutta, 1972.

Jaimini
Śrīmajjaiminipraṇīte Mīmāṃsādarśane, vol. 1 & 2, ed. Mahādeva Cimaṇājī Āpaṭe Ānandāśrama, Mudraṇālaye 1970.
Śabarabhāśya, translated into English, vol. 1, tr. Ganganatha Jha, Oriental Institute, Baroda, 1973.

Jagannātha
Rasagaṅgādhara, tr. Dhananjaya Bhanja, Bharatiya Kala Prakashan, Delhi, 2004.

Kumārila
Ślokavārtikaṭīkā, ed. Dr. C. Kunhan Raja, Universatiy of Madras, Madras 1946.
Ślokavārtika, translated from the original Sanskrit, tr. Ganganatha Jha, Śri Satguru, India, 1900.
Tantravārttika, AAS 97, Poona, 1937.

Mammaṭa
Kāvyaprakāśa, vol. 1-4, ed. Jyotsnā Mohan, Nag Publishers, Delhi 1995.

Kāvyaprakāśa, ed. Vāsudev Śāstrī Abhyaṅkar, *Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series #66,* Ānandāśrama Press, Poona, 1929.
Kāvyaprakāśa of Mammaṭa, tr. Ganganatha Jha, Indian Press, Allahabad, 1925.
Kāvyaprakāśa of Mammaṭa, First, Second, Third & Tenth Ullāsas, tr A.B. Gajendragadkar, Popular Prakashan, Bombay, 1939.
The Poetic Light, Vol 1&2*,* tr. R. C. Dwivedi, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1977.

Śabara: see Jaimini.

Uddyotakara: see Gautama.

Vācaspati Miśra: see Gautama.

Vātsyāyana: see Gautama.

Visvanātha
The Mirror of Composition, being a Translation of the Sāhitya-Darpana of Visvanātha Kavirāja, tr. Mitra & Ballantyne, Baptist Mission Press, Calcutta, 1875.

Sanskrit Literature: Texts and Translations

Amaru
Erotic Love Poems from India, tr. A. Schelling, Shambhala, Boston, 2004.
Hundred Verses, in *Love Lyrics by Amaru, Bhartṛhari, and Bilhaṇa,* tr. G. Bailey, New York University Press and the JJC Foundation, New York, 2005.

Bhāllata
The Hundred Allegories, in *Three Satires, Nīlakaṇṭha, Kṣemendra & Bhallaṭa*, tr. S. Vasudeva, New York University Press and the JJC Foundation, New York, 2005.

Bhartṛhari
Politics, Passion, and Disenchantment, in *Love Lyrics by Amaru, Bhartṛhari, and Bilhaṇa,* tr. G. Bailey, New York University Press and the JJC Foundation, New York, 2005.

Bhaṭṭa Nārāyaṇa
Veṇīsaṃhāra, ed. and tr. M. R. Kale, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1936.

Bhavabhūti

Mahāvīracarita, ed. and tr. F. Grimal, Institut Français de Pondichéry, Pondichéry, 1989.

Bhilaṇa
The Fifty Stanzas of a Thief, in *Love Lyrics by Amaru, Bhartṛhari, and Bilhaṇa,* tr. R. Gombrich, New York University Press and the JJC Foundation, New York, 2005.

Daṇḍin
What Ten Young Men Did, tr. I. Onians, New York University Press and the JJC Foundation, New York, 2005.

Hāla
Das Saptacatakam des Hala, ed. and tr. A. Weber, reprint of the 1881 text by Kraus, Nendeln, Liechtenstein, 1966.
Gāhākosa (Gāthāsaptaśati) with Sanskrit Commentary of Bhuvanapāla, ed. and tr. M.V. Patwardhan, Vol. 1, Prakrit Text Society, Ahmedabad, 1980. Vol. 2, B.L. Institute of Indology, Delhi, 1988.
The Homely Touch, Selections from the Sattasai, tr. J. Roberts, Mazda Publisher, Lexington, KY. 1986.

Kālidāsa
The Birth of Kumāra, tr. David Smith, New York University Press and the JJC Foundation, New York, 2005.
Kumārasaṃbhava, tr. M. R. Kale, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1967.
Malāvikāgnimitra, tr. M. R. Kale, Rashtra Vaibhav Press, Bombay, 1968.
Malāvikāgnimitra, tr. M. R. Kale, Booksellers Publishing Co, Bombay, no date.
Śakuntalā, in *Three Sanstrit Plays,* tr. M. Coulson, Penguin Books, New York, 1981.

Kṣemendra
The Grace of Guile, in *Three Satires, Nīlakaṇṭha, Kṣemendra & Bhallaṭa*, tr. S. Vasudeva, New York University Press and the JJC Foundation, New York, 2005.

Nilakantha
Mockery of the Kali Era, in *Three Satires, Nīlakaṇṭha, Kṣemendra & Bhallaṭa*, tr. S. Vasudeva, New York University Press and the JJC Foundation, New York, 2005.

Śūdraka
The Little Clay Cart, An English Translation of the Mṛcchakaṭika, tr. A. L. Basham, State University of New York Press, Albany, 1994.

Vidyākara
The Subhāṣitaratnakoṣa, ed. Kosambi and Gokhale, Harvard Oriental Series 42,

Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1957.
An Anthology of Sanskrit Poetry, Vidyākara's "Subhāṣitaratnakoṣa", tr. D. Ingalls, Harvard Oriental Series 44, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1965.

Translation from Greek and Latin

Aristotle
Poetics, tr. Gerald Else, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1967.

Horace
The Essential Horace, Odes, Epodes, Satires, and Epistles, tr. B. Raffel, North Point Press, San Francisco, 1983.
Horace for Students of Literature, tr. L. Golden, University of Florida Press, Gainsville, 1995.

Plato
Ion, tr. Lane Cooper in *The Collected Dialogues of Plato*, ed. Hamilton and Cairns, Bollingen Series LXXI, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1961.
Laws, tr. Benjamin Jowett in *The Dialogues of Plato,* 4th edition, Clarendon Press, Cambridge 1953.
Plato's Republic, tr. Grube, Hackett, Indianapolis, 1974.
The Republic of Plato, tr. Allan Bloom, Basic Books, New York, 1968.
Republic, tr. Benjamin Jowett in *The Dialogues of Plato,* 4th edition, Clarendon Press, Cambridge 1953.
The Statesman, tr. Benjamin Jowett in *The Dialogues of Plato,* 4th edition, Clarendon Press, Cambridge 1953.
The Statesman, tr. J.B. Skemp in *The Collected Dialogues of Plato*, ed. Hamilton and Cairns, Bollingen Series LXXI, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1961.

Chinese Texts and Translations

Hanshan
Cold Mountain, 100 poems by the T'ang poet Han-shan, tr. Burton Watson, Columbia University Press, New York, 1970.

Japanese Texts and Translations

Basho
Bashō and His Interpreters, Selected Hokko with Commentary, tr. Makoto Ueda,

Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1991.
The Essential Haiku, Versions of Bashō, Busan, and Issa, tr. and edited by Robert Hass, The Ecco Press, New Jersey, 1994.

Busan
The Essential Haiku, Versions of Bashō, Busan, and Issa, tr. and edited by Robert Hass, The Ecco Press, New Jersey, 1994.

Chōmei
The Ten Foot Square Hut, tr, A.L. Sadler, Charles E. Tuttle Co. Rutland, Vt. *
Notebook of a Ten Square Rush-Mat Sized World, tr. Rowe and Kerrigan,
The Dolmen Press, Dublin, Irland, 1979

Issa
The Essential Haiku, Versions of Bashō, Busan, and Issa, tr. and edited by Robert Hass, The Ecco Press, New Jersey, 1994.

Sanskrit Dictionaries

Abhyankar, Kashinath Vasudev
A Dictionary of Sanskrit Grammar, Oriental Institute, Baroda, 1977.

Apte, Vaman Shivaram
A Practical Sanskrit-English Dictionary, Motilal Banarsidas, Delhi, 1998.

MacDonell, A. A.
A Practical Sanskrit Dictionary, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1963.

Sir Monier-Williams
A Sanskrit-English Dictionary, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1899.

Modern Language Works on the Sanskrit Tradition

Amaldass, Anand
1984 *Philosophical Implications of Dhvani,* Gerold & Co. Vienna.

Bhattacharya, Shashthi Prasad
1976 *Śanta Rasa and its Scope in Literature*, Sanskrit College, Calcutta.

Chari, V.K.
1990 *Sanskrit Criticism,* University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu.

Coomaraswamy, Ananda K.
1956 *The Transformation of Nature in Art,* reprint. Dover, New York.

De, Sushil Kumar
1960 *History of Sanskrit Poetics,* 2nd edition, Mukhopadhyay, Calcutta.

De & Dasgupta
1977 *A History of Sanskrit Literature,* University of Calcutta Press, Calcutta.

Dimock, Gerow, Niam, Ramanujan, Roadarmel, and van Buitenen
1974 *The Literatures of India, An Introduction*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.

Dravid, Raja Ram
1972 *Universals in Indian Philosophy,* Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi.

Gerow, Edwin
1971 *A Glossary of Indian Figures of Speech*, Mouton, The Hague, Paris.
13. *Indian Poetics,* Otto Harrassowitz, Weisbaden.
1984 "Language and Symbol in Indian Semiotics," *Philosophy East and West,* 34.3, pp. 245-260.
1994 "Abhinava's Aesthetics as a Speculative Paradigm," *Journal of the American Oriental Society,* 114.2, pp. 186-208.

Gnoli, Raniero
1968 Introduction and notes to, *The Aesthetic Experience According to Abhinava,* Chowkhamba Sanstrit Series Office, Calcutta.

Herzberger, Radhika
1986 *Bhartṛhari and the Buddhists,* D. Reidel Publishing Co., Dordrecht.

Ingalls, Danial H.
1954 "A Sanskrit Poetry of Village and Field: Yogeśvara and his fellow Poets," *Journal of American Oriental Society* #74 (119-131), New Haven.
1962 "Words for Beauty in Classical Sanskrit," *Indological Studies in Honor of W. Norman Brown,* ed. E. Bender, American Oriental Series 47, New Haven.
1965 Introduction to, *An Anthology of Sanskrit Poetry,* Harvard Oriental Series 44, Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
1990 Introduction and notes to*, The Dhvanyāloka of Ānandavardhana with Locana*

of Abhinavagupta, tr. Ingalls, Masson & Patwardhan, Harvard Oriental Series 49, Harvard University Press, Cambridge.

Kane, P.V.
1961 *History of Sanskrit Poetics,* 3rd Edition, Motilal Banaridass, Delhi.

Krishnamoorty, K.
1944 "The Doctrine of Doṣas in Sanskrit Poetics," *Indian Historical Quarterly,* Calcutta.

Kunjunni Raja, K.
1963 *Indian Theories of Meaning,* Adyar Library Series 91, Adyar Library and Research Center, Madras.

Lienhard, Siegfried
1984 *A History of Classical Poetry, Sanskrit – Pali – Prakrit,* Otto Harrassowitz, Wiebaden.

Lahiri, P.C.
1974 *Concepts of Rīti and Guṇa in Sanskrit Poetics,* The University of Dacca, Dacca, 1937; reprinted by Oriental Books Reprint Co., New Delhi.

MacDonell, A. A.
1899 *A History of Sanskrit Literature*, 3rd Indian Edition (1972), Munshiram Manoharlal, New Dehli.
1927 *India's Past, A Survey of her Literatures, Religions, Languages and Antiquities*, Clarendon Press, Oxford.

Masson, J.L.
1969 Who Killed Cock Krauñca? Abhinavagupta's Reflections on the Origin of Æsthetic experience," *Journal of the Oriental Institute of Baroda* 18 (207-224), Baroda.
16. "Imagination vs. Effort" *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 1 (296-299), ed. B.K. Matilal, D.Reidel Publishing Co., Dordrecht.
1977 Introduction to, *Sanskrit Love Poetry,* Columbia University Press, New York.

Masson and Patwardhan
1. *Śantarasa and Abhinavagupta's Philosophy of Aesthetics,* Bhandarkar Oriental Series 9, BORI, Poona.
1970 Introduction and notes to *Aesthetic Rapture: The Rasādhyāya of the Nāṭyaśāstra,* 2 vols., Deccan College Postgraduate & Research Institute.

Matilal, B.K.
1971 *Epistemology, Logic, and Grammar in Indian Philosophical Analysis,* Mouton, The Hague.
1985 *Logic, Language, and Reality,* Motilal Banasidass, Delhi.
1986 *Perception,* Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Merwin and Masson
1977 *Sanskrit Love Poetry,* Columbia University Press, New York.

Mukherji, Ramaranjan
1998 *Global Aesthetics and Sanskrit Poetics*, Rashtriya Sanskrit Sanstan, Delhi.

Pandey, Kanti Chandra
1959 *Comparative Aesthetics Vol. 1, Indian Aestheics,* Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, Varnasi.

Phillips, Stephen H.
1995 *Classical Indian Metaphysics,* Open Court, Chicago.
2002 *Gaṅgeśa on the Upādhi*, Indian Council of Philosophical Research, New Delhi.

Porcher, Marie-Claude
1978 *Figures de Style en Sanskrit, Théories des Alaṅkāraśāstra, Analyse de Poèmes de Veṅkaṭādhvarin,* Institut de Civilisation Indienne, Paris.

Potter, Karl
1987 *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophy,* Vol. IV, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi.

Raghavan, V.
1942 *Some Concepts of the Alaṅkāraśāstra*, The Adyar Library, Adyar, Madras
1967 *The Number of Rasas,* Adyar Library Series 23, Adyar, Madras.
1978 *Bhoja's Śṛṅāra Prakāśa*, Vasanta Press, Madras.
1988 *The Concept of the Beautiful in Sanskrit Literature*, The Kuppuswami Sastri Research Institute, Madras.

Raja, K. Kunjunni
1969 *Indian Theories of Meaning,* 2nd edition, Adyar Library and Research Center, Madras.

Ramanujan, A.K.
1967 *The Interior Landscape, Love poems from a Classical Tamil Anthology,* Indiana University Press, Bloomington and London.

1973 *Speaking of Śiva,* Penguin Books, Harmondsworth.
1999 *The Collected Essays of A. K. Ramanujan,* ed. Dharwadker, Oxford University Press, New Delhi.

Ramulu, A.
1995 *A Study of Differences Between Bhatta and Prabhakara Schools (Mimamsa),* Sri Rama Nama Ksetram, Jagadevpur.

Renou, Luois
1957 *Terminologie Grammaticale du Sanskrit,* Librairie Ancienne, Paris.

Russell, D. A. and Winterbottom, M.
1972 *Ancient Literary Criticism,* Clarendon Press, Oxford.

Selby, Martha Ann
2000 *Grow Long, Blessed Night*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Shastri, Dharmendra Nath
1964 *Critique of Indian Realism*, Agra University, Agra.

Shukla, Chitra P.
1977 *Treatment of Alaṃkāras in Rasagaṅgādhara,* Sardar Patel University.

Swaroop, Sharda
The Role of Dhvani in Sanskrit Poetics, Banaras Hindu University Press, Banaras (information uncertain due to the condition of the only copy I could obtain).

Vasudeva, Somadeva
2005 *Three Satires, Nīlakaṇṭha, Kṣemendra & Bhallaṭa*, New York University Press and the JJC Foundation, New York.

Verpoorten, Jean-Marie
1978 *Mīmāṃsā Literature,* Otto Harrassowitz, Weisbaden.

Modern Language Works on the Greek & Roman Philosophic Tradition

Brink, C.O.
1971 *Horace on Poetry, Vol. 2, The 'Ars Poetica'*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Hardison, O.B.
1995 *Horace for Students of Literature*, University of Florida Press, Gainsville.

Ross, Sir David
1923 *Aristotle,* University Paperbacks, Methuen, London.

Randall, John, H. Jr.
1960 *Aristotle,* Columbia University Press, New York.

Veatch, Henry B.
1974 *Aristotle: A Contemporary Appreciation,* Indiana University Press, Bloomington.

White, Nicholas, P.
14. *A Companion to Plato's Republic,* Hackett, Indianapolis.

Modern Language Works on the Western Philosophic Tradition

Abrams, M.H.
1983 *The Mirror and the Lamp: Romantic Theory and the Critical Tradition,* Oxford.
1989 *Doing Things with Texts: Essays in Criticism and Critical Theory,* W.W. Norton & Co.

Beardsley, M.C.
1966 *Aesthetics from Classical Greece to the Present,* Macmillian, New York.
1975 *Thinking Straight,* 4th ed., Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.

Cioran, E.M.
1949 *Précis de Décomposition*, Gallimard, Paris.

Danto, Arthur
1997 *After the End of Art, Contemporary Art and the Pale of History,* Princeton University Press, Princeton.

Davidson, Donald
1978 "What Metaphors Mean" reprinted in *The Philosophy of Language,* Oxford University Press, Oxford 1985, pages 438-449.

Gombrich, E.H.

1966 *Norm and Form: Studies in the Art of the Renaissance,* Phaidon, London.
1999 *The Use of Images: Studies in the Social Function of Art and Visual Communication,* Phaidon, London.

Hume, David
1978 "On the Standard of Taste" in *Essays: Moral, Political, and Literary,* Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Martinich, A.P.
1984 "A Theory for Metaphor," *Journal of Literary Semantics,* 13 (1984), 35-56, Julius Grooss Verlag, Heidelberg.

Russell & Winterbottom
1972 *Ancient Literary Criticism,* Clarendon Press, Oxford.

Searle, John R.
1979 "Metaphor," reprinted in *The Philosophy of Language,* Oxford University Press, Oxford 1985, pages 416-437.

Modern Language Works on the East Asian Tradition

Harrist, Robert E.
1965 *Painting and the Private Life in Eleventh-Century China: Mountain Villa by Li Gonglin,* Princeton University Press, Princeton.

Modern Language Works on Translation

Raffel, Burton
1968 *The Art of Translating Poetry,* The Pennsylvania University Press, University Park.
1983 Introduction to *The Essential Horace, Odes, Epodes, Satires, and Epistles*, North Point Press, San Francisco.

Ramanujan, A.K.
1973 *Speaking of Śiva*, Penguin Books, Baltimore.

Young, David
1997 "Second Honeymoon: Some Thoughts on Translation," in *A Field Guide to Contemporary Poetry and Poetics,* Longman, New York and London.

VITA

Alexander Havemeyer Catlin was born in Greenwich, Ct. on June eight, 1969, the son of Susan Johnson Catlin and Loring Catlin. After completing his work at Choate Rosemary Hall, Connecticut, in 1987, he entered Trinity University in San Antonio, Texas. During the years of 1990 to 1992 he attended the Université de France, Aix-en-Provence. He received the degree of D.E.U.G. de Philosophie in May, 1992. After returning to the U.S.A., he received the degree of Bachelor of Arts from Trinity University in December, 1992. In August, 1994, he entered The Graduate School at the University of Texas at Austin. He received the degree of Master of Arts in May, 2000.

Permanent Address: 4406 Duval St.
Austin Tx. 78751

This dissertation was typed by the author.